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BRIEFING

THE AFRICAN UNION AT TEN: AN APPRAISAL

TIM MURITHI*

AS THE AFRICAN UNION MARKED ITS TENTH ANNIVERSARY on 9 July 2012, it was still recovering from one of its most public disagreements. At the heart of this disagreement was the AU’s interpretation of and commit- ment to good governance and humanitarian intervention. Sparked by the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, and the contested November 2010 elections in Côte d’Ivoire, these issues came under intense debate. The NATO-led intervention in Libya – the AU’s backyard – caught the organization unaware and divided its members on whether the military in- cursion, under the rubric of the UN doctrine of the ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P), was warranted. Similarly, the earlier crisis in Côte d’Ivoire and the involvement of the UN and France led to criticisms of the AU’s failure to respond in a unified and coherent manner. The key issue of debate was whether the AU should act as a bulwark

against external intervention and become the primary agent of humanitarian intervention and democratic consolidation on the continent, or whether this role should continue to be usurped by foreign actors who are often perceived to pursue their own strategic self-interests. South Africa, which was involved in the AU efforts to mediate the crisis in both Libya and Côte d’Ivoire, adopted a strategic position premised on moulding the leadership institutions of the African Union, with a view to making it a more effective and profes- sional regional organization. Arguing that the AU Commission, and by exten- sion its membership, was slow and indecisive in addressing the two crises, South Africa attempted to take over the leadership of the Commission towards the end of 2011. It did so by proposing its former Minister for International Relations and Cooperation, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) candidate for the pos- ition of Chairperson of the AU Commission. This was an unprecedented

*Tim Murithi ([email protected]) is a Research Fellow at the Centre for African Studies, University of the Free State and Head of the Justice and Reconciliation Programme at the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation in Cape Town, South Africa.

African Affairs, 111/445, 662–669 doi: 10.1093/afraf/ads058 © The Author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Royal African Society. All rights reserved

Advance Access Publication 26 August 2012

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move, and a direct critique of the existing chairperson, Jean Ping of Gabon. The subsequent vote to elect the Chairperson was conducted through a secret ballot so the exact break down of the voting pattern is difficult to discern, but initially the incumbent Ping received sufficient votes to prevent an outright majority for Dlamini-Zuma. However, in July 2012, Dlamini- Zuma secured the support she required to be crowned as Chair at the Summit of Heads of State and Governement. The very public disagreement over who should lead the AU revealed two competing notions of the nature and character of the organization. At the heart of this debate lies the question of whether the AU should make a robust transition towards becoming an ef- fective norm entrepreneur as far as the ideals of peace, security, democracy, and development are concerned.

This Briefing provides an assessment of the AU’s achievements to date. It focuses on the Union’s attempts to become a norm entrepreneur, particularly in the areas of peace and security, democracy, and human rights. It also assesses the organization’s achievements in terms of establishing itself as ‘a voice of Africa’ and concludes that the project of Pan-Africanism has made some progress under the AU, but that the dream of African unity remains unfulfilled.

The AU as a norm enterpreneur: from Pan-Africanism to regional integration

An endeavour to re-animate Pan-Africanism was the directing force behind the establishment of the African Union.1 Pan-Africanism is an invented notion, but with the purpose of addressing Africa’s insecurity and underdevelopment.2 The ideal of African solidarity was first institu- tionalized in the form of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, and subsequently re-articulated in the establishment of the AU in 2002. It continues to act as the animating drive behind the AU and its commitment to regional integration. However, the first ten years of the AU reveal that the Pan-Africanist project remains predominantly a top-down affair with elites from across Africa crafting and moulding the institutions to govern the continent, often without sufficiently consulting their publics. That said, there are social movements developing across African borders, which are also fuelling Pan-Africanism from below.

In the ten years of its existence, the AU has attempted to play a contin- ental role as a norm entrepreneur, understood here as a normative leader who encourages others to uphold a range of norms for the improvement of the livelihood of people within their jurisdiction or authority. The AU

1. Hakim Adi and Marika Sherwood, Pan-African History: Political figures from Africa and the Disapora since 1787 (Routledge, London, 2003), p. vii. 2. Timothy Murithi, The African Union: Pan-Africanism, peacebuilding and development (Ashgate, Aldershot, 2005).

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has sought to advance norms related to peace and stability and to func- tion as a collective security regime. The AU Constitutive Act ascribes to the Union the right to intervene and a responsibility to protect in situa- tions of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. In terms of norms and policy this means that African countries have to agreed to pool their sovereignty to enable the AU to act as the continental guarantor and protector of the security, rights, and well-being of the African people. The African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC) was established as a legal institution of the Union through the ‘Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union’ in 2002, and in this sense the AU has undoubtedly led in promoting the norms of peace and security on the continent. Currently the AU is seeking to operationalize these norms through its peace operations in Somalia, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM, launched in 2007), its Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to the Comoros (AU-MAES, launched in 2008), and its contribution to the Joint AU-UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID, launched in 2007). In addition, Union personnel contributed towards stabilizing the situation in Burundi, through the AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB) from 2003 to 2004.

Promoting governance and development norms

Similarly, on issues relating to governance the AU has sought to establish norms to guide the behaviour of its member states. In particular, the African Union Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance is a seminal document, which has been ratified by the required fifteen member states and is accordingly a living document that outlines a range of provi- sions on how countries can improve their governance. The challenge is to ensure that these norms are actually adopted and implemented. African countries have consistently expressed their desire to regain

control of their economic development policies, in order to improve their citizens’ access to education and health care. The Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) and so-called Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) promoted and enforced by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank have had a negative impact on development. Both the IMF and the Bank have admitted that these programmes did not achieve the desired results, while the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) estimates that IMF/World Bank policies led to a 10 percent decline in economic growth in Africa.3

3. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), ‘Trade perform- ance and commodity dependence’ (UNCTAD, Geneva, 26 February 2004).

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The AU’s New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) should be understood in this context. NEPAD was conceived as the means to enable Africa to accelerate its active participation on equal terms in the international economic sphere, and was endorsed by the Group of Eight (G8) in June 2002.4 The key objectives of NEPAD include developing a viable Pan-African market economy, through infra- structure development and the promotion of intra-African trade, as well as improved access to education, training, and healthcare.5 NEPAD has now been fully integrated into the AU with a Coordinating Agency based at the Union’s headquarters in Addis Ababa.

At the African Union’s Assembly in 2002, held in Durban, the Declaration on the Implementation of NEPAD was adopted. It included a more specific ‘Declaration on Democracy, Political Economic and Corporate Governance’, which also established the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). The objectives of the APRM are to enhance African ownership of its development and governance agenda, to identify, evaluate, and disseminate best practices, and to monitor progress towards agreed goals. Member states are invited to join the APRM to participate in a self-monitoring programme with a clear timeframe for achieving certain standards of inclusive governance, premised on a commitment to accountability through peer pressure. However, as with many good inten- tions both NEPAD and the APRM have fallen short when it comes to im- plementation.6 The G8 (now the G20) have not lived up to the development promises that they made in 2002 in terms of approaching Africa as a partner rather than a patron, while critics of NEPAD argue that the programme cannot succeed because it tries to integrate Africa into a global framework of neo-liberal laissez-faire economics, which is part of the reason why the continent found itself in such a difficult eco- nomic position in the first place.7 In addition, African governments have only paid lip service to the APRM, due to its intrusive approach to do- mestic governance issues.

4. Godwin Dogbey, ‘Towards a strategic vision for a continent in distress’ in Olubenga Adesida and Arunma Oteh (eds.), African Voices, African Visions (Nordic Africa Institute, Stockholm, 2001). 5. New Partnership for Africa’s Development, ‘The African Peer Review Mechanism’ (Base Document, Sixth Summit of the NEPAD Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee, NEPAD/HSGIC/03-2003/APRM/MOU/Annex II, 9 March 2003, Abuja, Nigeria). 6. Ayesha Kajee, ‘NEPAD’s APRM: a progress report, practical limitations and challenges’ in South African Yearbook of International Affairs (South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, 2004). 7. George Monbiot, ‘At the seat of empire: Africa is forced to take the blame for the devas- tation inflicted on it by the rich world’, The Guardian, 25 June 2002 <http://www.guardian. co.uk/politics/2002/jun/25/foreignpolicy.greenpolitics?INTCMP=SRCH> (1 July 2012).

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The AU as an international actor: the voice of Africa

The continental body has a dual role of forging unity among its member states and advocating their interests internationally. During its first ten years of existence the AU’s role as an international actor has been compli- cated by the difficulty of promoting consensus among African states and then maintaining that consensus in the face of often divergent national interests. The Africa Group at the UN General Assembly works to forge consensus on key issues of Pan-African interest, such as development, trade, debt cancellation, infectious diseases, small arms and light weapons, nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, climate negotiations, trans-national crime prevention, and the election of Africans to various UN activities and bodies.8

In March 2005, the AU issued a declaration known as ‘The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations: the Ezulwini Consensus’, which highlighted issues pertaining to HIV/AIDS and security, poverty, debt, environmental degradation, trade negotia- tions, the responsibility to protect, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding.9 In addition, the AU issued a position on UN reform and in particular on the reform of the Security Council by noting that ‘in 1945, when the UN was formed, most of Africa was not represented and that in 1963, when the first reform took place, Africa was represented but was not in a particular- ly strong position’.10 It continues that ‘Africa’s goal is to be fully repre- sented in all the decision-making organs of the UN, particularly in the Security Council’.11 The Common Position enumerates what ‘full repre- sentation’ of Africa in the Security Council means by demanding ‘not less than two permanent seats with all the prerogatives and privileges of per- manent membership including the right to veto’ and ‘five non-permanent seats’.12

On paper, the AU was attempting to establish and maintain a common position, but in practice some countries, including South Africa, broke ranks with the Ezulwini Consensus and sought ways to ascend individually

8. See the statement of the Africa Group at the 11th UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, 18–25 April 2005; the statement of the Coordinator of the Africa Group to the Chemical Weapons Convention, April 2003; and the Africa Group position statement to the UN Climate Negotiations, August 1997. Controversially, in May 2004, the Africa Group submitted and successfully achieved the election of Sudan to the UN Commission on Human Rights, see Economic and Social Council, press release ECOSOC/ 6110. 9. African Union, ‘The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations: the Ezulwini Consensus’ (EXT/EX.CL/2 (VII), African Union, Addis Ababa, 7–8 March 2005). 10. Ibid., p. 9. 11. Ibid. 12. Ibid.

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to become permanent members of the Security Council. This in effect undermined efforts to demonstrate African ‘unity of purpose’. It was not the first time this had happened: time and again African countries have shown that they are unlikely to vote as a collective on matters before, or pertaining to, the Security Council – a clear indication that member states are not respecting the AU as a norm entrepreneur. Governments generally tend to adopt positions that best serve their interests, or positions that enable them to receive certain benefits from more powerful countries that ‘pick and choose’ which countries they want to work with. Malawi’s move to deny President Omar Al Bashir of Sudan access to the AU Summit, due to be hosted in Lilongwe in July 2012, is a case in point. Explaining Malawi’s reasons for taking this stance, President Joyce Banda stated that her country’s commitment to its donors, notably the United Kingdom as the largest bilateral contributor, and its desire to uphold the ICC’s Rome Statute, would not allow it to host Bashir, an alleged war criminal. The AU Commission subsequently took the decision to relocate the Summit to Addis Ababa, rather than submit to Banda’s injunction. The logic of na- tional self-interest and political realism can thus be seen to have prevailed among African countries, as well as member states at the UN.13

The AU’s discontents

Those who are discontented with the African Union acknowledge the formal existence of unity, but fault the genuineness of its Pan-African commitment and its achievements. This is evident at several levels. While the political and business elite, as well civil society actors, who work across borders, are often supportive of Pan-African interaction and soli- darity, the vast majority of citizens across the continent do not know that the AU exists. For this silent majority, Pan-Africanism is not yet a lived experience. Stringent visa restrictions, for example, remain in place, making a mockery of the notion of unity as citizens from African coun- tries are deported from other African countries. Freedom of movement to and from the headquarters of the African Union in Addis Ababa, in par- ticular, should not be constrained by visa restrictions on African citizens, and the AU leadership should commit in principle to removing visa restrictions on the travel of African citizens across borders.

At its inception the AU waxed lyrically about its commitment to reach- ing out and engaging civil society. Its founding document, the Constitutive Act, is unambiguous in its commitment ‘to build a partner- ship between governments and all segments of civil society’ and to

13. Currently there is no systematic analysis of the history of the voting record of the Africa Group.

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promote the ‘participation of the African peoples in the activities of the Union’.14 However, ten years on, it is clear that the AU has mainly paid lip service to empowering African citizens to engage and influence their states.15 This is particularly evident in the difficulties faced by African civil society organizations that seek to engage the AU in Addis Ababa, as well as its liaison offices around the continent. The regional economic communities (RECs) are another issue where

genuine Pan-Africanism is challenged. The RECs have often positioned themselves as countervailing focal points for collective action and the AU has yet to ensure effective coordination, particularly on issues pertaining to peace, security, governance, the rule of law, citizen participation, and development. The AU and the RECs need to increase their level of inter- action and communication in order to ensure effective coordination and collective action. The AU has also faced criticism for being lethargic and slow in

responding to crisis and conflict situations across the continent.16 This is due to the administrative bottlenecks that constrain the emergence of a culture of professionalism and efficiency, particularly within the AU Commission. These administrative challenges also undermine the morale of AU staff in its various offices around the continent and ultimately affects the AU’s ability to engage member states, African citizens, and partners effectively. In the pursuit of its peace and security interventions the AU has not

always seen eye-to-eye with the UN, the International Criminal Court (ICC) or NATO. The UN Security Council’s referral of the President of Sudan to the ICC for alleged war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide in Darfur in 2009 precipitated a tense stand-off between the AU and the ICC, which is yet to be resolved. In the interest of peace and se- curity, it is essential that the relationship between the AU and these key international organizations is improved.

Conclusion

At its tenth anniversary, the African Union remains, at its core, a dispar- ate collection of nation states that recognizes the value of collective action and solidarity on a range of regional and international issues. The AU,

14. African Union, Constitutive Act of the African Union (African Union, Lome, 2000), preamble. 15. Mammo Muchie, Adam Habib, and V. Panayachee, ‘African integration and civil society: the case of the African Union’, Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa 61, 1 (2006), pp. 3–24. 16. Sadiki Koko and Martha Bakwesegha-Osula, ‘Assessing the African Union’s response to the Libyan crisis’, Conflict Trends 1 (2012), pp. 3–15.

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since it holds primary responsibility for establishing and operationalizing the continent’s peace and security architecture, has become the leading norm entrepreneur on issues pertaining to peace, security, democracy, and development on the continent. However, this role is tempered by the primary character that continues to define the constituents of the Westphalian system, namely the self-interest of nation states and the per- sistence of political realism in their day-to-day interactions. A decade after its establishment, the AU is only just beginning to assert its voice in the international system. Even though the AU is not always taken serious- ly by its interlocutors and powerful countries in the global north, it is laying the foundation to empower its member states to play a more pro- active role in international relations. The AU has emerged as a home- grown initiative to take the destiny of the continent into the hands of the African people. However, there is a long way to go before the AU’s role as a norm entrepreneur is actualized and its vision and mission realized. The injunction that the great Pan-Africanist Kwame Nkrumah bequeathed to subsequent generations continues to animate the African Union and is still valid: ‘Africa must unite, or disintegrate individually.’17

17. Kwame Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite (Heinemann, London, 1963).

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