response essay of roughly 250-500 words

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cont._issues_in_bioethics_response__4--345-394.pdf.pdf

344 R E

P R

O D

U C

T IO

N

N or need the peison believe that only perfect individu-

als ought to exist A n individual can lationally decide

to abort a fetus w ith a genetic defect w

hile nevertheless b e lie

vin g th

a t p

e lso

n s w

ith d

lsa b ih

tie s a

re o

f e q u a l

w orth if he believes that fetuses (or at least fetuses up

to and including the stage at w hich the abortion is pel-

foim ed) are not persons and hence do not have the

rights and equal m oial status of pelsons

T o believe that it is pelm

lsslble to avoid a serious dlsabihty by selective abom

on one need not beheve that Individuals w

ith that disability ought not to be born A

ll that is necessary is the belief that the fetus h a s n

o rig

h t to

b e b

o rn

F u rth

e rm

o re

, o n e ca

n --a

n d

m any people appatently do--consistently believe both

that fetuses, w hethei they w

ill have disabilities or not, have no right to be born (because they are not per- sons) w

hile believing that all persons, including those w

ith d

lsa b lh

tie s, h

a ve

a lig

h t to

e xist, a

n d h

e n ce

a nght not to be killed, because they are peisons

S im

ilarly, there is nothing inconsistent O l m

otlva- tio

n a lly in

co h e re

n t a

b o u t b

e lie

vin g th

a t o

n e o

u g h t

not bllng a disabled child into the w orld and believ-

in g th

a t it is n

o t th

e ca

se th

a t in

d ivid

u a ls w

ith d

is- abilities ought not to be boln. (S

om eone can believe

that she ought not to m arry w

ithout believing that m

aiilages ought not to occur.) P

erhaps those w ho advance the expresslvlst algu-

m e n t w

ill still n o t b

e co

n vin

ce d o

f o u r re

b u tta

l. T h e

appeal of the argum ent is its sim

phclty Thus a peison w

h o h

e rse

lf h a s a

d isa

b ility, im

p a tie

n t w

ith th

e su

b -

tleties and halr-sphttm g of the plecedlng argum

ents, m

ight leply:

tlve, w e are com

m itted to the judgm

ent that m the

the w orld should not include so m

any disabilities and !ÿ hence so m

any individuals w ith dlsabilitm

s. B ut it is not

the people w ith the dlsabllitm

s that w e devalue, it is the

dIsablhtm s them

selves W e do not w

ish to reduce the num

ber of people w ith disabilities by taking the life of

any individual w ho has a disability.

D e

va lu

m g

D tsa

b th

tie s, N

o t P

e o

p le

w ith

D isa

b ilitie

s W

e devalue dlsabllm es because w

e value the oppoltu- nItles and w

elfale of the people w ho have them

A nd

it IS because w

e value people, all people, that w e care

about lim itations on theal w

elfare and oppoxtunihes. W

e also know that dlsabxhtles as such dim

im sh oppor-

tunities and w elfaae, even w

hen they ale not so severn that the lives of those w

ho have them am

not w orth

livin g , a

n d e

ve n if th

o se

in d ivid

u a ls d

o n

o t h

tm a lly

su ffe

r a s a

le su

lt o f th

e ir d

isa b

lh tie

s. T h

u s th

e m

is nothing m

atlonal, m otivatlonally Incoherent, or disin-

genuous in saying that w e devalue the disabilities and

w ish to ieduce theil incidence w

hile valuing existing pm

sons w ith dlsabilm

es, and that w e value them

the sam

e as those w ho do not have disablhties.

M oieovei, even if It w

ele assum ed that fetuses are

persons and that hence kllhng them to leduce the inci-

dence of disabilities is m orally indlstingm

shable from extm

im natm

g & sabled chlldien and adults, this w

ould

h a

ve n

o n

e g

a tive

im p

lica tio

n s fo

i th e

o th

e r th

re e

m o

d e

s o f g

e n

e tic ln

te lve

n tlo

n to

a vo

id d

isa b

lh tIe

s N

one of these involves killing a fetus, so none can be descilbed as kllhng a peison, even if w

e assum e that

fetuses ale pm sons T

herefore endoism g these m

odes of reducing disabilities need not expiess and does not

presuppose the judgm ent that existing individuals w

ith disabihtles have no right to hve

T o lepeat A

dvocating the foulth m ode of interven-

tion (selective aboltlon) is tantam ount to saying that

people hke you (w ho have disabilities) have no right

to e

xist o n

ly o n

th e

h ig

h ly co

n tio

ve isla

l a ssu

m p

tio n

that fetuses are pelsons O pting for the first, second,

and thnd m odes of intervention has no im

plications at a ll fo

r th e w

o lth

in e ss o

r u n w

o rth

in e ss o

f "& sa

b le

d lives," legm

dless of w hich vm

w of the m

oral status of fetuses is conect W

hat appeared to be a distinctive

objection to a new technology turns out to be a fam

ll- im

objection to the age-old practice of aboitlon. N

one of this is to deny that som e m

em bers of the

disabihtles com m

um ty m

e genuinely offended by w hat

they take to be the m isplaced zeal to harness the pow

ers of science to pievent disabihtIes G

ranted the sham eful

hlstoly of dlscrinunatlon against and insensltiV W

tow ard

p e rso

n s w

ith d

isa b ilitie

s, th e u ta

kin g o

ffe n se

is p e i-

fectly understandable H ow

ever, it is one thing to say that certm

n behavIol is offensive to a partlculm group,

and qm te anothei to say that the fact that the group is

offended constitutes a violation of anyone's nghts. In geneial, a hbeial som

ety cannot count the occm -

rence of offense, as distinct from rights violations, as a

sufficient glound for cm talllng liberty, w

hether it is the hbelty of a pelson to choose a surgical proceduIe that w

ill cure her ow n paraplegia O

l that of her child, or the llbm

ty of a researchel to tiy to develop a techm que for

preventing a genetically based im pairm

ent

S um

m a13, of R

esponse to E xptessivtst O

bJection It m

a y b

e u

se fu

l a t th

ÿs p o

in t to

su m

m a

rize th

e m

a re

points of our com plex discussion of the explessivist

aIgum ent against genetic intelventlon T

o be sound, the argum

ent eathel m ust show

that it is m otivation-

ally im possible or m

ational both to devalue and seek to

a vo

id d

lsa b

lh tm

s w h

ile a

t th e

sa m

e tim

e va

lu in

g equally individuals w

ho have dlsabahtaes or it m ust

defend the view that fetuses am

persons, w ith all the

lghts that pelsons have, and that avoiding disabditm s

by abol tm g fetuses w

ith disabihtles is the m oxal equiv-

alent of reducing the incidence of disabilities by exter- m

inating disabled chil& en and adults

T h

e first a

lte in

a tlve

is u n

co n

vin cin

g . T

h e

ie a

re m

a n

y in sta

n ce

s in w

h ich

w e

d e

va lu

e (a

n d

se e

k to a

vo id

) ce lta

m ch

a la

cte rista

cs th a

t so m

e in

d ivid

u a

ls h

a ve

w ith

o u

t d e

va lm

n g

in d

ivid u

a ls w

h o

h a

ve th

e m

. T

h e

se co

n d

a lte

rn a

tive co

m e

s a t a

ste e

p p

rice N

o t

o n ly m

u st th

e d

isa b lh

tie s rig

h ts a

d vo

ca te

a m

cu la

te and defend an account of pm

sonhood that show s that

fetuses ale pm sons, he m

ust also acknow ledge that

the fundam ental m

ror of those w ho advocate selective

abortion to avoid dlsabilitm s is not that they devalue

in d

ivid u

a ls w

ith d

isa b

ilitie s b

u t th

a t th

e y fa

ll to recognize that fetuses, w

hether disabled ol not, are pm

sons. T he aIgum

ent, then, w ould have nothing to

do w ith disabilities as such

R ecall, how

ever, that to say that it is perrm ssible to

avoid dlsabihtles by genetic Interventions is not to say that w

e ought to seduce the incidence of dlsabihties, m

uch less that disabled pelsons ought not to exist .... [W

e] have aigued [elsew hele] that there can be obhga-

tions of justice, as w ell as obligations to w

event harm ,

that iequne genetic intelventlons F rom

this ÿm sD

ec-

N o analysis of the possible m

otives O l of the coherence of

the possible ieasons for pleventm g &

sablhtles can erase one sH

nple fact W hen you endorse the use of genetlc science to

pievent dÿsablllhes, you ate saying that people hke m e ought

not to exist A nd w

hen you say that people hke m e ought

n o

t to e

xist, yo u

d e

va lu

e m

e In

th e

m o

st fu n

d a

m e

n ta

l a n

d thieatenlng w

ay Im aginable Y

oui conceptm n of the value

of hum an hfe denm

s that m y hfe, im

perfect as it is m youl

eyes, has value

The Problem of Justifying Abortion

D O

N M

A R

Q U

IS

W hy A

bortion Is Im m

oral

D onald M

arqm s, professor of philosophy at the U

m verslty of K

ansas, has m ain-

tam ed acm

, e interests in the history of ethics as w ell as problem

s of aboruon, social ethics, and research ethm

s R epresentative publications include "Leaÿ,m

g T

h e ra

p y to

C h a n ce

A n h

n p a sse

m th

e E

th ics o

f R a n d o lm

ze d C

h n ica

l T ria

ls," T

he H astings C

ente) R e])ott, "A

n E thm

al P roblem

C onceInIng R

ecent T herapeutic

R esearch on B

reast C ancer," H

ypatÿa, and "F oul" V

ersions of D ouble E

ffect," The Jouÿ hal of M

e&cm e and Phdosophy

T he vm

w that abortion is, w

ith iare exceptions, seri- ously im

m olal has iecelved little suppoIt in the xecent

philosophical htm ature. N

o doubt m ost phllosophm

s

From Journal of Phdosophy 86, no 4 (Apnt 1989), 183-202

F o o tn

o te

s m n u m

b e re

d

affihated w ith secular restitutions of hlghel education

believe that the anti-aboitlon position ts elthm a sym

p- tom

of irrational lehglous dogm a ol a conclusion gen-

erated by seriously confused philosophical argum ent.

T he purpose of this essay is to undelm

m e this genelal

belief. T his essay sets out an algum

ent that purpoits

J+ -l-ÿ Jtx.Jlÿg X

\'ÿ'Lt tJ ÿ I IÿIN

to show , as w

ell as any argum ent in ethics can show

, that abortion is, except possibly In Iare cases, sei1- o u sly Im

m o ra

l, th a t it is In

th e sa

m e m

o ra

l ca te

g o ly

as killing an Innocent adult hum an being.

T h e a

rg u m

e n t is b

a se

d o

n a

m a jo

I a ssu

m p tio

n .

M any of the m

ost Insightful and caieful w ritels on the

e th

ics o f a

b o rtio

n . . b

e lie

ve th

a t w

h e th

e i o

r n o t

a b o rtio

n is m

o la

lly p e tm

Issib le

sta n d s o

1 " fa

lls o n

w hether ol not a fetus IS

the sort of being w hose life

It is se iio

u sly w

ro n g to

e n d T

h e a

rg u m

e n t o

f th is

essay w ill assum

e, but not argue, that they are correct. A

lso, this essay w ill neglect Issues of great im

por- tance to a com

plete ethics of aboation S om

e antiaboi- tlo

m sts w

ill a llo

w th

a t ce

rta in

a b

o itlo

n s, su

ch a

s aboltlon before Im

plantation or aboltion w hen the life

of a w om

an is threatened by a pIegnancy oi abortion a fte

r la p e , m

a y b

e m

o ra

lly p e lm

a sslb

le T

h is e

ssa y

w all not exploie the casuistry of these hard cases. T

he purpose of this essay IS

to develop a general argum ent

for the claim that the overw

helm ing m

ajority of delib- erate aboltions ale seriously Im

m oral .

I P

assions in the aboition debate m n high. T

here are both plauslblhtles and difficulties w

ith the standard positions A

ccordingly, it is haldly sm pnsm

g that pam

sans of either side em brace w

ith fervor the m oral

g e n e ra

h za

tlo n s th

a t su

p p o it th

e co

n clu

sio n s th

e y

pleanalytlcally favor, and reject w ith disdain the

m o ra

l g e n e ra

liza tio

n s o

f th e u o

p p o n e n ts a

s b e in

g subject to Inescapable difficulties. It as easy to beheve that the counterexam

ples to one's ow n m

oral pnncl- ples are m

erely tem poraiy difficulties that w

all dis- so

lve in

th e

w a

ke o

f fm th

e l p

h d

o so

p h

lca l le

se a

rch ,

a n d th

a t th

e co

u n te

re xa

m p le

s to th

e p

rin cip

le s o

f o n e 's o

p p o n e n ts a

ie a

s stra lg

h tfo

iw a rd

a s th

e co

n -

tra d

ictio n b

e tw

e e

n A

a n

d O

p Io

p o sitio

n s m

tIa d

l- tIo

n a

l lo g

ic T h

is m ig

h t su

g g

e st to

a n

lm p

a m

a l

observe1 (if thele are any) that the aboltion issue is unIesolvable

T here is a w

ay out of this apparent dialectical quandm

y The m oial generalizations of both redes are

n o t q

u ite

co rre

ct T h e g

e n e la

liza tio

n s h

o ld

fo r th

e m

ost pait, for the usual cases. T his suggests that they

a re

a ll a

ccid e

n ta

l g e

n e

ra liza

tio n

s, th a

t th e

m o

ra l

claim s m

ade by those on both redes of the dispute do not touch on the essence of the m

atter T

his use of the dIstm ctm

n betw een essence and

accident is not m eant to Invoke obscm

e m etaphysical

ca te

g o rie

s. R a th

e r, it is in

te n d e d to

re fle

ct th e rÿ

atheoretical nature of the aboItion discussion. If the? generalization a pat tisan In the aborhon dispute adopts w

ere derived from the reason w

hy ending the life of a h

u m

a n b

e in

g IS

w ro

n g , th

e n th

e le

co u ld

n o t b

e exceptions to that geneiahzation unless som

e special case obtains in w

hich there are even m ore pow

erful countervailing reasons S

uch generalizations W ould

not be m elely accidental generalizations; they W

ould point to, or be based upon, the essence of the w

rong, ness of killing, w

hat it is that m akes kllhng w

rong. A

ll this suggests that a necessary condition of resolv- in

g th

e a

b o

rtio n

co n

tro ve

rsy is a m

o re

th e

o re

tica l

account of the w Iongness of killing A

ftel all, if w e

m erely beheve, but do not understand, w

hy killing adult hum

an beings such as om selves is w

rong, how co

u ld

w e co

n ce

iva b ly sh

o w

th a t a

b o ltio

n is e

ith e r

im m

olal or perm issible9

II In oider to develop such an account, w

e can stair from the follow

ing unproblem atlc assum

phon concerning our ow

n case: It is w rong to kill us W

hy as it w long?

S om

e answ ers can be easily elim

inated. It m ight be

said that w hat m

akes kllhng us w rong is that a killing

brutahzes the one w ho kills B

ut the brutahzation con- sJsts of being inuied to the perform

ance of an act that is hideously im

m oral; hence, the brutahzatlon does

not explain the lm m

orahty. It m ight be said that w

hat m

akes kilhng us w rong is the gleat loss others w

ould expeiaence due to our absence. A

lthough such hubris is u

n d

e lsta

n d

a b

le , su

ch a

n e

xp la

n a

tio n

d o

e s n

o t

account for the w rongness of killing herrm

ts, or those w

h o

se h

ve s a

re a

e la

tive ly in

d e

p e

n d

e n

t a n

d w

h o

se friends find ÿt easy to m

ake new friends.

A m

o le

o b w

o u s a

n sw

e J is b

e tte

r W h a t p

rim a rily

m a

ke s killin

g w

ro n

g is n

e lth

e l its e

ffe ct o

n th

e m

u i-

d e le

r n o a its e

ffe ct o

n th

e vich

m 's frie

n d s a

n d re

la -

tives, but its effect on the victim . T

he loss of one's life is one of the gieatest losses one can suffer. T

he loss of one's hfe deprives one of all the experiences, activ- ihes, plojects, and enjoym

ents that w ould otherw

ise have constituted one's future. T

herefore, killing som e-

o n e is w

ro n g , p

n m

a rily b

e ca

u se

th e killin

g in

flicts (one of) the greatest possible losses on the victim

. T o

describe this as the loss of life can be m isleading,

how evel The change in m

y biological state does not by itself m

ake killing m e w

rong The effect of the loss of m

y biological hfe is the loss to m e of all those

a ctivm

e s, p

ro je

cts, e xp

e rie

n ce

s, a n

d e

n jo

ym e

n ts

w h

a ch

w o

u ld

o th

e lw

ise h

a ve

co n

stitu te

d m

y fu tu

re

n a l life

T h e s e a

c tiv

itie s , p

ro je

c tÿ

, e x p ÿ L ÿ n ÿ ,,ÿ

,

ld enjoym ents aIe etther valuable foI their ow

n sakes are m

eans to som ething else that is valuable for its

sake. S om

e parts of m y futuie aie not valued by

now , but w

ill com e to be valued by m

e as I giow and as m

y values and capactties change. W hen

I am killed, I am

depIlved both of w hat I now

value w

h ich

w o

u ld

h a

ve b

e e

n p

a rt o

f m y fu

tu le

p e

rso n

a l

life, but also w hat I w

ould com e to value T

heiefole, )" w

hen I die, I am deprived of all of the value of m

y [nture Inflicting this loss on m

e as ultim ately w

hat m

akes killing m e w

long. T his being the case, it w

ould seem

that w hat m

akes kilhng any adult hum an being

prim a facie seriously w

iong is the loss of his oI hm futule.

H o

w sh

o u

ld th

is ru d

im e

n ta

ry th e

o ry o

f th e

w rongness of kdhng be evaluated? It cannot be

fa u lte

d fo

i d e

iivm g a

n "o

u g h

t" fro m

a n "is," fo

r a t

d o e s n

o t. T

h e a

n a lysis a

ssu m

e s th

a t kd

h n g m

e (o

r yo

u , le

a d e r) is p

rim a fa

cle se

rio u sly w

ro n g T

h e

point of the analysts is to estabhsh w hich natural

propelty ultim ately explains the w

longness of the kilhng, given that it is w

rong A natm

al property w

all ultim ately explain the w

rongness of kilhng, only ff (1) the explanation fits w

ith our intuitions about the m

atte1 and (2) there is no other natural p ro

p e Ity th

a t p

ro vid

e s th

e b

a sis fo

x a b

e tte

i e xp

la -

nation of the w longness of kilhng T

his analysis rests on the intuition that w

hat m akes kxlhng a par-

ticu la

I h u m

a n o

l a n im

a l w

ro n g is w

h a t it d

o e s to

that partm ular hum

an or anim al W

hat m akes kllhng

w io

n g

is so m

e n

a tu

ra l e

ffe ct o

l o th

e r o

f th e

killin g

S o m

e w

o u ld

d e n y th

is F

o I in

s ta

n c e , a

d iv

in e -

co m

m a n d th

e o rist in

e th

ics w o u ld

d e n y It. S

m e ly

this denial is, how ever, one of those featm

es of divine- com

m and theory w

hich lendeIs it so im plausible

T he claim

that w hat m

akes killing w long is the

loss of the victim 's future is directly suppolted by tw

o conm

deratm ns In the first place, this theoIy explains

w hy w

e legm d killing as one of the W

O lS

t of crim es.

K illing is especially w

iong, because it deprives the victim

o f m

o re

th a

n p

e lh

a p

s a n

y o th

e r crim

e . In

th e

second place, people w ith A

ID S

or cancer w ho know

they ate dying believe, of couxse, that dying is a very bad thing fol them

T hey beheve that the loss of a

future to them that they w

ould otherw ise have expe-

rienced xs w hat m

akes theil ptem ature death a veiy

bad thing for them . A

betteI theory of the w rongness

of killing w ould requile a diffeient natulal plopetty

associated w ith kilhng w

hich better fits w ith the atti-

tudes of the dying W hat could It be9

T he vtew

that w hat m

akes kÿlling w iong is the loss

to the victnn of the value of the victim 's futute gains

addttional suppoIt w hen som

e of its tm phcatm

ns aie e xa

m in

e d . In

th e filS

t p la

ce , It IS

in co

m p a tib

le w

ith th

e vie

w th

a t it is w

io n

g to

kill o n

ly b e

in g

s w h

o m

e b

io lo

g ica

lly h u

m a

n . It is p

o ssib

le th

a t th

e le

e xists a

diffelent species fiom anotheI planet w

hose m em

beis have a futuie hke ores S

ince having a futuIe like that xs w

h a

t m a

ke s kd

lin g

so m

e o

n e

w ro

n g

, th is th

e o

iy entails that it w

ould be w iong to kill m

em bers of such

a species H ence, this theoly is opposed to the clm

m that only life that IS

biologically hum an has great

m o

ia l w

o xth

, a cla

im w

h ich

m a

n y a

n ti-a

b o

ltm n

lsts h

a ve

se e

m e

d to

a d

o p

t T h

is o p

p o

sitio n

, w h

ich th

is th

e o ry h

a s in

co m

m o n w

ith p

e a so

n h o o d th

e o lxe

s, seem

s to be a m eiit of the theoly

In the second place, the claim that the loss of one's

fu tu

re is th

e w

io n

g -m

a kIn

g fe

a tu

ie o

f o n

e 's b

e in

g killed entails the possibility that the futuies of som

e a ctu

a l n

o n h u m

a n m

a m

m a ls o

n o

u r o

w n p

la n e t a

re sufficiently like ores that it is seriously w

iong to kill them

also W hether som

e am m

als do have the sam e

light to hfe as hum an beings depends on adding to the

a cco

u n

t o f th

e w

lo n

g n

e ss o

f killin g

so m

e a

d d

itm n

a l

account of just w hat it is about m

y futm e oi the futules

of othei adult hum an beings w

hich m akes ÿt w

rong to kdl us N

o such addltm nal account w

ill be offeIed m this essay U

ndoubtedly, the pm vlsm

n of such an account w

ould be a vely difficult m atte1 U

ndoubtedly, any such account w

ould be quite controvelsIal. H ence,

it sulely should not leflect badly on this sketch of an elem

entary theory of the w iongness of killing that it

is m d

e te

rm m

a te

w ith

ie sp

e ct to

so m

e ve

ry d ifficu

lt issues xegm

ding am m

al rights. In the thnd place, the claim

that the loss of one's future is the w

rong-m aking feature of one's being killed

does not entail, as sanctity of hum an life theoIies do,

th a t a

ctive e

u th

a n

a sia

is w lo

n g

P e

rso n s w

h o

a re

sevelely and incuiably ill, w ho face a futuIe of pain and

despair, and w ho w

ish to die w ill not have suffered a

loss ff they are killed. It is, sm ctly speaking, the value

of a hum an's futuie w

hich m akes kilhng w

aong in this theory This being so, kllhng does not necessarily w

rong som

e persons w ho are sick and dying. O

f com se, there

m ay be othei reasons for a plohibm

on of active euthana- sia, but that is another m

attei S anctity-of-hum

an-hfe theories seem

to hold that active euthanasia is seriously w

iong even m an individual case w

hele there seem s to

be good leason fol it independently of public policy

consldeiatÿons. T ins consequence ÿs m

ost im plausible,

and It is a plus fol the claim that the loss of a future of

value is w hat m

akes killing w iong that it does not shale

this consequence

In the fouith place, the account of the w rongness

o f killin

g d

e fe

n d

e d

in th

is e ssa

y d o

e s stra

ig h

tfo r-

w ardly entad that it is prim

a facie seliously w rong to

kill chddlen and infants, for w e do presum

e that they h a ve

fu tu

le s o

f va lu

e S

in ce

w e d

o b

e lie

ve th

a t it is

w rong to kill defenseless little babies, it is Im

portant that a theory of the w

rongness of killing easily account fo

r th is. P

e rso

n h o o d th

e o lle

s o f th

e w

ro n g n e ss o

f killin

g , o

n th

e o

th e

l h a

n d

, ca n

n o

t stia lg

h tfo

rw a

id ly

account for the w longness ofkllhng Infants and young

ch ild

re n H

e n ce

, su ch

th e o rie

s m u st a

d d sp

e cia

l a d

hoc accounts of the w longness of killing the young

The plauslbdaty of such ad hoc theories seem s to be

a function of how desperately one w

ants such theolleS to

w o rk. T

h e cla

im th

a t th

e p

iim a iy w

lo n g -m

a kin

g fe

a tu

ie o

f a killin

g is th

e lo

ss to th

e victim

o f th

e value of its futuie accounts for the w

iongness of kdhng yo

u n

g ch

ild re

n a

n d

In fa

n ts d

n e

ctly; it m a

ke s th

e w

ro n

g n

e ss o

f su ch

a cts a

s o b

w o

u s a

s w e

a ctu

a lly

th in

k It is T h is is a

fm th

e l m

e rit o

f th is th

e o ry

A ccordingly, it seem

s that this value of a future-hke- o

u rs

th e

m y o

f th e

w lo

n g

n e

s s o

f k illin

g s

h a

re s

stre n

g th

s o f b

o th

sa n

ctlty-o f-h

fe a

n d

p e

lso n

h o

o d

accounts w hile avoiding w

eaknesses of both. In addi- tio

n , It m

e sh

e s w

ith a

ce n tla

l in tu

itio n co

n cm

n ln

g w

hat m akes kllhng w

rong T

he claim that the pnm

aiy w rong-m

aking featm e

of a killing is the loss to the victim of the value of ItS

fu tu

ie h

a s o

b vio

u s co

n se

q u

e n

ce s fo

r th e

e th

ics o f

abom on. T

he futuie of a standald fetus includes a set o

f e xp

e rie

n ce

s, p ro

je cts, a

ctivitie s, a

n d

su ch

w h

ich are Identical w

ith the futures of adult hum an beings

and aie Identical w ith the futures of young children.

S ince the leason that is sufficient to explain w

hy it is w

long to k311 hum an beings aftel the tim

e of birth is a Ie

a so

n th

a t a

lso a

p p lie

s to fe

tu se

s, it fo llo

w s th

a t

abom on is piIm

a facle seriously m olally w

rong. T

his argum ent does not xely on the m

vahd lnfei- ence that, since it is w

rong to k311 persons, it is w rong

to kill p

o te

n tia

l p e lso

n s a

lso . T

h e ca

te g o ly th

a t IS

m o la

lly ce n tla

l to th

is a n a lysis is th

e ca

te g o ly o

f h

a vin

g a

va lu

a b

le fu

tu re

like o

re s, it is n

o t th

e ca

te -

gory of personhood. T he algum

ent to the conclusm n

that abortion is prim a facle seriously m

orally w xong

proceeded independently of the notion of person or

w ish to strut w

ith this analysis in term s of t

of a hum an futm

e, conclude that aboihon Is, except :ÿ p

e rh

a p

s in lin

e cilcu

m sta

n ce

s, se rio

u sly m

o la

lly w

lo n

g , ln

fe l th

a t fe

tu se

s h a

ve th

e H

g h

t to h

fe , a

n d

then call fetuses "persons" as a result of theu having th

e lig

h t to

h fe

. C le

a rly, in

th is ca

se , th

e ca

te g o ry o

f ;ÿ p

e lso

n is b

e in

g u

se d

to sta

te th

e co

n clu

sto n

o f th

e analysis lathei than to generate the argum

ent of the ÿi; a n a ly

s is

ÿ ::

T he structm

e of this antl-aborhon argum ent can be

both dlum inated and defended by com

paling it to w

hat appears to be the best argum ent for the w

long. ness of the w

anton infliction of pare on anim als. T

his latter argum

ent is based on the assum ption that it is

p ia

m a

fa cie

w lo

n g

to in

flict p a

in o

n m

e (o

r yo u

, leadel) W

hat is the natuial plopelty associated w ith

th e

In flictio

n o

f p a

in w

h ich

m a

ke s su

ch In

flictio n

w long? T

he obvious answ er seem

s to be that the Inflic- tio

n o

f p a

in ca

u se

s su ffe

rin g

a n

d th

a t su

ffe lm

g is a

m lsfo

ltu n

e T

h e

su ffe

rin g

ca u

se d

b y th

e In

flictio n

o f

p a

in is w

h a

t m a

ke s th

e w

a n

to n

In flictio

n o

f p a

in o

n m

e w

ro n g

T h e

w a

n to

n m

flm h o n o

f p a in

o n o

th e r

adult hum ans causes suffering T

he w anton Infliction

o f p

a in

o n

a n

im a

ls ca u

se s su

ffe lm

g S

in ce

ca u

sin g

suffering is w hat m

akes the w anton infliction of pain

w rong and since the w

anton infliction of pain on ani- m

als causes suffering, it follow s that the w

anton inflic- hon of pain on anim

als is w rong.

T h

is a rg

u m

e n

t fo r th

e w

lo n

g n

e ss o

f th e

w a

n to

n infliction of pain on anim

als shares a num ber of struc-

tural featm es w

ith the algum ent for the serious prim

a fa

ca e

w ro

n g

n e

ss o f a

b o

rtio n

B o

th a

Ig u

m e

n ts sta

lt w

ÿth a

n o

b vio

u s a

ssu m

p tio

n co

n ce

rn in

g w

h a t it is

w rong to do to m

e (ol you, leader) B oth then look

fol the chaxacteristic or the consequence of the w rong

action w hich m

akes the action w long. B

oth recognize th

a t th

e w

ro n

g -m

a kin

g fe

a tu

re o

f th e

se Im

m o

ra l

actions is a property of actions som etim

es diIected at individuals othei than postnatal hum

an beings If the stru

ctm e

o f th

e a

rg u

m e

n t fo

l th e

w ro

n g

n e

ss o f th

e w

a n

to n

in flictio

n o

f p a

in o

n a

n im

a ls is so

u n

d , th

e n

the shucture of the algum ent for the prim

a facie seli- ous w

rongness of abortion is also sound, for the stiuc- tree of the tw

o argum ents is the sam

e. T he structm

e com

m on to both is the key to the explanation of how

the w iongness of aboItion can be dem

onstiated w ith-

o u

t le e

o u

lse to

th e

ca te

g o

ly o f p

e lso

n In

n e

ith e

r algum

ent is that categoly crucial T

his defense of an argum ent fol the w

Iongness of abortion m

term s of a structurally slm

dar aigum ent for

',3t ÿ311.111 ÿJll tl.lll-

succeeds only if the account legarding anim als is

the conect account Is it9 In the filst place, st seem s

plausible. In the second place, its m ajol com

petition is K

ant's account. K ant beheved that w

e do not have d ile

ct d u tie

s to a

n im

a ls a

t a ll, b

e ca

u se

th e y a

re n

o t

p e lso

n s H

e n ce

, K a n t h

a d to

e xp

la in

a n d ju

stify th e

w rongness of inflicting pain on am

m als on the grounds

th a

t "h e

w h

o is h

a id

m h

is d e

a lin

g s w

ith a

n im

a ls

b e co

m e s h

a rd

a lso

in h

is d e a lin

g w

ith m

e n ''ÿ T

h e

ploblem w

ith K ant's account is that there seem

s to be no leason for accepting this latteÿ claim

unless K ant's

account is rejected. If the alteinahve to K ant's account

is accepted, then it is easy to undelstand w hy som

e- one w

ho is indifferent to lnfhctm g pain …