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Administrative Profi le

William M. Leavitt is associate

professor in the Department of Urban

Studies and Public Administration at Old

Dominion University. His teaching and

research interests are in the areas of

customer service and service delivery, public

sector pay, human resource management,

organizational design, social marketing, and

business process reengineering.

E-mail: [email protected]

General Douglas MacArthur: Supreme Public Administrator of Post–World War II Japan 315

Public Administration Review,

Vol. 75, Iss. 2, pp. 315–324. © 2015 by

The American Society for Public Administration.

DOI: 10.1111/puar.12326.

W. Henry Lambright, Editor

William M. Leavitt Old Dominion University

Abstract: Th is article examines General Douglas MacArthur’s six years as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in post–World War II Japan. MacArthur was appointed by President Harry S. Truman in 1945 to preside over and administer the reconstruction of postwar Japan. No American serving in the role of a public administrator has ever had a more diffi cult task than the one MacArthur took on in Japan. At the end of World War II, Japan was devas- tated, and the entire population faced starvation. MacArthur’s administrative style and his successes and failures in Japan are examined in this Administrative Profi le. Fifty years after his death, the infl uence of MacArthur’s policies during his tenure as Supreme Commander are still felt in Japan.

the Allied Powers, but in eff ect, he was the supreme public administrator of Japan for six years follow- ing the end of the war. As MacArthur recalled in his memoirs, “Th e pattern of government was unique in modern annals. I, as a professional soldier, had the civil responsibility and absolute control over almost 80 million people, and I would maintain that control until Japan had once more demonstrated that it was ready, willing, and able to become a responsible mem- ber of the family of free nations” (1964, 280–81). Winning a war is one thing; it is clear when the mis- sion is accomplished. Winning the peace is an entirely diff erent matter—it is, as Rittel and Weber (1973) defi ned it, a “wicked problem.” It is not clear how to defi ne winning the peace, and it is diffi cult to know when the task is accomplished.

Japan offi cially surrendered on September 2, 1945, which brought an end to World War II. At the end of the war, Japan was in very bad shape. Sixty-six major cities had been heavily bombed during the war, including the fi rebombing of Tokyo and the destruc- tion of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by atomic bombs. Every major city was described as a “wilderness of

rubble.” Between two million and three million people had lost their lives, and that number included around 600,000 civil- ians who were killed in the air raids, the fi ghting on Okinawa, and the atomic bombings. Th ere was little phone or train service, and virtually no power plants were in operation. Cities

General Douglas MacArthur: Supreme Public Administrator of Post–World War II Japan

Could I have but a line a century hence credit- ing a contribution to the advance of peace, I would yield every honor which has been accorded by war.

—General Douglas MacArthur

The year 2014 marked the fi ftieth anniversary of the death of General Douglas MacArthur. He was granted more authority and discre- tion serving in the role of a public administrator than the nation has ever seen or is likely to see again. MacArthur’s role as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) in Japan at the end of World War II was not only an administrative one but one that also involved political, policy, and leadership responsibilities. Th is profi le is not intended as a com- plete recounting of MacArthur’s six years as Supreme Commander; historians have written volumes about MacArthur and postwar Japan. Rather, it is intended to highlight MacArthur’s style and administrative accomplishments in Japan during his tenure.

Japan in the twenty-fi rst century is a prosperous, democratic country with the world’s third-largest economy. Th e path to Japan’s success as a democratic nation and economic powerhouse began with the occupation of Japan in 1945 at the end of World War II. General Douglas MacArthur’s offi cial title was Supreme Commander for

General Douglas MacArthur’s offi cial title was Supreme

Commander for the Allied Powers, but in eff ect, he was the supreme public administrator of Japan for six years following the

end of the war.

316 Public Administration Review • March | April 2015

fought in France during World War I with the Rainbow Division and won every medal the army had for bravery (Valley 2000, 7). He rose to the rank of brigadier general and later took command of the division. After World War I, MacArthur had a number of oppor- tunities to hone his administrative skills, fi rst serving as the superintendent of West Point from 1919 to 1922, where he launched the basis for modern offi cer training, and later serving as chief of staff for the army in 1930. At West Point, he introduced some important innovations, such as an increased emphasis

on liberal arts and codifi cation of the Cadet Honor System. Th ere is general agreement, according to James (1970, 294), that MacArthur led West Point across the threshold into the world of modern military education. As chief of staff , he surrounded himself with bright, young offi cers; two of them, Dwight Eisenhower and George Patton, would later ascend to greater prominence. At that time, MacArthur was “easy-going, loquacious, and enjoyed intellectual challenge” (Harvey 2006, 197).

MacArthur’s tenure as chief of staff of the army was marred by one severe blunder. A large group of World War I veterans, the “Bonus Marchers,” as they were called, intended to ask Congress for the immediate payment of bonuses promised to them for service in the war. President Herbert Hoover ordered the army to restore order, and MacArthur took personal charge, although there was no real reason for him to do so. Th e Bonus Marchers were bloodlessly removed by the army troops, but MacArthur equated the veterans with communists in a press conference following the incident. Th e American public sympathized with the pathetic veterans, and MacArthur received a blemish to his image that he never quite lived down (Eisenhower 2012, 105; James 1970, 404).

When World War II broke out in 1941, MacArthur was commander of the army in the Far East and was stationed in the Philippines. He was acknowledged as one of the army’s most perceptive and experi- enced authorities on the Far East, but he badly misjudged the mili- tary potentiality of Japan and the Philippines (James 1970, 4). Th e destruction of the U.S. Army Air Force at Clark Field was the gravest defeat of MacArthur’s career (Masuda 2012, 38). Although there was certainly enough blame to go around, the defeat in the Philippines was regarded as MacArthur’s defeat, leaving a stain on his brilliant military career. Certainly the performance of Major Orrin Grover of the V Interceptor Command was a source of bewilderment to his pilots, who were not ordered to intercept the incoming Japanese aircraft that destroyed many planes on the ground at Clark Field (Bartsch 2003, 420). Unlike the case of the Pearl Harbor attack, no offi cial investigation was ever conducted to determine the causes and to allocate responsibility for the Clark and Iba Field disasters, despite the fact that the loss was similar to that of Hawaii.

MacArthur was forced out of the Philippines by the Japanese army in 1941. President Franklin D. Roosevelt ordered him to turn over command to General Jonathan Wainwright and depart for Australia, as it would have been a disaster to have America’s most recognizable general captured by the Japanese. MacArthur turned his humiliating departure into a media triumph by dramatizing the

and factories were gutt ed, and the entire population faced starvation. Not one of the four Japanese home islands was capable of feeding or supplying its population with the necessities of life. Approximately nine million Japanese were homeless. Japan had lost its supply of raw materials, most of which had been brought in from outside the country. Virtually all of Japan’s merchant marine fl eet had been destroyed. Th e transportation system was in complete shambles. Making matters even worse, six million Japanese were brought home from all parts of Asia, adding many more mouths to feed (Allinson 2004; Dower 1999; Harvey 2006; MacArthur 1964; Rinjiro 2001). MacArthur referred to Japanese industrial activity and output at the beginning of the occupation as “zero.” Six days after the formal surrender, MacArthur rode into the capital. He recalled, “It was just 22 miles from the New Grand Hotel in Yokohama to the American Embassy, which was to be my home throughout the occupation, but they were 22 miles of devastation and vast piles of charred rubble” (1964, 280).

It was not just the physical damage that posed a problem for the occupation. As D. Clayton James put it, “Besides the heavy war casualties, physical ruination, and economic crisis, the plight of Japan was aggravated by a breakdown in social order and morale” (1985, 5). MacArthur refl ected that “[i]t was not merely the over- throw of their military might—it was the collapse of a faith, it was the disintegration of everything they believed in and lived by and fought for. It left a complete vacuum, morally, mentally, and physi- cally” (1964, 310). Rovere and Schlesinger wrote of postwar Japan, “Th e overpowering need was for faith, for a mystique, for a moral revival in the midst of moral collapse. Th e powerful and dedicated fi gure of MacArthur fi lled that need, as probably no other American general could have fi lled it” (1951, 95).

Douglas MacArthur’s Background Douglas Arthur MacArthur was born in Little Rock, Arkansas, on January 26, 1880, where his father, Arthur MacArthur, was posted in the U.S. Army. Douglas MacArthur graduated from West Point in 1903 at the top of his class; his score on the general merit role was one of the highest in the history of the academy (Eisenhower 2012; James 1970). Douglas MacArthur admired and emulated his father, who was seen as a national hero for his service in the Civil War. In the Union victory at Franklin, Colonel MacArthur was credited with leading his troops in a desperate resistance and was carried from the fi eld unconscious with bullet holes through his chest and leg (Whitney 1956). Th e action for which Arthur MacArthur ultimately received the Medal of Honor occurred on November 25, 1863, at Missionary Ridge near Chattanooga. As the military governor of the Philippines, General Arthur MacArthur “had achieved such popularity among the Filipinos that he had developed a remarkable closeness to them. Th at emotional attach- ment had been inherited by the son” (Eisenhower 2012, 100). In fact, Douglas and Arthur MacArthur are the only father-and-son combination to have won the Congressional Medal of Honor.

Many of Douglas MacArthur’s early army assignments took him to the Far East, including a tour of duty in Tokyo in 1905. MacArthur

MacArthur had a number of opportunities to hone his

administrative skills, fi rst serv- ing as the superintendent of

West Point from 1919 to 1922, where he launched the basis for

modern offi cer training, and later serving as chief of staff for

the army in 1930.

General Douglas MacArthur: Supreme Public Administrator of Post–World War II Japan 317

In addition to his duties as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan, MacArthur served as the American military com- mander in the Far East (James 1985). In 1950, when the North Korean army invaded South Korea, MacArthur assumed yet another role as commander of the newly created United Nations forces in South Korea. Despite initial successes, the entrance of Chinese forces into the confl ict resulted in a stalemate and a permanent division of the North and South Koreas. MacArthur was relieved of his command by an exasperated President Truman in April 1951. It was primarily his ego rather than his tactical performance that brought about his downfall, according to Eisenhower (2012, 112). MacArthur claimed publicly that he had “won” the Korean War and that Communist China had started a “brand-new” war. His insubordination attained new heights with his very public views that the war should be expanded to include an invasion of Communist China.

When MacArthur was relieved of command of the Korean War and simultaneously relieved of his command of the Japanese occupa- tion, his Japanese admirers were thunderstruck. Crowds lined the streets of Tokyo to say farewell, and handmade signs in English read, “We love you General MacArthur” (Rinjiro 2001, xii). MacArthur returned to the United States to a hero’s welcome and ticker-tape parade in New York. He settled in Washington, D.C., for a time, and later, he and his wife Jean moved to New York City, where he was elected chairman of Remington Rand, a manufacturer of typewriters and early computers. He also devoted much of his time to writing his memoirs.

MacArthur died in Washington, D.C., on April 5, 1964, at the age of 84. He was honored with a state funeral and was buried at the Douglas MacArthur Memorial in Norfolk, Virginia. Th e memo- rial is not only the resting place of MacArthur and his wife but also home to a museum collection that documents his life and military service.1

MacArthur in Postwar Japan President Truman, who actually had a very strong dislike of Douglas MacArthur, appointed MacArthur as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan on August 15, 1945. Th e feeling was probably mutual. Brigadier General Charles West, who was on MacArthur’s headquarters staff in 1945–46 as a fi rst lieutenant, commented, “I think the whole thing was that he [MacArthur] just didn’t respect Truman as anything but a cheap Kansas City politi- cian. I don’t think he recognized that Harry Truman in his own way was truly a brilliant politician” (1977, 51). Th e president’s decision to select MacArthur to head the Japanese occupation was apparently determined on the basis of the most experienced and best-qualifi ed offi cer available for the job; the British, Russian, and Chinese allies agreed with the choice (James 1975, 776).

MacArthur was at his headquarters in Manila when he was told that he would be named Supreme Commander and would receive the Japanese surrender (Finn 1992). MacArthur’s job as SCAP was to carry out the harsh terms of the surrender established at the Potsdam Conference (Willoughby and Chamberlain 1954, 300). Th e initial guidelines of the occupation policy were loose and unclear. Th ey were summarized in a key sentence of Washington’s Initial Post-Surrender Directive: “Disarmament and demilitarization

hazards of the trip from Corregidor; upon landing in Australia, he declared grandly, “I have come through from Corregidor and I shall return” (Eisenhower 2012, 107). In Australia, he began to organize the Allied response in the Pacifi c to the Japanese invasions.

MacArthur served as the commander of army forces in the Southwest Pacifi c area until the end of the war in 1945. D. Clayton James, author of the defi nitive biography of Douglas MacArthur in three volumes, stated in the foreword to Th e Years of MacArthur, volume II, 1941–1945, that never was MacArthur’s contradictory nature more vividly apparent than during World War II. James observed that during the war,

[MacArthur e]ngaged in acts of rare courage, yet at other times refused to visit combat areas for long periods; he will gain both the Medal of Honor and the scurrilous nickname of “Dugout Doug.” He will decide and act on strategic moves with brilliance and boldness on some occasions, yet display inexplicable hesitancy at other times. He will shrewdly bypass enemy strong points, but later demand their seizure despite their uselessness. He will achieve remarkable military results with relatively meager logistical support, while misusing and wasting his resources when they were later augmented. He will show intense concern over keeping his forces’ casualties as low as possible, yet will relentlessly compel his fi eld com- manders to assault some objectives which could have been enveloped. He will develop cordial, harmonious relations with certain admirals at the same time that he will charge the Navy’s leadership with conspiring against him and his theater’s interests. He will display amazing fl exibility in his thinking on the uses of air, naval, and amphibious forces, but will remain within the narrow, conventional bounds of the “old Army” thinking on some matters of strategy, tactics, and logistics. He will adjust to and work eff ectively with the socialist leaders of the Australian Labor ministry while himself remaining a political conservative as staunch in his convictions as Hoover. He will be extremely sensitive about his public image, but will blunder repeatedly in press and public relations. He will prove to be a skilled administrator who can organize and inspire his headquarters personnel to maximum eff orts, yet at the same time coddle some inept staff offi cers and permit Sutherland [his chief of staff at the time] to become a virtual Rasputin. He will diligently endeavor to turn over civil aff airs to the Commonwealth offi cials as rapidly as Philippine areas are liberated, but will become thoroughly embroiled in the cauldron of Philippine politics. A fi rm believer and expounder of spiritual and moral values, he will avoid formal religious services and will engage in mendacious, face-saving schemes. He will demand the utmost loyalty and obedience from his subordinates, yet will be continuously critical of the decisions of his superiors, the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff , and will sometimes defy their directives. (1975, viii–ix)

President Harry S. Truman appointed MacArthur as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan at the end of the war, and he served in that capacity for six years. Once MacArthur was appointed as Supreme Commander in 1945, it was no longer politi- cally feasible to hold him accountable for the early years of the war or the Philippines disaster (Bartsch 2003, 423).

318 Public Administration Review • March | April 2015

formal surrender, and ended in April 1952, which was almost twice as long as the war itself. At the beginning of the occupation, the people of Japan had no civil liberties, no civil rights, and no habeas corpus. Instead, they had been given the absolute obligation to obey orders (Manchester 1978, 462). During the occupation, Japan had no sovereignty and no diplomatic relations (Dower 1999). On August 30, 1945, General Douglas MacArthur stepped off his command plane, the Bataan, at Atsugi air base 30 miles south- west of Tokyo. MacArthur ordered his party to take off their guns before the airplane landed. He believed the arrival of the Americans unarmed would make it less likely that they would be attacked. Th e dangers of landing with minimal protection at Atsugi airfi eld, where 300,000 well-armed Japanese troops had been based, was only too apparent and against the advice of his staff . Commenting later to his staff , MacArthur stated, “In the Orient, the man who shows no fear is master. I count on the Japanese people to protect me” (Manchester 1978, 477). Th e Japanese historian Kazuo Kawai wrote that MacArthur’s arrival was “[a]n exhibition of cool personal courage, it was even more a gesture of trust in the good faith of the Japanese. It was a masterpiece of psychology, which completely disarmed Japanese apprehensions. From that moment, whatever danger there might have been of a fanatic attack on the Americans vanished in a wave of Japanese admiration and gratitude” (quoted in Finn 1992, 8).

MacArthur had been given sole charge of a country of more than 80 million people with a unique tradition of deference to authority and hierarchy. He was the fi rst foreign ruler and occupier in 2,000 years of Japanese history. Major General Courtney Whitney stressed the magnitude of the task facing MacArthur in Japan at the time of the surrender. He noted,

It would be impossible to exaggerate the magnitude and complexities of the task which confronted MacArthur in that autumn of 1945. Here was a nation living in the twentieth century but feudalistic in virtually every other respect. Under an ancient and entrenched political system, Japan was ruled by an Emperor claiming absolute power by divine right as a direct descendant of the Sun Goddess. His dictatorial authority was exercised through a triple oligarchy of military, bureaucratic, and economic cliques. Fundamental human rights were nonexistent. Th e masses of the people—the peas- ants, the workers, and the small shopkeepers—were exploited arbitrarily and tyrannically . . . Japan, as MacArthur himself put it, was “something out of the pages of mythology.” (1956, 241)

MacArthur was Japan’s new shogun, and he charged himself with the task of transforming a warlike despotism into a modern democratic state. Historian John Gunther wrote in 1951,

In blunt fact MacArthur’s authority is so great and his powers so sweeping that he is the actual ruler of Japan. Th e manner of

this rule is often indirect, and a semitransparent façade is care- fully maintained behind which Japanese authority is exerted in many fi elds, but MacArthur is in fact the all powerful boss of 83,000,000 Japanese, and will remain so until a peace

are the primary tasks of the military occupation and shall be car- ried out promptly and with determination” (Sebald and Brines 1965, 41). As Moore and Robinson observed, “In theory, the Occupation was undertaken and directed by the Allied powers that had fought Japan. In fact, it was almost entirely an American operation, dominated by the personality of MacArthur. As SCAP, MacArthur’s mission was to implement American policy as defi ned by the Potsdam Declaration and Washington’s policy directives. But seldom did MacArthur simply implement orders from Washington; if he disagreed, he would interpret, protest, or simply ignore them” (2002, 33).

It was very clear that MacArthur was not a man to want much guidance from Washington, and he indicated that he himself would interpret general policies such as the Potsdam Declaration, “which is broad and capable of varied interpretation” (Finn 1992, 33). Th e tactics actually used by SCAP during the occupation were predomi- nantly developed on the ground in Japan (Ward 1987, 415).

Th e United States attempted to confi ne its allies to a strictly advisory role in the occupation of Japan, but, as Moore and Robinson (2002) pointed out, the Soviet Union and Great Britain were bent on establishing multinational bodies with Soviet, British, and Chinese vetoes over occupation policies and close monitoring of SCAP performance. Moore and Robinson noted that “[t]o MacArthur, these commissions and councils were irritants. He treated them with diplomatic cordiality, at best. When they sought to interfere with his prerogatives, he administered a dose of arch disdain or defi ance, as the occasion required” (2002, 6). William Sebald, the U.S. ambas- sador to Japan, wrote, “A less resolute commander doubtless would have succumbed to the constant pressure against him. If this had happened, the occupation itself might well have been a complete fi asco” (Sebald and Brines 1965, 127). Some allies, including Joseph Stalin, expressed concern that the occupation of Japan was too “soft” and demanded that MacArthur be replaced by a four-power com- mission that would then impose harsher conditions on the Japanese. Th e establishment of the Far Eastern Commission and the Allied Council for Japan were American concessions to Allied demands for a political voice. However, cooperation among the allies on the Allied Council was diffi cult, and they had very little impact on the occupation.

MacArthur used two government structures to administer the occupation. Th e fi rst was his general headquarters, located in Tokyo, with approximately 5,000 American personnel, both military and civilian. Th e Japanese government was responsible for implementing orders and policy directives issued by general headquarters staff . Th e second structure was the U.S. Eighth Army, which was headquar- tered in Yokohama with units based near all major cities in Japan. Th e Eighth Army constituted the real occupying force in Japan (General Staff of Douglas MacArthur 1994; Moore and Robinson 2002).

Th e most pressing problems in Japan were of a military, logisti- cal, and organizational nature, which seemed to rule out a civilian authority. Th e war in the Pacifi c lasted less than four years. Th e occupation of Japan began in late August 1945, just before the

MacArthur was Japan’s new shogun, and he charged himself with the task of transforming a warlike despotism into a mod-

ern democratic state.

General Douglas MacArthur: Supreme Public Administrator of Post–World War II Japan 319

showmanship that invited sneers, but was suited to modern leadership as well as to enhancing his public reputation when the media had become all-important for the fi rst time. He knew and cared about Japan and Asia. He had a huge reserve of charismatic idealism and genuinely believed he could reform Japanese society from top to bottom. (2006, 324)

MacArthur was also a pragmatist who was well aware that if he was to have a quiet and peaceful administration, American impe- rial arrogance was not the right approach. Considering that MacArthur was a main American commander in one of the most savage campaigns in military history, he displayed a truly amazing gentleness in his initial occupation policy toward the defeated

nation of Japan. MacArthur wanted the Japanese to regard him as a protector, not as a conqueror (Manchester 1978). He wanted to win “the hearts and minds” of the Japanese people, which was no easy task. Propaganda by the Japanese government during the war had instilled a fear in the Japanese population that if the Americans ever won the war, they would kill, mutilate, torture, and rape Japanese civilians. Japanese fears soon dissolved after initial contact with American troops (Neville 1991). Th e Japanese people discovered that the GIs were generous and aff ectionate. Th ey also learned that MacArthur had ordered a fi ve-year jail sentence for any American caught slapping a Japanese citizen. “Th at,” one man told Gunther, “was when we knew we had lost the war” (1951, 92). MacArthur expected that occupation troops in Japan would conduct them- selves in a manner that showed respect for the Japanese people, and they did exactly as he expected. He refused to adhere to a War Department missive to restrict fraternization and encouraged American soldiers to meet and mingle with the people of Japan (Kinni and Kinni 2005, 134). MacArthur did, however, note in his memoirs, “I cautioned our troops from the start that by their conduct our own country would be judged in world opinion, that success or failure of the occupation could well rest upon their poise and self-restraint” (1964, 283).

MacArthur hardly ever summoned the Japanese to meet with him. He almost invariably let the Japanese take the initiative if they wanted to see him. MacArthur vetoed suggestions that he sum- mon the emperor to appear before him—better the patience of the East than the haste of the West. He said that, in time, the emperor would come to him, if only out of curiosity (Manchester 1978, 467). During his fi rst four months in Japan, he met with only 19 Japanese, and few of those more than once (James 1985).

Clearly, MacArthur could be considered a remote and secluded leader. Th is was deliberate on his part. He understood that his regal low profi le, austerity, and remoteness would make a powerful impression on the Japanese people. “He displayed a thoroughly un- American formality and lack of approachability and was regaled as an oriental despot in return” (Harvey 2006, 327). In the opinion of Robert Textor, who served as an information and education offi cer during the occupation, MacArthur’s aloof stance was not only one that came naturally, but also one that he should have taken even if it had not come naturally. As Textor observed, “Given the Japanese political culture at the time, his very unreachability gave him

treaty is signed. Powers of this formidable nature are unique in American history and it is a tribute to MacArthur that he used them with such moderation. (15–16)

It seemed that in 1945, almost everyone wanted vengeance on the Japanese. In Gallup polls at the time, a third of all Americans favored executing Emperor Hirohito without trial, while the majority favored convicting him as a war criminal. Attitudes of some elected offi cials were even more extreme, urging sterilization of all Japanese and denouncing the Japanese as “savage apes” and “bestial Japs” (Harvey 2006, 331). As MacArthur noted, there were vehement media campaigns in the United States, as well as in Russia and Australia, against retention of the emperor. Calls in the press asked for Hirohito and his family, and the complete Japanese government, to be “stamped out” (MacArthur 1964, 280). MacArthur strongly disagreed. He believed the emperor was essential to maintaining stability in Japan. Th e occupation, he felt, could not govern against the emperor, only through the emperor. MacArthur won this argument, and the emperor was retained. Th e cooperation of the Japanese people and government was assured once the continuity of Hirohito’s reign was established. However, though the emperor continued to reign, it was MacArthur who ruled (Willoughby and Chamberlain 1954, 305).

MacArthur’s own views were certainly not in line with the prevail- ing opinions about the treatment of the Japanese. During the fi rst week of the occupation, MacArthur made it clear that he was not concerned with how to keep Japan down but rather how to get the nation on its feet again (Whitney 1956, 242). Harvey, refl ecting on MacArthur’s views, noted,

Only a military man could have shown such wholesale contempt for the views of the country he served: MacArthur stood foursquare against most public and congressional opinion in the United States; he was trading, to a great extent, on his immense wartime reputation: it confused many con- servatives in America that the very man most responsible for victory in the Pacifi c War, and a man admired as an opponent of New Dealers within the administration should hold such conciliatory views toward the Japanese. (2006, 332–33)

The MacArthur Style MacArthur was decisive, high profi le, and likely to impress the Japanese, who were not used to more democratic fi gures. He was commanding in both stature and personality and rarely displayed doubt in his ideas or uncertainty in his actions; he also possessed a remarkable memory (Finn 1992). Harvey observed,

MacArthur was a man of towering virtues and dizzying defects. He was an authoritarian fi gure, unusual for an American, which served him in immense good stead in a country like Japan. He had tremendous physical courage. He was undoubtedly one of the great military strategists and commanders of the Second World War. He possessed superb organizational qualities, which were suited to a country in the immediate aftermath of defeat. He had a theatrical sense of

MacArthur was also a prag- matist who was well aware

that if he was to have a quiet and peaceful administration, American imperial arrogance was not the right approach.

320 Public Administration Review • March | April 2015

with the most diffi cult situation of my life. Power is one thing. Th e problem of how to administer it is another. My professional military knowledge was no longer a major factor. I had to be an economist, a political scientist, an engineer, a manufacturing executive, a teacher, even a theologian of sorts” (1964, 281).

Much of the success of the occupation can be attributed to the work of the SCAP staff in Japan. Th ey performed the majority of the important work in developing programs and policies for MacArthur’s approval (Willoughby and Chamberlain 1954, 343). Th e turnover in SCAP jobs during the early occupation was severe. Brigadier General Crawford Sams, MD, who was close to MacArthur and served on his staff as a colonel in charge of the Public Health and Welfare Section during the occupation, noted that once you showed MacArthur that you knew your business and could get the work done and were loyal to the policies he established, then he would ask you to stay on (Sams 1971, 40). Th ere was, of course, some confl ict and diff erence of opinion among the staff , particularly on major policy issues, such as the development of a new constitution for Japan. It was MacArthur’s job to sort out the various views and then make his own determina- tion (Sackton 1982, 12).

MacArthur’s Successes and Failures in Postwar Japan MacArthur understood that he needed to act quickly to create stability in Japan as his fi rst priority, which is why he determined that the emperor system must stay and refused to allow interfer- ence from the Allied Council. MacArthur, however, seemed to have a clear understanding of the limitations of his power. He astutely observed,

Nothing that was good in the new Japanese government was going to be done because I imposed it, or because of fear of me and what I represented. Any change pressed home on those grounds would last only as long as I lasted. Th e minute I left Japan, so would the changes. Th ese things had to come from the Japanese themselves, and they had to come because the Japanese sincerely wanted them. (1964, 294)

MacArthur also believed that the occupation should end as soon as possible. History had taught him that the longer an occupation extended, the greater the odds of failure. By 1947, MacArthur had begun calling for a peace treaty and Japan’s return to the community of nations. He said, “Th ere should be no bayonet control of Nippon once the peace terms have been arranged” (Kinni and Kinni 2005, 135).

Th e American occupation “cracked open the authoritarian structures of the old society in a manner that permitted unprecedented indi- vidual freedom and unanticipated forms of popular expression to fl ourish” (Dower 1999, 84). MacArthur’s priorities were as follows:

First destroy the military power. Punish war criminals. Build the structure of representative government. Modernize the constitution. Hold free elections. Enfranchise women. Release political prisoners. Liberate the farmers. Establish a free labor movement. Encourage a free economy. Abolish police oppres- sion. Develop a free and responsible press. Liberalize educa- tion. Decentralize political power. And separate church from state.2 (MacArthur 1964, 283)

maximal charisma, and hence tremendous infl uence over political, economic, and sociocultural change processes” (1991, 153). Th e disadvantage of this remoteness was that MacArthur had no direct opportunity to observe events at the grassroots level. MacArthur made up for this to some extent by familiarizing himself with his command through voracious reading and close, shrewd questioning of visitors. According to Whitney (1956, 230), he knew how to use his staff , how to cross-examine visitors, and how to glean informa- tion by scanning offi cial documents. He never used the phone at work and did not have a deputy, a secretary, or a personal assistant. MacArthur worked seven days a week and, often, a 10- to 12-hour day. He even worked Christmases and his own birthdays, and he never took a vacation. In the fi ve years between V-J Day and the Korean War, he only left Tokyo twice (Manchester 1978, 476). He had no hobbies, except his reading, and few diversions except mov- ies in his embassy home.

In terms of MacArthur’s administrative skills, Finn (1992) noted that running big military operations was one of his strong points. General Dwight Eisenhower, who had served under MacArthur earlier in his career, said that he was “deeply grateful for the administrative experi- ence he gained under General MacArthur” (James 1985, 564). Each day usually began for MacArthur with a tight schedule of appoint- ments. He met with a variety of church leaders, businessmen, politi- cians, media people, and administration offi cials from the United States, and he was available to meet with some high-ranking Japanese offi cials. His aides usually tried to brief him ahead of time about his visitors, and they were often surprised by how much MacArthur already knew about the person or the subject of the visit (Whitney 1956). MacArthur entertained visitors at lunch about three times a week at his home in the American Embassy. During the lunches, “he was absolutely magnifi cent, complete charmer. And he was a good listener as well as a good speaker. He used the lunches to completely capture the visitors” (Sackton 1982, 14).

MacArthur enlisted the aid of many outside experts, both military and civilian, to study the major problems of the occupation, to make recommendations, and to propose strategies to resolve the problems. MacArthur’s method for making decisions involved thinking out loud. He would walk back and forth in his offi ce and the adjacent rooms with his hands clasped behind his back, talk- ing continuously and weighing the pros and cons of a decision he needed to make (West 1977, 60). MacArthur delegated freely to his senior staff and held few staff meetings (Finn 1992). MacArthur may have depended on and trusted his staff , but he relied on his own judgment as well. Lieutenant General Frank Sackton, who served as secretary to MacArthur’s staff , observed that “General MacArthur was a very unusual person, not the typical army general. He had very strong views, rooted in his knowledge of the Far East because he had been a student for many years of the Far East. When staff work was prepared for him on subjects of substance involv- ing the Japanese government and Japan, sometimes he would not accept the consensus of the staff , but move in a direction of his own” (1982, 4). To MacArthur, according to Frazier Hunt, “Issues automatically became moral issues, his decisions resting on the sim- ple test of what is right and what is wrong” (1954, 439). MacArthur had a passion for social justice and contempt for advocates of white supremacy (Manchester 1978, 479, 503). MacArthur noted in his memoirs, “Because I had been given so much power, I was faced

General Douglas MacArthur: Supreme Public Administrator of Post–World War II Japan 321

nation had to be disarmed and the people fed. Having taken the necessary measures to cope with the immediate postwar emergency and set the country on the road to recovery, MacArthur embarked with “dictatorial vigor” on an ambitious program of transforming a whole nation.

Dealing with the Russians and the emergence of communism in Japan became a major headache for MacArthur. Th e Soviet Union was a most unwelcome ally in Japan from MacArthur’s perspec- tive. He had no intention of allowing the Soviets to interfere with his programs. Stalin demanded a Russian occupation zone on the Japanese island of Hokkaido, a demand rejected by both President Truman and MacArthur (James 1985; Sebald and Brines 1965; Valley 2000). One of MacArthur’s major tasks would be to halt communist expansion in Japan, a task that was successfully accom- plished in due time.3

Another major undertaking was the repatriation of hundreds of thousands of Japanese soldiers who were located in a huge semicir- cle from Manchuria and China to the Solomons, and among the islands of the central and southwest Pacifi c. James noted,

MacArthur masterminded the vast repatriation program, which, though marred by some cases of delay, confusion, mistreatment, lost belongings, undue over-crowding, and outbreaks of disease, was all in all, planned well and carried out rapidly and effi ciently. It was a logistical accomplishment of gigantic proportions, and as a humanitarian achievement it earned for MacArthur and his forces continuing grateful remembrance in millions of Japanese and other Asian homes. (1985, 3:90)

Along with the repatriation came the demobilization of the Japanese war machine. Again, like repatriation, the demobilization was a dif- fi cult undertaking with more than six million Japanese under arms. Th e eff ort was coordinated under MacArthur’s command, but it was the Japanese themselves who performed the task (Valley 2000). SCAP’s General Order No. 1 directed that Japanese commanders be charged with the disarmament of Japanese troops. MacArthur explained to his troubled staff that it was a matter of face. If the Japanese troops were humiliated, they would cause trouble later (Manchester 1978, 467).

MacArthur’s most important reform was the Japanese constitution. Th e order to revise the Japanese constitution did not come from MacArthur’s superiors in Washington. Th e decision to proceed with constitutional reform was MacArthur’s, and he insisted on four

basic principles. Th e emperor could stay as head of state, but he must be responsible to the people and exercise no political power. Feudal institutions, such as the peerage, had to be abolished and a representa- tive legislature established. Th e budget was to be patterned after the British system. And, fi nally, war and the possession of armed forces were to be proscribed (Masuda 2012). A bill of rights was drawn up that enshrined freedom of speech, thought, religion, assembly, and the press. Discrimination was outlawed, and universal suff rage was intro- duced. Women were given the right to vote and the right to choose their husbands as well as to divorce. Few could have guessed how well

In terms of encouraging a free economy, MacArthur intended to promote a wide distribution of income among the Japanese as well as provide the opportunity for wider ownership of the means of production and trade (Finn 1992, 40). Great leaders share at least one common characteristic: they are driven by a vision and are passionate about the mission they have set for themselves and their organization. MacArthur was very clear with the Japanese as to his intentions. MacArthur presented to Shidehara Kijuro, Japan’s fi rst postwar prime minister, a short paper listing fi ve basic reforms he wanted instituted as rapidly as possible. Th e fi ve reforms were to give women the right to vote, encourage labor unions and child labor protections, create a more liberal education system, eliminate secret inquisitions, and promote a wide distribution of income and ownership of production. MacArthur pursued these goals with passion and unwavering determination to change the direction of Japanese history.

MacArthur noted in his memoirs that one of the things that made the occupation a success was his insistence that Americans both learn from and teach the Japanese (1964, 283). MacArthur told his staff that “[w]e must scrupulously avoid interference with Japanese acts merely in search for a degree of perfection we may not even enjoy in our own country” (295). General MacArthur relied heavily on the Japanese government bureaucracy to carry out his directives and to run the country, although his authority was always visible. Unlike the situation in Germany, MacArthur’s command did not take over the functions of Japan’s major government departments; instead, the Americans set up a parallel or shadow administration to issue orders to Japanese government offi cials (Dower 1999; Harvey 2006; Sebald and Brines 1965). In practice, MacArthur relied almost entirely on the Japanese government to run the country and to carry out American directives. MacArthur’s attempts to tie down the Japanese bureaucracy, Harvey noted, “were confi ned to con- stitutional reform designed to make it accountable to parliament. Th is was only partially successful, although the changes secured were signifi cant. By and large the power of the bureaucracy was hardly diminished by the occupation” (2006, 352). Despite SCAP’s practical need for their services, government bureaucrats posed a challenge to MacArthur’s goals of democratization. James noted that a “SCAP public administration offi cial reported in early 1946: ‘Of all the major bulwarks of feudal and totalitarian Japan only the bureaucracy remains unimpaired . . . All our evidence indicates that without constant pressure and guidance from Headquarters the present bureaucracy is neither willing nor competent to reform the system’” (1985, 147).

Th e fi rst immediate crisis that MacArthur dealt with was the mass starvation facing the Japanese people. Within days of the beginning of the occupation, MacArthur had army kitchens set up to feed hundreds of thousands of starving people. He also seized some 3.5 million tons of food stockpiled by the American army in the Pacifi c in order to see Japan through the winter of 1945–46. Th e Appropriations Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives was indignant at his seizure of army supplies. MacArthur replied with admirable logic: “Starvation breeds mass unrest, disorder and violence. Give me bread or give me bullets” (1964, 307). MacArthur knew that order must be restored and maintained in order for change to succeed. Th at meant that the

MacArthur’s most impor- tant reform was the Japanese

constitution.

322 Public Administration Review • March | April 2015

yet also cooperating mega-economic giants. Virtually the whole shape of Japan’s economic success and expansion was governed by this single fact during the postwar years” (Harvey 2006, 397). Also, MacArthur’s assaults on the political interests that ruled Japan were extremely limited. By and large, the power of the Japanese govern- ment bureaucracy was hardly diminished by the occupation.

Conclusion Douglas MacArthur was, by all accounts, a skilled and pragmatic administrator. He was a complex man with a contradictory nature that made some of his decisions and actions appear incomprehensi- ble to his biographers. On occasion, he was courageous, and at other times, he appeared timid. He was often a brilliant strategist, work- ing with few resources, and at other times made serious strategic blunders. He demanded loyalty and was very loyal to his staff , yet his interactions with his superiors often bordered on insubordina- tion. He was charming and persuasive and had enormous charisma as well as tremendous self-confi dence, and he enjoyed the limelight. He cared deeply about his public image, but he blundered often in public relations and did not like criticism, not even the smallest amount (Sackton 1982, 15). He was a strong advocate of morality and Christian values, yet he avoided religious services.

MacArthur wanted to be in charge and did not want to share power. He would not likely have been an eff ective leader in a situation requiring collaboration among partners. MacArthur’s administrative activities in Japan were predicated on the need for him to exercise political leadership to accomplish his mission. He had the authority vested in him to govern Japan, and in this sense, his tenure in Japan cannot be compared to that of modern public administrators, who face myriad constraints in the performance of their jobs.

Not all went smoothly during MacArthur’s years as Supreme Commander in Japan. In fact, there were contradictions in the occupation. While the victors preached democracy, MacArthur ruled by fi at. While the Americans espoused equality, they consti- tuted a privileged caste. Th e reformist agenda rested on the assump- tion that Western culture and its values were superior to those of the “orient” (Harvey 2006, 329). It is also true, however, that MacArthur had a vision of what Japan could become, a democratic and demilitarized nation, and he worked incessantly to realize that vision. It is also true that he cared about the Japanese people, and his policies in Japan refl ected that concern for the people. He under- stood that what Japan needed during the occupation was stability, and his decision to support the retention of the emperor and other policies demonstrated his pragmatism. Th e fact that SCAP was able to govern through the Japanese government certainly contributed to the success of the occupation.

In the fi nal analysis, however, as Harvey pointed out,

It was one of the boldest political experiments ever undertaken by a single man and the fact that it was only three quarters, or even half, successful does not refl ect badly on MacArthur and was itself of huge importance. In less than six years he attempted a peaceful revolution in a country of 80 million people that was essentially locked into a medieval time warp politically and culturally, whatever its industrial and scientifi c progress during the twentieth century. (2006, 408)

the MacArthur constitution, as it became known, would stand the test of time, but it has endured. MacArthur himself may have had an ink- ling of its importance. In his memoirs, he called it “probably the single most important accomplishment of the occupation, for it brought to the Japanese people freedoms and privileges which they had never known. I am certain that it would never have been accomplished had the occupation been dependent on the deliberations of the Far East Commission—with the Soviet power of veto” (1964, 302). A great deal of credit for work on the new Japanese constitution must go to SCAP staff , especially Colonel Charles Kades, who served as General Courtney Whitney’s chief aide for SCAP’s Government Section. MacArthur laid out the principles, but the SCAP Government Section produced the fi nal draft (McNelly 1987, 79).

Land reform was also an important achievement of MacArthur’s administration. Th e majority of Japanese now live in cities, but in pre–World War II Japan, most Japanese were farmers and villag- ers (McNelly 1987, 102). Th e plight of the peasants in Japan was a wretched one. MacArthur demanded far-reaching change. Absentee landlords were expropriated and their land purchased by the govern- ment and sold to tenants at prewar prices. MacArthur’s land reform was successful in improving the lives of millions of wretchedly poor Japanese, which undermined the militarist class. For the fi rst time in Japanese history, the new rural class was not living at levels of absolute poverty (Harvey 2006; Masuda 2012).

In December of 1945, MacArthur cut off government funding of the Shinto religion and its shrines in order to ensure separation of church and state. He curbed Shintoist indoctrination in schools and made shrine levies illegal on ordinary Japanese. Th e separa- tion of religion and government on which MacArthur insisted was a principle the general public found very diffi cult to grasp. Th e Shinto shrines continued to be the centers of community life and loyal citizens were expected to give their support (Cogswell 1991). MacArthur believed that democracy in any nation could not exist without Christianity, and he authorized the entrance of foreign missionaries into Japan before any other groups. He also personally encouraged the Japanese people to embrace Christianity (Moore and Robinson 2002, 45).

In one signifi cant area MacArthur’s attempts at reform did not suc- ceed, and that was in breaking the Zaibatsu hold on the Japanese economy. Th e Zaibatsu (literally, “fi nancial clique or combines”) were important in producing much of the material for the Japanese war machine (James 1985). Harvey noted that “MacArthur himself was in no doubt about the malevolent eff ects of the Zaibatsu. ‘Th e world,’ he argued, ‘has probably never seen a counterpart to so abnormal an economic system. It permitted the exploitation of the many for the sole benefi t of the few. Th e integration of these few with government was complete and their infl uence upon govern- ment inordinate, and set the course which ultimately led to war and destruction’” (2006, 354).

Little visible progress was made by the end of the occupation, in terms of the dissolution of the Zaibatsu. “Th e Japanese economic and industrial structure was virtually the same as during the middle of the Pacifi c War—when the Zaibatsu were considerably more pow- erful than they had been during the 1920s. Th e Japanese economy was still dominated by a handful of massive, furiously competing,

General Douglas MacArthur: Supreme Public Administrator of Post–World War II Japan 323

3. For a period of time, MacArthur did allow the Japanese communists to gather and publish newspapers.

References Allinson, Gary D. 2004. Japan’s Postwar History. 2nd ed. Ithaca, NY: Cornell

University Press. Bartsch, William H. 2003. December 8, 1941: MacArthur’s Pearl Harbor. College

Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press. Cogswell, James A. 1991. Th e Occupation: A New Day in Japan’s Religious History.

In Th e Occupation of Japan: Th e Grass Roots: Th e Proceedings of the Eighth Symposium, edited by William F. Nimmo. Norfolk, VA: General Douglas MacArthur Foundation.

Dower, John W. 1999. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II. New York: W. W. Norton.

Eisenhower, John S. D. 2012. Soldiers and Statesmen: Refl ections on Leadership. Columbia: University of Missouri Press.

Finn, Richard B. 1992. Winners in Peace: MacArthur, Yoshida, and Postwar Japan. Berkeley: University of California Press.

General Staff of Douglas MacArthur. 1994. Reports of General MacArthur: MacArthur in Japan: Th e Occupation: Military Phase. Vol. 1 Supplement. Washington, DC: Department of the Army.

Gunther, John. 1951. Th e Riddle of MacArthur: Japan, Korea, and the Far East. New York: Harper & Bros.

Harvey, Robert. 2006. American Shogun: General MacArthur, Emperor Hirohito and the Drama of Modern Japan. Woodstock, NY: Overlook Press.

Hunt, Frazier. 1954. Th e Untold Story of Douglas MacArthur. New York: Devin-Adair.

James, D. Clayton. 1970. Th e Years of MacArthur: Volume 1: 1880–1941. Boston: Houghton Miffl in.

———. 1975. Th e Years of MacArthur: Volume 1: 1941–1945. Boston: Houghton Miffl in.

———. 1985. Th e Years of MacArthur: Volume 3: Triumph and Disaster, 1945–1964. Boston: Houghton Miffl in.

Kinni, Th eodore, and Donna Kinni. 2005. No Substitute for Victory: Lessons in Strategy and Leadership from General Douglas MacArthur. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

MacArthur, Douglas. 1964. Reminiscences: General of the Army. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Manchester, William. 1978. American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur, 1880–1964. Boston: Little, Brown.

Masuda, Hiroshi. 2012. MacArthur in Asia: Th e General and His Staff in the Philippines, Japan, and Korea. Translated by Reiko Yamamoto. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

McNelly, Th eodore H. 1987. Induced Revolution: Th e Policy and Process of Constitutional Reform in Occupied Japan. In Democratizing Japan: Th e Allied Occupation, edited by Robert E. Ward and Sakamoto Yoshikazu, 76–106. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

Moore, Ray A., and Donald L. Robinson. 2002. Partners for Democracy: Crafting the New Japanese State under MacArthur. New York: Oxford University Press.

Neville, Edwin L. 1991. Japanese and G.I. Rapport. In Th e Occupation of Japan: Th e Grass Roots: Th e Proceedings of the Eighth Symposium, edited by William F. Nimmo. Norfolk, VA: General Douglas MacArthur Foundation.

Rinjiro, Sodei. 2001. Dear General MacArthur: Letters from the Japanese during the American Occupation. Translated by Shizue Matsuda. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefi eld.

Rittel, Horst W. J., and Melvin M. Webber. 1973. Dilemmas in a General Th eory of Planning. Policy Sciences 4: 155–69.

Rovere, Richard H., and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. 1951. Th e General and the President and the Future of American Foreign Policy. New York: Farrar, Straus and Young.

MacArthur had reformed the Meiji Constitution and instituted free- dom of the press in Japan. He had attempted to end the emperor’s divine status. He had introduced far-reaching land reform. He had staged an assault on the economic monopolies that dominated Japan, and he had tried to dismantle the Japanese war machine and destroy their weapons. As Harvey further noted,

All of this was done in the context of a victor’s sensitivity probably unparalleled throughout history. While the victims of Japanese aggression cried out for vengeance, he behaved with restraint, mercy and respect for Japanese traditions and institutions . . . He had come as a conqueror, and acted bravely as a liberator. It was a staggering achievement by any standards: the fact that he was not successful in many areas of his bold reforms and that he was ultimately ambushed by conservative Japanese institutions and by business interests in America should not detract from the greatness of what he attempted. He was perhaps the most merciful and enlightened conqueror in history. (2006, 408)

Robert Textor, who wrote one of the fi rst scholarly books on the occupation in 1951, refl ected on MacArthur’s role in the occupation forty 40 years later. He concluded,

However much I may have disagreed with him at the time, let me add my conviction that the record of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur as Supreme Commander for the Allied Occupied Powers serves well to remind us of the social truth that situations do from time to time arise in which a single individual can signifi cantly infl uence history. General MacArthur showed far greater wisdom and eff ectiveness than most other American leaders, civilian or military, of the sort that might have been given his assignment, probably would or could have shown. He achieved clear and defi nite success in an unprecedented undertaking. He holds a high place in Japanese history, indeed a unique one. He deserves that place. And he deserves honor in our memory. (1991, 165–66)

In June 1960, the Japanese government awarded Douglas MacArthur the highest honor it could give to a foreigner who was not a head of state—the Grand Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun with Paulownia Flowers. Japan was recognizing MacArthur for his leadership in Japan’s postwar reconstruction and for his promo- tion of friendly relations between America and Japan (James 1985, 673). Most people in Japan still know MacArthur’s name, and he is still credited with “benevolent, even wise leadership during the occupation years, although the intense adulation of the man has passed from the Japanese consciousness” (Rinjiro 2001, 299).

Notes 1. MacArthur’s mother, Mary “Pinky” Hardy, was from Norfolk, Virginia, which is

why the MacArthur Memorial is located in Norfolk. 2. Michael Schaller disputes MacArthur’s claim. He contends that two direc-

tives from Washington (“Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan,” issued by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, and the “Basic Directives for Post-Surrender Military Government in Japan Proper,” issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff ) “outlined virtually the entire reform agenda” and that MacArthur was taking credit for the reform agenda conceptualized by planners in Washington (Schaller 1989, 123).

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Valley, David J. 2000. Gaijin Shogun: General Douglas A. MacArthur Stepfather of Postwar Japan. San Diego: Sektor.

Ward, Robert E. 1987. Conclusion. In Democratizing Japan: Th e Allied Occupation, edited by Robert E. Ward and Sakamoto Yoshikazu, 392–433. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

West, Charles J. 1977. Oral Reminiscences. Interview with D. Clayton James, July 14. Norfolk, VA: MacArthur Memorial Archives.

Whitney, Courtney. 1956. MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Willoughby, Charles A., and John Chamberlain. 1954. MacArthur: 1941–1951. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Sackton, Frank. 1982. Oral Reminiscences. Interview with D. Clayton James, October 22. Norfolk, VA: MacArthur Memorial Archives.

Sams, Crawford F. 1971. Oral Reminiscences. Interview with D. Clayton James, August 25. Norfolk, VA: MacArthur Memorial Archives.

Schaller, Michael. 1989. Douglas MacArthur: Th e Far Eastern General. New York: Oxford University Press.

Sebald, William J., and Russell Brines. 1965. With MacArthur in Japan: A Personal History of the Occupation. New York: W. W. Norton.

Textor, Robert B. 1991. Success in Japan—Despite Some Human Foibles and Cultural Problems. In Th e Occupation of Japan: Th e Grass Roots: Th e Proceedings of the Eighth Symposium, edited by William F. Nimmo. Norfolk, VA: General Douglas MacArthur Foundation.

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