philosophy paper 2
Valerielee
2/13/2018
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Phil 2: Puzzles and Paradoxes
Prof. Sven Bernecker
University of California, Irvine
Tripartite Analysis
of Knowledge
Kinds of Knowledge
• Knowing x (where x is an individual or thing)
• knowing who
• Knowing whether
• Knowing when
• Knowing if
• Knowing how
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Knowing that/
propositional knowledge
What are Propositions?
• A proposition is something like the meaning of an utterance,
sentence or Fregean “thought.”
• Propositions are true or false.
• Only declarative sentences express propositions.
• Not all declarative sentences express propositions.
• Propositions are different from the action (talking, thinking, drawing
etc.) by which they are expressed.
• Propositions are different from the words, sounds, symbols, or brain
states that express them.
• Propositions are independent of the language used to express them
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Justified-True-Belief (JTB) Account
of Knowledge
S knows that p if and only if (iff)
truth condition (i) p is true (p)
belief condition (ii) S believes that p
justification condition (iii) S has reasons/evidence
for believing that p (S is justified
in believing that p)
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2/13/2018
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Truth Condition
• The truth condition of the JTB account of knowledge
states that if you know that p, then p is true.
• But, of course, p can itself be a claim that something
else is false. “I have been to the moon” is false. So I can
know that it is false that I have been to the moon.
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Belief Condition
• Beliefs are a kind of mental state, like intentions. The contents
of beliefs are propositions.
• If you know that p, you believe that p. But you can believe that
p, without knowing that p.
• Degrees of belief: The activity of believing is not an all-or-
nothing affair. We believe in degrees.
• Occurrent vs. dispositional belief: An occurrent belief is a
belief which you currently entertain and which you are
conscious of. The beliefs you have while asleep, unconscious
or distracted are dispositional.
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Justification Condition
• If you know that p, you have reasons (evidence, justification)
for believing p.
• Epistemic justification for a belief is justification for the
belief’s truth, not its usefulness or its social respectability.
• The justification condition should prevent lucky guesses
from counting as knowledge.
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