Essential Readings in World Politics S E C O N D E D I T I O N
The Norton Series in World Politics Jack Snyder, General Editor
Essentials of International Relations Karen A. Mingst
From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict Jack Snyder
Prosperity and Violence: The Political Economy of Development Robert H. Bates
Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations Bruce Russett and John Oneal
The Tragedy of Great Power Politics John Mearsheimer
Lenses of Analysis Richard Harknett
Stephen Krasner on international political economy
Bahan asal darl Arklb Negara Malaysia
Essential Readings in World Politics
S E C O N D E D I T I O N
K A R E N A . M I N G S T A N D JACK L . SNYDER
Copyright © 2004, 2001 by W. W. Norton 8c Company, Inc.
S T E P H E N M . W A L T "International Relations: One World, Many Theories" 4
J O H N L E W I S G A D D I S "History, Theory, and Common Ground" 11
T H U C Y D I D E S "Melian Dialogue," adapted by Suresht Bald FROM Complete Writings: The Peloponnesian War 18
I M M A N U E I . K A N T " T O Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch," PROM Perpetual Peace, and Other Essays on Politics, History, and Morals 20
W O O D R O W W I L S O N "The Fourteen Points," Address to the U.S. Congress, 8 January 1918 26
G E O R G E R K E N N A N ("X") "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" 28
J O H N L E W I S G A D D I S "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System" 33
v i C O N T E N T S
H A N S M O R G E N T H A U
J O H N M E A R S H E I M E R
M I C H A E L W . D O Y L E
A N D R E G U N D E R F R A N K
J . A N N T I C K N E R
M A R T H A F I N N E M O R E
"A Realist Theory of International Politics" and "Political Power," F R O M Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace 49
"Anarchy and the Struggle for Power," FROM The Tragedy of Great Power Politics 54
"Liberalism and World Politics" 73
"The Development of Underdevelopment" 86
"Man, the State, and War: Gendered Perspectives on National Security," FROM Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security 94
"Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention" 102
H E D L E Y B U L L
H A N S M O R G E N T H A U
I M M A N U E L W A L L E R S T E I N
R O B E R T J E R V I S
"Does Order Exist in World Politics?" FROM The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics 120
"The Balance of Power," "Different Methods of the Balance of Power," and "Evaluation of the Balance of Power," FROM Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace 124
"The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis" 130
"The Compulsive Empire" 138
S T E P H E N D . K R A S N E R "Sovereignty" 143
A N N E - M A R I E S L A U G H T E R "The Real New World Order" 149
R O B E R T I. R O T B E R G "Failed States in a World of Terror" 157
S A M U E L P. H U N T I N G T O N "The Clash of Civilizations?" 163
EDWARD W . SAID
G R A H A M E . FULLER
"The Clash of Ignorance" 170
"The Future of Political Islam" 173
C O N T E N T S VII
MARGARET G . H E R M A N N
AND JOE D . H A G A N
C Y N T H I A ENLOE
"International Decision Making: Leadership Matters" 182
"Hypotheses on Misperception" 189
"The Personal Is International," F R O M Bananas, Beaches, and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics 202
M I C H A E L J . G L E N N O N
EDWARD C . L U C K
A N N E - M A R I E SLAUGHTER
IAN H U R D
MARGARET E . K E C K A N D
S A M A N T H A POWER
HENRY A . KISSINGER
K E N N E T H R O T H
G . JOHN IKENBERRY
JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER
"Why the Security Council Failed" 208
"Transnational Advocacy Networks in International Politics: Introduction" and "Human Rights Advocacy Networks in Latin America," F R O M Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics 222
"Bystanders to Genocide: Why the United States Let the Rwandan Tragedy Happen" 233
"The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction" 253
"The Case for Universal Jurisdiction" 258
"Is American Multilateralism in Decline?" 262
"The False Promise of International Institutions" 283
Viii C O N T E N T S
CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ
THOMAS C SCHELLING
SCOTT D. SAGAN AND
KENNETH N . WALTZ
J O H N M U E L L E R
M I C H A E L W . DOYLE
BARRY R. POSEN
AUDREY K U R T H CRONIN
ROBERT A . PAPE
"War as an Instrument of Policy," F R O M On War 297
"The Diplomacy of Violence," F R O M Arms and Influence 301
"Cooperation under the Security Dilemma" 309
"Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Weapons: For Better or Worse?" F R O M The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 322
"The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World" 341
"International Intervention," F R O M Ways of War and Peace 347
"The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict" 357
"Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism" 367
"The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism" 382
STEPHEN D. KRASNER
BRUCE R. SCOTT
JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ
"The Nature of Political Economy," FROM U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation 403
"State Power and the Structure of International Trade" 410
"The Great Divide in the Global Village" 421
"The World Bank's Mission Creep" 430
"The Way Ahead," FROM Globalization and Its Discontents 437
DAVID H E L D A N D
A N T H O N Y M C G R E W , WITH
DAVID GOLDBLATT A N D
T H O M A S FRIEDMAN
"The Backlash" FROM The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization 471
"Universal Truths: Human Rights and the Westernizing Illusion" 477
This reader is a quintessential collaborative effort between the two co-editors and Ann Marcy of W. W. Norton. In a flurry of e-mails during 2003, the co- editors suggested articles for inclusion, traced the sources, and rejected or ac- cepted them, defending choices to skeptical colleagues. It became apparent during the process that the co-editors, while both international relations schol- ars, read very different literatures. This book represents a product of that collab- orative process and is all the better for the differences.
The articles have been selected to meet several criteria. First, the collection is designed to augment and amplify the core Essentials of International Relations text (third edition) by Karen Mingst. The chapters in this book follow those in the text. Second, the selections are purposefully eclectic, that is, key theoretical articles are paired with contemporary pieces found in the popular literature. When possible articles have been chosen to reflect diverse theoretical perspec- tives and policy viewpoints. The articles are also both readable and engaging to undergraduates. The co-editors struggled to maintain the integrity of the chal- lenging pieces, while making them accessible to undergraduates at a variety of colleges and universities.
Special thanks go to those individuals who provided reviews of the first edi- tion of this book and offered their own suggestions and reflections based on teaching experience, Our product benefited greatly from these evaluations, al- though had we included all the suggestions, the book would have been thou- sands of pages! Ann Marcy orchestrated the process, reacting to our suggestions, mediating our differences, and keeping us "on task." To her, we owe a special thanks. Andrea Haver guided the manuscript through the permissions and edit- ing process, a very labor-intensive task.
Essential Readings in Wor ld Politics S E C O N D E D I T I O N
In Essentials of International Relations, Karen Mingst introduces various theories and approaches used to study international relations. In this section, Stephen Walt, a professor of international relations at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, provides a brief overview of these theories and sets them in the context of new is- sues that are being debated in the field. The scholars thinking about international relations and debating these issues are divided by both theoretical and method- ological differences. Recognizing these divisions in a symposium on history and theory in a special issue of International Security, John Lewis Gaddis, a promi- nent diplomatic historian at Yale University, acknowledges that historians pay too little attention to methodology but chastises political scientists for using methods that overgeneralize by searching for timeless laws of politics. Finding common ground between these divergent approaches, he argues that students of politics should use the past not to try to predict the future, but to help people understand political developments as they unfold.
Both historical analysis and philosophical discourse contribute to the study of international relations. The historian of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides, uses the Melian Dialogue. In this classic realist/idealist dilemma, the leaders of Melos ponder the fate of the island, deciding whether to fight their antagonists, the Athe- nians, or to rely on the gods and the enemy of Athens, the Lacedaemonians (also known as Spartans), for their safety. Centuries later, in 1795, the philosopher Im- manuel Kant posited that a group of republican states with representative forms of government that were accountable to their citizens would be able to form an effec- tive league of peace. That observation has generated a plethora of theoretical and empirical research known as the democratic peace debate. In Essentials, Mingst uses the debate to illustrate how political scientists conduct international relations research. Michael Doyle's article on "Liberalism and World Politics," excerpted in Chapter 3, sparked the contemporary debate on this topic. And an important statement on the status of that debate is presented in Bruce Russett and John Oneal's Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations (2002) which integrates a comprehensive body of research findings on the democratic debate.
4 C H A P T E R 1 A P P R O A C H E S
S T E P H E N M . W A L T
International Relations: One World,
Why should policymakers and practition-ers care about the scholarly study of in-ternational affairs? Those who conduct foreign policy often dismiss academic theorists (fre- quently, one must admit, with good reason), but there is an inescapable link between the abstract world of theory and the real world of policy. We need theories to make sense of the blizzard of infor- mation that bombards us daily. Even policymakers who are contemptuous of "theory" must rely on their own (often unstated) ideas about how the world works in order to decide what to do. It is hard to make good policy if one's basic organizing princi- ples are flawed, just as it is hard to construct good theories without knowing a lot about the real world. Everyone uses theories—whether he or she knows it or not—and disagreements about policy usually rest on more fundamental disagreements about the ba- sic forces that shape international outcomes.
Take, for example, the current debate on how to respond to China. From one perspective, China's ascent is the latest example of the tendency for rising powers to alter the global balance of power in potentially dangerous ways, especially as their growing influence makes them more ambi- tious. From another perspective, the key to China's future conduct is whether its behavior will be modified by its integration into world markets and by the (inevitable?) spread of democratic princi- ples. From yet another viewpoint, relations be- tween China and the rest of the world will be shaped by issues of culture and identity: Will China see itself (and be seen by others) as a normal member of the world community or a singular so- ciety that deserves special treatment?
From Foreign Policy, no, 110 (spring 1998): 29-44.
In the same way, the debate over NATO expan- sion looks different depending on which theory one employs. From a "realist" perspective, NATO expansion is an effort to extend Western influ- ence—well beyond the traditional sphere of U.S. vital interests—during a period of Russian weak- ness and is likely to provoke a harsh response from Moscow. From a liberal perspective, however, ex- pansion will reinforce the nascent democracies of Central Europe and extend NATO's conflict- management mechanisms to a potentially turbu- lent region. A third view might stress the value of incorporating the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland within the Western security community, whose members share a common identity that has made war largely unthinkable.
No single approach can capture all the com- plexity of contemporary world politics. Therefore, we are better off with a diverse array of competing ideas rather than a single theoretical orthodoxy. Competition between theories helps reveal their strengths and weaknesses and spurs subsequent re- finements, while revealing flaws in conventional wisdom. Although we should take care to em- phasize inventiveness over invective, we should welcome and encourage the heterogeneity of con- temporary scholarship,
Where Are We Coming From?
The study of international affairs is best under- stood as a protracted competition between the realist, liberal, and radical traditions. Realism em- phasizes the enduring propensity for conflict be- tween states; liberalism identifies several ways to mitigate these conflictive tendencies; and the radi- cal tradition describes how the entire system of
siM'i t t 'N M . W A I T : International Relations 5
on the power of states, liberalism generally saw states as the central players in international affairs. Al l liberal theories implied that cooperation was more pervasive than even the defensive version of realism allowed, but each view offered a different recipe for promoting it.
R A D I C A L A P P R O A C H E S
Until the 1980s, marxism was the main alternative to the mainstream realist and liberal traditions. Where realism and liberalism took the state system for granted, marxism offered both a different ex- planation for international conflict and a blueprint for fundamentally transforming the existing inter- national order.
Orthodox marxist theory saw capitalism as the central cause of international conflict. Capitalist states battled each other as a consequence of their incessant struggle for profits and battled socialist states because they saw in them the seeds of their own destruction. Neomarxist "dependency" the- ory, by contrast, focused on relations between ad- vanced capitalist powers and less developed states and argued that the former—aided by an unholy alliance with the ruling classes of the developing world—had grown rich by exploiting the latter. The solution was to overthrow these parasitic elites and install a revolutionary government committed to autonomous development.
Both of these theories were largely discredited before the Cold War even ended. The extensive history of economic and military cooperation among the advanced industrial powers showed that capitalism did not inevitably lead to conflict. The bitter schisms that divided the communist world showed that socialism did not always pro- mote harmony. Dependency theory suffered simi- lar empirical setbacks as it became increasingly clear that, first, active participation in the world economy was a better route to prosperity than au- tonomous socialist development; and, second, many developing countries proved themselves quite capable of bargaining successfully with multinational corporations and other capitalist in- stitutions.
As marxism succumbed to its various failings, its mantle was assumed by a group of theorists who borrowed heavily from the wave of postmodern writings in literary criticism and social theory. This "deconstructionist" approach was openly skeptical of the effort to devise general or universal theories such as realism or liberalism. Indeed, its propo- nents emphasized the importance of language and discourse in shaping social outcomes. However, because these scholars focused initially on criticiz- ing the mainstream paradigms but did not offer positive alternatives to them, they remained a self- consciously dissident minority for most of the 1980s.
D O M E S T I C P O L I T I C S
Not all Cold War scholarship on international af- fairs fit neatly into the realist, liberal, or marxist paradigms. In particular, a number of important works focused on the characteristics of states, gov- ernmental organizations, or individual leaders. The democratic strand of liberal theory fits under this heading, as do the efforts of scholars such as Graham Allison and John Steinbruner to use orga- nization theory and bureaucratic politics to explain foreign policy behavior, and those of Jervis, Irving Janis, and others, which applied social and cogni- tive psychology. For the most part, these efforts did not seek to provide a general theory of interna- tional behavior but to identify other factors that might lead states to behave contrary to the predic- tions of the realist or liberal approaches. Thus, much of this literature should be regarded as a complement to the three main paradigms rather than as a rival approach for analysis of the interna- tional system as a whole.
New Wrinkles in Old Paradigms
Scholarship on international affairs has diversified significantly since the end of the Cold War. Non- American voices are more prominent, a wider range of methods and theories are seen as legiti- mate, and new issues such as ethnic conflict, the environment, and the future of the state
have been placed on the agenda of scholars every- where.
Yet the sense of deja vu is equally striking. In- stead of resolving the struggle between competing theoretical traditions, the end of the Cold War has merely launched a new series of debates. Ironically, even as many societies embrace similar ideals of democracy, free markets, and human rights, the scholars who study these developments are more divided than ever.
R E A L I S M R E D U X
Although the end of the Cold War led a few writers to declare that realism was destined for the acade- mic scrapheap, rumors of its demise have been largely exaggerated.
A recent contribution of realist theory is its at- tention to the problem of relative and absolute gains. Responding to the institutionalises' claim that international institutions would enable states to forego short-term advantages for the sake of greater long-term gains, realists such as Joseph Grieco and Stephen Krasner point out that anar- chy forces states to worry about both the absolute gains from cooperation and the way that gains are distributed among participants. The logic is straightforward; If one state reaps larger gains than its partners, it will gradually become stronger, and its partners will eventually become more vul- nerable,
Realists have also been quick to explore a vari- ety of new issues. Barry Posen offers a realist expla- nation for ethnic conflict, noting that the breakup of multiethnic states could place rival ethnic groups in an anarchic setting, thereby triggering intense fears and tempting each group to use force to improve its relative position. This problem would be particularly severe when each group's territory contained enclaves inhabited by their eth- nic rivals—as in the former Yugoslavia—because each side would be tempted to "cleanse" (preemp- tively) these alien minorities and expand to incor- porate any others from their ethnic group that lay outside their borders. Realists have also cautioned that NATO, absent a clear enemy, would likely face
increasing strains and that expanding its presence eastward would jeopardize relations with Russia. Finally, scholars such as Michael Mastanduno have argued that U.S. foreign policy is generally consis- tent with realist principles, insofar as its actions are still designed to preserve U.S. predominance and to shape a postwar order that advances American interests.
The most interesting conceptual development within the realist paradigm has been the emerg- ing split between the "defensive" and "offensive" strands of thought. Defensive realists such as Waltz, Van Evera, and Jack Snyder assumed that states had little intrinsic interest in military con- quest and argued that the costs of expansion gen- erally outweighed the benefits. Accordingly, they maintained that great power wars occurred largely because domestic groups fostered exaggerated per- ceptions of threat and an excessive faith in the effi- cacy of military force.
This view is now being challenged along several fronts. First, as Randall Schweller notes, the neore- alist assumption that states merely seek to survive "stacked the deck" in favor of the status quo be- cause it precluded the threat of predatory revision- ist states—nations such as Adolf Hitler's Germany or Napoleon Bonaparte's France that "value what they covet far more than what they possess" and are willing to risk annihilation to achieve their aims. Second, Peter Liberman, in his book Does Conquest Pay?, uses a number of historical cases— such as the Nazi occupation of Western Europe and Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe—to show that the benefits of conquest often exceed the costs, thereby casting doubt on the claim that military expansion is no longer cost-effective. Third, offensive realists such as Eric Labs, John Mearsheimer, and Fareed Zakaria argue that anar- chy encourages all states to try to maximize their relative strength simply because no state can ever be sure when a truly revisionist power might emerge.
These differences help explain why realists dis- agree over issues such as the future of Europe. For defensive realists such as Van Evera, war is rarely profitable and usually results from militarism, hy-
pernationalism, or some other distorting domestic factor. Because Van Evera believes such forces are largely absent in post-Cold War Europe, he con- cludes that the region is "primed for peace." By contrast, Mearsheimer and other offensive realists believe that anarchy forces great powers to com- pete irrespective of their internal characteristics and that security competition will return to Eu- rope as soon as the U.S. pacifier is withdrawn.
N E W L I F E F O R L I B E R A L I S M
The defeat of communism sparked a round of self- congratulation in the West, best exemplified by Francis Fukuyama's infamous claim that hu- mankind had now reached the "end of history." History has paid little attention to this boast, but the triumph of the West did give a notable boost to all three strands of liberal thought.
By far the most interesting and important de- velopment has been the lively debate on the "de- mocratic peace," Although the most recent phase of this debate had begun even before the Soviet Union collapsed, it became more influential as the number of democracies began to increase and as evidence of this relationship began to accumulate.
Democratic peace theory is a refinement of the earlier claim that democracies were inherently more peaceful than autocratic states. It rests on the belief that although democracies seem to fight wars as often as other states, they rarely, if ever, fight one another. Scholars such as Michael Doyle, James Lee Ray, and Bruce Russett have offered a number of explanations for this tendency, the most popular being that democracies embrace norms of compromise that bar the use of force against groups espousing similar principles. It is hard to think of a more influential, recent aca- demic debate, insofar as the belief that "democra- cies don't fight each other" has been an important justification for the Clinton administration's ef- forts to enlarge the sphere of democratic rule.
* * *
Liberal institutionalists likewise have continued to adapt their own theories. On the one hand, the
core claims of institutionalist theory have become more modest over time. Institutions are now said to facilitate cooperation when it is in each state's interest to do so, but it is widely agreed that they cannot force states to behave in ways that are con- trary to the states' own selfish interests. On the other hand, institutionalists such as John Duffield and Robert McCalla have extended the theory into new substantive areas, most notably the study of NATO. For these scholars, NATO's highly institu- tionalized character helps explain why it has been able to survive and adapt, despite the disappear- ance of its main adversary.
The economic strand of liberal theory is still in- fluential as well. In particular, a number of scholars have recently suggested that the "globalization" of world markets, the rise of transnational networks and nongovernmental organizations, and the rapid spread of global communications technology are undermining the power of states and shifting attention away from military security toward eco- nomics and social welfare. The details are novel but the basic logic is familiar: As societies around the globe become enmeshed in a web of economic and social connections, the costs of disrupting these ties will effectively preclude unilateral state actions, es- pecially the use of force.
This perspective implies that war will remain a remote possibility among the advanced indus- trial democracies. It also suggests that bringing China and Russia into the relentless embrace of world capitalism is the best way to promote both prosperity and peace, particularly if this process creates a strong middle class in these states and re- inforces pressures to democratize. Get these soci- eties hooked on prosperity and competition will be confined to the economic realm,
This view has been challenged by scholars who argue that the actual scope of "globalization" is mod- est and that these various transactions still take place in environments that are shaped and regulated by states. Nonetheless, the belief that economic forces are superseding traditional great power politics en- joys widespread acceptance among scholars, pundits, and policymakers, and the role of the state is likely to be an important topic for future academic inquiry,
Sects and shapes beliefs and interests, and estab- lishes accepted norms of behavior. Consequently, constructivism is especially attentive to the sources of change, and this approach has largely replaced marxism as the preeminent radical perspective on international affcirs,
The end of the Cold War played an important role in legitimating conttructivist theories because realism and liberalism both failed to anticipate this event and had some trouble explaining it. Con- ttructtvte had an explanation; Specifically, former
Whereas realism and Ltheultsm tend to toe us on material factor, stub .is power or trade, construe trust approaches emphasise the itupatt ol ideas. Instead tut taking the state (or granted and asstun trig that it simply seeks to uirvive, umstun tivist. regard the interests and identities ut states as a highly malleable ptodml ot .pectiu hi.tornai ptoirs.es. They pay close attention to the prevatl tug cltscouiseSil in society because druoutse re
president Mikhail Gorbachev revolutionized Soviet foreign policy because he embraced new ideas such as "common security."
Moreover, given that we live in an era where old norms are being challenged, once clear boundaries are dissolving, and issues of identity are becoming more salient, it is hardly surprising that scholars have been drawn to approaches that place these issues front and center. From a constructivist perspective, in fact, the central issue in the post-Cold War world is how different groups conceive their identities and in- terests. Although power is not irrelevant, construc- tivism emphasizes how ideas and identities are created, how they evolve, and how they shape the way states understand and respond to their situation. Therefore, it matters whether Europeans define them- selves primarily in national or continental terms; whether Germany and Japan redefine their pasts in ways that encourage their adopting more active international roles; and whether the United States embraces or rejects its identity as "global police- man."
Constructivist theories are quite diverse and do not offer a unified set of predictions on any of these issues. At a purely …