philosophy paper 2

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TripartiteAnalysisofKnowledge.pdf

2/13/2018

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Phil 2: Puzzles and Paradoxes

Prof. Sven Bernecker

University of California, Irvine

Tripartite Analysis

of Knowledge

Kinds of Knowledge

• Knowing x (where x is an individual or thing)

• knowing who

• Knowing whether

• Knowing when

• Knowing if

• Knowing how

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Knowing that/

propositional knowledge

What are Propositions?

• A proposition is something like the meaning of an utterance,

sentence or Fregean “thought.”

• Propositions are true or false.

• Only declarative sentences express propositions.

• Not all declarative sentences express propositions.

• Propositions are different from the action (talking, thinking, drawing

etc.) by which they are expressed.

• Propositions are different from the words, sounds, symbols, or brain

states that express them.

• Propositions are independent of the language used to express them

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Justified-True-Belief (JTB) Account

of Knowledge

S knows that p if and only if (iff)

truth condition (i) p is true (p)

belief condition (ii) S believes that p

justification condition (iii) S has reasons/evidence

for believing that p (S is justified

in believing that p)

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LiYuxi

2/13/2018

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Truth Condition

• The truth condition of the JTB account of knowledge

states that if you know that p, then p is true.

• But, of course, p can itself be a claim that something

else is false. “I have been to the moon” is false. So I can

know that it is false that I have been to the moon.

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Belief Condition

• Beliefs are a kind of mental state, like intentions. The contents

of beliefs are propositions.

• If you know that p, you believe that p. But you can believe that

p, without knowing that p.

• Degrees of belief: The activity of believing is not an all-or-

nothing affair. We believe in degrees.

• Occurrent vs. dispositional belief: An occurrent belief is a

belief which you currently entertain and which you are

conscious of. The beliefs you have while asleep, unconscious

or distracted are dispositional.

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Justification Condition

• If you know that p, you have reasons (evidence, justification)

for believing p.

• Epistemic justification for a belief is justification for the

belief’s truth, not its usefulness or its social respectability.

• The justification condition should prevent lucky guesses

from counting as knowledge.

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