Discussion Covert Action and Intelligence

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POL341Week3Lecture1.pptx

POL341 Covert Action and Intelligence Week 3 Lecture 1 Collection

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Info Needs

Processors

(Process, Exploit,

Analyze, Finish)

Intelligence

Collectors

(Gather)

Deciders

(Plan and Act)

Info Needs

Raw Info

A Central Part of the Process

Recall that collectors get info needs (requirements) from Policy makers and Analysts. As you will see, the relationship between collectors and these groups is not as close for a variety of reasons, organizational, structural, personality, need to protect information, etc.

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Collection Assets

TECHINT

HUMINT

Collection: Broad Categories

Generally speaking, the technically components are significantly more expensive and are controlled by Department of Defense. Recall some of the issues with technology collection with regard to nation-states like the USSR and the new transnational enemies.

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TECHINT

(Technical)

HUMINT

(Human)

GEOINT

(Geospatial or

Imagery)

OSINT

(Open Source)

SIGINT

(Signals)

MASINT

(Measure)

TELINT (Telemetry)

ElectroMag Rad

COMINT (Communications)

ELINT (Electronic)

FISINT (Foreign Instr)

Collection: A Listing of INTs

Explain Each one. There are many INT that circulate. These are some of the more common categories.

FISINT – Exploit foreign instruments

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Another Org Chart - Look at your text, page 114 for a better view.

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Intent: Leaders and Orgs

OSINT

HUMINT

COMINT

Cyber

Capabilities

GEOINT

ELINT, MASINT, TELINT

Non-EM (Geophysical and Nuclear)

FISINT

Collection: Asset Allocation

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This is a typical look at asset assignment and expectations. Recall, the general target of nation-states or enemies is to determine intent and capabilities (weapons, forces, attacks etc.). However, these assets can cross-pollinate. For instance, imagery of a weapons plant that shows less cars over a regular period may help determine the intent of the company to shut down or move, or budget etc.

NGA (GEOINT)

NSA (SIGINT)

CIA/DO (HUMINT, TECHINT)

DOD/AF (All INT)

FBI (HUMINT)

STATE DEP- HUMINT

General Collection Missions

These are not exclusive, there is overlap.

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Each Collection asset and sometimes organization has an internal cycle.

The finished product is not always shared, and gets “Stovepiped” breaking the system.

Difficult to get products from all asset cycles together into one product

Perfect World: “ALL SOURCE ANALYSIS”

“Stovepipes”

Stovepipes are a problem, but a byproduct of a large process and a necessity to protect “Sources and Methods” that creates pockets of “Un-sharable” information. All Source Analysis is the goal. As you saw in the CIA video, we need to expand our humint capabilities and work with people we may not be able to “Trust” or thoroughly vett. There is a balance between counterintelligence (protection) concerns and collection mission. In a interconnected world, information sharing is critical but these are obstacles.

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The recruitment, utilization, and management of human sources to collect information against a given target

HUMINT (Human Intelligence) - What

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Targeting or Spotting

Assessing (Validation System)

Recruit – “Sales Pitch” (Money, philosophical, sex, thrill etc.)

Handle(r) – Manage relationship

Terminate – Priority Change, No access, discovery, etc.

HUMINT Agent Acquisition Cycle - How

Need access, need to be credible and limited vulnerabilities. This is kind of like recruiting in the real world, but with a different employment objective.

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Walk-in

Official Cover – Diplomat

Non-Official Cover (NOC) – another professional identity (journalist, but not priest, peace corps_

Sleepers – Inserted early (The Americans)

Foreign Liaisons

HUMINT – Who (Individuals)

Corp Targets: Disgruntled employees, Bribes from a competitor, Cleaning crews, Industrial mole, Scientists, Engineers. Companies hire a competitors employee for their trade knowledge

Applicant interviews only to pump potential employer for information, or vice versa

Spy pretends to be a student, journalist, or venture capitalist

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CIA – Lead Role

Military – Capability, primarily through Defense Intelligence Agency (Mil Targets)

Law Enforcement and Counterintelligence – FBI, DEA, other Homeland Security, etc. Transnational Issues (narcotics, corporate espionage) make these more relevant and often creates overlap.

HUMINT – Who (Organization)

HUMINT is not complicated. Basically, it is the manipulation of human relationships to gather information or give (mis)information. Thus, many organizations have some capacity that often overlaps.

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Director of CIA (DCI) is the lead HUMINT Program manager

National Clandestine Service: Created during Reform period.

CIA HUMINT

Community HUMINT (Coordinating with Agencies)

Technology

CIA - NSC

HUMINT is not complicated. Basically, it is the manipulation of human relationships to gather information or give (mis)information. Thus, many organizations have some capacity that often overlaps.

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Good “Intent” information (plans, thoughts etc.)

Cheaper than TECHINT

Good Counterintel (providing deceptive information)

Useful against targets with extensive human network, but more limited technical capability (Narcotics, Terrorism

HUMINT Pros - Why

vv

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Reliability difficult to prove.

Legality. Aversion to dirty sources, bribes, manipulation, etc.

Liasons. Call for unilateral ops. Close ties with Brits etc. Loss of info.

Timely Process. Getting assets slow and risky. Illegals and sleepers.

Be Like Me: We need spies that can blend, but also can be trusted.

Blowback. Keep sources and friendly counties covert. No trials. Sources double edged sword. Political fallout.

HUMINT Cons

Humint is based on relationships. If you develop a long relationship over some time, based on trust, then it becomes difficult when others try to interfere. Thus secretive.

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As we develop away from nation-state, and encounter issues like counterinsurgency, narcotics, corporate espionage, counterintel, WMD, etc. the issues are more interconnected require multiple agency attention.

HUMINT is COOL. Everybody wants to be COOL, and not be the processor or analyzer.

Secretive and Territorial. CIA-FBI compete or cooperate? New FBI National Security Service. For collection and analysis on terrorism. DEA, CIA, NCIS, AFOSI, DIA, SEALS,

Competition for COOL Points

This creates all the problems discussed earlier like stovepiping, processing, analyzing, from multiple sources. The system is disparate with many competing priorities.

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Huge Growth in available information via the Internet, both on capabilities and intent

Media, public data, social websites, Professional materials, commercial imagery (Google)

Large volume, difficult to process, reliability problems

CIA: “Open Source Works”

Middle East Regime Changes – organized over the internet in part

Counterintelligence Possibilities

OSINT – The New Frontier

Really just a new medium for Human Intelligence, Covert Action, and counterintelligence. We will discuss Cyber later.

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Reactive – What already happened, but some indication and warning with analysis

Tech heavy, expensive, trained analysts

Drones – Newfound flexibility

Very Sexy – “Predator Crack”

Excellent for TACTICAL Intelligence (Spec Ops, Dropping Bombs)

GEOINT (Imagery)

We will talk about FISA in more detail during the counterintelligence section.

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Intentions (Indications and Warnings)

Requires code-breaking and heavy processing resources

Analysts must be well-trained technically and otherwise (e.g. Languages)

Less Risky than Humint but more expensive

Oversight and Regulation – FISA

High technology curve – constant improvement

SIGINT

We will talk about FISA in more detail during the counterintelligence section.

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Electro-optical – Light

Geophysical – Earth shifts

Materials – Gases, bio

Nuclear Radiation

Radar

Radio Frequency

NGA and DIA

(-) Difficult to Understand, technical training to analyze

(+) Good against WMD and Proliferation

MASINT

Need access, need to be credible and limited vulnerabilities. This is kind of like recruiting in the real world, but with a different employment objective.

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High Volume – Limited Processing, lots of “Chaff”

Very Expensive

Good against Capabilities

Tasking Competition

Technical Processing/Analyzing

Constant Innovation

TECHINT – Pros and Cons

Need access, need to be credible and limited vulnerabilities. This is kind of like recruiting in the real world, but with a different employment objective.

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Comprehensive and dynamic requirements process from policy makers and analysts

Collecting too much information that cannot be processed

Stovepipe collection and analysis

Asset allocation, direction, and collection timelines particularly with technical

Breakdown between Policy and Collection

Collection Issues

Processing and Exploitation: The budget is largely allocated to collection assets, and limited money to processing (analysts, machines). We get way too much information. I call this the google problem.

Collection Priorities: There is competition for assets, and the system to allocate assets, make priorities, and requirements is complex and often rigid, because of the sheer number of people engaging the system. Remember back to the policy stage. Creating priorities at the highest level is more clear, but when it “Trickles down” it becomes messier.

A National Integrated Intelligence Requirements Process Developing a requirements process that cuts across the collection disciplines and assessing the level and effectiveness of overall collection efforts remain extremely difficult.  The ADCI for Analysis and Production and the ADCI for Collection are working together and with other components in the Intelligence Community to achieve a more coherent and integrated front  to-back-end collection management process. During the past year, a number of new initiatives have emerged:  The two ADCIs have provided initial funding for a collection management system to be used by all of the collection disciplines. The system will provide an integrated collection management capability—enabling information sharing among the various collection communities and users of intelligence data.  It should improve interaction and enable collection managers to collaborate directly with planners, analysts, collection system operators, and exploitation and dissemination specialists to ensure that requirements are met rapidly and efficiently. The system will provide users with a capability to track the status of their requirements and to adjust their collection requirements to rapidly changing intelligence needs and priorities. The new board was established last year under the chairmanship of the ADCI for Administration and vice-chairmanship of the ADCI/AP and ADCI/C to oversee the development of national requirements for future systems.  The board serves as the DCI’s focal point for identifying future intelligence needs within the national security missions and as customer advocates for those needs as they relate to Intelligence Community strategic planning, programming, and acquisition decisions.  The board takes the long  term view in defining and prioritizing needs, and constructs detailed system requirements documents related to the acquisition of intelligence capabilities.These efforts are steps in the right direction. The analytic community, however, must now help sustain such activities and work together with the ADCI/C and the collection community to ensure that strategic and near-term analytic priorities inform and drive collection requirements and management.  In short, the time is now ripe for a new national integrated intelligence requirements process that will link the activities described above and provide the critical interface between analysis and collection, information needs and collection requirements, and analytic priorities and long-term acquisition strategies.

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