3-part request

Part 3 of 3:

Assignment Instructions: Write a 300 – 500-word substantive journal entry:

1. Describe the process and concept of framing the operational environment and

2. How you envision facilitating this process as an Operation Sergeant Major.

Be sure to reference appropriate doctrine (listed below) that supports your analysis. Please review and use the attached Rubrics.

References/Doctrines (please use these for assignment):

ATP 5-0.1 1

ARMY DESIGN METHODOLOGY 2

JULY 2015 3

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 4

Headquarters, Department of the Army 5

6

Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

i

Army Techniques Publication

No. 5-0.1

Headquarters

Department of the Army

Washington, DC, 1 July 2015

Army Design Methodology

Contents

Page

PREFACE.............................................................................................................. iii

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... v

Chapter 1 FUNDAMENTALS OF ARMY DESIGN METHODOLOGY ............................... 1-1 Mission Command and The Operations Process ............................................... 1-1 Planning .............................................................................................................. 1-2 Army Design Methodology ................................................................................. 1-3 Key Concepts ..................................................................................................... 1-5

Chapter 2 GETTING STARTED .......................................................................................... 2-1 When to Employ Army Design Methodology ...................................................... 2-1 Commander Involvement ................................................................................... 2-3 Forming the Planning Team ............................................................................... 2-4 Leading the Team ............................................................................................... 2-7 Sharing the Workload ......................................................................................... 2-7 Resources........................................................................................................... 2-8

Chapter 3 FRAMING OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS ................................................. 3-1 Operational Environment .................................................................................... 3-1 Framing Activities ............................................................................................... 3-1 Tools and Techniques ........................................................................................ 3-6

Chapter 4 FRAMING PROBLEMS ...................................................................................... 4-1 Nature of Problems ............................................................................................. 4-1 Framing Activities ............................................................................................... 4-2 Tools and Techniques ........................................................................................ 4-5

Chapter 5 FRAMING SOLUTIONS ..................................................................................... 5-1 Operational Approach ......................................................................................... 5-1 Activities.............................................................................................................. 5-2 Transitioning to Detailed Planning ...................................................................... 5-8

Chapter 6 ASSESSMENT AND REFRAMING ................................................................... 6-1 Organizational Learning ..................................................................................... 6-1 Assessment ........................................................................................................ 6-1 Reframing ........................................................................................................... 6-2

ATP 5-0.1

Contents

ii ATP 5-0.1 1 July 2015

Tools and Techniques ......................................................................................... 6-4

Appendix A THINKING CHALLENGES ................................................................................ A-1

Appendix B VIGNETTE ......................................................................................................... B-1

SOURCE NOTES .......................................................................... Source Notes-1

GLOSSARY .......................................................................................... Glossary-1

REFERENCES .................................................................................. References-1

INDEX ......................................................................................................... Index-1

Figures

Figure 1-1. The operations process ....................................................................................... 1-2

Figure 1-2. Combining conceptual and detailed planning...................................................... 1-3

Figure 1-3. Systems thinking ................................................................................................. 1-8

Figure 2-1. Integrated planning .............................................................................................. 2-2

Figure 2-2. The commander’s role in the operations process ............................................... 2-3

Figure 2-3. Workspace setup ................................................................................................. 2-8

Figure 3-1. Framing an operational environment ................................................................... 3-2

Figure 3-2. Current state of the operational environment ...................................................... 3-4

Figure 3-3. Desired end state ................................................................................................ 3-6

Figure 3-4. Brainstorming....................................................................................................... 3-8

Figure 3-5. Mind map ........................................................................................................... 3-11

Figure 4-1. Problem frame ..................................................................................................... 4-3

Figure 5-1. Operational approach .......................................................................................... 5-1

Figure 5-2. Sample line of effort and line of operation ........................................................... 5-6

Figure 5-3. Sample operational approach.............................................................................. 5-9

Figure 6-1. Decisionmaking during execution and reframing ................................................ 6-3

Figure B-1. Network analysis 1 .............................................................................................. B-2

Figure B-2. Network analysis 2 .............................................................................................. B-3

Figure B-3. Network analysis 3 .............................................................................................. B-3

Figure B-4. Network analysis 4 .............................................................................................. B-4

Figure B-5. Network analysis 5 .............................................................................................. B-5

Figure B-6. Network analysis 6 .............................................................................................. B-6

Tables

Table 1-1. Elements of operational art ................................................................................... 1-6

Table 4-1. Types of problems and solution strategies ........................................................... 4-1

1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 iii

Preface

Army techniques publication (ATP) 5-0.1, Army Design Methodology (ADM) is part of a continuing effort

focused on improving the critical and creative thinking abilities of leaders and teams to understand and solve

problems. This publication describes ADM in the context of the operations process and offers techniques for

forming and leading teams for group problem solving. It describes the major activities of ADM and provides

techniques for framing operational environments, framing problems, developing an operational approach, and

reframing.

To comprehend the doctrine contained in this publication, readers must first understand the fundamentals of the

operations process described in Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 5-0, The Operations Process. In

addition, readers must understand the fundamentals of mission command described in ADRP 6-0, Mission

Command and the fundamentals of leadership found in ADRP 6-22, Leadership. Readers must also have a solid

foundation in various processes and procedures of mission command addressed in Field Manual (FM) 6-0,

Commander and Staff Organization and Operations.

ADM takes an interdisciplinary approach to planning and problem solving incorporating ideas associated to

critical and creative thinking, leadership, decisionmaking, and organizational learning. The professional field of

books and articles on these disciplines is vast and rich. Readers are encouraged to continue their study on these

topics beyond the material offered in this ATP.

The principal audience for this publication is Army commanders and staffs. Commanders and staffs of Army

headquarters serving as joint task force or multinational headquarters should refer to applicable joint or

multinational doctrine concerning joint or multinational planning. Trainers and educators throughout the Army

will also use this publication as a guide for instructing ADM.

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable U.S.,

international, and, in some cases, host nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure their Soldiers

operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement. (See FM 27-10.)

ATP 5-0.1 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the

glossary and the text, the term is italicized, and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition.

ATP 5-0.1 is not the proponent publication (the authority) for any terms.

ATP 5-0.1 applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and

the United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

The proponent of ATP 5-0.1 is Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. The preparing agency

is the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center. Send written comments and

recommendations on a DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to

Commander, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-MCK-D (ADRP 5-0),

300 McPherson Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2337; by e-mail to [email protected];

or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.

This page intentionally left blank.

1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 v

Introduction

Recognizing and solving problems is essential. Faced with unfamiliar or ambiguous situations, commanders

and staffs may feel overwhelmed by uncertainty. This is where Army design methodology (ADM) can help.

By first framing an operational environment and associated problems, ADM enables commanders and staffs

to think about the situation before developing ways to solve those problems. Based on this understanding,

commanders and staffs are better equipped to develop approaches to overcome identified problems.

Design thinking in Army doctrine resulted from a recognition that commanders and staffs had difficulty

understanding complex situations. This hindered their ability to distinguish between symptoms of problems

and their root causes. This difficulty led to solutions that addressed symptoms of problems rather than

problem causes. Beginning in 2005, the Army and Marine Corps began a multi-year effort to examine

methods to help commanders and staffs understand complex, ill-structured problems and visualize

approaches to solve them. Collectively referred to as “design,” the Army and Marine Corps incorporated

design into their respective doctrines by 2010. In 2011, the joint community adopted the critical and creative

thinking aspects of design in Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operations Planning. In 2012, the Army

modified its doctrine on design with the publication of Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 5-0, The

Operations Process. ADP 5-0 replaced the term “design” with “Army design methodology” and associated

ADM with conceptual planning.

ADM helps commanders and staffs with understanding, visualizing, and describing operations and it is an

aid to conceptual planning. During operations, ADM supports organizational learning as the command adapts

to changing circumstances. The potential benefits for using ADM include:

 Enhanced dialogue between commanders, staffs, and unified action partners.

 Greater understanding of an operational environment.

 Deeper understanding of problems and their causes.

 Shared understanding of the operation’s purpose.

 Shared visualization of the conduct of an operation.

 Enhanced guidance to drive detailed planning.

 Expanded role of the assessment process.

This publication contains six chapters and two appendices.

Chapter 1 begins with an overview of mission command and the operations process. A review of the

fundamentals of planning follows. Next, this chapter defines ADM and describes its major activities. The

chapter concludes with ADM’s key concepts.

Chapter 2 addresses preparing for ADM. It begins with a discussion of when to employ ADM followed by

a discussion of commander involvement. The chapter then offers considerations for forming and leading a

planning team for the employment of ADM. This chapter concludes with discussions on sharing the workload

and resources commonly used when performing ADM.

Chapter 3 provides a general discussion of an operational environment and describes the operational

variables used to understand, visualize, and describe an operational environment. Next, this chapter offers an

approach for framing an operational environment. The chapter concludes with tools and techniques

commanders and staffs use to help understand both the current and future states of an operational

environment.

Chapter 4 begins with a general discussion of problems. Next, this chapter describes activities associated

with problem framing. The chapter concludes with tools and techniques used in framing problems.

Chapter 5 defines an operational approach and describes its purpose. Next, this chapter describes activities

associated with developing an operational approach to include documenting results and transitioning to

Introduction

vi ATP 5-0.1 1 July 2015

detailed planning. The chapter concludes with several tools and techniques used in developing an operational

approach.

Chapter 6 begins with a discussion of organizational learning. Next, it describes how assessment and

reframing helps commanders adapt operations to changing circumstances. The chapter concludes with tools

and techniques available to help the commander and staff with assessing operations and reframing.

Appendix A serves as an aid to effective thinking by describing several cognitive biases and logic errors to

guard against.

Appendix B provides an example of framing an operational environment from a systems perspective utilizing

a counter drug vignette.

1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 1-1

Chapter 1

Fundamentals of Army Design Methodology

This chapter begins with an overview of mission command and the operations process.

A review of the fundamentals of planning follows. Next, this chapter defines Army

design methodology (ADM) and describes its major activities. The chapter concludes

with key concepts of ADM.

MISSION COMMAND AND THE OPERATIONS PROCESS

1-1. To appreciate how ADM helps commanders and staffs understand, visualize, and describe operations, leaders must first understand the nature of operations. Military operations are human endeavors characterized

by the continuous, mutual adaptation of give and take, moves, and countermoves among all participants. In

operations, friendly forces engage a thinking, multifaceted enemy. While friendly forces try to impose their

will on the enemy, the enemy resists and seeks to impose its will on the friendly force. In addition, operations

occur in and among populations whose desires influence and are influenced by military operations. The

results of these interactions are often unpredictable and in many instances uncontrollable.

1-2. Uncertainty pervades operations with unknowns about the enemy, the people, and the surroundings. Commanders cannot predict with certainty how enemies will act and react or how events will develop. During

operations leaders make decisions, develop plans, and direct actions under varying degrees of uncertainty.

Commanders counter the uncertainty of operations by empowering subordinates at the scene to make

decisions, act, and quickly adapt to changing circumstances. As such, mission command guides commanders,

staffs, and subordinates throughout the operations process.

1-3. Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the

conduct of unified land operations (ADP 6-0). This philosophy of command requires an environment of

mutual trust and shared understanding among commanders, staffs, and subordinates. It requires a command

climate where commanders encourage subordinates to accept risk and exercise initiative to seize

opportunities and counter threats within the commander’s intent. Using mission orders, commanders issue

directives to subordinates that emphasize results to be attained, not how to achieve them. Doing this

minimizes detailed control and allows subordinates the greatest possible freedom of action to accomplish

missions within the commander’s intent. (See ADRP 6-0 for a detailed discussion of mission command.)

1-4. The Army’s framework for exercising mission command is the operations process—the major mission command activities performed during operations: planning, preparing, executing, and continuously assessing

the operation (ADP 5-0). Commanders, supported by their staffs, use the operations process to understand,

visualize, and describe their operational environment; make and articulate decisions; and direct, lead, and

assess military operations.

1-5. The activities of the operations process are not discrete; they overlap and recur as circumstances demand. Planning starts an iteration of the operations process. Upon completion of the initial order, planning

continues as leaders revise the plan based on changing circumstances. Preparing begins during planning and

continues through execution. Execution puts a plan into action by applying combat power to seize, retain,

and exploit the initiative. Assessing is continuous and influences the other three activities.

1-6. Both the commander and staff have important roles in the operations process. Figure 1-1 on page 1-2 shows how the commander drives the operations process by understanding, visualizing, describing, directing,

leading, and assessing. The staff helps the commander understand situations and problems, implement

decisions, control operations, and assess progress. In addition, the staff helps subordinate units (commanders

and staffs) and keeps units and organizations outside the headquarters informed throughout the operations

process. See ADRP 5-0 for a detailed discussion of the operations process.

Chapter 1

1-2 ATP 5-0.1 1 July 2015

Figure 1-1. The operations process

PLANNING

1-7. Planning is the art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and laying out effective ways of bringing that future about (ADP 5-0). Planning helps leaders understand and develop

solutions to problems, coordinate and synchronize action, and anticipate events to adapt to changing

circumstances. In its simplest form, planning helps determine how to move from the current state of affairs

to a more desirable future state.

1-8. Imperfect knowledge and assumptions about the future are inherent in all planning. Planning cannot predict how enemies will react or how civilians will respond to the friendly force or the enemy. Nonetheless,

the understanding and learning that occurs during planning have great value. Even if units do not execute the

plan as envisioned—and few ever do—planning results in improved situational understanding that facilitates

future decisionmaking.

1-9. A product of planning is a plan or order—a directive for future action. Commanders issue plans and orders to subordinates to communicate their understanding of the situation and their visualization of how the

operation should unfold. A plan is a continuous, evolving framework of anticipated actions that maximizes

opportunities. It guides subordinates as they progress through each phase of the operation. The measure of a

good plan is not whether execution transpires as planned, but whether the plan facilitates effective action in

the face of unforeseen events.

1-10. Planning is a continuous learning activity of the operations process. While planning starts an iteration of the operations process, planning does not stop with production of an operations order. During preparation

and execution, the order is refined as the situation changes. Through assessment, subordinates and unified

action partners provide feedback that often results in modifications to the order. In some circumstances,

commanders determine that the current order (including associated branches and sequels) is no longer

relevant to the situation. In these instances, instead of modifying the current order, commanders reframe their

understanding of the operational environment and problems and develop a new plan. (See chapter 6 for a

discussion on assessment and reframing.)

Fundamentals of Army Design Methodology

1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 1-3

1-11. Planning has a conceptual component and a detailed component as shown in figure 1-2. Conceptual planning involves understanding operational environments and problems, determining the operation’s end

state, and visualizing an operational approach to attain that end state. Conceptual planning corresponds to the

art of command and is the focus of the commander with staff support. Detailed planning translates the

commander’s operational approach into a complete and practical plan. Generally, detailed planning is

associated with the science of control including synchronizing forces in time, space, and purpose to

accomplish missions. Detailed planning works out the scheduling, coordination, or technical problems

involved with moving, sustaining, and synchronizing the actions of the force toward the desired end state.

Figure 1-2. Combining conceptual and detailed planning

1-12. Effective planning requires integrating the conceptual and detailed components. As such, Army leaders employ and integrate the following planning methodologies throughout an operation—

 ADM.

 The military decisionmaking process (MDMP). (See FM 6-0.)

 Troop leading procedures. (See FM 6-0.)

1-13. ADM helps commanders and staffs with the conceptual aspects of planning. These aspects include understanding, visualizing, and describing operations. The MDMP helps commanders and staffs translate the

commander’s vision into an operations plan or operations order that synchronizes the actions of the force in

time, space, and purpose to accomplish missions. Small-unit leaders use troop leading procedures as their

planning and preparation methodology. (See ADRP 5-0 for a detailed discussion of the fundamentals of

planning).

ARMY DESIGN METHODOLOGY

1-14. Army design methodology is a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe unfamiliar problems and approaches to solving them (ADP 5-0). ADM includes

interconnected thinking activities that aid in conceptual planning and decisionmaking. By first framing an

operational environment and associated problems, ADM enables commanders and staffs to think about the

situation in depth. From this understanding, commanders and staffs develop a more informed approach to

solve or manage identified problems. During operations, ADM supports organizational learning through

reframing—a maturing of understanding that leads to a new perspective on problems or their resolution.

1-15. There is no one-way or prescribed set of steps to employ ADM. There are, however, several activities associated with ADM including framing an operational environment, framing problems, framing solutions,

Chapter 1

1-4 ATP 5-0.1 1 July 2015

and reframing when necessary. The learning from these activities results in a conceptual framework that

guides the development of an operations plan or operations order using the MDMP. While planners complete

some activities before others, the understanding and learning within one activity may require revisiting the

learning from another activity. Thus, ADM is iterative in nature.

FRAMING AN OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

1-16. To understand something—an idea, a statement, an event, or a situation—commanders and staffs need to put that something into context. Establishing context involves discerning the relationships of that

something and its surrounding. Commanders initiate ADM by forming a planning team to help them develop

a contextual understanding of their operational environment. In framing the operational environment, the

team seeks to understand what is going on and why and what the future operational environment should look

like.

1-17. Framing an operational environment involves critical and creative thinking by a group to build models that represent the current conditions of the operational environment (current state) and models that represent

what the operational environment should look like at the conclusion of an operation (desired end state). The

planning team also models the future natural tendency of the operational environment and constructs models

of desired future states of other actors as points of comparison with the desired end state. Members of the

planning team capture their work in an environmental frame (visual models supported by narratives) that

describe and show the relationship among the operational variables including the history, culture,

relationships, and future goals of relevant actors for both the current state and future states of an operational

environment. (See chapter 3 for a detailed discussion on framing an operational environment.)

FRAMING PROBLEMS

1-18. Identifying and understanding problems is essential to solving problems. As the commander and planning team gain an initial understanding of an operational environment, they shift their efforts to

identifying and understanding those issues impeding progress toward achieving the desired end state.

Through critical thinking and dialogue, the planning team frames problems by examining the differences

between the current state of an operational environment and the desired end state. The also examine the

differences between the natural tendency of an operational environment and desired future states of relevant

actors with the desired end state. These differences are tensions (frictions, conflicts, and competitions)

between relevant actors including geographic, demographic, economic, religious, and resource consumption

trends. Combined, these tensions represent a set of interrelated problems (a system of problems) requiring

resolution. The planning team captures their work in a problem frame that describes the system of problems

in visual models supported by a narrative. (See chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of framing problems.)

FRAMING SOLUTIONS

1-19. With an understanding of the operational environment and associated problems, the commander and planning team consider an operational approach—the broad general actions and means to solve or manage

identified problems. The commander and planning team use elements of operational art to visualize and

describe the operational approach. In developing the operational approach, the commander and planning team

consider resources to support the operational approach and considers associated risk. The team describes the

operational approach in a visual model with supporting text. The operational approach forms the basis for

the commander’s planning guidance used to develop an operations order or operations plan during the

MDMP. (See chapter 5 for a detailed discussion of developing an operational approach.)

REFRAMING

1-20. Assessment precedes and guides the other activities (plan, prepare, execute) of the operations process. Assessment involves comparing forecasted outcomes with events to determine the effectiveness of force

employment. Assessment helps the commander determine progress towards attaining the desired end state,

achieving objectives, and performing tasks. It involves monitoring and evaluating the operational

environment to determine what changes affect operations.

Fundamentals of Army Design Methodology

1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 1-5

1-21. Operations, however, may not proceed as visualized during planning. Commanders reframe after assessing that desired conditions have changed or are unattainable by executing the current plan (including

associated branches and sequels). Reframing includes revisiting early hypotheses, conclusions, and the

operational approach that underpins the current plan. In reframing, the commander and staff revise their

understanding of the operational environment and problem. If required, they develop a new operational

approach to overcome the challenges or opportunities that precipitated the need to reframe. (See chapter 6

for a discussion of assessment and reframing.)

KEY CONCEPTS

1-22. ADM is an interdisciplinary approach to planning and problem solving. It combines military theory, writings on the nature of problems, and the challenges of critical and creative thinking. Some of these

constructs such as operational art have long been associated with military planning. Other constructs such as

systems thinking and framing have recently taken on increased emphasis. Key concepts associated with the

ADM include—

 Operational art.

 Critical thinking and creative thinking.

 Collaboration and dialogue.

 Systems thinking.

 Framing.

 Visual modeling.

 Narrative construction.

OPERATIONAL ART

1-23. ADM helps commanders and staffs with the conceptual aspects of planning and applying operational art. Operational art is the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill,

knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to

organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means (JP 3-0). Operational art applies

to all levels of war, not just at the operational level. Through operational art, commanders and staffs combine

art and science to develop plans and orders that describe how (ways) the force employs its capabilities

(means) to achieve the desired end state (ends) while considering risk. This requires commanders to answer

the following questions:

 What conditions, when established, constitute the desired end state (ends)?

 How will the force achieve these desired conditions (ways)?

 What sequence of actions helps attain these conditions (ways)?

 What resources are required to accomplish that sequence of actions (means)?

 What risks are associated with that sequence of actions and how can they be mitigated (risks)?

1-24. ADM supports operational art by helping commanders and staffs answer the ends—ways—means— risk questions. During ADM, commanders and their staffs use a set of intellectual tools known as the elements

of operational art (see table 1-1 on page 1-6). Commanders and staffs apply these elements to understand an

operational environment and problems and to visualize and describe an operational approach. Subsequent

chapters discuss elements of operational art as applied to the major activities of the ADM. For example,

chapter 3 describes how end state and conditions help frame an operational environment. Chapter 5 describes

how center of gravity, decisive points, lines of operations and lines of effort, and phasing help the commander

and planning team formulate an operational approach.

Chapter 1

1-6 ATP 5-0.1 1 July 2015

Table 1-1. Elements of operational art

 End state and conditions

 Center of gravity

 Decisive points

 Lines of operations and lines of effort

 Operational reach

 Basing

 Tempo

 Phasing and transitions

 Culmination

 Risk

CRITICAL THINKING AND CREATIVE THINKING

1-25. Commanders and staffs apply critical thinking and creative thinking throughout the operations process to help them understand situations, make informed decisions, and direct action. Critical thinking and creative

thinking are central to ADM. This section summarizes critical thinking and creative thinking. Proceeding

chapters address tools and techniques for improving critical and creative thinking.

Critical Thinking

1-26. Cognition is thinking—it is the mental process of knowing that includes awareness, perception, reasoning, and intuition. Much of our thinking, however, is faulty and biased (prejudiced for or against

someone or something). As such, commanders and planners practice critical thinking throughout ADM and

the operations process to counter their biases and avoid logic errors.

1-27. Critical thinking is purposeful and reflective thought about what to believe or what to do in response to observations, experience, verbal or written expressions, or arguments. Critical thinking involves

questioning information, assumptions, conclusions, and points of view to interpret data and information,

evaluate evidence, and clarify goals. Critical thinking helps commanders and staffs understand situations,

identify causes of problems, arrive at justifiable conclusions, and make good judgments. Appendix A

describes several cognitive biases and logic errors to guard against to improve quality of thought.

1-28. By thinking critically, individuals formulate judgments about whether the information they encounter is true or false, or falls somewhere along a scale of plausibility between true or false. Critical thinking

involves considering background knowledge, situational facts, and speculative information. When

individuals think critically, they impose structure to ensure rigor and thoroughness. In turn, decisions about

what to believe guide individual actions and decisions about what to do. Done well, critical thinking increases

the likelihood that actions achieve their desired purposes.

Creative Thinking

1-29. Creative thinking examines problems from a fresh perspective to develop innovative solutions. Creative thinking creates new and useful ideas, and reevaluates or combines old ideas, to solve problems.

Leaders face unfamiliar or ill-structured problems that require new or original approaches to solve them. This

requires creativity and a willingness to accept change, newness, and a flexible outlook of new ideas and

possibilities.

1-30. Breaking old habits of thought, questioning the status quo, visualizing a better future, and devising responses to problems requires creative thinking. Leaders face problems unfamiliar or old problems under

new conditions. In these situations, leaders apply creative thinking to gain new insights, novel approaches,

fresh perspectives, and new ways of understanding and conceiving things.

Fundamentals of Army Design Methodology

1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 1-7

COLLABORATION AND DIALOGUE

1-31. ADM is a team-based approach to understand, visualize, and describe operations. It includes considering diverse perspectives through collaboration and dialogue. Collaboration and dialogue help

develop shared understanding between the commander and staff and externally with other commanders and

unified action partners.

1-32. Collaboration is two or more people or organizations working together toward common goals by sharing knowledge and building consensus. Dialogue is a way to collaborate that involves the candid

exchange of ideas or opinions among participants and encourages frank discussions in areas of disagreement.

Throughout the operations process, commanders, subordinate commanders, staffs, and unified action partners

collaborate and dialogue, sharing and questioning information, perceptions, and ideas to understand

situations and make decisions.

1-33. Through collaboration and dialogue, the commander creates a learning environment by allowing participants to think critically and creatively and share their ideas, opinions, and recommendations without

fear of retribution. Effective dialogue requires candor and a free, yet mutually respectful, competition of

ideas. Participants must feel free to make viewpoints based on their expertise, experience, and insight; this

includes sharing ideas that contradict the opinions held by those of higher rank. Successful commanders

listen to novel ideas and counterarguments concerning any problem.

1-34. Dialogue is the catalyst that drives planning teams to develop new ways of thinking about problems and identify innovative solutions. Effective dialogue ensures team members may question one another about

ideas, discuss alternatives, and refine the team’s thinking. When done well, dialogue helps:

 Reveal assumptions that underlie an argument or concept and reveal individual biases. It also

reveals what members are not thinking about the situation.

 Display diversity of ideas and expose a range of viewpoints.

 Explore concepts from different perspectives.

 Reveal areas where the team lacks diversity or experience and where external subject matter

experts are valuable.

 Develop shared mental models—individual beliefs about cause-effect relationships, assumptions

and biases about how the world works—concerning problems and solutions.

 Build trust in the team and the planning effort.

1-35. During ADM, and throughout the operations process, the commander promotes and encourages collaboration and dialogue. Effective collaboration and dialogue are not possible unless the commander

ensures it. Commanders establish a culture of collaboration and dialogue in the organization. They recognize

that they do not know everything, can be wrong, and recognize that they have something to learn from even

the most junior Soldier. Throughout the operations process, commanders demonstrate humility to learn and

understand from others to make better decisions. Commanders establish a command climate where

collaboration and dialogue routinely occur throughout the organization through personal example, coaching,

and mentorship.

SYSTEMS THINKING

1-36. A system is a group of interacting, interrelated, and interdependent components or subsystems that form a complex and unified whole. Systems have a purpose with their parts arranged in a way (structure) to

carry out their purpose. Understanding why a system exists, how the parts of the system serve that purpose,

and appreciating how that system interacts with its broader environment helps develop ways to change that

system.

1-37. Systems thinking is a process of understanding how parts of a system work and influence each other as part of a greater whole. It is an approach to problem solving that views problems as part of the greater

system and that these problems are interrelated. By understanding components and problems in a system in

relation with each other (as opposed to in isolation), problem solvers are better equipped to develop a holistic

approach to solving or managing identified problems.

Chapter 1

1-8 ATP 5-0.1 1 July 2015

1-38. In applying systems thinking, commanders and the planning team view an operational environment as a system. The team reflects on how components of the system relate to each other from an internal perspective

to understand the system’s purpose, structure, and processes (internal logic). The team also seeks to

understand how a system interacts with, and is influenced by, its surrounding environment (including other

systems) as shown in figure 1-3 on page 1-8. In doing so, system thinking helps participants understand how

a system receives inputs, adapts to those inputs according to its internal logic, and provides outputs to the

surrounding environment.

1-39. The team also thinks about problems in an operational environment as part of the system. As the commander and staff learn about the operational environment, they start to identify a host of issues and

tensions in the system. These problems are often interrelated and change over time. As such, commanders

and staff think about these problems as a system of problems, as opposed to a single problem.

Figure 1-3. Systems thinking

1-40. Systems thinking helps planners break away from linear cause-effect and compartmentalized ways of addressing problems (such as considering components of a problem set in isolation). When teams adopt a

system-level view, members see subtleties, indirect influences, and interactive effects important to

understanding the complexity of problems and anticipating second and third order effects of possible actions.

1-41. A systems thinking approach is also useful during execution as commanders and staffs assess changes in their operational environment and the progress of operations. For example, military, economic, political,

and social systems are not static but adapt based on inputs. Collecting feedback from actions through

assessment helps the commander reinforce successful action while altering actions not leading to intended

results. Examining events and studying patterns and trends in a system among systems enable the command

to develop actions to create desired change with an operational environment.

FRAMING

1-42. In the context of ADM, framing is about building conceptual models of reality. When framing, planners use systems thinking to select, organize, interpret, and make sense of situations and problems by

establishing context—the set of circumstances that surround a particular event or situation. ADM involves

framing operational environments, problems, and solutions to problems through dialogue and critical

thinking by a group. When framing an operational environment, the planning team considers the perspectives

and worldviews of others to understand the situation. This contextual understanding of an operational

environment is a frame of reference to understand problems, develop solutions, and act.

1-43. Constructing systems models helps planners integrate the pieces of information to make sense of a situation. This leads to a deeper understanding of an operational environment and problems requiring

resolution. The usefulness of models increases as they become explicit and commonly understood. Building

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1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 1-9

explicit conceptual models of the situation and associated problems promotes understanding among

stakeholders. It is important to note that framing results in models based on current information. These

models may or may not approximate reality. As the commander and staff learn more about the situation or if

the situation changes significantly over time, commanders and staffs adjust their models and reframe as

required.

VISUAL MODELING

1-44. ADM relies heavily on forming and presenting ideas in narrative and visual form. Visual information is stimulating; therefore, visual models enhance critical and creative thinking. A visual model, based on

logical inference from evidence, helps creative thought develop into understanding. A diagram or sketch

points to hidden relationships not considered through conversation alone. In addition, showing periodic

summaries of work helps individuals see the results under consideration. This identifies new ways of thinking

and possible areas for further examination. In other words, seeing something drawn may help individuals

think through challenging problems, especially when examining abstract concepts. Graphic modeling

techniques available to the team include:

 Rich picture diagrams that use symbols and sketches that graphically tell the story of a situation.

 Influence diagrams that use symbols and words to show relationships among variables in a system.

 Mind-maps that use symbols and words to show relationships to an idea or a thing.

 Causal loop diagrams that use symbols and words to show reinforcing and balancing loops among

actors and things to show cause and effect between variables.

1-45. In addition, planning teams consider and use the capabilities of their unit’s geospatial intelligence teams. These teams help develop visual models that overlay a range of information on maps including terrain

and weather, infrastructure, and cultural demographics.

1-46. Throughout ADM, team members develop drawings and sketches of operational environments, problems, and approaches to solve those problems. These initial sketches are called working diagrams. The

group uses these to create a common understanding in the group. These sketches evolve into presentation

diagrams the planning team uses to present understanding to members outside their group. An effective

presentation diagram uses commonly understood doctrinal terms and graphics. It is helpful to have personnel

not involved in ADM review presentation diagrams to gauge the effectiveness of the diagrams to increase

understanding.

NARRATIVE CONSTRUCTION

1-47. A narrative is a story that gives meaning to individuals, objects, and events. Individuals, groups, organizations, and countries all have narratives with many components that reflect and reveal how they define

themselves. Political parties, social organizations, and government institutions, for example, have stories

bound chronologically and spatially. They incorporate symbols, historical events, and artifacts tied together

with a logic that explains their reason for being.

1-48. Developing narratives is essential to ADM. Narrating is the production of a story–an explanation of an event or phenomenon by proposing a question or questions that relate to the artifacts themselves. These

questions include:

 What is the meaning of what I see?

 Where does the situation begin and end?

 What happened, is happening, and why?

 What information is missing?

1-49. Commanders, staffs, and unified action partners create a narrative to help understand and explain an operational environment, problems in an operational environment, and solutions. Not only is the narrative

useful to communicate to others, the act of constructing the narrative itself is a key learning event for the

command.

1-50. When developing a narrative, the team must be cautious of a common pitfall known as “narrative fallacy.” The narrative fallacy is a tendency of individuals to create a plausible narrative given only a small

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amount of information. Often, the fewer facts known about a situation, the easier it is to create a narrative,

and individuals have greater confidence in the accuracy of that narrative. To avoid the narrative fallacy, it is

important that the planning team studies and researches the situation in depth before engaging in narrative

construction. (See source note 1.)

1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 2-1

Chapter 2

Getting Started

This chapter addresses preparing for Army design methodology (ADM). It begins with

a discussion of when to employ ADM followed by a discussion of commander

involvement. The chapter then offers considerations to form and lead a planning team.

The chapter concludes with discussions on sharing the workload and resources

commonly used when performing ADM.

WHEN TO EMPLOY ARMY DESIGN METHODOLOGY

2-1. Planning begins upon receipt of or in anticipation of a mission. The purpose of this step is to alert all participants of the pending planning requirements, determine how much available time for planning and

preparation, and decide on a planning approach. An important consideration for commanders upon receipt or

anticipation of a mission is how best to integrate the conceptual and detailed components of planning (see

Chapter 1). Depending on the situation, commanders employ ADM before, in parallel with, or after the

military decisionmaking process (MDMP).

2-2. Commanders need to recognize the triggers, cues, and characteristics of the situation that indicate when to apply ADM. In some cases, the operation’s end state may be unclear. In other cases, it is a sense of surprise,

uncertainty, or confusion that triggers a need for a deeper understanding of the situation. During execution,

commanders may decide to employ ADM after realizing that actions are not achieving expected results or

have unanticipated second- and third-order effects. Below are some questions commanders consider when

assessing whether ADM is appropriate.

 Is there enough information about the situation to move forward?

 Are problems and solutions self-evident?

 Is there a clear desired end state?

 Is a course of action evident?

 Are the known unknowns significant enough to distort detailed planning?

 Are means (resources and force structure) undetermined?

 Are there unexpected and/or surprising effects to actions?

 Are actions falling short of achieving the desired impact?

2-3. When problems are hard to identify or the operation’s end state is unclear, commanders may initiate ADM before the headquarters engages in detailed planning. This is often the case when developing long-

range plans or orders for an operation or a new phase of an operation. When using this approach, a complete

evolution of ADM is employed with the resulting products (environmental frame, problem frame, and

operational approach), informing the development of a plan or order using the MDMP. This approach is time

consuming but provides the greatest understanding of an operational environment and associated problems

resulting in effective planning products and orders.

2-4. Commanders may also perform ADM with the MDMP. This technique allows both planning efforts to inform each other. In this instance, the commander forms separate planning teams. One team performs ADM

while the other team leads the staff through the mission analysis step of the MDMP. Results from both ADM

and mission analysis inform the efforts of each team and help the commander develop the initial

commander’s intent and planning guidance. The two planning teams then merge and continue with the

remaining steps of the MDMP. Smaller headquarters, such as brigades and battalions, may not have enough

personnel to execute this approach.

2-5. Another option is to embed aspects of ADM in the mission analysis step of the MDMP, especially when time available for planning is compressed. In this case, the staff initially focuses on the intelligence

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preparation of the battlefield (IPB) steps of “define the operational environment” and “describe the effects of

the operational environment”. Based on this initial IPB, the commander and staff perform a planning session

or sessions to understand the operational environment and problems. The staff continues with mission

analysis and shares their results with the commander. See ATP 2-01.3 for a detailed discussion of IPB.

2-6. Sometimes planning time is limited as in crisis action planning. In this case, the commander and staff perform the MDMP in a time-constrained environment to produce an operations order to accomplish the

mission (see FM 6-0 for abbreviating the MDMP). As planning time becomes available during execution,

commanders initiate ADM to reframe their understanding of the operational environment and associated

problems and modify the plan as required.

2-7. Figure 2-1 shows a balance of conceptual and detailed planning efforts throughout an operation to illustrate the relationship of ADM and the MDMP. In this example, the balance of activities is initially on

conceptual planning. The commander and planning team frame the operational environment and associated

problems and develop an operational approach. The planning emphasis shifts to more detailed planning using

the MDMP after the commander issues the initial commander’s intent and planning guidance based on their

understanding and visualization developed during ADM.

2-8. During the MDMP, the commander and staff refine their understanding and develop, compare, and decide on a course of action and produce an operations order. During execution, the plan is refined based on

the continuous assessment of the operational environment and of the progress of the operation. If the current

operational approach is not leading to the intended results, if aspects of the operational environment or

problems change significantly, or if the operation meets with unexpected success, the commander may decide

to reframe. As such, the balance of activities shifts back to conceptual planning as shown on the right side of

figure 2-1.

Figure 2-1. Integrated planning

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1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 2-3

COMMANDER INVOLVEMENT

2-9. Commanders are the most important participants in the operations process. They drive operations through understanding, visualizing, describing, directing, leading, and assessing operations as shown in

figure 2-2. All of these commander activities occur during planning, preparation, execution, and assessment

but take on different emphasis throughout operations. For example, commanders focus their activities on

understanding, visualizing, and describing during planning. During execution, commanders focus on

directing, leading, and assessing while improving understanding and modifying visualization.

Figure 2-2. The commander’s role in the operations process

2-10. Commanders are an integral to any ADM effort. Working with their staffs, other commanders, and unified action partners, commanders employ ADM to understand the operational environment and associated

problems, visualize the desired end state and operational approach, and to describe that visualization in time,

space, purpose, and recourses.

2-11. While commander’s involvement is central to successful ADM, the responsibilities and demands on a commander’s time prevent continuous involvement in ADM. Before embarking on ADM, commanders

consider how to manage their own level of involvement and the benefits and risks associated with varying

levels of participation. There are the two primary techniques that reflect varying levels of commander

involvement:

 The commander leads the team and facilitates the dialogue.

 The commander comes in and out of the activities of ADM and is involved periodically at various

points throughout the effort.

2-12. It is important to recognize the risks of both limited commander involvement and too much involvement in ADM. Limited commander involvement poses a risk that the potential benefits of ADM are

unrealized and outcomes have limited impact. Commanders not engaged in the process find it difficult to

understand the logic behind the understanding developed during ADM. Too much involvement from the

commander poses risk to effective ADM. An important issue to recognize is the influence commanders have

over their staff. The commander has the potential to dampen dialogue by providing too many ideas and

interpretations upfront. To help determine their degree of involvement in ADM, commanders consider the

following questions:

 How much time can they devote to the planning effort?

 If they cannot be involved in all aspects, what are the critical parts they want to be involved in?

Where can they have the greatest impact?

 If they cannot be involved in all aspects, how do they want the team to communicate their logic

and insights? How frequently does the commander need updates and in what format?

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2-13. Because of the competing demands on the commander’s time, planning team leaders are selective on engaging the commander throughout ADM. Team leaders work with the chief of staff or executive officer to

get time on the unit battle rhythm with the commander. If the commander is fully engaged in an ADM effort,

an off-site with subordinate commanders and the planning team is an option. Scheduling periodic design

sessions (daily, every other day, weekly) is another option. Not all design sessions with the commander are

formal or structured. A design session with the commander, key leaders, and planners over dinner is an

example.

FORMING THE PLANNING TEAM

2-14. In a headquarters, the plans cell performs numerous planning tasks simultaneously. A technique for organizing the workload is to form planning teams for requirements. A planning team consists of a lead

planner [normally from the G-5 (S-5), plans or G-3 (S-3), operations], functional planners (e.g. fires,

protection, sustainment), and other subject matter experts as required. Commanders form a planning team

(sometimes referred to as a design team) to perform ADM. This team leverages multiple, diverse perspectives

and knowledge to help the commander understand an operational environment and problems, and develop

an operational approach to solve those problems.

2-15. Some higher Army headquarters commanders form a semipermanent staff section called a commander’s initiatives group. Commander’s initiative groups produce focused, professional studies,

projects, and products at the direction of the commander. For those units that create a commander’s initiatives

group, this group is another option to become the base for forming a planning team for ADM. However,

unless members of the commander’s initiative group continue to participate in the planning effort through

orders production, there is some risk to this option. Since the results of ADM—deeper and broader

understanding of the operational environment and problems—are best understood by those participating in

ADM, some of this understanding may be lost during translation if commander initiative group members are

not involved in the MDMP.

2-16. Teams offer advantages over individual’s endeavors. The interaction of personalities can lead to a set of team dynamics that require attention and energy to manage for a quality outcome. Selecting the right

individuals to serve on the planning team is important to successful ADM. The following are some

considerations when forming the planning team:

 Skills and characteristics of potential team members.

 Diversity of team members.

 Size of the team.

 Roles in the team.

SKILLS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF POTENTIAL TEAM MEMBERS

2-17. A key aspect of assembling the team is considering the knowledge, skills, abilities, work styles, and personality characteristics needed for the team’s tasks. Commanders consider the scope of the problem and

personnel resources when forming a planning team. While individuals are often selected to the team based

on their expertise associated to the problem (for example functional or regional knowledge), individuals

should also possess the following characteristics:

 Having an open mind for new ideas.

 Having an inquisitive mindset; being curious, and eager for knowledge.

 Being comfortable with ambiguity.

 Possessing critical thinking and creative thinking skills.

 Being willing to listen to others and valuing differing points of view.

 Being able to take and offer different perspectives.

 Possessing an investigative mindset and research skills.

 Able to communicate complex ideas in simple words.

 Not afraid of having own ideas critiqued by others.

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1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 2-5

 Able to think visually and effectively use visual graphics.

 Having training in ADM and the philosophy and theory that underpin it.

DIVERSITY OF TEAM MEMBERS

2-18. Commanders and team leaders strive for variety of skill sets, knowledge levels, and personalities among individuals when forming the planning team. Planning teams comprised of people with widely varying

backgrounds and experiences have more perspectives to draw on for their work. Teams that are more diverse

can be more creative, engage in higher quality dialogue, and develop more innovative solutions. Commanders

and team leaders assemble a team with a rich mix of:

 Education level, training, credentials and qualifications.

 Rank.

 Assignments, deployment, and career history.

 Functional areas of expertise (such as planner, intelligence, logistics, special operations).

 Gender.

 Personality characteristics.

 Thinking styles and preferences (for example, big picture thinkers, detailed thinkers, abstract

thinkers, historical thinkers, or those who think about the future).

2-19. Commanders and team leaders recognize the advantages and disadvantages associated with team member diversity. For example, diverse teams have a wider range of perspectives on which to draw, but may

experience more interpersonal conflict and higher coordination needs. For teams with diverse rank, team

leaders spend time encouraging junior members to speak their mind and challenge ideas of those of senior

rank if they disagree with an idea.

SIZE OF THE TEAM

2-20. Team size is an additional consideration when forming the team. Determining the size of the team requires a fine balance between a team big enough to provide diversity of perspective but small enough to be

productive. A core team of six to nine people, with other subject matter experts participating as needed, is an

effective size. Larger teams manage their work by dividing into smaller subteams to complete tasks (for

example research) then come together to dialogue their findings.

2-21. The optimal team composition depends on the nature of problems facing the command and gaps in knowledge attributed to those problems. In many cases, it is not fully apparent on the required areas of

expertise needed on the planning team. It may only be after engaging in framing an operational environment

that the commander and planning team recognize the needs for a particular area of expertise.

ROLES IN THE TEAM

2-22. As the team forms, commanders and team leaders consider the roles of each team member. Roles assigned to team members may include but are not limited to:

 Team leader.

 Subject matter experts.

 Red team members.

 Note takers.

 Graphic artist.

Team Leader

2-23. The team leader is an active facilitator of the team and methodology. Team leaders are experienced with performing the activities of ADM and skilled in leading group work among peers, subordinates, and

superiors. Team leaders create an environment of learning among team members by encouraging wide

participation amongst all members of the team, and avoid over relying on any individual. Team leaders

engage individuals on the team to think creatively while monitoring and orchestrating the inquiry. The team

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leader controls the planning timeline and oversees the quality of resulting products. Team leader duties

include:

 Working with the commander to define the team’s purpose, establishing goals, and setting

expectations.

 Working with the commander to set the tone for open and honest discourse.

 Building and maintaining interpersonal trust and a sense of team cohesion.

 Managing personalities and associated team dynamics.

 Minimizing unproductive (interpersonal) conflict.

 Organizing the work of the team.

 Managing the team’s work pace and workflow.

 Encouraging and guiding team members to exchange, discuss, and integrate information.

 Helping the team avoid quick opinions that match the group consensus (i.e., groupthink) rather

than evaluating information.

 Maintaining awareness of the organizational context where the team is working, including the

commander’s and other stakeholders’ needs and preferences.

Subject Matter Experts

2-24. Various subject matter experts help form the team. Routinely, members of the team engaging in ADM are internal to the headquarters. This includes members of the G-2 (S-2), Intelligence and G-9 (S-9), Civil

Affairs staff sections. Not only do these individuals have expertise in their fields, they can access the

analytical and research capabilities of their respective staff sections.

2-25. As the team learns more about the situation, they recognize what they do not know. Areas and topics under consideration require individuals from outside the existing staff who have different perspectives and/or

specialized knowledge and expertise. Examples include human terrain teams, political advisors, economic

advisors, and historians. Request for subject matter expert support ranges from requesting individuals are

present in the headquarters or reaching back via teleconference, video teleconference, and e-mail. Reception

and orientation of new members to the team is vital to their integration into the core group.

Red Team Members

2-26. Red team qualified individuals are part of the commander’s staff at division through theater army and augment brigade headquarters as required. Trained and educated to think critically and creatively, red team

members help commanders and staffs think from different perspectives. They help commanders and staffs

explore alternatives in plans and orders and see things from the perspective of others. Red team members

help:

 Broaden the understanding of the operational environment.

 Identify problems and clarifying end state conditions.

 Challenge assumptions.

 Ensure the perspectives of the enemies, adversaries, and others are considered.

 Identify friendly and enemy vulnerabilities and opportunities.

 Identify areas for assessment.

 Anticipate cultural perceptions of partners, adversaries, and others.

2-27. Commanders and chiefs of staff (executive officers) consider how to use their red teams when forming the planning team. One technique is to form a red team to critically review and provide an alternative

perspective of products developed by the planning team. Another technique is for a red team qualified

individual to serve on the planning team as facilitator. In this role, the red team member helps the planning

team leader encourage constructive dialogue between group members and maintain order of the group

discussion to protect member’s ideas and manage time. Another technique is forming a red team to work on

a portion of ADM and compare their work with that of the planning team. For example, red team members

frame an operational environment from the perspective of the population.

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1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 2-7

Note Takers

2-28. As the team works together, the team’s knowledge base expands and their understanding of the various problems deepens and evolves. A consideration for planning and problem solving teams throughout the

process is how to document the knowledge, the evolving logic, and the insights that emerge during the team’s

work.

2-29. In part, dealing with knowledge capture is a resource issue. The team lead considers how much time the team spends thinking and talking and how much time the team spends documenting thoughts and

discussion. While it is important that all members of the team keep diligent notes, it is helpful to assign a

dedicated note taker.

2-30. ADM relies on collaboration and dialogue among members on the team and with individuals outside of the team. The team captures key points in these discussions as the team moves through the activities of

ADM. The note taker records collaborative work sessions. Key information recorded includes assumptions,

reasoning or logic behind statements, areas of disagreement and commander’s guidance. If resources allow,

bringing in someone from outside the team helps free all team members to participate in the session.

Graphic Artist

2-31. Visual modeling or sketching is another key aspect of ADM (see chapter 1). Thinking visually is a skill that not all members of the team can do well. It is important for team leaders to seek out members in the

team that are good visual thinkers and graphic artists. These visual thinkers capture team thought and develop

clear visual models for presentation to others outside the group.

LEADING THE TEAM

2-32. A significant challenge for team leaders and commanders is establishing a collaborative and trusting environment where team members feel safe discussing, questioning, thinking creatively, and sharing ideas

openly. Team leaders encourage members to openly question and debate ideas with those who are higher in

rank. These behaviors may seem high-risk, uncomfortable, and inappropriate to those who are accustomed

to deferring to higher-ranking personnel in a hierarchical command structure.

2-33. Another challenge is a tendency of individuals to label ideas either “good” or “bad,” “right” or “wrong.” Individuals can tie their identity to the ideas they create and the esteem they get from being told

they are right. As a result, members of a planning team refrain from thinking creatively or putting forth

alternative ideas out of concern of being wrong or fear of being judged negatively by others.

2-34. The commander and team leader work to overcome these challenges. Despite rank, service, agency, or the background of team members, the commander and team leader create an atmosphere where members

share ideas, think critically, question assumptions, and challenge ideas without fear. Senior leaders are aware

of how they respond to others’ ideas and critiques. The commander and team leader reinforce the view that

an attack on an idea is not an attack on the person and that the debate is to develop a deeper understanding.

Creating a positive climate requires leadership that emphasizes and encourages continual learning, creative

and novel thought, and positively recognizes those who test ideas.

2-35. The team leader also plays a key role in activities external to the team. The planning team does not exist in a vacuum; rather the team exists in a particular organizational context that has a specific culture and

set of norms for interacting and performing business. The team has a “customer”—typically the commander,

in addition to other senior leaders and external organizations—who have needs and an interest in what the

team learns and produces. A team leader is aware of the organizational context where the team functions and

the team’s role in that context.

SHARING THE WORKLOAD

2-36. While ADM involves group work, the whole group does not work on all aspects of ADM. Leaders assign some work to subteams or to individuals. Large group work is optimal for shared understandings.

While slow at times, it is important that the entire planning team share their understanding and exchange

ideas. Small group work is effective when the large group has too many issues to sort through or the expertise

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of all members of the group are not needed for a particular inquiry or activity. Individual work is useful when

performing detailed research on a topic. The team leader remembers that the work of small groups or work

done by individuals is subject to criticism by those not present. Small group and individuals vet their work

with the larger group. This provides a chance for all to comment, but also shares understanding among the

team.

RESOURCES

2-37. One area to consider when preparing for ADM is the types of resources the activity requires. Resource considerations include physical space for the team to work and materials needed for communicating and

representing ideas.

2-38. Graphical depiction is a key element of ADM. It allows the team to visualize concepts and show relationships and interdependencies. The ability to share information across the team and to manipulate and

structure information in different ways is fundamental to ADM. It is helpful to have a workspace dedicated

to the ADM effort where the team leaves drawings and other products displayed throughout the ADM effort.

The room has ample wall space for posting work products. It is large enough to enable small group work if

the team determines it is beneficial to have smaller breakout groups working on particular aspects of the

problem set.

2-39. Team leaders organize workspace to facilitate group discussion and collaboration. A room or area where individuals see and hear each other and view the various visual products is ideal. When bringing the

group together to work on an activity, positioning members in a circle or oval facilitates effective dialogue

among members as shown in figure 2-3.

Figure 2-3. Workspace setup

Note: This picture of a typical briefing room arrangement on the left side of figure 2-3 discourages

dialogue. Team members in the front cannot see those in the back, and those in the back have

difficulty participating. The right side of figure 2-3 represents a collaborative setting that promotes

dialogue. In this setup, everyone sees and interacts with each other, including observing physical

reactions and facial expressions. Everyone has an equal place at the table and that signifies

everyone’s contribution is equally important.

2-40. The team shares and displays information, so it is necessary that the team access materials such as whiteboards and butcherblock paper for drawing, structuring, and displaying information. Materials for

consideration include:

 Maps and overlays.

 Whiteboards and butcher block paper.

 Markers and other drawing tools.

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1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 2-9

 Post-it notes of varying sizes and colors.

 Notepads and sketch paper.

 Laptop computer.

 Video teleconferencing capability.

 Projector.

 Audio recorder.

 Camera.

 Command post of the future and other information systems.

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1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 3-1

Chapter 3

Framing Operational Environments

This chapter begins with a description of an operational environment from a general

perspective. Next, this chapter offers an approach for framing an operational

environment. The chapter concludes with several techniques commanders and staffs

use to understand the current state of an operational environment and to visualize a

desired end state.

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

3-1. An operational environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0). An operational

environment includes physical areas (air, land, maritime, and space domains) and cyberspace. It also includes

the information that shapes conditions in those areas and enemy, friendly, and neutral aspects relevant to

operations. An operational environment is not isolated or independent but interconnected by various

influences (for example, information and economics) from around the globe. No two operational

environments are the same.

3-2. Whether designed to relieve suffering from a natural disaster or to defeat a large enemy force, military operations occur in complex and ever changing operational environments. Complexity describes situations

with many parts and subparts (structural complexity) and the numerous relationships and resulting behaviors

among those parts and subparts (interactive complexity). While aspects of an operational environment are

less complex than other aspects, an operational environment as a whole is both structurally and interactively

complex.

3-3. In addition, an operational environment is not static but evolves and redefines itself in potentially unpredictable ways. This evolution results from humans interacting in an operational environment and from

their ability to learn and adapt. The operational environment changes as people and organizations take action

in an operational environment. Some of these changes are anticipated while others are not. Some changes are

immediate and apparent while other changes are delayed or hidden. The complex and dynamic nature of an

operational environment makes determining the relationship between cause and effect difficult and

contributes to the uncertainty of military operations.

3-4. Commanders and staffs employ systems thinking (see chapter 1) and use the operational variables to help understand, visualize, and describe an operational environment. Operational variables are those aspects

of an operational environment, both military and nonmilitary, that differ from one operational area to another

and affect operations. Operational variables describe not only the military aspects of an operational

environment but also the population’s influence on it. The eight interrelated operational variables are

political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-

PT). The operational variables are broad information categories that help the commander analyze and develop

a comprehensive understanding of an operational environment. The operational variables are information

categories used to describe an operational environment. (See ADRP 5-0 for a more detailed description of

the operational variables and a listing of associated subvariables).

FRAMING ACTIVITIES

3-5. Military operation occurs in a context larger than a unit’s mission. As such, the staff supports commanders in developing a contextual understanding of an operational environment through framing—the

act of constructing models that seek to describe reality. Framing involves selecting, organizing, interpreting,

and making sense of interrelated variables and relevant actors in an operational environment. When framing

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an operational environment, the commander and planning team understand the current state and visualize a

desired future state of an operational environment as shown in figure 3-1.

Figure 3-1. Framing an operational environment

3-6. Understanding current conditions and desired future conditions of an operational environment helps commanders identify problems and develop approaches to solve or manage those problems. When framing

an operational environment, the commander and planning team answers questions such as:

 What is going on in an operational environment?

 Why has this situation developed?

 Who are the relevant actors?

 What is causing conflict among relevant actors?

 What are the strengths and weaknesses of the relevant actors?

 Why is the situation (or the projected future situation) undesirable?

 What is the direction and guidance of higher authorities pertaining to the situation?

 What future conditions need to exist for success?

3-7. A product of framing an operational environment is an environmental frame. The environmental frame describes and depicts the context of the operational environment—how the context developed (historical and

cultural perspective), how the context currently exists (current conditions), and how the context could trend

in the future (projected future conditions). The environmental frame also includes a description of what the

operational environment should look like at the conclusion of an operation (desired end state conditions).

Note: As the planning team frames an operational environment, they will identify problems and

think about ways to solve those problems. The team should record these ideas and addresses them

in more detail during problem framing (see chapter 4).

3-8. There is no “one- way” or set of steps for framing an operational environment. There are, however, several activities that help the commander and staff develop an environmental frame including:

 Understand higher guidance and direction.

 Understand the current state of an operational environment.

 Project how an operational environment may trend in the future.

 Discern desired future states of other actors.

 Envision a desired end state.

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UNDERSTAND HIGHER GUIDANCE AND DIRECTION

3-9. Framing an operational environment involves understanding higher guidance and appreciating how higher authorities view the current state and future state of an operational environment. Army forces operate

within the context of a higher headquarters; whether that being a higher Army headquarters or a higher joint

force headquarters. As such, it is essential the commander and staff understand how their higher headquarters

perceives the operational environment, problems, and operational approach.

3-10. To understand higher guidance and direction, the planning team reviews relevant orders, directives, policy documents, written and oral guidance, and estimates of their higher and next higher headquarters.

They study strategic guidance and directives, international mandates, and other products that influence their

operational environment. As the commander and planning team frame their own operational environment,

they may see their operational environment, problems, and approaches to solve those problems differently

than higher headquarters. Commanders question contradictory or ambiguous guidance and directives.

Dialogue up and down the echelons and with unified action partners help work out these differences and help

build shared understanding throughout the planning effort.

UNDERSTAND THE CURRENT STATE OF AN OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

3-11. To envision an operational approach to solve problems, the commander and planning team understand those conditions that make up the current state of an operational environment. A condition is a state of

something essential in an operational environment. An example is a three-year drought in an area. Insurgent

control of a certain province is another example. Not only does the team identify current conditions, they

understand how those conditions came to be from a historical and cultural perspective.

3-12. One way to develop an understanding of an operational environment is from a systems perspective (see chapter 1). To develop this systems perspective, the planning team identifies and discerns the

relationships among relevant variables and actors in an operational environment. An actor is an individual or

group in a social network who acts to advance personal interests. Relevant actors include individuals, enemy

forces, states and governments, coalitions, terrorist networks, and criminal organizations. They also include

multinational corporations, nongovernmental organizations, and others able to influence the situation. Once

identified, further research and analysis by the team helps clarify the roles and functions of each actor and

how they relate to other actors and the other variables in an operational environment. (See appendix B for an

example of using a systems approach in framing an operational environment.)

3-13. Building a diagram illustrating relevant actor functions, relationships, and tensions helps the commander and staff to understand an operational environment. Often relationships among actors have many

facets, and these relationships differ depending on the scale of interaction and temporal aspects (history,

duration, type, and frequency). Clarifying the relationships among actors requires intense effort since these

relationships require examination from multiple perspectives.

3-14. Figure 3-2 on page 3-4 is an influence diagram followed by a supporting narrative. This example is a presentation diagram. The purpose of a presentation diagram is to convey the main ideas to individuals

outside of the planning team. Detailed supporting diagrams, backed up by in-depth research, accompanies a

presentation diagram.

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Figure 3-2. Current state of the operational environment

Narrative: The Newland defense force controls the population and provides General E power.

The President provides direction to the Newland defense force to control the society. The people

comply with the direction provided by the President and the Newland defense forces. Those who

do not comply are oppressed. In exchange for sanctuary, the drug cartels provide funding to the

regime. They harass and terrorize the section of the society that opposes the regime. Countries X

and Y provide material capabilities to the Newland defense force and international legitimacy to

the regime. In turn, the regime maintains an anti-U.S. policy stance. Over the last six months, over

100,000 persons fled Newland to Country Z. Country Z provides Newland refugees humanitarian

assistance and protection. Several border clashes have erupted between Newland defense forces

and Country Z in the last three weeks. The antidemocratic dictatorship of Newland oppresses its

people, encourages instability in the region, and supports criminal and terrorist activities is

unacceptable to U.S. interests.

3-15. The environmental frame evolves as the commander and planning team discusses and debates their finding. For example, several questions may arise after the commander and team discuss the environmental

frame. Questions may include:

 What are the other sources of power in Newland beyond General E?

 What are the limits to the drug money provided by the cartels?

 Is the society this homogenous? What are the different groups and divisions in the population?

 What are some of the other key international relationships or interests with Newland?

 Are there limits to military aid provided by Country X and Country Y?

PROJECT HOW AN OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT MAY TREND

3-16. Part of framing an operational environment results in an appreciation for how an operational environment may trend into the future. An operational environment evolves even in the absence of friendly

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intervention. If no outside actors influence an operational environment, an operational environment will

change due to inherent tendencies in the system. Tendencies reflect an inclination to think or behave in a

certain manner. Tendencies are not deterministic, but models describing the thoughts or behaviors of relevant

actors. Tendencies identify likely patterns of relationships between actors without external influences. The

natural tendencies in an operational environment have the most momentum, and therefore difficult to change.

Tendencies can be positive and encouraged or viewed as obstacles that become the focus for change. Friendly

actions or activities that reinforce (or at least do not conflict with) natural trends may have the best chance to

succeed. Appreciating the natural tendencies in an operational environment better define the desired end state

and develops an operational approach that encourages or changes identified tendencies. Visual models

support this understanding by text capture.

DISCERN DESIRED FUTURE STATES OF OTHER ACTORS

3-17. The planning team describes alternative future states of relevant actors. Other actors affect an operational environment and have different desired end states. For example, the enemy has a desired set of

conditions for the future. These conditions describe their desired end state. Friendly or neutral actors may not

have opposing mindsets, but some of their desired conditions may be different from some of the command’s

desired end state conditions. Further, some desired conditions of other actors converge with the command’s

desired conditions, with a possibility of exploiting this convergence. The team’s understanding of the

differences between alternative future states and the command's desired end state help in problem framing.

The team captures its understanding of alternative future states of relevant actors in various visual models

and narratives.

ENVISION A DESIRED END STATE

3-18. The commander and planning team envision the desired end state based on higher guidance, the current state of an operational environment, and alternative future states of an operational environment. The

operation’s end state is a set of desired conditions that, if achieved, meet the objectives of policy, orders,

guidance, and directives issued to the commander. A desired condition is a sought-after future state of the

operational environment. Conditions are tangible or intangible, military or nonmilitary, or physical or

psychological. They describe or relate to perceptions, cohesion among groups, or relationship between

organizations or individuals. When determining desired end state conditions, the commander and planning

team consider their relevance to higher orders, directives, and guidance. The team also considers available

resources to ensure end state conditions are feasible.

3-19. Time is important when determining desired end state conditions. How time relates to the desired end state influences the expectation of higher authorities and influences how commanders use forces and

capabilities to achieve desired conditions. The commander and planning team use diligence during the

planning effort to account for the time expected to achieve desired conditions. They qualify whether the

desired conditions are intended to be lasting or transient in nature. This temporal dimension helps develop

an effective operational approach and manages expectation.

3-20. Commanders describe the operation’s end state by stating the desired conditions of the friendly force in relationship to desired conditions of the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations. Commanders share and

discusses their desired end state with their higher commander to ensure unity of effort. Commanders may

elect to discuss several proposed end states, and their respective costs, for the higher commander to consider.

Figure 3-3 on page 3-6 provides a sample presentation diagram of the desired end state of Newland followed

by a narrative.

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Figure 3-3. Desired end state

The country of Newland is a friendly democracy that no longer oppresses its people, threatens its

neighbors, or provides sanctuary for criminal and terrorist organizations. The society has replaced

the Newland defense force as the source of power for the democratic government. The Newland

defense force is replaced with an army and navy that serves the society and protects the country

from external aggression. Local and national police forces serve the population by providing law

and order for society. World democracies support the new government by providing legitimacy

and capabilities to the government of Newland and the society. In turn, the new government of

Newland supports the rule of law among nations and human rights.

TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES

3-21. This section offers several tools and techniques that help the planning team with framing operational environments (and problems) including but not limited to:

 Brainstorming, researching, and mind mapping.

 Meta-questioning.

 Questioning of assumptions.

 Four ways of seeing.

BRAINSTORMING, RESEARCHING, AND MIND MAPPING

3-22. A technique for framing an operational environment is through a sequence of brainstorming, researching, and mind mapping. Brainstorming helps the team develop ideas and variables for further

research and analysis. Research helps the team understand identified variables to help the team map out the

relationships and interdependencies among variables in the operational environment. Combined with critical

thinking and continuous dialogue, the result of this technique leads to an in depth understanding of an

operational environment and problems in that operational environment.

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Brainstorming

3-23. Brainstorming develops an initial understanding of the relevant variables and actors in an operational environment. Brainstorming is a group creative thinking technique that uses different perspectives of

individuals in a group to develop and build on ideas. Brainstorming is a thinking tool used to surface a large

quantity of ideas without considering the relative value of each. This group process allows others to build on

initial ideas developed in the brainstorming secession.

Note: As a technique for stimulating new thinking, brainstorming also helps with framing

problems and developing an operational approach.

3-24. A key success in brainstorming is capturing many diverse ideas. Several guides that help reduce inhibition among group members and increase overall group creativity include:

 Allow time for individuals to develop ideas on their own for presentation to the group.

 Focus on quantity of ideas.

 Defer judgment of ideas and withhold criticism.

 Welcome new and unusual ideas.

 Combine and improve upon ideas.

3-25. There are many techniques for brainstorming. The difference between these techniques is the level of structure imposed on the brainstorming session. A less structured technique involves individuals in a group

developing ideas about a subject on their own. Individuals offer their ideas to the group while a note taker

records these ideas on a white board or paper for all to see. This technique is helpful in initial brainstorming

to identify relevant variables and actors in an operational environment.

3-26. A more structured approach involves a divergent thinking phase followed by a convergent phase with associated steps to each phase. The purpose of the divergent thinking phase is to develop and collect new

ideas and insights. This technique follows steps to stimulate thinking. Steps in this phase include:

 Pose a “focal question” to the group. For example, “Why is the insurgent movement gaining

support?” or “What are the sources of power and influence in region X.” Post the focal question

on a white board or large easel with white paper.

 Ask individuals to write down responses to the question using key words that fit on a sticky note.

 Stick all the notes on a white board, wall, or paper for all to see—treat all ideas the same.

 Allow for a pause after the initial flow of ideas and ask individuals to add new responses to the

question and post their answers.

 End the collection stage of ideas after two or three pauses.

3-27. A convergent phase follows the divergent phase that uses a technique known as affinity mapping. The purpose of the convergent phase is to arrange ideas identified into logical groups. For example, figure 3-4 on

page 3-8 groups ideas by recruiting, financing, and training. This includes:

 Asking group participants to arrange the sticky notes according to their commonalities or similar

concepts. The group may also copy some notes so ideas can be included in more than one group.

 Selecting a word or phrase that characterizes each grouping or cluster of notes.

 Identifying any notes that do not fit with others and consider them either not relevant or the

beginning of an idea that deserves further attention.

 Assess what the group has accomplished in terms of new ideas or concepts identified or new areas

that need more research.

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Figure 3-4. Brainstorming

Researching

3-28. Understanding an operational environment requires detailed research and study. Effective planning teams use the results of brainstorming to guide deliberate research of identified variables and actors. Research

can be a challenge if members of the planning team have not researched since graduating from civilian

schools. Team leaders should leverage those individuals skilled at research. For example, intelligence

analysts and civil affairs specialists have good research skills. Research skills are developed and sustained.

These skills include:

 Breadth.

 Depth.

 Description, explanation and meaning.

 Form, function, logic.

 Iteration.

Breadth

3-29. For research to be comprehensive, it must be broad. The team leader forms research teams when framing an operational environment to collect as much information as possible in the shortest amount of time.

An approach is to divide the planning team into two-person groups and assign each pair a set number of

categories, ideally related in some way. The pair researches each category and collects papers, briefings, and

videos and presents their findings during group dialogue sessions. Researchers consult with subject matter

experts external to the organization to better understand the context and extend the breadth of understanding.

Team members research additional categories that emerge during group sessions.

Depth

3-30. Researchers explore each category identified. Researchers consider multiple sources from many governmental, academic, corporate, public and private viewpoints. An internet search reveals relevant books,

papers, journals, newspapers, speeches, documentaries, and databases on a subject. In addition, subject matter

experts extend the depth of understanding of the research team. For example, a human terrain team that served

in the unit’s anticipated area of operations (AO) could provide detailed knowledge of the social, tribal, and

cultural factors in that area.

3-31. The more sources employed, the more in depth and reliable the research becomes. Sources are classified, unclassified, or open-source. Research note that unclassified and open-source information may be

more informative than classified information. To evaluate source credibility, researchers note the authors of

their respective documents; author known biases, and the publication dates of the sources. (See ATP 2-22.9,

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1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 3-9

Open-Source Intelligence, for various research techniques using open-sources and a detailed listing of

available open-sources).

3-32. One of the major factors that affect depth and breadth of the research is time. Effective research takes time. Time is a precious commodity in any problem solving or planning endeavor. It is important that

planning team leaders allocate enough time for research.

Description, Explanation and Meaning

3-33. Researchers are not content with collecting data and information. Research determines what the data and information means to the organization. Description, explanation, and meaning together lead to

understanding. Description provides an articulation of “what” is going on in a situation. Explanation

describes “how” something works and meaning explains “why” something is of particular value and

importance to the planning team. An accurate expression of description, explanation, and meaning helps the

commander and staff make sense of a situation.

3-34. Accurate expression requires analysis. This analysis is to ascribe and validate meaning. Individuals get to meaning through critical thinking and the application of deductive, inductive, and abductive logic to derive

an explanation for why the data or information obtained is the way it is. Using deductive reasoning, the

researcher draws conclusion from general rules or premises. In deductive reasoning, if all premises are true

and the rules of deductive logic are followed, then the conclusion is valid. In contrast to deductive reasoning,

inductive reasoning draws conclusion from examples or evidence. In inductive reasoning, premises supply

strong evidence for (not absolute proof of) the truth of the conclusion. The truth of an inductive argument is

probable based upon the evidence given.

3-35. Many are familiar with deductive and inductive reasoning, but less familiar with abductive reasoning. Abductive reasoning starts with a set of observations (often incomplete) and proceeds with developing to the

likeliest possible explanation for the set. Using abductive logic, individuals form a hypothesis of what the

various observations mean. A hypothesis is a proposed explanation of a phenomenon (for example, an

explanation of the causes of a conflict or problem). If further research does not support the hypothesis, another

hypothesis is formed and the reasoning continues until there is a conclusion.

3-36. Using the three types of reasoning, research teams answer the critical questions for their topics. For example, why are the drug cartels fighting each other and why are the insurgents moving back into a river

valley? There may be more than one explanation. The team considers each explanation until there is a reason

to discard that explanation. Developing these explanations facilitates meaningful and effective

decisionmaking. In developing these explanations, team members are aware that their thinking is biased and

prone to various logic errors. A way to guard against these bias and logic fallacies is first being aware of

them. Appendix A provides a listing of the more common cognitive biases and logic fallacies to guard against.

3-37. Achieving understanding of the meaning of observed data and information is the goal of research. Individuals or small groups that perform research achieve understanding through a clear articulation of the

description, explanation, and meaning of observed phenomena.

Form, Function, Logic

3-38. Researchers, whether operating individually or in small groups, think beyond what they see. Data or information describes the form (patterns and relationships) of what is observed. For example, research may

reveal three components of a terrorist cell. Researchers move beyond form to discover the function of what

they observe. What does the terrorist cell component do? How do they operate? What function do they

perform? What was the logic that guided the linkage of form and function or was the logic externally driven

by some other considerations? Perhaps one of the components of the terrorist cell provides a position for a

favorite son and has nothing to do with what the component does. The planning team understands the

relationship of the form, function, and logic of the relationships that create the component of each category.

Iteration

3-39. One pass through a research and synthesis cycle is not sufficient to understand a topic. After initial research and dialogue, the planning team cycles back through the research effort as many times as it takes to

achieve understanding for the organization. Some research is refined, some expanded to cover new topics in

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a category, some new categories will emerge, and some information will need to be confirmed or conflicts

in available information resolved. The planning team performs as many iterations as necessary to fill in the

gaps in knowledge, and deliberately correlate and validate information through both analysis and synthesis

to improve understanding as time permits.

Mind Mapping

3-40. Mind mapping is a technique for discerning and depicting the relationships of relevant variables and actors in an operational environment and problem. Mind mapping begins with a single idea or topic

represented in the center of a white board or paper (for example insurgent recruitment). The planning team

writes out secondary ideas and words associated to insurgent recruitment. The team uses lines, symbols,

pictures, and colors to show relationships. Examples of secondary ideas associated to “insurgent recruitment”

may include:

 Poverty and unemployment.

 Corruption and bad governance.

 Criminality.

 Ethnic factors.

 Civilian casualties.

3-41. The planning team may draw further relationships with criminality including the drug trade, money laundering, and extortion as shown in figure 3-5 on page 3-11. As they continue to map out relationships, the

planning team finds a relationship of poverty and unemployment with cultivation and production of illegal

narcotics (subcategories under criminality). They find a linkage among corrupt political leaders and the drug

trade through bribery and the facilitation of money laundering. The planning team refines various mind maps

and develops associated narratives for them to describe their understanding of the operational environment

and problems.

Meta-questioning

3-42. The use of disciplined questions or meta-questions helps commanders and staffs probe their own and others’ thinking during ADM and throughout the operations process. Meta-questioning is a critical thinking

skill that enables a more complete understanding of a topic by asking higher order questions. A way to

understand the concept of meta-questioning is by thinking of the different views one gets from different levels

of a ladder. An individual’s view is somewhat restricted when standing next to a ladder. As the individual

takes a few steps up the rungs of the ladder, the view becomes broader. This is true of meta-questions. As

individuals and groups ask and answer successively higher order questions, their understanding becomes

more comprehensive.

3-43. Meta-questions probe into complex issues that help get at the true qualities of the problem rather than superficial qualities. These higher order questions explore ideas, understand problems, and uncover

assumptions. They help challenge claims or premises by revealing a contradiction or internal inconsistency

in logic. Examples of questions that probe reasons and evidence include the following:

 Why did it happen?

 Why was it true?

 How does X relate to Y?

 All reasoning depends on the idea that X is the source of conflict. Why is reasoning based on X

instead of Y?

 Are there other possibilities?

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Figure 3-5. Mind map

Questioning Assumptions

3-44. An assumption is a supposition on the current situation or a presupposition on the future course of events, either or both assumed to be true in the absence of positive proof, necessary to enable the commander

in the process of planning to complete an estimate of the situation and make a decision on the course of action

(JP 5-0). An assumption is true in the absence of actions or information contradicting it. Assumptions are

probably correct but cannot be verified at the time made. An assumption used during planning has two

characteristics:

 It is likely to be true.

 It is necessary to continue planning.

3-45. Assumptions are logical and reflect the reality of the situation. Commanders and staffs are careful with their assumptions to ensure they are not based on preconceptions, bias, false historical analogies, or wishful

thinking. Additionally, planners are aware of any unstated assumptions. Often, an unstated assumption is

more dangerous than a stated assumption proven wrong. Good assumptions support effective decision-

making and problem solving. Conversely, if assumptions are unsupportable or based on faulty reasoning or

knowledge, they result in poor decision-making and problem solving.

3-46. Commanders and staffs question whether their assumptions are valid throughout planning and the operations process. Key points concerning the use of assumptions include:

 Assumptions are logical, realistic, and considered likely to be true.

 Too many assumptions result in a higher probability that the plan or proposed solution may be

invalid.

 The use of assumptions requires the staff to develop branches and sequels to execute if one or

more key assumptions prove false.

3-47. The planning team develops assumptions in the lack of factual evidence as they frame an operational environment and problems. Planning teams record their assumptions and challenge them while planning.

Some key questions to help challenge assumptions include:

 Why must this assumption “be true”?

 How much confidence exists that this assumption is true?

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 What is the explanation for the degree of confidence for this assumption to be true?

 Could the assumption have been true in the past but less so now?

 If the assumption proves to be wrong, would it alter the line of thinking?

 Has checking assumptions identified new factors that need future analysis?

 What circumstance or information might underline this assumption?

3-48. The planning team works on these questions as a group, assigns a subteam to work on these questions, or solicits support from the unit’s red team to help with challenging assumptions.

Four Ways of Seeing

3-49. To develop a richer understanding of an operational environment and problems, it is helpful for the planning team to examine the situation from the perspectives of other actors in the operational environment.

For example:

 How does an enemy view the causes of conflict?

 What are the goals of the enemy force in an area?

 How does the enemy force perceive the goals of coalition forces in the area?

3-50. Four ways of seeing is a technique available to planning teams to develop and compare how other actors in an operational environment view a situation or problem. In four ways of seeing, the planning team

answers the following questions of actors represented as X and Y.

 How does X view itself?

 How does Y view itself?

 How does X view Y?

 How does Y view X?

3-51. Four ways of seeing is a flexible tool. The planning team can compare the friendly force with an enemy force or other actors or compare multiple actors with each other.

1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 4-1

Chapter 4

Framing Problems

This chapter begins with a general discussion of problems. Next, this chapter describes

activities associated with problem framing. The chapter concludes with techniques

used in framing problems.

NATURE OF PROBLEMS

4-1. A problem is an issue or obstacle that makes it difficult to achieve a desired goal or objective. In a broad sense, a problem exists when an individual notices a difference between the current state and desired

end state. In the context of operations, an operational problem is a discrepancy between the state of affairs as

it is and the state of affairs as it ought to be that compels military actions to resolve it. An operational problem

includes those issues that impede commanders from accomplishing missions, achieving objectives, and

attaining the desired end state.

4-2. Army leaders are problem solvers and the complexity of problems they address range from well- structured problems to those extremely complex and ill-structured. The degree of interactive complexity (see

chapter 3) of a given situation is the primary factor that determines the problem’s structure. Another factor

determining problem structure is an individual perception of a problem. Perception of whether a problem is

well, medium, or ill-structured depends on the perceived familiarity and understanding of the problem. Table

4-1 describes three types of problems and offers potential solution strategies for each one.

Table 4-1. Types of problems and solution strategies

Well-structured Medium-structured Ill-structured

Perception The problem is self-evident.

Leaders easily agree on its structure.

Leaders have difficulty agreeing on problem structure and will have to agree on a shared hypothesis.

Solution development

Solution techniques are available and there are verifiable solutions.

There may be more than one “right” answer. Leaders may disagree on the best solution. Leaders can agree on a desired end state.

Leaders will disagree on—

 How the problem can be solved.

 The most desirable end state.

 Whether the end state can be attained.

Execution of solution

Success requires learning to perfect technique.

Success requires learning to perfect techniques and to adjust the solution.

Success requires learning to perfect technique, adjust the solution, and continuously refine understanding of the problem.

Adaptive iteration

No adaptive iteration required.

Adaptive iteration is required to find the best solution.

Adaptive iteration is required to refine the problem structure and solutions.

WELL-STRUCTURED PROBLEMS

4-3. Well-structured problems are easy to identify because required information is available. In addition, known methods (for example a math formula) are available to solve these types of problems. While difficult

to solve, well-structured problems display little interactive complexity and have verifiable solutions. Most

individuals are comfortable addressing well-structured problems. Such problems are easy to control through

technical means and systematic method-based solutions. The types of problems are easier to recognize and

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place in categories. For example, Army doctrine provides tasks, conditions, and standards for problems

ranging from tank gunnery to performing a movement to contact. The most structured problems, tank gunnery

for example, have one correct solution. Success in gunnery requires learning to perfect the established

technique.

MEDIUM-STRUCTURED PROBLEMS

4-4. Medium-structured problems are more interactively complex than well-structured problems. For example, a field manual describes how a combined arms battalion performs a defense, but it offers no single

solution that applies to all circumstances. Leaders can agree on the problem and the end state for the

operation. However, they may disagree about how to apply the doctrinal principles to a piece of terrain against

an enemy. Furthermore, a defense may succeed against one enemy yet fail against another under the same

circumstances. Success and failure differs as a function of interactive complexity or technical difference

between the two enemy forces. Success during execution requires not only learning to perfect a technique

but also adjusting the solution based on changing conditions.

ILL-STRUCTURED PROBLEMS

4-5. Ill-structured problems are complex, nonlinear, and dynamic. These problems are the most challenging to understand and solve. Unlike well or medium-structured problems, leaders disagree about how to solve

ill-structured problems, what the end state should be, and whether the desired end state is achievable. At the

root of this lack of consensus is the difficulty in agreeing on what is the problem. Unlike medium-structured

problems, there is no clear action to take because the nature of the problem itself is not clear. Classic examples

of ill-structured problems include social issues like crime, racism, and poverty and military operations as a

whole. ADM helps commanders and staffs identify and understand ill-structured problems.

FRAMING ACTIVITIES

4-6. Identifying and understanding problems is essential to solving them. As the planning team understands an operational environment and the desired end state, the planning team shifts their efforts to identifying and

understanding those issues that may impede progress toward achieving the desired end state. These

interrelated issues represent the problem situation or “system of problems” the command will need to address.

During problem framing, commanders and staffs answer questions such as:

 What is the difference between the current state of an operational environment and the desired end

state?

 What is the difference between the natural tendency of an operational environment and the desired

end state?

 What is the difference between the desired end state of other actors and the desired end state?

 What is preventing the command from reaching the desired end state?

 What needs to change?

 What does not need to change?

 What are the opportunities and threats from a friendly perspective?

 What are the opportunities and threats from an enemy and other actor’s perspective?

4-7. The planning team captures its work in a problem frame that describes the set of interrelated problems or system of problems in a narrative supported by visual models. The problem frame supports the

commander’s dialogue with higher commanders and unified action partners in defining problems and

developing common expectations regarding resolution. This is vital to develop an effective operational

approach to solve or manage identified problems.

4-8. Like framing an operational environment, there is no “one way” or set of steps for framing problems. There are three activities that help the commander and staff develop a problem frame.

 Review the environmental frame.

 Identify problems and map out their relationships.

 Capture the problem frame in text and graphics.

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1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 4-3

REVIEW ENVIRONMENTAL FRAME

4-9. The problem frame is an extension of the environment frame as shown in figure 4-1. As such, the planning team begins framing the problem by reviewing the environmental frame. The team reviews the

following:

 Current state of the operational environment.

 Projections on how an operational environment may trend in the future.

 Desired future states of other actors.

 Desired end state.

 Problems identified during earlier design sessions.

Figure 4-1. Problem frame

IDENTIFY PROBLEMS AND MAP OUT THEIR RELATIONSHIPS

4-10. The goal of problem framing is to identify obstacles impeding progress toward achieving the desired end state. Effective commanders and planning teams recognize that no problem is solved in isolation, but set

in relation to other problems in an operational environment. Rarely is there a single problem facing the

command. For example, a unit tasked to neutralize insurgents, enable the host nation government to expand

its influence, and create a capable security force in an area of operations (AO) may be faced with the

following interrelated problems:

 Lack of resolve of the host nation’s security force to professionalize and win.

 Host nation security force systems (logistics, personnel, pay) are not functional.

 Host nation security force leadership is incompetent.

 Effective insurgent resistance.

 Lack of intelligence.

 Civilian casualties.

 Population’s lack of trust of coalition forces.

 Lack of commitment of the central government to the area.

 Corruption at the district and provincial level beyond the limit of tolerance.

 Security along main supply route.

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 The size of the AO.

 Task assigned versus troops available.

 Rotation schedule of higher, adjacent, and subordinate units.

 Limited unity of effort among some unified action partners.

4-11. A technique for identifying problems begins with two questions:

 What is the difference between the current state of the operational environment and the desired

state?

 What is preventing the force from reaching the desired end state?

4-12. The team identifies the differences between the desired end state and alternative future states (the natural tendency of an operational environment and desired end states conditions of other actors). These

differences are tensions—resistance or friction among and between actors. Combined, these tensions

represent the system of problems requiring resolution. In addition to identifying differences, the planning

team identifies any shared desired conditions among alternative future states and the friendly end state.

Shared desired conditions represent opportunities to leverage and consider when developing the operational

approach.

4-13. To help understand the system of problems, it is helpful to map the relationships of the problems identified (see chapter 3 for a discussion on mind mapping). Part of this mapping is explaining the causes or

contributors to the problem. For example, team members identify that a certain population group has a history

of not participating in the election process. While useful information in itself, the planning team understands

and explains why the group does not participate. As the planning team maps out the various problems and

related causes, they see that some of the issues are symptoms of a bigger issue. In addition, the team discerns

that some problems are outside the scope of their mission. Mapping helps isolate the root cause of problems

that the operational approach must address.

DEVELOP A PROBLEM FRAME

4-14. The planning team captures its work in a problem frame that describes the set of interrelated issues in a narrative supported by visual models. The problem frame identifies those issues preventing the command

from achieving its desired end state. The problem frame supports the commander’s dialogue with higher

commanders and unified action partners by defining the problem situation. This is an example of an initial

problem narrative based on the Newland scenario from chapter 3.

The Newland defense force is impeding the establishment of a democratic government in

Newland and the primary factor of instability in the region. For more than forty years, the

Newland defense force maintained power for itself and the regime by oppressing all opposition

in society. In addition, the Newland defense force has a history of intimidating Country Z

through force (both overtly and covertly). Corruption in the Newland defense force is rampant in

the leadership, and it has close ties to several drug cartels. General E is the latest of two dictators

emerging from the Newland defense force. Even if General E is removed from power, the

potential of a new dictator emerging from the Newland defense force is likely. There is no

indication that the leadership of the Newland defense force is willing to relinquish its power in

Newland.

4-15. The initial problem narrative develops as the commander and staff learn more about the operational environment and develop an operational approach. For example, the oppressive nature of the Newland

defense force is a significant issue, but not the only one. After discussing the problem narrative with the

commander and others, the planning team expands the narrative including problems associated with:

 Developing a democratic government.

 Potential for civil conflict.

 Reform and transformation of the armed forces.

 Influence of countries X and Y.

 Power and influence of the drug cartels.

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TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES

4-16. The tools and techniques used to frame an operational environment (see Chapter 3) also help frame problems including:

 Brainstorming

 Mind mapping.

 Meta-questioning.

 Questioning assumptions.

 Four ways of seeing.

4-17. Problem restatement is a technique that helps the planning team with framing problems. Before developing an operational approach, the commander and planning team spends some time discussing and

examining the results of the problem frame. How the command frames the problem situation directly affects

possible solutions. Poor problem framing leads to solutions that may not solve the real issues at hand. Poorly

framed problems:

 Are too vague or broad in definition.

 Are too narrow in definition.

 Contain inherent assumptions.

 Contain a presumed solution.

4-18. Problem restatement includes several activities related to the “proposed problem narrative” in a divergent thinking mode. The following activities lead to an alternative perspective to improve the problem

narrative:

 Paraphrase the problem situation—restate it using different words without losing the original

meaning. Saying the same thing with different words puts a different spin on the meaning, which

triggers new perspectives and informative insights.

 Turn the problem situation on its head by stating it in an opposite manner. This provides a different

perspective to consider the problem.

 Broaden the focus—restate the problem situation in a larger context. This reveals a narrowly

defined problem narrative.

 Redirect the focus—boldly, consciously change the focus of portions of the problem narrative. If

the original focus concerned troops available, look at the situation in terms of number of tasks.

This task involves looking for unexamined variables affecting the problem frame.

 Ask “Why?” Formulate a “why” to the issues identified in the problem narrative, answer them,

and do it again. Performing this activity may reveal insights obscured during previous framing

activities.

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1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 5-1

Chapter 5

Framing Solutions

This chapter defines an operational approach and describes its purpose. Next, this

chapter describes activities associated with developing an operational approach. The

chapter concludes with techniques for documenting the results of ADM and

transitioning to detailed planning.

OPERATIONAL APPROACH

5-1. Once commanders and planners agree on the problem or set of problems, they develop ways to address them. They do this by developing an operational approach—a description of the broad actions the force must

take to transform current conditions into those desired at end state (JP 5-0). An operational approach is the

commander’s visualization of what needs to be done to solve or manage identified problems. It is the main

idea that informs detailed planning. The operational approach promotes mutual understanding and unity of

effort between the force and unified action partner on the way ahead.

5-2. The operational approach reflects understanding of the operational environment and the problem while describing the commander’s visualization of ways to achieve the desired end state as shown in figure 5-1.

The operational approach accounts for higher direction, describes required resources in general terms, and

identifies risk. Commanders, supported by their planning teams, describe their operational approach in a

narrative supported by graphics.

Figure 5-1. Operational approach

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Note: An operational approach is not a course of action—a scheme developed to accomplish a

mission (JP 5-0). An operational approach provides focus and boundaries for the development of

courses of action during the military decisionmaking process (MDMP). A course of action is more

detailed than an operational approach, including details such as task organization, unit boundaries,

and tasks to accomplish. (See FM 6-0 for more details on developing courses of action).

5-3. The operational approach is a conceptualization of “what needs to be done” to solve or manage identified problems. Like the other activities of ADM, commanders collaborate and dialogue with their staffs,

other commanders, and unified action partners as they formulate their operational approach. In developing

their operational approach, the commander and planning team synthesize early work concerning the

operational environment, problem, and desired end state and seek to answer questions such as:

 How do we go from the existing conditions to the desired end state?

 What obstacles or tensions exist between the two?

 What broad actions help attain these conditions?

 What type of resources are required?

 What are the risks?

ACTIVITIES

5-4. As with the other activities of ADM, there is no prescribed format for developing an operational approach. Several activities help the commander and staffs develop an operational approach and translate

that operational approach into a plan or order for execution. Activities include:

 Review the environmental and problem frames.

 Formulate an operational approach.

 Document results.

REVIEW THE ENVIRONMENTAL AND PROBLEM FRAMES

5-5. The commander describes the current state of the operational environment and how the operational environment looks when operations conclude (desired end state) to visualize an approach. As such, the

commander and planning team review their understanding of the operational environment. Commanders and

staffs review conditions that make up the desired end state and those obstacles or tensions that impede the

force from achieving that end state. They review their understanding of the enemy’s desired end state and

desired future states of unified action partners and other actors.

FORMULATE AN OPERATIONAL APPROACH

5-6. While there is no prescribed set of steps to develop an operational approach, the commander and planning team use the elements of operational art to formulate their operational approach. Earlier in ADM,

the planning team considered end state conditions. When formulating an operational approach, the

commander and planning team consider center of gravity, decisive points, objectives, line of operations, and

phasing. The following activities help the commanders and staffs apply the elements of operational art when

formulating an operational approach:

 Determine enemy and friendly center of gravity.

 Identify decisive points.

 Determine a direct or indirect approach.

 Establish objectives and devise lines of operations and lines of effort.

 Refine the operational approach.

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Center of Gravity

5-7. As an element of operational art, the center of gravity construct helps the planning team understand friendly, enemy, and other actors’ sources of strength in an operational environment. A center of gravity is

the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act (JP 5-0). Centers

of gravity are not limited to military forces and are either physical or moral. Physical centers of gravity, such

as a capital city or military force, are easier to identify. In contrast, moral centers of gravity are intangible

and more difficult to influence. They can include a charismatic leader, powerful ruling elite, religious

tradition, tribal influence, or strong-willed populace. Military means alone are often ineffective when

changing moral centers of gravity. Affecting them requires the collective, integrated efforts of all unified

action partners.

5-8. A technique for analyzing centers of gravity (enemy, friendly, and other actors) is a framework of three critical factors—capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities. Critical capabilities enable a friendly, enemy,

or other actor to accomplish its objective(s). Critical requirements are the conditions, resources, and means

associated to a critical capability. Critical vulnerabilities are those aspects or components of critical

requirements that are deficient or vulnerable to direct or indirect attack in a manner achieving decisive or

significant results. Center of gravity analysis helps the commander and planning team determine ways to

undermine enemy strengths by exploiting enemy vulnerabilities while protecting friendly vulnerabilities from

enemies attempting to do the same. In addition, understanding the relationship among a center of gravity’s

critical capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities helps the team identify decisive points. See JP 5-0, and

JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, for a more detailed discussion of

center of gravity analysis.

Identify Decisive Points

5-9. A decisive point is a geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving

success (JP 5-0). Decisive points are not centers of gravity; they are keys to attacking or protecting them.

Some decisive points are geographic. Examples include port facilities, distribution networks and nodes, and

bases of operations. Events and elements of an enemy force are decisive points. Examples of these events

include commitment of the enemy operational reserve or reopening a major oil refinery. A common

characteristic of decisive points is their importance to a center of gravity. A decisive point’s importance

requires the enemy to commit significant resources to defend it. The loss of a decisive point weakens a center

of gravity and may expose more decisive points.

5-10. Decisive points have a different character during operations dominated by stability or defense support of civil authorities. These decisive points are less tangible and associated with important events and

conditions. Examples include—

 Repairing a vital water treatment facility.

 Establishing a training academy for national security forces.

 Securing an election.

 Quantifiably reducing crime.

 Protecting property.

5-11. None of these examples is purely physical. Nonetheless, any may be vital to establishing conditions for transitioning to civil authority.

Determine a Direct or Indirect Approach

5-12. Based on an understanding of centers of gravity and decisive points, the commander and staff consider an approach to contend with a center of gravity. There are two approaches—direct or indirect. The direct

approach attacks the enemy’s center of gravity or principal strength by applying combat power directly

against it. However, centers of gravity are well protected and not vulnerable to a direct approach. Thus,

commanders often choose an indirect approach. The indirect approach attacks the enemy’s center of gravity

by applying combat power against a series of decisive points while avoiding enemy strength. Both approaches

use combinations of defeat or stability mechanisms, depending on the situation. Defeat and stability

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mechanisms are not tactical missions; rather, these mechanisms describe broad operational and tactical

effects.

Defeat Mechanisms

5-13. A defeat mechanism is the method through which friendly forces accomplish their mission against enemy opposition (ADRP 3-0). A defeat mechanism is described in terms of the physical or psychological

effects it produces. Physical defeat deprives enemy forces of the ability to achieve those aims; psychological

defeat deprives them of the will to do so. Army forces are most successful when applying focused

combinations of defeat mechanisms. This produces complementary and reinforcing effects not attainable

with a single mechanism. Used individually, a defeat mechanism achieves results proportional to the effort

expended. Used in combination, the effects are synergistic and lasting. Army forces at all echelons use

combinations of four defeat mechanisms:

 Destroy.

 Dislocate.

 Disintegrate.

 Isolate.

5-14. Destroy means to apply lethal combat power on an enemy capability so that it no longer performs any function and cannot be restored to a usable condition without rebuilding. The most effective way to destroy

enemy capabilities is with a single, decisive attack. When the necessary combat power is not massed

simultaneously, commanders apply it sequentially. This approach is called attrition. It defeats the enemy by

maintaining the highest possible rate of destruction over time.

5-15. Destruction may not force the enemy to surrender; well-disciplined forces and those able to reconstitute endure heavy losses without giving up. Defeat cannot be measured by terms of destruction. This is true when

criteria focus on narrow metrics, such as casualties, equipment destroyed, or perceived enemy strength.

Destruction is difficult to assess if friendly forces apply force indiscriminately. The effects of destruction are

transitory unless combined with isolation and dislocation.

5-16. Dislocate means to employ forces to obtain significant positional advantage, rendering the enemy’s disposition less valuable, perhaps even irrelevant. It makes the enemy expose forces by reacting to the

dislocating action. Dislocation requires the enemy commander to make a choice: accept neutralization of part

of their force or risk its destruction while repositioning. Turning movements and envelopments produce

dislocation. When combined with destruction, dislocation contributes to rapid success.

5-17. Disintegrate means to disrupt the enemy’s command and control system, degrading the ability to conduct operations while leading to a rapid collapse of the enemy’s capabilities or will to fight. It exploits

the effects of dislocation and destruction to shatter the enemy’s coherence. Typically, disintegration follows

the loss of capabilities that enemy commanders use to develop and maintain situational understanding,

coupled with destruction and dislocation. Simultaneous operations produce the strongest disintegrative

effects. Disintegration is difficult to achieve; however, prolonged isolation, destruction, and dislocation can

produce it.

5-18. Isolate means to deny an enemy or adversary access to capabilities that enable the exercise of coercion, influence, potential advantage, and freedom of action. Isolation limits the enemy’s ability to perform

operations effectively by marginalizing one or more of these capabilities. It exposes the enemy to continued

degradation through the massed effects of the other defeat mechanisms. There are two types of isolation:

 Physical isolation, which is difficult to achieve but easier to assess. An isolated enemy loses

freedom of movement and access to support.

 Psychological isolation, which, while difficult to assess, is an enabler of disintegration. The most

important indicators include the breakdown of enemy morale and the alienation of a population

from the enemy.

5-19. Isolation rarely defeats an enemy. However, it complements and reinforces other defeat mechanisms’ effects. Offensive tasks focus on destroying personnel and equipment. They use maneuver to dislocate forces.

However, these effects multiply when combined with isolating the enemy from sources of physical and moral

support.

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1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 5-5

Stability Mechanisms

5-20. A stability mechanism is the primary method where friendly forces affect civilians in order to attain conditions that support establishing a lasting, stable peace (ADRP 3-0). As with defeat mechanisms,

combinations of stability mechanisms produce complementary and reinforcing effects that accomplish the

mission more effectively and efficiently than single mechanisms do alone. The four stability mechanisms

are—

 Compel.

 Control.

 Influence.

 Support.

5-21. Compel means to use, or threaten to use, lethal force to establish control and dominance, affect behavioral change, or enforce compliance with mandates, agreements, or civil authority. The appropriate and

discriminate use of lethal force reinforces efforts to stabilize a situation, gain consent, or ensure compliance.

Conversely, misusing force can adversely affect an operation’s legitimacy. Legitimacy is essential to

producing effective compliance. Compliance depends on how the local populace and others perceive the

force’s ability to exercise lethal force to accomplish the mission.

5-22. In the context of stability, control means imposing civil order. It includes securing borders, routes, sensitive sites, population centers, and individuals. It also involves physically occupying key terrain and

facilities. Control includes activities related to disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, as well as

security sector reform.

5-23. Influence means to alter the opinions and attitudes of a civilian population. It changes behaviors through nonlethal means. Influence is a product of public perception as a measure of operational success. It

reflects the ability of friendly forces to operate in the cultural and societal norms of the local populace while

accomplishing the mission. Influence requires legitimacy. Developing legitimacy requires time, patience, and

coordinated, cooperative efforts across the operational area.

5-24. Support means establishing, reinforcing, or setting the conditions necessary for other instruments of national power to function effectively. It requires coordination and cooperation with civilian agencies as they

assess the immediate needs of failed or failing states and plan, prepare for, or execute responses to them. In

extreme circumstances, support requires committing considerable resources for a protracted period. This

commitment involves establishing or reestablishing the institutions required for normal life. These typically

include a legitimate civil authority, market economy, and criminal justice system supported by government

institutions for health, education, and civil service.

ESTABLISH OBJECTIVES AND DEVISE LINES OF OPERATIONS AND LINES OF EFFORT

5-25. Normally, there are far more decisive points in a given operational area that can be attacked, seized, retained, controlled, or protected by available forces and capabilities. Accordingly, planners study and

analyze decisive points and determine which offer the best opportunity to attack the adversary’s center of

gravity, extend friendly operational reach, or enable the application of friendly forces and capabilities. The

art of planning includes selecting decisive points that best lead to creating end state conditions in a sequence

that most quickly and efficiently leads to mission success. Once identified for action, decisive points become

objectives. An objective can be physical (an enemy force or a terrain feature) or conceptual as a goal (rule of

law established). Combined with end state conditions, objectives form the building blocks for developing

lines of operation and lines of effort.

5-26. Commanders and the planning team devise lines of operations and lines of effort to link objectives in time, space, and purpose to attaining desired end state conditions as shown in figure 5-2 on page 5-6.

Commanders describe their operational approach along lines of operations, lines of effort, or a combination

of both. Commanders at all levels may use lines of operations and lines of effort to develop tasks to

subordinate units and allocate resources. Commanders designate one line as the decisive operation and others

as shaping operations. Commanders synchronize and sequence related actions along multiple lines. Seeing

these relationships helps commanders assess progress toward achieving the end state as forces perform tasks

and accomplish missions.

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Figure 5-2. Sample line of effort and line of operation

5-27. A line of operations is a line that defines the directional orientation of a force in time and space in relation to the enemy and that links the force with its base of operations and objectives (ADRP 3-0). Lines

of operations connect a series of actions that lead to control of a geographic or force-oriented objective.

Operations designed using lines of operations include a series of actions executed according to a well-defined

sequence.

5-28. A line of effort is a line that links multiple tasks using the logic of purpose rather than geographical reference to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions (ADRP 3-0). Commanders

describe their operational approach through lines of effort when positional references to an enemy or

adversary have little relevance. In operations involving many nonmilitary factors, lines of effort are the only

way to link tasks to the end state.

5-29. Commanders use lines of operations and lines of effort to connect objectives to a central, unifying purpose. The difference between lines of operations and lines of effort is that lines of operations are oriented

on physical linkages while lines of effort are oriented on logical linkages. While largely conceptual in nature

during this stage of planning, commanders and planners develop lines of operation and lines of effort with

an appreciation for required resources to execute the operational approach.

REFINE THE OPERATIONAL APPROACH

5-30. While an operational approach is broad in nature, it describes the commander’s visualization in time, space, and purpose. It also addresses resources required to support the operational approach and identify risk.

After forming a framework for the operational approach using lines of operations and lines of effort,

commanders and planning teams consider additional elements of operational art to refine the operational

approach. Additional elements of operational art to consider include:

 Operational reach, basing, and culmination.

 Tempo.

 Phasing and transitions.

 Risk.

Operational Reach, Basing, and Culmination

5-31. Commanders and the planning team develop the operational approach in anticipated resource constraints considered in framing an operational environment. To help visualize ways to sustain and protect

the force, the commander and planning team consider operational reach, basing, and culmination.

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1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 5-7

5-32. Operational reach is the distance and duration across which a force can successfully employ its capabilities. The skillful positioning of forces, reserves, bases, and equipment extend operational reach.

Although reach might be constrained or limited by the geography, the enemy, and adversaries in and around

an operational area, reach is extended by—

 Forward positioning of capabilities and resources.

 Increasing the range and effectiveness of weapons systems.

 Leveraging host nation support and contract support.

5-33. Basing, in the broadest sense, is an indispensable part of operational art. It is tied to lines of operations and affects operational reach. In particular, the arrangement and positioning of bases in an operational area

underwrites the ability of the force to protect its components from enemy action while expanding the distance

and duration of capabilities. Commanders consider bases and base camps as intermediate staging bases,

lodgments (subsequently developed into base camps or potentially bases), and forward operating bases as

part of the operational approach.

5-34. Commanders consider culmination when developing their operational approach and visualizing resources to support it. A culminating point is that point in time and space at which a force no longer possesses

the capability to continue its current form of operations (ADRP 3-0). Culmination means a shift in relative

combat power. It is relevant to both attackers and defenders at each level of war. While conducting offensive

tasks, the culminating point occurs when the force cannot continue the attack and assumes a defensive posture

or executes an operational pause. While conducting defensive tasks, it occurs when the force cannot defend

itself and withdraws or risks destruction. The culminating point is difficult to identify when forces conduct

stability tasks. Two conditions result in culmination: units being too dispersed to secure an area of operations

(AO) or units lacking resources to achieve the end state.

Tempo

5-35. Tempo is another element to consider when developing an operational approach. Tempo is the relative speed and rhythm of military operations over time with respect to the enemy (ADRP 3-0). Tempo reflects

the rate of military action. Controlling tempo helps commanders keep the initiative during combat operations

or establish a sense of normalcy during humanitarian crises. During operations dominated by offensive and

defensive tasks, commanders maintain a higher tempo than the enemy does; a rapid tempo overwhelms an

enemy’s ability to counter friendly actions. It is the key to achieving a temporal advantage during operations.

During operations dominated by stability tasks, commanders control events and deny the enemy positions of

advantage. By acting faster than the situation deteriorates, commanders change the dynamics of a crisis and

restore stability.

5-36. Army forces expend more energy and resources when operating at a high tempo. Commanders assess the force’s capacity to operate at a higher tempo based on its performance and available resources. An

effective operational approach varies tempo throughout an operation to increase endurance while maintaining

appropriate speed and momentum.

Phasing and Transition

5-37. The ability Army forces to extend operations in time and space, coupled with a desire to dictate tempo, presents commanders with more objectives than the force can engage simultaneously. This requires

commanders and staffs to consider sequencing operations. Commanders do this by phasing an operation. A

phase is a planning and execution tool used to divide an operation in duration or activity (ADRP 3-0). A

change in phase involves a change of mission, task organization, or rules of engagement.

5-38. Phasing extends operational reach. Only when the force lacks the capability to accomplish the mission in a single action do commanders phase the operation. Each phase should—

 Focus effort.

 Concentrate combat power in time and space at a decisive point.

 Accomplish its objectives deliberately and logically.

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5-39. Transitions mark a change of focus between phases or between the ongoing operation and execution of a branch or sequel. Shifting priorities between the core competencies or among offensive, defensive,

stability, and defense support of civil authorities tasks involve a transition. Transitions require planning and

preparation before execution to maintain the momentum and tempo of operations. The force is vulnerable

during transitions and commanders establish clear conditions for execution.

Risk

5-40. Risk, uncertainty, and chance are inherent in all military operations. During ADM, it is important for commanders, supported by their staffs, to identify and communicate risk to mission accomplishment. Part of

developing an operational approach includes answering the question, “What is the chance of failure or

unacceptable consequences in employing the operational approach?” Risks range from resource shortfalls to

an approach that alienates a potential friendly actor. Commanders and staffs evaluate assumptions to develop

the operational environment as potential areas of risk. Identified risks are communicated to higher

headquarters and risk mitigation guidance is provided in the commander’s planning guidance. (See ATP 5-

19 for a discussion of risk management.)

DOCUMENT RESULTS

5-41. A critical aspect of ADM is transferring the understanding and knowledge developed during ADM to others on the staff; subordinate, adjacent, and higher commanders; and unified action partners. The goal of

documenting the results of ADM is to capture the tacit knowledge gained during ADM into explicit

knowledge for others to apply. Tacit knowledge resides in an individual’s mind where explicit knowledge

consists of written or otherwise documented information. Products of ADM including the environmental

frame, problem frame, and operational approach, may be part of the unit’s operations order. (See FM 6-0 for

the Army’s operations order format.)

5-42. The planning team helps the commander summarize their understanding of the operational environment and the problem, along with describing the operational approach to solve the problem. Key

outputs of ADM conveyed in text and graphics include:

 Description of the operational environment.

 Description of the problem.

 Description of the operational approach

 Initial commander’s intent.

 Panning guidance including operational timings, resources requirements in broad terms, and risk.

5-43. Similar to an environmental frame and a problem frame, commanders and staff use graphics and text to describe the operational approach. Figure 5-3 on page 5-9 shows an operational approach using lines of

effort, defeat and stability mechanisms, objectives, and end state conditions.

TRANSITIONING TO DETAILED PLANNING

5-44. The products of ADM support the development of a detailed plan or order using the MDMP. The transition between ADM and the MDMP is important to convey the understanding and logic developed by

the planning team to those developing the detailed plan. Briefing the results of ADM and handing over

associated products to another planning team is not an effective approach. Often the same planning team that

led the design effort leads the staff through the MDMP. If not, key members of the planning team are part of

the core element of the planning team performing the MDMP.

5-45. During the mission analysis step of the MDMP, products of ADM are refined as the commander and staff learn more about the situation. The planning team rechecks and validates assumptions developed during

ADM. Commanders consider new information and modify their visualization as required before issuing

planning guidance for the development of courses of action.

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1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 5-9

Figure 5-3. Sample operational approach

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1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 6-1

Chapter 6

Assessment and Reframing

The chapter begins with a general discussion of organizational learning. Next, it

describes how assessment and reframing helps commanders with adapting operations

to changing circumstances. The chapter concludes with techniques available to help

the commander and staff with assessing operations and reframing.

ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING

6-1. Organizational learning is a field of study that examines ways organizations learn and adapt. A premise behind this discipline is that in order for an organization to remain relevant, it must continue to grow and

adapt to changes in the environment. Organizations, however, do not normally adapt effectively by accident.

To adapt effectively, an organization must develop a deliberate system of learning to help that organization

make informed choices on ways to change.

6-2. Best practices suggest that successful Army units develop, maintain, and employ an organizational learning system that contributes to effective decisionmaking throughout an operation (from deployment to

redeployment). There are numerous tools and techniques that support the commander to promote

organizational learning throughout operations including:

 Knowledge management (see ATP 6-01.1).

 Collaboration and dialogue.

 Running estimates.

 Backbriefs and rehearsals.

 After action reviews.

 Center for Army Lessons Learned products and databases.

6-3. ADM helps commanders promote organizational learning. The collaborative nature of ADM encourages diverse perspectives. The creative thinking aspects of ADM help develop innovative solutions to

problems and ways to adapt the organization to changing circumstances. Continuous assessment and

reframing are other ways ADM enables organizational learning.

ASSESSMENT

6-4. Assessment is the determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective (JP 3-0). Assessment involves comparing forecasted outcomes with events to

determine the effectiveness of force employment. More specifically, assessment helps the commander

determine progress toward attaining desired end state conditions, achieving objectives, and accomplishing

tasks. Assessment involves monitoring and evaluating the operational environment to determine what

changes affect operations.

6-5. Throughout the operations process, commanders integrate their own assessments with those of the staff, subordinate commanders, and other unified action partners. Primary tools for assessing progress of the

operation include the personal observations, the common operational picture, running estimates, and the

assessment plan. The latter includes measures of effectiveness (MOE), measures of performance (MOP), and

reframing indicators. The commander’s visualization forms the basis for the commander’s personal

assessment of progress. Running estimates provide information, conclusions, and recommendations from the

perspective of each staff section.

6-6. Assessment is continuous. It precedes and guides every operations process activity and concludes each operation or phase of an operation. Broadly, assessment consists of, but is not limited to, the following

activities:

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6-2 ATP 5-0.1 1 July 2015

 Monitoring the current situation to collect relevant information.

 Evaluating progress toward attaining end state conditions, achieving objectives, and performing

tasks.

 Recommending or directing action for improvement.

6-7. Monitoring is continuous observation of those conditions relevant to the current operation (ADRP 5- 0). Monitoring in the assessment process allows staffs to collect relevant information, specifically that

information about the current situation to compare to the forecasted situation described in the commander’s

intent and concept of operations. Commanders cannot judge progress or make effective decisions without an

accurate understanding of the current situation.

6-8. The staff analyzes relevant information collected through monitoring to evaluate the operation’s progress. Evaluating is using criteria to judge progress toward desired conditions and determining why the

current degree of progress exists (ADRP 5-0). Evaluation is at the heart of the assessment process where

most of the analysis occurs. Evaluation helps commanders determine what works and what does not work. It

also helps them gain insights into how to accomplish the mission.

6-9. Criteria in the forms of MOEs and MOPs help determine progress toward attaining end state conditions, achieving objectives, and performing tasks. MOEs determine if a task achieves its intended

results. MOPs help determine if a task is completed properly. MOEs and MOPs are simply criteria—they do

not represent the assessment itself. MOEs and MOPs require relevant information as indicators for

evaluation.

6-10. Monitoring and evaluating are critical activities; however, assessment is incomplete without recommending or directing action. Assessment may diagnose problems, but unless it results in recommended

adjustments, its use to the commander is limited. Based on the evaluation of progress, the staff brainstorms

possible improvements to the plan and makes preliminary judgments about the relative merit of those

changes. Staff members identify those changes possessing sufficient merit and provide them as

recommendations to the commander or make adjustments in their delegated authority. Recommendations to

the commander range from continuing the operation as planned, executing a branch, or reframing. (See

ADRP 5-0 and JP 5-0 for more information on assessment.)

REFRAMING

6-11. Through continuous assessment, the commander and staff monitor the operational environment and progress toward obtaining end state conditions and achieving objectives. Assessment helps commanders

measure the overall effectiveness of employing forces and capabilities to ensure that the operational approach

remains feasible and acceptable in the context of the higher commander’s intent and concept of operations.

If the current operational approach is failing to meet these criteria, or if aspects of the operational environment

or problem change significantly, the commander may decide to begin reframing efforts.

6-12. A reframe is a shift in understanding that leads to a new perspective on the problem or its resolution. Reframing is the activity of revisiting earlier hypotheses, conclusions, and decisions that underpin the current

operational approach. In essence, reframing reviews what the commander and staff believe they understand

about the operational environment, the problem, and the desired end state. At any time during the operations

process, the decision to reframe may be triggered by factors such as:

 Assessment reveals a lack of progress.

 Key assumptions prove invalid.

 Unanticipated success or failure.

 A major event that causes “catastrophic change” in the operational environment.

 A scheduled periodic review that shows a problem.

 A change in mission or end state issued by higher authority.

6-13. During operations, commanders reframe after realizing that desired conditions have changed, are not achievable, cannot be attained through the current operational approach, or because of change of mission or

end state. Reframing provides the freedom to operate beyond the limits of any single perspective. Conditions

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1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 6-3

change during execution, and such change is expected because forces interact in the operational environment.

Recognizing and anticipating these changes is fundamental to an organization’s ability to learn.

6-14. Reframing incorporates the concept of double-loop learning—an organizational learning concept that distinguishes the differences between single-loop and double-loop learning. In single-loop learning,

individuals, groups, or organizations modify their actions according to the difference between expected and

obtained outcomes. In single-loop learning, an organization detects errors and makes corrections to

accomplish existing goals and solve familiar problems. In contrast, double-loop involves error correction

where things are not so predictable. In double-loop learning, individuals, groups, or organizations question

the values, assumptions and policies that led to the actions in the first place. (See source note 2.)

6-15. Effective units incorporate single- and double-loop learning throughout operations. Army commanders and staffs practice single-loop learning to assess the progress of an operation and modify plans to bring

operations back on track with their original visualization. Operations rarely unfold as visualized during

planning. Commanders and staffs recognize the triggers, cues, and characteristics of the situation that indicate

the underlying logic behind the plan was flawed and is no longer applicable. This is not an easy task because

once an issue is framed and a mental model formed, it is natural for commanders and staffs to not see (or

even discard) indicators and events that do not conform to the original understanding and visualization of an

operation.

6-16. During execution, it is important that commanders, supported by the staff and subordinate commanders, question their original understanding and visualization of the operations. Commanders question

early assumptions, hypotheses, and conclusions that underpin the current plan during design sessions,

commander’s conferences, or long-range assessment meetings. This may lead to the commander directing an

effort to reframe the operational environment and problems and develop a new operational approach.

6-17. Figure 6-1 shows reframing in operations. As depicted, planning begins a cycle of the operations process. Because operations never occur as envisioned, commanders refine the plan during preparation and

execution. During execution, assessment helps identify variances to the commander’s original visualization.

A variance is the difference between the actual situation and forecasted situation at the time or event.

Figure 6-1. Decisionmaking during execution and reframing

6-18. Two forms of variances exist: opportunities and threats. An opportunity results from forecasted or unexpected success. When commanders recognize an opportunity, they alter the order to exploit it if the

change achieves the end state without incurring unacceptable risk. The second form of variance is a threat to

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6-4 ATP 5-0.1 1 July 2015

mission accomplishment or survival of the force. When recognizing a threat, the commander adjusts the order

to eliminate the enemy advantage, restore the friendly advantage, and regain the initiative. Not all threats to

the force or mission involve hostile or neutral persons. Disease, toxic hazards, and natural disasters are

examples of other threats.

6-19. Depending on the magnitude of the variance identified, commanders make execution and adjustment decisions throughout execution. Execution decisions implement a planned action under circumstances

anticipated in the order. An adjustment decision is the selection of a course of action that modifies the order

to respond to opportunities or threats. In some instances, the variance is so extreme that no branch or sequel

is available or the current plan lacks the flexibility to respond to the variance. In this situation, the commander

and staff may reframe the operational environment and the problem resulting in a new plan. This starts a new

cycle of the operations process.

TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES

6-20. Tools and techniques that help the commander and staff assess operations and to reframe including:

 Assessment plan.

 Assessment working group.

 Reframing indicators.

 Periodic design sessions.

 Premortem analysis.

ASSESSMENT PLAN

6-21. The staff develops an assessment plan to help judge progress of an operation. The assessment plan incorporates criteria (MOP, MOE, and indicators) used to evaluate completed tasks, achieved objectives, and

obtained end state conditions. An effective assessment plan incorporates the logic used to build the plan.

Each plan is built on assumptions and an operational approach—a broad conceptualization of the actions that

produce the conditions to define the desired end state. The logic as to why the commander believes the actions

in the plan will produce the desired results is an important consideration when developing the assessment

plan. Recording and understanding this logic during ADM helps the staff recommend the appropriate MOP,

MOE, and indicators for assessing the operation. It also helps the commander and staff determine if they

need to reframe the problem if assumptions prove false or the logic behind the plan appears flawed as

operations progress. (See FM 6-0 for details in building an assessment plan.)

ASSESSMENT WORKING GROUPS

6-22. All staff sections assess progress. It is not the responsibility of any one staff section or command post cell. Each staff section assesses the operation from its area of expertise. However, these staff sections

coordinate and integrate their individual assessments and associated recommendations across the warfighting

functions to produce a comprehensive assessment for the commander. A technique to develop a

comprehensive assessment is to form an assessment working group.

6-23. The assessment working group is cross-functional by design and includes membership from across the staff, liaison personnel, and other unified action partners outside the headquarters. Commanders direct the

chief of staff, executive officer, or a staff section leader to run the assessment working group. Selected

personnel that participated in developing the environment frame, problem frame, and operational approach

are a part of the assessment working group.

REFRAMING INDICATORS

6-24. It is helpful to think in advance about what circumstance, events, or changes require the command to reframe. As such, the commander and planning team develop reframing indicators. A reframing indicator

helps identify a condition in the operational environment that has changed or that could cause a shift in the

problem such that the current operational approach may no longer be valid. Although many reframing

indicators will not meet the requirement for the commander’s critical information requirement, some

reframing indicators could be included in the commander’s critical information requirements if they represent

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1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 6-5

information that would cause the commander to consider near-term reframing and potential redesign. An

example of such information could be the impending alliance of a regional nation with the enemy that shifts

the balance of power in spite of an earlier assumption that this alliance would not occur. Reframing indicators

support the commander’s ability to understand, learn, adapt, and reframe as necessary. Examples of such

information include the following:

 Changes in the original problem statement.

 Significant changes in the enemy composition.

 Significant changes in the expected enemy approach.

 Significant changes in friendly capability.

 Higher headquarters policy changes or directives that change the desired end state.

 Unexpected lack of friendly progress toward objectives.

 Shifts in international support and/or domestic will.

 Key assumptions prove to be invalid.

PERIODIC DESIGN SESSIONS

6-25. One of the most important questions when assessing an operation is whether the plan is still relevant. Assessment entails measuring progress according to the plan. It includes periodically reexamining the logic

and assumptions of the original plan to determine if it is still relevant. It is difficult to get outside pre-existing

mindsets associated with the current plan—especially when involved in protracted operations. It is helpful

for the commander and planners to step back from formal assessment and reexamine the situation free of

existing mindsets. As such, the commander directs a periodic design session to look at the environmental and

problem frames and to examine if the current operational approach is still valid.

PREMORTEM ANALYSIS

6-26. Premortem analysis is a thinking tool to help leaders examine the premises behind a proposed course of action, assumption, or a specified task. This tool breaks ownership to a particular plan of action through a

series of questions that focus on what may cause the plan to fail. The premise for premortem analysis is that

during planning, the commander and planners may have become too confident in the plan itself. By imagining

ways the plan could fail and discerning why, commanders and staffs improve the plan and develop reframing

indicators to consider during education. In a group setting, the following steps help perform a premortem

analysis of a plan.

 All members of the group become completely familiar with the plan.

 As a group, imagine a fiasco or set of circumstances that could cause the plan to fail.

 Individually develop the reasons for failure.

 As a group, discuss each reason and record all ideas.

 Revisit the plan to determine what to revise in the plan including recommending concepts for

potential branch plans.

 Refine the list of reasons the plan may fail and develop reframing indicators.

 Periodically review the list of reasons the plan could fail and reframing indicators during

execution.

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1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 A-1

Appendix A

Thinking Challenges

Critical thinking and creative thinking are essential leader skills and key components

of Army design methodology (ADM). This appendix describes how humans think,

discusses influences on thought, and addresses challenges to good thinking. These

challenges are biases and logic fallacies. Commanders and staffs are aware of and

guard against these biases and fallacies to improve the quality of their thinking and

decisionmaking.

COGNITION

Everyone thinks; it is our nature to do so. But much of our thinking, left to itself, is biased,

distorted, partial, uninformed or downright prejudice. (See source note 3.)

Richard Paul and Linda Elder

A-1. Cognition is thinking—it is the mental process of knowing that includes awareness, perception, reasoning, and intuition. Research points to the existence of two systems at work simultaneously in

individuals’ minds as they think. One system the individual controls consciously. The other system operates

without the individual being aware of it most of the time. These are referred to as the conscious and the

subconscious systems. Individuals use the conscious system when they study, analyze information, weigh

evidence, argue, and make choices. The subconscious system operates independently and enables a kind of

thinking commonly known as intuition. (See source note 4.)

A-2. Instead of exerting explicit mental energy to make a decision, the subconscious system relies on information from experience. For example, when individuals drive to an unfamiliar location guided by map,

they use their conscious system. When they seek the same destination six months later, even without

directions, they may be able to find the way by relying on information recorded by the subconscious system.

The subconscious system recorded information such as the time between landmarks, the sensations of sharp

or gradual curves; climbs and descents; smells and sounds encountered along the way. It aids navigation

without the individuals being consciously aware of it. Those cues form a pattern in the individuals’ memory,

which they recognize subconsciously when they travel that route again. The more experience individuals

have, the more detailed and enduring their store of subconscious knowledge becomes. Collectively, these

experiences shape something known as mindset.

A-3. A mindset is a set of assumptions and core beliefs (mental models) that form a lens through which individuals perceive the world. A mindset can be so engrained that individuals subconsciously and

consciously resist information that does not conform to that mindset. When information is lacking, as often

the case when framing an operational environment and problems, individuals rely on prior beliefs and

assumptions about how and why events came to be and would normally transpire. In essence, these mindsets

are a distillation of all that planners think they know about a subject.

A-4. As planners evaluate information they need to be aware that mindset, along with other cognitive biases, influences all their thinking. Planners guard against fallacious reasoning often used, sometimes intentionally

and sometimes out of ignorance, to support an argument. Paragraphs A-5–A-16 discuss cognitive biases and

logic fallacies. (See source note 5.)

COGNITIVE BIASES

A-5. A cognitive bias is an unconscious belief that conditions governs or compels human behavior. Just as planners must know their own mindset and its influence on conscious thought, they must also know other

cognitive biases that influence their thinking. Some of the more common cognitive biases include:

Appendix A

A-2 ATP 5-0.1 1 July 2015

 Confirmation bias.

 Status quo bias.

 Sunk cost bias.

 Sample size bias.

 Anchoring bias.

CONFIRMATION BIAS

A-6. Confirmation bias is when individuals seek confirmatory information for conclusions they have made prematurely, not realizing that the evidence supports several hypotheses. As a result, individuals fail to search

for or discard inconsistent and disconfirming evidence. This bias emphasizes the need for the commander to

establish a culture of collaboration and dialogue in the organization.

STATUS QUO BIAS

A-7. Many humans find the status quo comfortable and avoid changing it. A status quo bias may be present when individuals display the inclination to keep their circumstances stable. When individuals avoid change,

they assign unwarranted weight to information that justifies maintaining the current conditions. This bias is

more prevalent under conditions of stress where stability and predictability are a source of comfort.

SUNK COST BIAS

A-8. Sunk cost bias is a powerful tendency to recover unrecoverable costs of an earlier decision. An individual may justify a previous decision by persisting in it even when the evidence indicates it was wrong

or a change is in order. One reason for the power of this bias is that it is hard for people to face-up to their

mistakes. After investing time and effort in planning—even though time and effort cannot be recovered—a

leader may stick to the plan long after its assumptions have been refuted. In extreme instances, continuation

of a very costly endeavor may seem preferable to an unfavorable outcome. To avoid this bias, the planning

team may seek advice from people with no stake in earlier decisions.

SAMPLE SIZE BIAS

A-9. Sample size bias occurs when individuals make generalizations based on small sample sizes. Instead of considering how truly representative the information is to the particular situation, individuals

unconsciously treat the small sample as a large sample. Large samples are accepted to be highly

representative of the situation or populations from which they are drawn.

ANCHORING BIAS

A-10. Anchoring bias is a tendency for humans to use initial estimates or information as a starting point for adjustment. Even though additional information invalidates the initial estimate, humans unconsciously use

the initial estimate as a starting point when making subsequent adjustments. They are anchored to the initial

estimate. As a result, any adjustments will be closer to the initial estimates than they ought to be.

LOGIC FALLACIES

A-11. A logic fallacy is an error in logic. When analyzing information, the goal of analysis is to ascribe and validate meaning. When individuals make an argument, they offer reasons why others should accept their

view(s) or judgment. These reasons are premises (sometimes evidence) and the assertion that they allegedly

support is called the conclusion. A sound argument meets the following conditions: the premises are

acceptable and consistent; the premises are relevant to the conclusion and provide sufficient support for the

conclusion, and; missing components have been considered and are judged consistent with the conclusion. If

the premises are dubious or if they do not warrant the conclusion, then the argument is fallacious.

A-12. Logic fallacies improperly influence decisionmakers because they are psychologically compelling and there is some degree of truth to the conclusion. Common logic fallacies include:

Thinking Challenges

1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 A-3

 Arguments against the person.

 Appeal to unqualified authority.

 Red herring.

 Weak analogy.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE PERSON

A-13. This fallacy occurs when someone tries to attack a person and not a position or argument. Instead of assessing the argument or position based on the premises or conclusion, the argument is ignored and the

arguer is attacked. Awareness of this fallacy should cause the planning team to know their biases and

prejudices to ensure they do not fall victim to a seemingly convincing argument based on an unsupported

attack on a person or group advancing the information.

APPEAL TO UNQUALIFIED AUTHORITY

A-14. A valid technique to support a premise is to cite a trusted authority on the topic. A logic fallacy occurs when the authority cited does not have strong credentials for the matter at hand. To avoid this fallacy, planners

verify the qualifications of the source of information gathered during research. In other words, the researcher

assesses the qualifications of the individuals providing information to the planning team. This is true when

using open-source documents or if the planning team has asked for subject matter expertise from outside the

organization. If these qualifications are not verified, the planning team may be misled by an appeal to

unqualified authority and convinced of the validity of what is, in fact, a fallacious argument.

RED HERRING

A-15. The red herring fallacy is committed when an individual’s attention is diverted with distracting information that is flashy, eye-catching, or not relevant to the topic at hand. A red herring may be used

intentionally to divert the attention of the rest of the team from a flawed argument or it may be used

inadvertently because of poor logic. A way to avoid the red herring fallacy is to ensure members of the team

stay focused on the premises of the argument and the conclusion they support.

WEAK ANALOGY

A-16. Analogies are an effective way to communicate concepts, especially complex ones. An analogy occurs when one situation side-by-side with another and there are similarities. Analogies may be history or

individual or group experience. Quite often, these analogies are strong and are useful in illustrating a valid

point. The fallacy of weak analogy is committed when the analogy used is not strong enough to support the

conclusion drawn.

ADDITIONAL THINKING CHALLENGES

A-17. There are additional traps and errors the planning team must consider that do not neatly fit into either the bias or the logic fallacy category. Nonetheless, they have an impact on how the planning team determines

what to believe.

 Groupthink.

 Mirror imaging.

 Cultural contempt.

GROUPTHINK

A-18. ADM relies on critical and creative thinking by a group. While working in a group is advantageous to both critical and creative thinking, group problem solving has potential pitfalls. One of these pitfalls is

“groupthink.” Groupthink refers to a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved

in a cohesive group. It occurs when members, striving for agreement, override their motivation to evaluate

evidence or alternative options. The group makes a collective decision and feels good about it because all

members favor the same decision. In the interest of unity, there is limited debate or challenge to the selected

Appendix A

A-4 ATP 5-0.1 1 July 2015

solution. Group pressures towards consensus leads to concurrence-seeking tendencies by individual group

members.

A-19. Being aware of the existence of groupthink is the most important factor in avoiding it. There are several ways to help avoid groupthink:

 Encourage group members to express objections or doubts.

 Refrain from expressing preferences about potential solutions.

 Assign two independent subgroups to work on the problem.

 Discuss the group’s ideas with people outside the group.

 Invite subject matter experts from outside the group to discuss the issues at hand.

 Employ the unit’s red team to challenge the team thinking and provide alternative perspectives.

MIRROR IMAGING

A-20. Mirror imaging means planners fill in gaps of understanding and knowledge by assuming that the other side or another party acts in a certain way because that is how they would do it under similar circumstances.

Failure to appreciate that others perceive their interests differently leads to faulty assumptions. Perception on

how others act is often irrelevant. Judgments must be made on how others perceive their interests. If planners

cannot gain insight in what others are thinking, mirror imaging may be the only alternative. Planners

recognize this and do not place a lot of confidence in that kind of judgment. See chapter 3 for a discussion

on four ways of seeing as a way to guard against mirror imaging.

CULTURAL CONTEMPT

A-21. Unlike mirror imaging, commanders and staffs recognize the existence of cultural differences with other actors in an operational environment. The error occurs when commanders and staffs discount those

differences, hold them in contempt, or misunderstand these differences. Cultural contempt and

misunderstanding is revealed in arrogance. Individuals underestimate the capabilities and motivations of

others. The challenge for commanders and staffs is to understand the culture of adversaries, enemies, and

unified action partners.

1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 B-1

Appendix B

Vignette

This appendix provides an example of framing an operational environment from a

systems perspective during an operation. It uses a series of network analysis diagrams

to visualize and describe an operational environment. The appendix concludes by

describing an operational approach using the diplomatic, information, military, and

economic (DIME) construct. The intent of this appendix is to show just one approach

employed during Army design methodology (ADM). There are numerous other tools

and models available to the commander and planning team for framing operational

environments, framing problems, and developing approaches to solve those problems.

INTRODUCTION

B-1. Army forces conduct operations as part of a joint, interdependent team. The joint force commander typically assigns the Army forces an area of operations (AO) large enough for the force to accomplish tasks

and protect the force. While responsible for the conduct of operations in their AO, the commander’s area of

interest expands beyond their area of operation. An area of interest is that area of concern to the commander,

including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory. This area also

includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission (JP 3-0).

B-2. An operational environment is not constrained by physical geography. Army commanders, especially at higher echelons (division and above), understand their operational environment from a regional

perspective. In operations such as counterdrug, combating terrorism, and counterinsurgency, the enemy acts

in ways and in networks that cross nation-state borders. In fact, these networks have a significant influence

on the traditional, established nation-state and regional systems. For example, a terrorist network commits

terrorist acts in three countries, has a safe haven and base of operations in a fourth country, and receives

supplies and other aid from a fifth country.

B-3. In addition to understanding an operational environment, it is important that commanders and staffs consider the capabilities and resources available outside of the command including the capabilities and

resources in the joint force and unified action partners. Through collaboration and dialogue, Army forces

request support from the joint force commander to help them with accomplishing their mission and

recommend actions that help achieve overarching campaign objectives for the joint operation.

FRAMING AN OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

B-4. In this vignette, a division commander directed the G-5 to form a planning team to examine the relationships between the drug trade and the insurgents and to develop options that could disrupt these

relationships. While the majority of the insurgent group is located in the division’s AO, insurgent elements

are located throughout the joint operational area. The insurgents have a strong support base outside the joint

operational area in neighboring country X. As such, the commander directed that the planning team expand

their analysis beyond the division’s AO and take a regional look at the problem. In addition, the commander

issued guidance not to restrict options to those that only the division has the ability to execute. The division

commander wanted to propose several options to the joint force commander on ways the joint force and

interagency organizations help disrupt funding to the insurgents.

B-5. The G-5 assigned a lead planner for this project with members from the G-2, G-3, and G-9 forming the core of the planning team. In addition the G-4 volunteered a captain (a former agent in the Drug

Enforcement Agency) to help plan. The hypothetical examples provided in Figures B-1–B-4 on pages B-2–

B-4 demonstrate how a planning team can think about actors (individual and organizations), nodes (facilities,

Appendix B

B-2 ATP 5-0.1 1 July 2015

areas, material), and relationships among actors and nodes to help identify potential actions to create a desired

end state conditions.

B-6. Figure B-1 represents initial work of the planning team. The team identifies that opium is used as a form of micro finance throughout the AO. Often, farmers (1) take loans, occasionally of goods-in-kind, based

on the promise to grow opium and repay the loan with the produced opium. This allows a farmer to get

through a particularly harsh winter or obtain particularly expensive things (car, house, wife, etc.). Socially,

there is a clear prohibition against the production of illicit narcotics and almost all farmers recognize and

agree with the prohibition. However, most opium farmers simply cannot ignore the economic realities of

opium farming. In many cases, the opium broker also will run a legitimate business that also deals in opium

in the local bazaar (2).

Figure B-1. Network analysis 1

B-7. Figure B-2 on page B-3 represents an expansion of the environmental frame. The former DEA agent explains that the real moneymaking step in the narcotics system is the conversion of opium to heroin and

explains the process to the rest of group as he draws on the white board. Opium is valuable as an ingredient

of heroin. The opium is converted to heroin in labs (3). The term “lab” means any place the precursors,

opium, and chemists are. No sophisticated tools are required. A lab may be a simple hut. Precursor chemicals

must be smuggled into country and can be obtained either directly from the smuggling networks (4) or often

at local bazaars (2). While there are legitimate uses for many precursor chemicals worldwide, none exists in

country. Chemists (5) are the people with the knowledge of how to convert opium into heroin. Another

member of the group adds that these are not chemists in any Western sense. Many have no idea about

chemistry at all, and may even be illiterate. They do know the recipe to convert opium to heroin, which is a

limited skill in the region.

Vignette

1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 B-3

Figure B-2. Network analysis 2

B-8. Based on detailed research from the division’s all-source intelligence element, the team further expands their understanding of the operational environment depicted in Figure B-3. The team agrees that there is little

narcotics use in country (given the extreme poverty, there would be little profit in that market). Therefore,

heroin has to be smuggled to overseas markets (6). Narco-barons (7), typically based in-country, are key

individuals who control vast segments of the country’s narcotics trade and have access to massive wealth

(probably hundreds of millions to billions of U.S. dollars). Many have sizable personal militias. They are the

primary profit makers from the sale of narcotics overseas. Haji Bashir Noorzai (currently in U.S. custody

awaiting trial in U.S. District Court) was a showcase example of a narco-baron. Their primary means of

getting money from the overseas’ markets is through banks (8) and the use of the hawala (an informal value

transfer system) (9). Narco-barons may also exert direct control over the smuggling networks (4), certain

“chemists” (5), the labs (3), and opium brokers (2). Additionally, by using their immense wealth, narco-

barons obtain political protection from local and national politicians (10).

Figure B-3. Network analysis 3

B-9. Figure B-4 represents the teams work in establishing the relationships among the insurgents and the drug trade. Current intelligence supports the conclusion that the Taliban [the insurgents (11)] benefits

indirectly from the narcotics trade. The Taliban almost certainly obtains funds by “taxing” farmers (1) and

Appendix B

B-4 ATP 5-0.1 1 July 2015

opium brokers (2) in areas where it has a strong presence. The Taliban also probably receives sizeable

contributions from narco-barons (7). This may be a form of protection payments, but narco-barons may also

seek to perpetuate the lack of enforcement enabled by the continuing instability created by Taliban

operations. Also, the same smuggling networks (4) responsible for moving narcotics out of country also are

likely responsible for the “backflow” movement of arms and personnel into country, directly benefiting the

Taliban.

Figure B-4. Network analysis 4

IDENTIFYING PROBLEMS AND DEVELOPING OPTIONS

B-10. As the planning team refines its understanding of the narcotics network, it shifts its efforts to understanding the problem and developing options to considering how to disrupt the relationship among the

insurgents and the drug trade. During a discussion, the team concludes that the nodes and links directly related

to the conversion of opium to heroin are important, and that the labs and their chemists are key to the entire

system. Perhaps opium could be smuggled out of country and the conversion could occur at labs in other

countries. This is much more difficult for the opium brokers, and severely reduces the profitability of

narcotics in country. Since the conversion occurs in the labs, attacking them directly could affect the entire

system. These makeshift labs are transient (where the right people and material are present for brief periods),

and may be too difficult to identify and interdict.

B-11. Figure B-5 represents areas friendly actions can affect the ability of the labs to convert opium to heroin. The team identifies three factors that could limit lab operations. First, the division works with host nation

security forces to interdict the supply of opium (1) and (2) to the labs. Second, interdict the opium farms and

brokers impacts labs. Third, the knowledge of how to convert opium to heroin is limited to the chemists, so

identifying, locating, and confining a sufficient number of chemists (5) should have a huge impact on labs.

Success in these three areas should limit heroin production and movement overseas, reduce the amount

available in overseas markets, and reduce or eliminate the flow of money to the Taliban from the sale of

narcotics. The G-2 planner also assessed that the given the wide-ranging influence the narco-barons (7) exert

on the narcotics trade, interdicting them directly also is likely to have a significant impact on the system.

Since the labs and the chemists are commonly co-located and vital to the production of heroin, the team

designates them as key nodes in the network.

Vignette

1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 B-5

Figure B-5. Network analysis 5

B-12. Based on their environmental frame, the team realizes that while the division takes action on parts of the narcotics network, many areas require the capabilities of the joint force, interagency organizations, and

the host nation. As such, the team decides to develop broad options by considering potential DIME actions

that influence the narcotics network. Figure B-6 represents recommend action by DIME.

 Diplomatic. Apply pressure against political leaders (10) to cease their political protection of

narco-barons and share information with international banks (8).

 Informational. Target opium farmers (1) with messages to influence them to accept alternative

income for the opium crop.

 Military. Capture and arrest narco-barons (7); capture chemists (5) and destroy labs (3); interdict

smuggling networks (4) to cut flow of precursors.

 Economic. Freeze narco-barons’ assets at international banks (8) and work with host country to

provide economic alternatives for opium farmers (1).

Appendix B

B-6 ATP 5-0.1 1 July 2015

Figure B-6. Network analysis 6

1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 Source Notes-1

Source Notes

These are the sources used, quoted, or paraphrased in this publication. They are listed by source note number.

Source note 1 The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable: Nassim Nicholas Taleb.

Random House, New York, 2007, 63-64.

Source note 2 Organizational Learning: A Theory of Action Perspective: Chris Argyris and

Donald Schon. Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA 1978. 8-9.

Source note 3 Thinker’s Guide Library. Critical Thinking Concepts & Tools: Richard Paul and

Linda Elder. The Foundation for Critical Thinking Press, Tomales, CA. 2009, 2. Source note 4 Thinking, Fast and Slow: Daniel Kahneman. Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, New York,

2011, 11-30.

Source note 5 Thinking Critically about Critical Thinking: A Fundamental Guide for Strategic

Leaders. Colonel (Retired) Stephen J. Gerras, Ph.D. Professor of Behavioral

Sciences. Department of Command, Leadership, & Management, U.S. Army War

College, August 2008, 14-24.

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1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 Glossary-1

Glossary

SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADM Army design methodology

ADRP Army doctrine reference publication

ADP Army doctrine publication

ATP Army technical publication

AO area of operations

DIME diplomatic, information, military, and economic

FM field manual

IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield

JP joint publication

MDMP military decisionmaking process

MOE measures of effectiveness

MOP measures of performance

PMESII-PT political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical

environment, and time

SECTION II – TERMS

area of interest

That area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and

extending into enemy territory. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could

jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission. (JP 3-0)

assessment

Determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an

objective. (JP 3-0)

assumption

A supposition on the current situation or a presupposition on the future course of events, either or both

assumed to be true in the absence of positive proof, necessary to enable the commander in the process

of planning to complete an estimate of the situation and make a decision on the course of action. (JP 5-

0)

center of gravity

The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. (JP 5-0)

course of action

A scheme developed to accomplish a mission. (JP 5-0)

culminating point

That point in time and space at which a force no longer possesses the capability to continue its current

form of operations. (ADRP 3-0)

decisive point

A geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows

commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving

success. (JP 5-0)

defeat mechanism

The method through which friendly forces accomplish their mission against enemy opposition.

(ADRP 3-0)

Glossary

Glossary-2 ATP 5-0.1 1 July 2015

evaluating

Using criteria to judge progress toward desired conditions and determining why the current degree of

progress exists. (ADRP 5-0)

line of effort

A line that links multiple tasks using the logic of purpose rather than geographical reference to focus

efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions. (ADRP 3-0)

line of operations

A line that defines the directional orientation of a force in time and space in relation to the enemy and

that links the force with its base of operations and objectives. (ADRP 3-0)

mission command

The exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined

initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of

unified land operations. (ADP 6-0)

monitoring

Continuous observation of those conditions relevant to the current operation. (ADRP 5-0)

operational approach

A description of the broad actions the force must take to transform current conditions into those

desired at end state. (JP 5-0)

operational art

The cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience,

creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ

military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means. (JP 3-0)

operational environment

A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of

capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (JP 3-0)

operations process

The major mission command activities performed during operations: planning, preparing, executing,

and continuously assessing the operation. (ADP 5-0)

phase

A planning and execution tool used to divide an operation in duration or activity. (ADRP 3-0)

planning

The art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and laying out effective

ways of bringing that future about. (ADP 5-0)

stability mechanism

The primary method through which friendly forces affect civilians in order to attain conditions that

support establishing a lasting, stable peace. (ADRP 3-0)

tempo

The relative speed and rhythm of military operations over time with respect to the enemy. (ADRP 3-0)

1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 References-1

References

REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS ADRP 1-02. Terms and Military Symbols. 2 February 2015.

JP 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 8 November 2010.

RELATED PUBLICATIONS These documents contain relevant supplemental information.

JOINT PUBLICATIONS

Most joint publications are available online: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub.htm/

JP 2-01.3. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment. 21 May 2014.

JP 3-0. Joint Operations. 11 August 2011.

JP 5-0. Joint Operation Planning. 11 August 2011.

ARMY PUBLICATIONS

Most Army doctrinal publications are available online: http://www.apd.army.mil/

ADP 5-0. The Operations Process. 17 May 2012.

ADP 6-0. Mission Command. 17 May 2012.

ADRP 3-0. Unified Land Operations. 16 May 2012.

ADRP 5-0. The Operations Process. 17 May 2012.

ADRP 6-0. Mission Command. 17 May 2012.

ADRP 6-22. Army Leadership. 1 August 2012.

ATP 2-01.3. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace. 10 November 2014.

ATP 2-22.9. Open-Source Intelligence. 10 July 2012.

ATP 5-19. Risk Management. 14 April 2014.

ATP 6-01.1. Techniques for Effective Knowledge Management. 6 March 2015.

FM 6-0. Commander and Staff Organization and Operations. 5 May 2014.

FM 27-10. The Law of Land Warfare. 18 July 1956.

OTHER PUBLICATIONS Argyris, Chris and Schon, Donald. Organizational Learning: A Theory of Action Perspective. Reading,

MA 1978.

Gerras, Colonel (Retired) Stephen J.. Thinking Critically about Critical Thinking: A Fundamental

Guide for Strategic Leaders. August 2008.

Kahneman, Daniel. Farrar, Strauss and Giroux. Thinking, Fast and Slow. 2011.

Paul, Richard and Elder, Linda. Thinker’s Guide Library. Critical Thinking Concepts & Tools.

Tomales, CA. 2009.

Taleb, Nassim Nicholas. The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable: New York, 2007.

PRESCRIBED FORMS None.

REFERENCED FORMS Forms are available online: www.apd.army.mil

DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.

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1 July 2015 ATP 5-0.1 Index-1

Index

Entries are by paragraph number unless indicated otherwise.

A

Army design methodology, 1- 14–1-21 commander involvement, 2-

9–2-13 defined, 1-14 key concepts, 1-22–1-50 when to employ, 2-1–2-8

assessment, 1-20, 6-4–6-10 defined, 6-4 evaluating, 6-8 MOE, 6-5 monitoring, 6-7 MOP, 6-5 plan, 6-21 premortem analysis, 6-26 working groups, 6-22–6-23

B

brainstorming, 3-23–3-27

C

cognititve biases, A-1–A-4 anchoring, A-10 confirmation, A-6 sample size A-9 status quo, A-7 sunk cost, A-8

collaboration, 1-31–1-35

creative thinking, 1-25, 1-29–1- 30

critical thinking, 1-25, 1-26–1- 28

cultural contempt, A-21

D

defeat mechanisms, 5-13–5-19

detailed planning, 5-44–5-45

dialogue, 1-31–1-35

E

elements of operational art, 1- 24 basing, 5-31–5-34 center of gravity, 5-7 culmination, 5-34 decisive point, 5-9–5-11 end state, 3-18–3-20 line of effort, 5-28 line of operations, 5-27

phasing and transition, 5- 37–5-39

risk, 5-40 tempo, 5-35–5-36

F

framing, 1-42–1-43

framing operational environments, 1-16–1-17 current state, 3-11–3-15 end state, 3-18–3-20 example, 3-14–3-15 framing questions, 3-6 reviewing, 4-9, 5-4 techniques, 3-21–3-51

framing problems, 1-18 example, 4-14–4-15 framing questions, 4-6 nature of, 4-1–4-2 problem types, 4-2–4-5 reviewing, 5-5 techniques, 4-16–4-18

framing solutions, 1-19 example, 5-43 framing questions, 5-3 operational approach, 5-1–

5-3 techniques, 5-4–5-43

G

group think, A-18

L

logic fallacies, A-11–A-16

M

meta-questioning, 3-42–3-43

military decisionmaking process, 1-13–1-15, 2-1–2- 8, 5-44–5-45

mind mapping, 3-40–3-41

mirror imaging, A-20

mission command, 1-1–1-3 defined, 1-3

N

narrative construction, 1-47–1- 50

network analysis, B-5

O

operational approach, 5-1–5-3, 5-30–5-34 defined, 5-1

operational art, 1-23–1-24 defined, 1-23 elements of, 1-24

operational environment, 3-1– 3-4 defined, 3-1

operations process, 1-4–1-6 defined, 1-4 role of commander, 1-6

P

planning, 1-7–1-13 defined, 1-7 integrated planning, 1-11–1-

13, 2-1–2-8, 5-44–5-45

planning team, 2-14–2-30 commander evolvement, 2-

9–2-13 diversity, 2-18–2-19 graphic artist, 2-31 leading, 2-32–2-35 note takers, 2-28–2-30 red team members, 2-26–2-

27 resources, 2-37–2-39 skills and characteristics, 2-

17 subject matter experts, 2-

24–2-25

problem restatement, 4-17–4- 18 reframing, 1-20–1-21 assessment, 6-4–6-10 organizational learning, 6-

1–6-3 refreaming indicators, 6-24 techniques, 6-20–6-26 triggers, 6-12

R

researching, 3-28—3-39

resources, 2-37–2-39

S

stability mechanisms, 5-20–5- 24

systems thinking, 1-36–1-41

Index

Index-2 ATP 5-0.1 1 July 2015

T

thinking challenges, A-17

V

visual modeling, 1-44–1-46

By Order of the Secretary of the Army

RAYMOND T. ODIERNO General, United States Army

Chief of Staff

Official:

GERALD B. O’KEEFE Administrative Assistant to the

Secretary of the Army 1516803

DISTRIBUTION: Active Army, Army National Guard, and United States Army Reserve: Distributed in electronic media only (EMO).

ATP 5-0.1 1 July 2015

PIN: 105348-000

  • COVER
  • CONTENTS
  • PREFACE
  • INTRODUCTION
  • CHAPTER 1: Fundamentals of Army Design Methodology
  • CHAPTER 2: Getting Started
  • CHAPTER 3: Framing Operational Environments
  • CHAPTER 4: Framing Problems
  • CHAPTER 5: Framing Solutions
  • CHAPTER 6: Assessment and Reframing
  • APPENDIX A
  • APPENDIX B
  • SOURCE NOTES
  • GLOSSARY
  • REFERENCES
  • INDEX

ADP 5-0_The Operations Process.pdf

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

This publication is available at the Army Publishing Directorate site (https://armypubs.army.mil/) and the Central Army Registry site

(https://atiam.train.army.mil/catalog/dashboard).

*ADP 5-0

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: This manual is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

*This publication supersedes ADP 5-0, dated 17 May 2012, and ADRP 5-0, dated 17 May 2012.

i

Army Doctrine Publication No. 5-0

Headquarters Department of the Army

Washington, D . 31 July 2019

THE OPERATIONS PROCESS Contents

Page

PREFACE.................................................................................................................... iii INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... v

Chapter 1 FUNDAMENTALS OF THE OPERATIONS PROCESS ........................................... 1-1 The Nature of Operations .......................................................................................... 1-1 Unified Land Operations ............................................................................................ 1-2 Mission Command ..................................................................................................... 1-3 The Framework of the Operations Process ............................................................... 1-4 Principles of the Operations Process ........................................................................ 1-7 Integrating Processes .............................................................................................. 1-15 Battle Rhythm .......................................................................................................... 1-17

Chapter 2 PLANNING ................................................................................................................ 2-1 Fundamentals of Planning ......................................................................................... 2-1 The Science and Art of Planning ............................................................................... 2-2 The Functions of Planning ......................................................................................... 2-3 Planning and the Levels of Warfare .......................................................................... 2-7 Operational Art ........................................................................................................ 2-10 Integrated Planning ................................................................................................. 2-15 Key Components of a Plan ...................................................................................... 2-19 Guides to Effective Planning ................................................................................... 2-21 Planning Pitfalls ....................................................................................................... 2-25

Chapter 3 PREPARATION ........................................................................................................ 3-1 Fundamentals of Preparation .................................................................................... 3-1 Guides to Effective Preparation ................................................................................. 3-2 Preparation Activities ................................................................................................. 3-4

Chapter 4 EXECUTION .............................................................................................................. 4-1 Fundamentals of Execution ....................................................................................... 4-1 Guides to Effective Execution ................................................................................... 4-1 Responsibilities During Execution ............................................................................. 4-4 Execution Activities .................................................................................................... 4-5 Rapid Decision-Making and Synchronization Process .............................................. 4-9

Chapter 5 ASSESSMENT .......................................................................................................... 5-1 Fundamentals of Assessment ................................................................................... 5-1 Assessment Activities ................................................................................................ 5-2

Contents

ii ADP 5-0 31 July 2019

Assessment Process................................................................................................. 5-4 Guides to Effective Assessment ............................................................................... 5-6 SOURCE NOTES ............................................................................... Source Notes-1 GLOSSARY ................................................................................................ Glossary-1 REFERENCES ........................................................................................ References-1 INDEX ............................................................................................................... Index-1

Figures

Introduction figure-1. Operations process logic chart ....................................................................... vi Figure 1-1. The operations process ............................................................................................... 1-4 Figure 1-2. The commander’s role in the operations process ....................................................... 1-8 Figure 1-3. Commander’s visualization ......................................................................................... 1-9 Figure 2-1. Levels of warfare ......................................................................................................... 2-9 Figure 2-2. Sample line of operations and line of effort ............................................................... 2-13 Figure 2-3. Integrated planning .................................................................................................... 2-16 Figure 2-4. Activities of Army design methodology ..................................................................... 2-17 Figure 3-1. Transition among the integrating cells ........................................................................ 3-8 Figure 4-1. Risk reduction factors .................................................................................................. 4-3 Figure 4-2. Decision making during execution............................................................................... 4-6 Figure 4-3. Rapid decision-making and synchronization process ................................................. 4-9 Figure 5-1. Activities of assessment .............................................................................................. 5-2

Tables

Introduction table-1. New, modified, and removed Army terms....................................................... vii Table 3-1. Preparation activities .................................................................................................... 3-4 Table 4-1. Decision types and related actions ............................................................................... 4-7

Vignettes

Agility: Rapidly Turning the Third Army to Bastogne .................................................................... 1-5 Collaboration: Meade’s Council of War ....................................................................................... 1-14 Tenets in Action: OPERATION JUST CAUSE ............................................................................ 2-22 Prepare: Rangers Train for Seizing Pointe du Hoc ....................................................................... 3-3 Large-Unit Preparation: Third Army Readies for OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM ....................... 3-9 Decision Making During Execution: Chamberlain at Little Round Top .......................................... 4-8 Measures of Effectiveness: OPERATION SUPPORT HOPE ........................................................ 5-4 Commander’s Assessment: Are We Ready To Close on Baghdad .............................................. 5-7

31 July 2019 ADP 5-0 iii

Preface

ADP 5-0 provides doctrine on the operations process. It describes fundamentals for effective planning, preparing, executing, and assessing operations. It describes how commanders, supported by their staffs, employ the operations process to understand situations, make decisions, direct action, and lead forces to mission accomplishment.

To comprehend doctrine contained in ADP 5-0, readers should first understand the fundamentals of unified land operations described in ADP 3-0. As the operations process is the framework for the exercise of command and control, readers should also understand the fundamentals of command and control and mission command described in ADP 6-0. Readers must also understand how the Army ethic guides decision making throughout the operations process (see Army doctrine on the Army profession).

Several publications support ADP 5-0. For detailed tactics and procedures associated with the operations process, such as the duties and responsibilities of the staff, how to conduct the military decision-making process, and formats for plans and orders, readers should refer to FM 6-0. Techniques for organizing command posts and command post operations is located in ATP 6-0.5. Techniques for employing the Army design methodology is located in ATP 5-0.1. Techniques for assessing operations is located in ATP 5-0.3.

The principal audience for ADP 5-0 is Army commanders, leaders, and unit staffs. This publication also provides the foundation for Army training and education curricula on the operations process. Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters that require joint capabilities or form the core of a joint task force, joint land component, or multinational headquarters should also refer to applicable joint or multinational doctrine. This includes JP 3-16, JP 3-31, and JP 3-33.

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure that their decisions and actions comply with applicable United States, international, and, in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure that their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement. (See FM 27-10.)

ADP 5-0 implements North Atlantic Treaty Organization Standardization Agreement 2199, Command and Control of Allied Land Forces. ADP 5-0 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the glossary and the text. Terms for which ADP 5-0 is the proponent publication (the authority) are marked with an asterisk (*) in the glossary. When first defined in the text, terms for which ADP 5-0 is the proponent publication are boldfaced and italicized, and definitions are boldfaced. When first defining other proponent definitions in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition. Following uses of the term are not italicized.

ADP 5-0 applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and the United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

The proponent of ADP 5-0 is the United States Army Combined Arms Center. The preparing agency is the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, United States Army Combined Arms Center. Send comments and recommendations on a DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to Commander, United States Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-MCD (ADP 5-0), 300 McPherson Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2337; by e-mail to [email protected]; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.

iv ADP 5-0 31 July 2019

Acknowledgements

The copyright owners listed here have granted permission to reproduce material from their works. The Source Notes lists other sources of quotations and research.

War as I Knew It by General George S. Patton. Copyright © 1947 by Beatrice Patton Walters, Ruth Patton Totten, and George Smith Totten. Copyright © renewed 1975 by MG George Patton, Ruth Patton Totten, John K. Waters, Jr., and George P. Waters. Reprinted by permission of Houghton Mifflin Company. All rights reserved.

Excerpts from On War by Carl von Clausewitz. Edited and translated by Peter Paret and Michael E. Howard. Copyright © 1976, renewed 2004 by Princeton University Press.

Quotes reprinted courtesy B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy. Copyright © 1974 by Signet Printing. Quote courtesy Bernard L. Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery. Copyright ©

1958 by Bernard Law Montgomery. Reprinted by permission of The World Publishing Company.

Quote reprinted courtesy William Tecumseh Sherman, Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman. Copyright © 2000 by Penguin Books.

Quote reprinted courtesy Field-Marshall Viscount William Slim, Defeat into Victory: Battling Japan in Burma and India, 1942–1945. Copyright © 1956 by Viscount William Slim. Copyright © renewed 2000 by Copper Square Press.

Quote from The Art of War by Sun Tzu, translated by Lionel Giles. Copyright © 1910. Quotes reprinted courtesy Stephen W. Sears’ Gettysburg. Copyright © 2003 by Houghton Mifflin

Company. Quote reprinted courtesy Antoine Henri de Jomini, Art of War, translated by G.H. Mendell and W.P.

Craighill. Copyright © 1862 by J.B. Lippincott & Co. Online by The Internet Archive. Available at https://archive.org/details/artwar00mendgoog.

Quote reprinted courtesy of The American Presidency Project. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley. Available at https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/233951.

Quote reprinted courtesy Owen Connolly, On War and Leadership. Copyright © 2002 by Princeton University Press.

Quotes reprinted courtesy Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations, compiled by Robert Debs Heinl, Jr. Copyright © 1967 by United States Naval Institute.

Paraphrased courtesy JoAnna M. McDonald, The Liberation of Pointe du Hoc: the 2nd U.S. Rangers at Normandy. Copyright © 2000 by Rank and File Publications.

Quote reprinted courtesy Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers, vol. 2, 1940–1945. Copyright 1974 by Martin Blumenson. Reprinted by permission of Houghton Mifflin Company. All rights reserved.

Quote from Horace Porter, Campaigning with Grant. Copyright © 1907 by The Century Co. Quote courtesy Erwin Rommel, The Rommel Papers. Edited by B.H. Liddell-Hart. Copyright © 1953

by Harcourt, Brace, and Company. Quote reprinted courtesy Gregory A. Daddis, No Sure Victory: Measuring U.S. Army Effectiveness and

Progress in the Vietnam War. Copyright © 2011 by Oxford University Press.

31 July 2019 ADP 5-0 v

Introduction

Military operations are human endeavors conducted in dynamic and uncertain operational environments to achieve a political purpose. Army forces, as part of a joint team, conduct unified land operations to shape operational environments, prevent conflict, consolidate gains, and contribute to winning the Nation’s wars. During periods of competition or armed conflict, command and control—the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander—is fundamental to all operations. Based on the Army’s vision of war and nature of operations, mission command is the Army’s approach for exercising command and control. The mission command approach empowers subordinate decision making and emphasizes decentralized execution appropriate to the situation.

The Army’s framework for organizing and putting command and control into action is the operations process. The operations process consists of the major command and control activities performed during operations (planning, preparing, executing, and continuously assessing). Commanders, supported by their staffs, employ the operations process to understand, visualize, and describe their operational environments, end state, and operational approach; make and articulate decisions; and direct, lead, and assess military operations as shown in introduction figure-1 on page vi.

The Army continuously prepares for large-scale ground combat while simultaneously shaping the security environment around the world. ADP 5-0 provides doctrine for how Army forces conduct the operations process across the range of military operations. It describes a mission command approach to planning, preparing, executing, and assessing operations. This revised ADP 5-0—

Combines the 2012 editions of ADP 5-0 and ADRP 5-0 into one publication. Incorporates updated tactics on Army operations to include an emphasis on large-scale combat operations described in the 2017 edition of FM 3-0. Incorporates updated fundamentals of mission command to include the reintroduction of command and control to Army doctrine described in the 2019 edition of ADP 6-0. Incorporates updated doctrine on assessment described in the 2017 edition of JP 5-0. Removes the detailed discussion of Army design methodology (now found in ATP 5-0.1). Removes the discussion of continuing activities as they are similar to the responsibilities of units assigned an area of operations.

ADP 5-0 contains five chapters:

Chapter 1 sets the context for conducting the operations process by describing the nature of operations, unified land operations, and mission command. Next, it defines and describes the operations process. A discussion of the principles of the operations process follows. The chapter concludes with discussions of the integrating processes and battle rhythm.

Chapter 2 defines planning and describes the functions of planning and plans. It discusses planning at the levels of warfare, operational art, integrated planning, and key components of a plan. The chapter concludes with guides for effective planning and planning pitfalls to avoid.

Chapter 3 addresses the fundamentals of preparation to include its definition and functions. It offers guides for effective preparation and addresses specific preparation activities commonly performed within the headquarters and across the force to improve the unit’s ability to execute operations.

Chapter 4 defines, describes, and offers guides for effective execution. It describes the role of the commander and the role of the staff during execution followed by a discussion of the major activities of execution. It concludes with a discussion of the rapid decision-making and synchronization process.

Chapter 5 defines and describes assessment. It discusses an assessment model and offers guides for effective assessment.

Introduction

vi ADP 5-0 31 July 2019

Introduction figure-1. Operations process logic chart

Introduction table-1 lists terms that have been added, rescinded, or modified for which ADP 5-0 is the proponent publication for the term. The glossary contains acronyms and defined terms.

Introduction

2019 ADP 5-0 vii

Introduction table-1. New, modified, and removed Army terms

Term Reasoning Army design methodology Modifies for clarity. civil considerations ADP 6-0 becomes proponent. collaborative planning ADP 5-0 becomes proponent and modifies the definition. commander’s visualization ADP 6-0 becomes proponent. concept of operations ADP 5-0 becomes proponent. confirmation brief ADP 5-0 becomes proponent and modifies the definition. decision support matrix ADP 5-0 becomes proponent. direct support FM 3-0 becomes proponent for the Army term. essential element of friendly information ADP 6-0 becomes proponent. evaluating ADP 5-0 becomes proponent and modifies the definition. execution Modifies for clarity. execution matrix ADP 5-0 becomes proponent and modifies the definition. general support-reinforcing FM 3-0 becomes proponent. indicator Army definition is no longer used. Adopts joint definition. key tasks ADP 6-0 becomes proponent. military decision-making process Modifies term for grammar. monitoring ADP 5-0 becomes proponent. nested concepts ADP 5-0 becomes proponent. operations process Modifies for clarity. parallel planning ADP 5-0 becomes proponent and modifies the definition. planning Modifies for clarity. planning horizon ADP 5-0 becomes proponent. priority of support ADP 5-0 becomes proponent. rehearsal ADP 5-0 becomes proponent and modifies the definition. reinforcing FM 3-0 becomes proponent. situational understanding ADP 6-0 becomes proponent. task organization ADP 5-0 becomes proponent. terrain management ADP 3-90 becomes proponent.

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31 July 2019 ADP 5-0 1-1

Chapter 1

Fundamentals of the Operations Process

The best is the enemy of good. By this I mean that a good plan violently executed now is better than a perfect plan next week.

General George S. Patton, Jr.

This chapter sets the contexts for conducting the operations process by describing the nature of operations, unified land operations, and mission command. Next, it defines and describes the operations process. A discussion of the principles of the operations process follows. The chapter concludes with discussions of the integrating processes and battle rhythm.

THE NATURE OF OPERATIONS 1-1. Understanding the doctrine on mission command and the operations process requires an appreciation of the nature of operations and the Army’s vision of war. It is upon this appreciation that mission command— an approach to the exercise of command and control—is built. The principles of mission command guide commanders and staffs in planning, preparing, executing, and assessing operations.

1-2. Military operations fall along a competition continuum that spans cooperation to war. Between these extremes, societies maintain relationships. These relationships include economic competition, political or ideological tension, and at times armed conflict. Violent power struggles in failed states, along with the emergence of major regional powers like Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea seeking to gain strategic positions of advantage, present challenges to the joint force. Army forces must be prepared to meet these challenges across the range of military operations during periods of competition and war.

1-3. The range of military operations is a fundamental construct that helps relate military activities and operations in scope and purpose within a backdrop of the competition continuum. The potential range of military operations extends from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence in periods of competition to large-scale combat operations in periods of war. Whether fighting terrorists as part of a limited contingency operation or defeating a peer threat in large-scale combat, the nature of operations is constant. Military operations are—

Human endeavors. Conducted in dynamic and uncertain environments. Designed to achieve a political purpose.

HUMAN ENDEAVORS 1-4. Military operations are human endeavors—a contest of wills characterized by violence and continuous adaptation among all participants. Fundamentally, all war is about changing human behavior. During operations, Army forces face thinking and adaptive enemies, differing agendas of various actors, and changing perceptions of civilians in an operational area. The enemy is not an inanimate object to be acted upon but an independent and active force with its own objectives. As friendly forces try to impose their will on the enemy, the enemy resists and seeks to impose its will on friendly forces. A similar dynamic occurs among civilian groups whose own desires influence and are influenced by military operations. Appreciating these relationships among opposing human wills is essential to understanding the fundamental nature of operations.

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DYNAMIC AND UNCERTAIN Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war.

Carl von Clausewitz

1-5. War is inherently dynamic and uncertain. The complexity of friendly and enemy organizations, unique combinations of terrain and weather, and the dynamic interaction among all participants create uncertainty. Chance and friction increase the potential for chaos and uncertainty during operations. Chance pertains to unexpected events or changes beyond the control of friendly forces, while friction describes obstacles that make executing even simple tasks difficult. Both are always present for all sides during combat.

1-6. The scale, scope, tempo, and lethality of large-scale ground combat exacerbates the dynamic and uncertain nature of war, making precise cause-and-effect determinations difficult or delayed. The unintended effects of operations often cannot be anticipated and may not be readily apparent during execution. Disorder is an inherent characteristic of war. This demands an approach to the conduct of operations that does not attempt to impose perfect order on operations but rather makes allowances for friction and uncertainty.

ACHIEVE POLITICAL PURPOSE Thus any study of the problem ought to begin and end with the question of policy.

Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart

1-7. All U.S. military operations share a common fundamental purpose—to achieve or contribute to national objectives. Objective—to direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal—is a principle of war. This principle reinforces the proper relationship between military operations and policy. Military operations must always be subordinate to policy and serve as a way to a political end.

1-8. In large-scale combat, the purpose of operations may be to destroy the enemy’s capabilities and will to fight. The purpose of operations short of large-scale combat may be more nuanced and broad, and subsequently, may require support to multiple objectives. These operations frequently involve setting conditions that improve positions of relative advantage compared to that of a specific adversary and that contribute to achieving strategic aims in an operational area. In either case, all operations are designed to achieve the political purpose set by national authorities.

UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS 1-9. The Army’s operational concept—the central idea that guides the conduct of Army operations—is unified land operations. Unified land operations is the simultaneous execution of offense, defense, stability, and defense support of civil authorities across multiple domains to shape operational environments, prevent conflict, prevail in large-scale ground combat, and consolidate gains as part of unified action (ADP 3-0). Army forces do this with combined arms formations possessing the mobility, firepower, protection, and sustainment to defeat an enemy and establish control of areas, resources, and populations. Army forces depend on the capabilities of the other Services as the joint force depends on Army capabilities across multiple domains. The goal of unified land operations is to achieve the joint force commander’s end state by applying land power as part of unified action. During the conduct of unified land operations, Army forces support the joint force through four strategic roles:

Shape operational environments (OEs). Prevent conflict. Prevail in large-scale ground combat. Consolidate gains.

1-10. Army forces assist in shaping an OE by providing trained and ready forces to geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) in support of their campaign plan. Shaping activities include security cooperation, military engagement, and forward presence to promote U.S. interests and assure allies. Army operations to

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prevent are designed to deter undesirable actions of an adversary through positioning of friendly capabilities and demonstrating the will to use them. Army forces may have a significant role in the execution of flexible deterrent options or flexible response options. Additionally, Army prevent activities may include mobilization, force tailoring, and other pre-deployment activities; initial deployment into a theater of operations; and development of intelligence, communications, sustainment, and protection infrastructure to support the joint force commander. During large-scale combat operations, Army forces focus on the defeat of enemy ground forces. Army forces close with and destroy enemy forces, exploit success, and break their opponent’s will to resist. While Army forces consolidate gains throughout an operation, consolidating gains become the focus of operations after large-scale combat operations have concluded. (See ADP 3-0 for a detailed discussion of unified land operations.)

MISSION COMMAND Diverse are the situations under which an officer has to act on the basis of his own view of the situation. It would be wrong if he had to wait for orders at times when no orders can be given. But most productive are his actions when he acts within the framework of his senior commander’s intent.

Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke

1-11. Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission (JP 1). Command and control is fundamental to all operations. By itself, however, command and control will not secure an objective, destroy an enemy target, or deliver supplies. Yet none of these activities could be coordinated towards a common objective, or synchronized to achieve maximum effect, without effective command and control. It is through command and control that the countless activities a military force must perform gain purpose and direction. The goal of command and control is effective mission accomplishment.

1-12. Mission command is the Army’s approach to command and control that empowers subordinate decision making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation (ADP 6-0). Mission command is based on the Army’s view that war is inherently chaotic and uncertain. No plan can account for every possibility and most plans must change rapidly during execution if they are to succeed. No single person is ever well-enough informed to make every important decision, nor can a single person manage the number of decisions that need to be made during combat. As such, mission command empowers subordinate leaders to make decisions and act within the commander’s intent to exploit opportunities and counter threats.

1-13. Mission command requires an environment of trust and shared understanding among commanders, staffs, and subordinates. It requires building effective teams and a command climate in which commanders encourage subordinates to accept risk and exercise initiative to seize opportunities and counter threats within the commander’s intent. Through mission orders, commanders focus leaders on the purpose of the operation rather than on the details of how to perform assigned tasks. Doing this minimizes detailed control and allows subordinates the greatest possible freedom of action to accomplish tasks. Finally, when delegating authority to subordinates, commanders set the necessary conditions for success by allocating appropriate resources to subordinates based on assigned tasks.

1-14. Because uncertainty is pervasive during operations, success is often determined by a leader’s ability to outthink an opponent and to execute tasks more quickly than an opponent can react. The side that anticipates better, thinks more clearly, decides and acts more quickly, and is comfortable operating with uncertainty stands the greatest chance to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative over an opponent. Leaders make decisions, develop plans, and direct actions with the information they have at the time. Commanders seek to counter the uncertainty of operations by empowering subordinates to quickly adapt to changing circumstances within their intent. Mission command decentralizes decision-making authority and grants subordinates significant freedom of action. The principles of mission command are—

Competence. Shared understanding. Mutual trust. Mission orders.

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Commander’s intent. Disciplined initiative. Risk acceptance.

(See ADP 6-0 for a detailed discussion of mission command.)

THE FRAMEWORK OF THE OPERATIONS PROCESS 1-15. The Army’s framework for organizing and putting command and control into action is the operations process—the major command and control activities performed during operations: planning, preparing, executing, and continuously assessing the operation. Commanders use the operations process to drive the conceptual and detailed planning necessary to understand their OE; visualize and describe the operation’s end state and operational approach; make and articulate decisions; and direct, lead, and assess operations as shown in figure 1-1.

Figure 1-1. The operations process

1-16. Commanders, staffs, and subordinate headquarters employ the operations process to organize efforts, integrate the warfighting functions across multiple domains, and synchronize forces to accomplish missions. This includes integrating numerous processes and activities such as information collection and targeting within the headquarters and with higher, subordinate, supporting, and supported units. The unit’s battle rhythm (see the discussion beginning in paragraph 1-82) helps to integrate and synchronize the various processes and activities that occur within the operations process.

1-17. A goal of the operations process is to make timely and effective decisions and to act faster than the enemy. A tempo advantageous to friendly forces can place the enemy under the pressures of uncertainty and time. Throughout the operations process, making and communicating decisions faster than the enemy can react produces a tempo with which the enemy cannot compete. These decisions include assigning tasks; prioritizing, allocating, and organizing forces and resources; and selecting the critical times and places to act. Decision making during execution includes knowing how and when to adjust previous decisions. The speed and accuracy of a commander’s actions to address a changing situation is a key contributor to agility.

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Agility: Rapidly Turning the Third Army to Bastogne

The summer and fall of 1944 saw significant gains by Allied armies in Western Europe. Since D-Day, the German army in the west had been falling steadily back toward the Rhine River. Allied commanders were confident that the war would be over in a matter of months. On 16 December 1944, the Wehrmacht launched three German armies in OPERATION WATCH ON THE RHINE against the U.S. First Army. This enemy counteroffensive caught the Allies off guard, causing significant operational changes in order to stabilize the penetration to the center of the Allied front.

Lieutenant General George Patton was leading the U.S. Third Army in offensive operations south of the First Army when the German counteroffensive began. Initially unconcerned with the reports of a German attack, Patton began to take note of German gains as the situation developed and started preparing to respond to the threat. “On the eighteenth, [General Omar] Bradley called me to come to Luxembourg … for a conference. …he showed me that the German penetration was much greater than we had thought and asked what I could do.” Patton told Bradley he could have three divisions moving north within twenty-four hours. After receiving his assessment, Bradley directed Patton to attend a meeting the next day with General Dwight Eisenhower to discuss options.

Returning to his headquarters, Patton met with his staff to prepare for meeting Eisenhower. Patton started the meeting by stating “plans had been changed, and, while we were all accustomed to rapid movement, we would now have to prove that we could operate even faster.” He then directed his staff to develop three options for attacking north as soon as possible.

Upon meeting Eisenhower and the collected Allied staff, Patton stated he could attack the German forces with a three-division front by the 22nd of December. Once it was decided to allow Patton to attack, Patton called his headquarters to start movement of the three divisions. He used the preplanned code phrase assigned to one of the options being planned back at his headquarters. The forethought of Patton and his staff allowed him to rapidly change battle plans enabling elements of the Third Army to attack north, relieve elements of the First Army, and cut off the German army in what is known as the Battle of the Bulge.

1-18. Both the commander and staff have important roles within the operations process. The commander’s role is to drive the operations process through the activities of understanding, visualizing, describing, directing, leading, and assessing operations as described in paragraphs 1-31 through 1-49. The staff’s role is to assist commanders with understanding situations, making and implementing decisions, controlling operations, and assessing progress. In addition, the staff assists subordinate units (commanders and staffs), and keeps units and organizations outside the headquarters informed throughout the conduct of operations. (See FM 6-0 for a detailed discussion of the duties and responsibilities of the staff.)

1-19. The Army Ethic guides commanders, leaders, and staffs throughout the operations process. The Army Ethic is the evolving set of laws, values, and beliefs, embedded within the Army culture of trust that motivates and guides the conduct of Army professionals bound together in common moral purpose. The Army demands its members to make ethical, effective, and efficient decisions and to act according to the moral principles of its ethic. The Uniform Code of Military Justice, Army regulations, the law of war, rules of engagement, and the Code of Conduct set the minimum standards for ethical conduct. (See ADP 6-22 for a discussion of the Army Ethic.)

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ACTIVITIES OF THE OPERATIONS PROCESS It is a mistake to think that once an order is given there is nothing more to be done; you have got to see that it is carried out in the spirit which you intended.

Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery

1-20. The activities of the operations process are not discrete; they overlap and recur as circumstances demand. While planning may start an iteration of the operations process, planning does not stop with the production of an order. After the completion of the initial order, the commander and staff continuously revise the plan based on changing circumstances. Preparation for a specific mission begins early in planning and continues for some subordinate units during execution. Execution puts a plan into action and involves adjusting the plan based on changes in the situation and the assessment of progress. Assessing is continuous and influences the other three activities.

Planning 1-21. Planning is the art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and laying out effective ways of bringing that future about. Planning is both conceptual and detailed. Conceptual planning includes developing an understanding of an OE, framing the problem, defining a desired end state, and developing an operational approach to achieve the desired end state. Conceptual planning generally corresponds to the art of operations and is commander led. Detailed planning translates the operational approach into a complete and practical plan. Detailed planning generally corresponds to the science of operations and encompasses the specifics of implementation. Detailed planning works out the scheduling, coordination, or technical issues involved with moving, sustaining, administering, and directing forces. (See chapter 2 for the fundamentals of planning.)

Preparation 1-22. Preparation consists of activities that units and Soldiers perform to improve their abilities to execute an operation. Preparation creates conditions that improve friendly forces’ opportunities for success. Activities of preparation help develop a shared understanding of the situation and requirements for execution. These activities—such as backbriefs, rehearsals, training, and inspections—help units, staffs, and Soldiers better understand their roles in upcoming operations, gain proficiency on complicated tasks, and ensure their equipment and weapons function properly. (See chapter 3 for the fundamentals of preparation.)

Execution 1-23. Planning and preparation enable effective execution. Execution is putting a plan into action while using situational understanding to assess progress and adjust operations as the situation changes. Execution focuses on concerted action to seize and retain the initiative, build and maintain momentum, and exploit success. (See chapter 4 for the fundamentals of execution.)

Assessment 1-24. Assessment precedes and guides the other activities of the operations process and concludes each operation or phase of an operation. The focus of assessment differs during planning, preparation, and execution. During planning, assessment focuses on gathering information to understand the current situation and developing an assessment plan. During preparation, assessment focuses on monitoring changes in the situation and on evaluating the progress of readiness to execute the operation. Assessment during execution involves a deliberate comparison of forecasted outcomes to actual events, using criterion to judge progress toward success. Assessment during execution helps commanders adjust plans based on changes in the situation. (See chapter 5 for the fundamentals of assessment.)

CHANGING CHARACTER OF THE OPERATIONS PROCESS 1-25. The situation and type of operations affects the character of the operations process. For example, planning horizons (a point in time commanders use to focus the organization’s planning efforts) and decision cycles are generally shorter in large-scale combat operations than in a counterinsurgency operation. The

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accelerated tempo, hyperactive chaos, and lethality of large-scale combat operations often require rapid decision making and synchronization to exploit opportunities and reduce risk. During large-scale ground combat, command posts displace often, communications are degraded, and troops receive limited precise information about the enemy. These conditions influence the operations process. Streamlining staff processes and the unit’s battle rhythm to those related to the defeat of the enemy is essential. Counterinsurgency operations are generally more methodical and deliberate. For example, they often have consolidated and stationary headquarters, longer planning horizons, and more time available for information gathering and analysis to inform decision making.

1-26. The character of the operations process also varies depending on echelon. Higher echelons generally have longer planning horizons and often have to make decisions concerning operations well in advance of execution. For example, a theater army commander plans for and requests forces months before their anticipated employment in follow-on phases of an operation. A division commander may decide to change task-organization days in advance of an operation to allow time for units to reposition and integrate into their new formation. On the other hand, changing the direction of an attack for a combined arms battalion requires limited planning and can be executed in hours or minutes.

1-27. Depending on the echelon, all activities of the operations process can occur simultaneously within a headquarters. Divisions and corps headquarters are staffed with a plans cell, a future operations cell, and a current operations integration cell. These headquarters can plan, prepare, execute, and assess operations simultaneously, cycling through multiple iterations of the operations process. Companies however, tend to move sequentially through the activities of the operations process because they lack a staff. A company commander receives the mission and conducts troop leading procedures (TLP). After developing the plan, the company commander conducts rehearsals and supervises preparation prior to execution. The company then executes its mission while continuously assessing. Following execution, the company consolidates and reorganizes in preparation of a new mission starting a new cycle of the operations process.

MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS AND THE OPERATIONS PROCESS 1-28. Multinational operations is a collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance (JP 3-16). Multinational operations are driven by common agreement among the participating alliance or coalition partners. While each nation has its own interests and often participates within the limitations of national caveats, all nations bring value to an operation. Each nation’s force has unique capabilities, and each usually contributes to the operation’s legitimacy in terms of international or local acceptability. Army forces should anticipate that most operations will be multinational operations and plan accordingly.

1-29. Multinational operations present challenges and demands throughout the operations process. These include cultural and language issues, interoperability challenges, national caveats on the use of respective forces, the sharing of information and intelligence, and rules of engagement. Establishing standard operating procedures (SOPs) and liaison with multinational partners is critical to effective command and control. When conducting the operations process within a multinational training or operational setting, Army commanders should be familiar with and employ multinational doctrine and standards ratified by the U.S. For example, Allied Tactical Publication 3.2.2, Command and Control of Land Forces, applies to Army forces during the conduct of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (known as NATO) operations. (See FM 3-16 for a detailed discussion on multinational operations.)

PRINCIPLES OF THE OPERATIONS PROCESS 1-30. The operations process, while simple in concept, is dynamic in execution. Commanders must organize and train their staffs and subordinates as an integrated team to simultaneously plan, prepare, execute, and assess operations. In addition to the principles of mission command, commanders and staffs consider the following principles for the effective employment of the operations process:

Drive the operations process. Build and maintain situational understanding. Apply critical and creative thinking.

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DRIVE THE OPERATIONS PROCESS 1-31. Commanders are the most important participants in the operations process. While staffs perform essential functions that amplify the effectiveness of operations, commanders drive the operations process through understanding, visualizing, describing, directing, leading, and assessing operations. Accurate and timely running estimates maintained by the staff, assist commanders in understanding situations and making decisions. See figure 1-2.

Understand 1-32. Understanding an OE and associated problems is fundamental to establishing a situation’s context and visualizing operations. An operational environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0). An OE encompasses the air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains; the information environment; the electromagnetic spectrum; and other factors. Included within these areas are the enemy, friendly, and neutral actors who are relevant to a specific operation.

Figure 1-2. The commander’s role in the operations process

1-33. Commanders collaborate with their staffs, other commanders, and unified action partners to build a shared understanding of their OEs and associated problems. Planning, intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), and running estimates help commanders develop an initial understanding of their OEs. During execution, commanders direct reconnaissance and develop the situation through action to improve their understanding. Commanders circulate within the area of operations (AO) as often as possible, collaborating with subordinate commanders and speaking with Soldiers. Ideally, true understanding should be the basis for decisions. However, commanders realize that uncertainty and time often preclude their achieving complete understanding before deciding and acting.

Visualize 1-34. As commanders build understanding about their OEs, they start to visualize solutions to solve the problems they identify. Collectively, this is known as commander’s visualization—the mental process of developing situational understanding, determining a desired end state, and envisioning an operational approach by which the force will achieve that end state (ADP 6-0).

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1-35. In building their visualization, commanders first seek to understand those conditions that represent the current situation. Next, commanders envision a set of desired future conditions that represents the operation’s end state. Commanders complete their visualization by conceptualizing an operational approach—a broad description of the mission, operational concepts, tasks, and actions required to accomplish the mission (JP 5-0). Figure 1-3 depicts activities associated with developing the commander’s visualization.

Figure 1-3. Commander’s visualization

1-36. Part of developing an operational approach includes visualizing an initial operational framework. The operational framework provides an organizing construct for how the commander intends to organize the AO geographically (deep, close, support, and consolidation areas), by purpose (decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations), and by effort (main and supporting). When establishing their operational framework, commanders consider the physical, temporal, virtual, and cognitive factors that impact on their AOs. Collectively, these considerations allow commanders and staffs to better account for the multi-domain capabilities of friendly and threat forces. (See ADP 3-0 for a detailed discussion of the operational framework.)

Describe 1-37. Commanders describe their visualization to their staffs and subordinate commanders to facilitate shared understanding and purpose throughout the force. During planning, commanders ensure subordinates understand their visualization well enough to begin course of action (COA) development. During execution, commanders describe modifications to their visualization in updated planning guidance and directives resulting in fragmentary orders (FRAGORDs) that adjust the original operation order (OPORD). Commanders describe their visualization in doctrinal terms, refining and clarifying it, as circumstances require. Commanders describe their visualization in terms of—

Commander’s intent. Planning guidance. Commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs). Essential elements of friendly information.

Commander’s Intent I suppose dozens of operation orders have gone out in my name, but I never, throughout the war, actually wrote one myself. I always had someone who could do that better than I could. One part of the order I did, however, draft myself—the intention.

Field-Marshall Viscount William Slim

1-38. The commander’s intent is a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired military end state that supports mission command, provides focus to the staff, and helps subordinate and supporting commanders act to achieve the commander’s desired results without further orders, even when the operation does not unfold as planned (JP 3-0). During planning, the initial commander’s intent guides COA development. In execution, the commander’s intent guides initiative as subordinates make decisions and take action when unforeseen opportunities arise or when countering threats. Commanders

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develop their intent statement personally. It must be easy to remember and clearly understood by commanders and staffs two echelons lower in the chain of command. The more concise the commander’s intent, the easier it is to understand and recall.

Commander’s Planning Guidance

1-39. Commanders provide planning guidance to the staff based upon their visualization of the operation. Planning guidance conveys the essence of the commander’s visualization, including a description of the operational approach. Effective planning guidance reflects how the commander sees the operation unfolding. The commander’s planning guidance broadly describes when, where, and how the commander intends to employ combat power to accomplish the mission within the higher commander’s intent. Broad and general guidance gives the staff and subordinate leaders maximum latitude; it lets proficient staffs develop flexible and effective options. Commanders modify planning guidance based on staff and subordinate input and changing conditions during different stages of planning and throughout the operations process. (See FM 6-0 for sample planning guidance by warfighting function.)

Commander’s Critical Information Requirements

1-40. A commander’s critical information requirement is an information requirement identified by the commander as being critical to facilitating timely decision making (JP 3-0). Commanders decide to designate an information requirement as a CCIR based on likely decisions during the conduct of an operation. A CCIR may support one or more decision points. During planning, staffs recommend information requirements for commanders to designate as CCIRs. During preparation and execution, they recommend changes to CCIRs based on their assessments of the operation.

1-41. Always promulgated by a plan or order, commanders limit the number of CCIRs to focus their staff and subordinate unit information collection and assessment efforts. The fewer the CCIRs, the easier it is for staffs to remember, recognize, and act on each one. As such, the rapid reporting of CCIRs to the commander is essential to adjusting operations. CCIR falls into one of two categories: priority intelligence requirements (known as PIRs) and friendly force information requirements (known as FFIRs).

1-42. A priority intelligence requirement is an intelligence requirement that the commander and staff need to understand the threat and other aspects of the operational environment (JP 2-01). Priority intelligence requirements identify the information about the enemy and other aspects of an OE that the commander considers most important. Intelligence about civil considerations may be as critical as intelligence about the enemy. In coordination with the staff, the intelligence officer manages priority intelligence requirements for the commander as part of the intelligence process.

1-43. A friendly force information requirement is information the commander and staff need to understand the status of friendly force and supporting capabilities (JP 3-0). Friendly force information requirements identify the information about the mission, troops and support available, and time available for friendly forces that the commander considers most important. In coordination with the staff, the operations officer manages friendly force information requirements for the commander.

Essential Elements of Friendly Information

1-44. Commanders also describe information they want protected as essential elements of friendly information. An essential element of friendly information is a critical aspect of a friendly operation that, if known by a threat would subsequently compromise, lead to failure, or limit success of the operation and therefore should be protected from enemy detection (ADP 6-0). Although essential elements of friendly information (known as EEFIs) are not CCIRs, they have the same priority. Essential elements of friendly information establish elements of information to protect rather than elements to collect. Their identification is the first step in the operations security process and central to the protection of information.

Direct 1-45. To direct is implicit in command. Commanders direct action to achieve results and lead forces to mission accomplishment. Commanders make decisions and direct action based on their situational

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understanding maintained by continuous assessment. Throughout the operations process, commanders direct forces by—

Approving plans and orders. Establishing command and support relationships. Assigning and adjusting tasks, control measures, and task organization. Positioning units to maximize combat power. Positioning key leaders at critical places and times to ensure supervision. Allocating resources to exploit opportunities and counter threats. Committing the reserve.

Lead Example whether it be good or bad has a powerful influence.

General George Washington

1-46. Leadership is the activity of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization (ADP 6-22). Leadership inspires Soldiers to accomplish things that they otherwise might not. Throughout the operations process, commanders make decisions and provide the purpose and motivation to follow through with the COA they chose. They must also possess the wisdom to know when to modify a COA when situations change. (See ADP 6-22 for a detailed discussion of leadership to include attributes of effective leaders.)

1-47. Commanders lead by example through command presence. Command presence is creating a favorable impression in demeanor, appearance, and professional and personal conduct. Commanders use their presence to gather and communicate information and knowledge as well as to assess operations. Establishing a command presence makes the commander’s knowledge and experience available to subordinates. It allows commanders to evaluate and provide direct feedback on their subordinates’ performance.

1-48. Command occurs at the location of the commander. Where the commander locates within the AO is an important consideration for effective mission command. No standard pattern or simple prescription exists for the proper location of a commander on the battlefield; different commanders lead differently. Commanders balance their time among the command post and staff, subordinate commanders, forces, and other organizations to make the greatest contribution to success. (See ADP 6-0 for discussions of command presence and location of the commander during operations.)

Assess 1-49. Assessment involves deliberately comparing intended forecasted outcomes with actual events to determine the overall effectiveness of force employment. Assessment helps the commander determine progress toward attaining the desired end state, achieving objectives, and completing tasks. Commanders incorporate assessments by the staff, subordinate commanders, and unified action partners into their personal assessment of the situation. Based on their assessment, commanders adjust their visualization and modify plans and orders to adapt the force to changing circumstances. (See chapter 5 for a detailed discussion on assessment.)

BUILD AND MAINTAIN SITUATIONAL UNDERSTANDING 1-50. Success in operations demands timely and effective decisions based on applying judgment to available information and knowledge. As such, commanders and staffs seek to build and maintain situational understanding throughout the operations process. Situational understanding is the product of applying analysis and judgment to relevant information to determine the relationships among the operational and mission variables (ADP 6-0). Commanders and staffs continually strive to maintain their situational understanding and work through periods of reduced understanding as a situation evolves. Effective commanders accept that uncertainty can never be eliminated and train their staffs and subordinates to function in uncertain environments.

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1-51. As commanders build their situational understanding, they share their understanding across the forces and with unified action partners. Creating shared understanding is a principle of mission command and requires communication and information sharing from higher to lower and lower to higher. Higher headquarters ensure subordinates understand the larger situation to include the operation’s end state, purpose, and objectives. Staffs from lower echelons share their understanding of their particular situation and provide feedback to the higher headquarters on the operation’s progress. Communication and information sharing with adjacent units and unified action partners is also multi-directional. Several tools assist leaders in building situational understanding and creating a shared understanding across the force to include—

Operational and mission variables. Running estimates. Intelligence. Collaboration. Liaison.

Operational and Mission Variables 1-52. Operational and mission variables are categories of relevant information commanders and staffs use to help build their situational understanding. Commanders and staffs use the eight interrelated operational variables—political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (known as PMESII-PT)—to help understand an OE. Operational variables are those aspects of an OE, both military and nonmilitary, that may differ from one operational area to another and affect operations.

1-53. Upon receipt of a mission, commanders and staffs filter information categorized by the operational variables into relevant information with respect to the mission. They use the mission variables, in combination with the operational variables, to refine their understanding of their situation and to visualize, describe, and direct operations. The mission variables are mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (known as METT-TC). Commanders and staffs view all the mission variables in terms of their impact on mission accomplishment. (See FM 6-0 for a detailed description of the operational and mission variables.)

Running Estimates 1-54. A running estimate is the continuous assessment of the current situation used to determine if the current operation is proceeding according to the commander’s intent and if planned future operations are supportable. Running estimates assist commanders and staffs with understanding situations, assessing progress, and making decisions throughout an operation. Effective plans and successful execution hinge on current and accurate running estimates.

1-55. Each staff section maintains a running estimate within its specified area of expertise (for example, intelligence, fires, logistics, and personnel). When building and maintaining a running estimate, staff sections monitor current operations and continuously consider the following in context of the operations:

Facts. Assumptions. Friendly status including location, activity, and combat power of subordinate units from two levels down. Enemy status including composition, disposition, and strength. Civil considerations. Conclusions and recommendations.

1-56. Running estimates cover essential facts and assumptions, including a summary of the current situation. Running estimates always include recommendations for anticipated decisions. During planning, commanders use these recommendations to select valid (feasible, acceptable, suitable, distinguishable, and complete) COAs for further analysis. During preparation and execution, commanders use recommendations from running estimates to inform their decision making.

1-57. While staffs maintain formal running estimates, the commander’s estimate is a mental process directly tied to the commander’s visualization. Commanders integrate personal knowledge of the situation, analysis

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of the mission variables, assessments by subordinate commanders and other organizations, and relevant details gained from running estimates.

1-58. Because a commander may need a running estimate at any time, staffs must develop, update, and continuously revise running estimates while in garrison and during operations. At a minimum, staffs maintain a running estimate on friendly capabilities while in garrison or when not actively engaged in operations. Commanders and staff elements immediately begin updating their running estimates upon receipt of a mission. They continue to build and maintain their running estimates throughout the operations process in planning, preparation, execution, and assessment.

Intelligence If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.

Sun Tzu

1-59. Intelligence supports the commander and staff in building and maintaining situational understanding during all activities of the operations process. Information and intelligence are essential for developing an understanding of the threat, terrain and weather, and civil considerations. Intelligence helps commanders understand and visualize their OEs and options available to the enemy and the friendly force.

1-60. The intelligence process describes how the intelligence warfighting function facilitates situational understanding and supports decision making. This process provides a common framework for Army professionals to guide their thoughts, discussions, plans, and assessments. Effective execution of the intelligence process depends on commander and staff involvement and effective information collection. Commanders drive the intelligence process by issuing planning guidance, establishing priorities, identifying decision points, and designating their CCIRs. The intelligence process generates information, products, and knowledge about an OE during planning, preparation, execution, and assessment. It also integrates intelligence into targeting, information operations, and risk management. (See ADP 2-0 for a detailed discussion of the intelligence process.)

Collaboration 1-61. Commanders and staffs actively build and maintain shared understanding within the force and with unified action partners by continually collaborating throughout the operations process. Collaboration is more than coordination. It is multiple people and organizations working together towards a common goal by sharing knowledge and building consensus. It requires dialogue that involves a candid exchange of ideas or opinions among participants and encourages frank discussions in areas of disagreement. Throughout the operations process, commanders, subordinate commanders, staffs, and unified action partners collaborate, sharing and questioning information, perceptions, and ideas to understand situations and make decisions.

1-62. Through collaboration, the commander creates a learning environment by allowing participants to think critically and creatively and share their ideas, opinions, and recommendations without fear of reproach. Effective collaboration requires candor and a free, yet mutually respectful, exchange of ideas. Participants must feel free to make viewpoints based on their expertise, experience, and insight. This includes sharing ideas that contradict the opinions held by those of higher rank. Successful commanders listen to novel ideas and counterarguments. Effective collaboration is not possible unless the commander enables it.

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Collaboration: Meade’s Council of War

In June 1863, General Robert E. Lee prepared the Army of Northern Virginia for a second invasion of the North. Moving through the Shenandoah Valley and north toward Harrisburg, Lee’s Army made contact with the Army of the Potomac near the town of Gettysburg on July 1, 1863. Day one of the battle saw initial Confederate success. By the afternoon of day two, Major General George Meade (who had just recently assumed command of the Army of the Potomac) had moved the bulk of his force into defensive positions on the high ground south of the city. The battlefield was set.

Late in the afternoon of July 2, Lee launched heavy assaults on both the Union’s left and right flanks. Fierce fighting raged at Little Round Top, the Wheatfield, Devil’s Den, Culp’s Hill, and Cemetery Hill. Despite heavy losses, the Army of the Potomac held its lines. That evening, Meade reported back to General-in-Chief Henry Halleck, “The enemy attacked me about 4 P.M. this day…and after one of the severest contests of the war was repulsed at all points.” Meade ended his message, “I shall remain in my present position to-morrow, but am not prepared to say until better advised of the condition of the army, whether operations will be of an offensive or a defensive character.” Having essentially made his decision, Meade summoned his corps commanders and chief of intelligence to assess the condition of the army and to hear from his commanders on courses of action for the next day.

The meeting began around 9 P.M. in which Brigadier General John Gibbon noted, “was at first very informal and in the shape of a conversation.” The meeting lasted about two hours as General Meade listened intently to his subordinates’ discussion. The tradition in such meetings or council of war is a discussion and then a vote by the officers on the course of action. Meade’s Chief of Staff Major General Butterfield posed three questions:

“Under existing circumstances, is it advisable for this army to remain in its present position, or retire to another nearer its base of supplies?

It being determined to remain in present position, shall the army attack or wait the attack of the enemy?

If we wait attack, how long?”

Meade’s commanders responded from junior to senior in rank. All wanted to remain on the field another day, but none favored to attack. When the discussion concluded Meade decided that the question was settled and the troops would remain in position. The two-hour discussion and vote formed consensus of the commanders and improved their confidence, resulting in the outcome Meade was seeking—to stay and fight.

Liaison 1-63. Liaison is that contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces and another organization to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. Most commonly used for establishing and maintaining close communications, liaison continuously enables direct, physical communications between commands. Commanders use liaison during operations to help facilitate coordination between organizations, de-conflict efforts, and build shared understanding.

1-64. A liaison officer (LNO) represents a commander. A trusted, competent LNO who is properly informed (either a commissioned or a noncommissioned officer) is the key to effective liaison. LNOs must have the

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commander’s full confidence and relevant experience for the mission. The LNO’s parent unit or unit of assignment is the sending unit. The unit or activity to which the LNO is sent is the receiving unit. An LNO normally remains at the receiving unit until recalled. LNOs—

Understand how the commander thinks and interpret the commander’s messages. Convey the commander’s intent, guidance, mission, and concept of operations. Represent the commander’s position.

(See FM 6-0 for a detailed discussion of the duties and responsibilities of LNOs.)

APPLY CRITICAL AND CREATIVE THINKING 1-65. Thinking includes awareness, perception, reasoning, and intuition. Thinking is naturally influenced by emotion, experience, and bias. As such, commanders and staffs apply critical and creative thinking throughout the operations process to assist them with understanding situations, making decisions, directing actions, and assessing operations.

1-66. Critical thinking is purposeful and reflective thought about what to believe or what to do in response to observations, experiences, verbal or written expressions, or arguments. By thinking critically, individuals formulate judgments about whether the information they encounter is true or false, or if it falls somewhere along a scale of plausibility between true or false. Critical thinking involves questioning information, assumptions, conclusions, and points of view to evaluate evidence, develop understanding, and clarify goals. Critical thinking helps commanders and staffs identify causes of problems, arrive at justifiable conclusions, and make good judgments. Critical thinking helps commanders counter their biases and avoid logic errors.

1-67. Creative thinking examines problems from a fresh perspective to develop innovative solutions. Creative thinking creates new and useful ideas, and reevaluates or combines old ideas to solve problems. Leaders face unfamiliar problems that require new or original approaches to solve them. This requires creativity and a willingness to accept change, newness, and a flexible outlook of new ideas and possibilities.

1-68. Breaking old habits of thought, questioning the status quo, visualizing a better future, and devising responses to new problems require creative thinking. During operations, leaders routinely face unfamiliar problems or old problems under new conditions. Leaders apply creative thinking to gain new insights, novel approaches, fresh perspectives, and new ways of understanding problems and conceiving ways to solve them. (See ATP 5-0.1 for creative thinking tools and techniques.)

1-69. Both critical and creative thinking must intentionally include ethical reasoning—the deliberate evaluation that decisions and actions conform to accepted standards of conduct. Ethical reasoning within critical and creative thinking helps commanders and staffs anticipate ethical hazards and consider options to prevent or mitigate the hazards within their proposed COAs. (See ADP 6-22 for a detailed discussion of ethical reasoning.)

1-70. Commanders may form red teams to help the staff think critically and creatively and to avoid groupthink, mirror imaging, cultural missteps, and tunnel vision. Red teaming enables commanders to explore alternative plans and operations in the context of an OE and from the perspective of unified action partners, adversaries, and others. Throughout the operations process, red team members help clarify the problem and explain how others (unified action partners, the population, and the enemy) potentially view the problem. Red team members challenge assumptions and the analysis used to build the plan. (See JP 5-0 for a detailed discussion of red teams and red teaming.)

INTEGRATING PROCESSES 1-71. Commanders and staffs integrate the warfighting functions and synchronize the force to adapt to changing circumstances throughout the operations process. They use several integrating processes to do this. An integrating process consists of a series of steps that incorporate multiple disciplines to achieve a specific end. For example, during planning, the military decision-making process (MDMP) integrates the commander and staff in a series of steps to produce a plan or order. Key integrating processes that occur throughout the operations process include—

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Intelligence preparation of the battlefield. Information collection. Targeting. Risk management. Knowledge management.

INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD 1-72. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield is the systematic process of analyzing the mission variables of enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations in an area of interest to determine their effect on operations (ATP 2-01.3). Led by the intelligence officer, the entire staff participates in IPB to develop and sustain an understanding of the enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations. IPB helps identify options available to friendly and threat forces.

1-73. IPB consists of four steps. Each step is performed or assessed and refined to ensure that IPB products remain complete and relevant. The four IPB steps are—

Define the OE. Describe environmental effects on operations. Evaluate the threat. Determine threat COAs.

IPB begins in planning and continues throughout the operations process. IPB results in intelligence products used to aid in developing friendly COAs and decision points for the commander. Additionally, the conclusions reached and the products created during IPB are critical to planning information collection and targeting. A key aspect of IPB is refinement in preparation and execution. (See ATP 2-01.3 for a detailed discussion of IPB.)

INFORMATION COLLECTION 1-74. Information collection is an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of sensors and assets as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations (FM 3-55). It integrates the functions of the intelligence and operations staffs that focus on answering CCIRs. Information collection includes acquiring information and providing it to processing elements. It has three steps:

Collection management. Task and direct collection. Execute collection.

1-75. Information collection helps the commander understand and visualize the operation by identifying gaps in information and aligning reconnaissance, surveillance, security, and intelligence assets to collect information on those gaps. The “decide” and “detect” steps of targeting tie heavily to information collection. (See FM 3-55 for a detailed discussion of information collection to include the relationship between the duties of intelligence and operations staffs.)

TARGETING 1-76. Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities (JP 3-0). Targeting seeks to create specific desired effects through lethal and nonlethal actions. The emphasis of targeting is on identifying enemy resources (targets) that if destroyed or degraded will contribute to the success of the friendly mission. Targeting begins in planning and continues throughout the operations process. The steps of the Army’s targeting process are—

Decide. Detect. Deliver. Assess.

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This methodology facilitates engagement of the right target, at the right time, with the most appropriate assets using the commander’s targeting guidance.

1-77. Targeting is a multidiscipline effort that requires coordinated interaction among the commander and several staff sections that together form the targeting working group. The chief of staff (executive officer) or the chief of fires (fire support officer) leads the staff through the targeting process. Based on the commander’s targeting guidance and priorities, the staff determines which targets to engage and how, where, and when to engage them. The staff then assigns friendly capabilities best suited to produce the desired effect on each target, while ensuring compliance with the rules of engagement. (See ATP 3-60 for a detailed discussion of Army targeting to include how Army targeting nest within the joint targeting cycle.)

RISK MANAGEMENT 1-78. Risk—the exposure of someone or something valued to danger, harm, or loss—is inherent in all operations. Because risk is part of all military operations, it cannot be avoided. Identifying, mitigating, and accepting risk is a function of command and a key consideration during planning and execution. (See chapter 2 for a discussion of risk as an element of operational art.)

1-79. Risk management is the process to identify, assess, and control risks and make decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits (JP 3-0). Commanders and staffs use risk management throughout the operations process to identify and mitigate risks associated with hazards (to include ethical risk and moral hazards) that have the potential to cause friendly and civilian casualties, damage or destroy equipment, or otherwise impact mission effectiveness. Like targeting, risk management begins in planning and continues through preparation and execution. Risk management consists of the following steps:

Identify hazards. Assess hazards. Develop controls and make risk decisions. Implement controls. Supervise and evaluate.

1-80. All staff elements incorporate risk management into their running estimates and provide recommendations to mitigate risk within their areas of expertise. The operations officer coordinates risk management throughout the operations process. (See ATP 5-19 for a detailed discussion of the risk management process.)

KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT 1-81. Knowledge management is the process of enabling knowledge flow to enhance shared understanding, learning, and decision making (ADP 6-0). It facilitates the transfer of knowledge among commanders, staffs, and forces to build and maintain situational understanding. Knowledge management helps get the right information to the right person at the right time to facilitate decision making. Knowledge management uses a five-step process to create shared understanding. The steps of knowledge management include—

Assess. Design. Develop. Pilot. Implement.

(See ATP 6-01.1 for discussion on knowledge management.)

BATTLE RHYTHM 1-82. Commanders and staffs must integrate and synchronize numerous activities, meetings, and reports within their headquarters, and with higher, subordinate, supporting, and adjacent units as part of the operations process. They do this by establishing the unit’s battle rhythm. Battle rhythm is a deliberate, daily schedule of command, staff, and unit activities intended to maximize use of time and synchronize staff actions (JP 3-33). A unit’s battle rhythm provides structure for managing a headquarters’ most important internal

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resource—the time of the commander and staff. A headquarters’ battle rhythm consists of a series of meetings, report requirements, and other activities synchronized by time and purpose. These activities may be daily, weekly, monthly, or quarterly depending on the echelon, type of operation, and planning horizon. An effective battle rhythm—

Facilitates interaction among the commander, staff, and subordinate commanders. Supports building and maintaining shared understanding throughout the headquarters. Establishes a routine for staff interaction and coordination.

1-83. There is no standard battle rhythm for every situation. Different echelons, types of units, and types of operations require commanders and staffs to develop a battle rhythm based on the situation. During large- scale ground combat, where lethality and time constraints require rapid planning and decision cycles, the unit’s battle rhythm focuses on defeating the enemy. Daily battle rhythm events may consist of a morning and evening current operations update brief, a targeting meeting, and a combined plans and future operations update brief. In operations dominated by stability tasks, where headquarters are often static, the battle rhythm may be more deliberate with daily, weekly, and monthly working groups and boards. While the battle rhythm establishes a routine for a headquarters, the unit’s battle rhythm is not fixed. Commanders modify the battle rhythm as the situation evolves. (See ATP 6-0.5 for a detailed discussion of battle rhythm to include examples of common meetings, working groups, and boards.)

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Chapter 2

Planning

To be practical, any plan must take account of the enemy’s power to frustrate it; the best chance of overcoming such obstruction is to have a plan that can be easily varied to fit the circumstances met; to keep such adaptability, while still keeping the initiative, the best way is to operate along a line which offers alternative objectives.

Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart

This chapter defines planning and describes the functions of planning and plans. It discusses planning at the levels of warfare, operational art, integrated planning, and key components of a plan. The chapter concludes with guides for effective planning and planning pitfalls to avoid.

FUNDAMENTALS OF PLANNING 2-1. Planning is the art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and determining effective ways to bring that future about. Planning helps leaders understand situations; develop solutions to problems; direct, coordinate, and synchronize actions; prioritize efforts; and anticipate events. In its simplest form, planning helps leaders determine how to move from the current state of affairs to a more desirable future state while identifying potential opportunities and threats along the way.

2-2. Planning is a continuous learning activity. While planning may start an iteration of the operations process, planning does not stop with the production of an order. During preparation and execution, the commander and staff continuously refine the order to account for changes in the situation. Subordinates and others provide assessments about what works, what does not work, and how the force can do things better. In some circumstances, commanders may determine that the current order (to include associated branches and sequels) no longer applies. In these instances, instead of modifying the current order, commanders reframe the problem and develop a new plan.

2-3. Planning may be highly structured, involving the commander, staff, subordinate commanders, and others who develop a fully synchronized plan or order. Planning may also be less structured, involving a commander and selected staff who quickly determine a scheme of maneuver for a hasty attack. Sometimes the planned activity is quite specific with very clear goals. At other times, planning must first determine the activity and the goals. Planning is conducted along various planning horizons, depending on the echelon and circumstances. Some units may plan out to years and months, others out to days and hours.

2-4. Planning techniques and methods vary based on circumstances. Planners may plan forward, starting with the present conditions and laying out potential decisions and actions forward in time. Planners also plan in reverse, starting with the envisioned end state and working backward in time to the present. Planning methods may be analytical, as in the MDMP, or more systemic, as in the Army design methodology (ADM).

2-5. A product of planning is a plan or order—a directive for future action. Commanders issue plans and orders to subordinates to communicate their visualization of the operations and to direct action. Plans and orders synchronize the action of forces in time, space, and purpose to achieve objectives and accomplish the mission. They inform others outside the organization on how to cooperate and provide support.

2-6. Plans and orders describe a situation, establish a task organization, lay out a concept of operations, assign tasks to subordinate units, and provide essential coordinating instructions. The plan serves as a foundation for which the force can rapidly adjust from based on changing circumstance. The measure of a good plan is not whether execution transpires as planned, but whether the plan facilitates effective action in the face of unforeseen events.

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2-7. Plans and orders come in many forms and vary in the scope, complexity, and length of time they address. Generally, commanders and staffs develop an operation plan (OPLAN) well in advance of execution; it is not executed until directed. An OPLAN becomes an OPORD when directed for execution based on a specific time or event. A FRAGORD is an abbreviated form of an OPORD issued as needed to change or modify an OPORD during the conduct of operations. (See FM 6-0 for Army formats for plans and orders.)

THE SCIENCE AND ART OF PLANNING Logistics comprises the means and arrangements which work out the plans of strategy and tactics. Strategy decides where to act; logistics brings the troops to this point.

Antoine Henri de Jomini

2-8. Planning is both a science and an art. Many aspects of military operations, such as movement rates, fuel consumption, and weapons effects, are quantifiable. They are part of the science of planning. The combination of forces, choice of tactics, and arrangement of activities belong to the art of planning. Soldiers often gain knowledge of the science of planning through institutional training and study. They gain understanding of the art of planning primarily through operational training and experience. Effective planners are grounded in both the science and the art of planning.

2-9. The science of planning encompasses aspects of operations that can be measured and analyzed. These aspects include the physical capabilities of friendly and enemy organizations. The science of planning includes a realistic appreciation for time-distance factors; an understanding of how long it takes to initiate certain actions; the techniques and procedures used to accomplish planning tasks; and the terms and graphics that compose the language of military operations. While not easy, the science of planning is fairly straightforward.

2-10. Mastery of the science of planning is necessary for military professionals to understand the physical and procedural constraints under which units operate. These constraints include the effects of terrain, weather, and time on friendly and enemy forces. However—because combat is an intensely human activity—the solution to problems cannot be reduced to a formula. This realization necessitates the study of the art of planning.

2-11. The art of planning requires understanding the dynamic relationships among friendly forces, the threat, and other aspects of an OE during operations. It includes making decisions based on skilled judgment acquired from experience, training, study, imagination, and critical and creative thinking. Commanders apply judgment based on their knowledge and experience to select the right time and place to act, assign tasks, prioritize actions, and allocate resources. The art of planning involves the commander’s willingness to accept risk.

2-12. Planning requires creative application of doctrine, units, and resources. It requires a thorough knowledge and application of the fundamentals of unified land operations (see ADP 3-0) and the fundamentals of tactics (see ADP 3-90). The art of planning involves developing plans within the commander’s intent and planning guidance by choosing from interrelated options, including—

Arrangement of activities in time, space, and purpose. Assignment of tactical mission tasks and tactical enabling tasks. Task organization of available forces and resource allocation. Choice and arrangement of control measures. Tempo. The risk the commander is willing to take.

2-13. These interrelated options define a starting point from which planners create distinct solutions to particular problems. Each solution involves a range of options. Each balances competing demands and requires judgment. The variables of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (known as METT-TC) always combine to form a different set of circumstances. There are no checklists that adequately apply to every situation.

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THE FUNCTIONS OF PLANNING I tell this story to illustrate the truth of the statement I heard long ago in the Army: Plans are worthless, but planning is everything.

Dwight D. Eisenhower

2-14. Imperfect knowledge and assumptions about the future are inherent in all planning. Planning cannot predict with precision how enemies will react or how civilians will respond during operations. Nonetheless, the understanding and learning that occurs during planning have great value. Even if units do not execute the plan exactly as envisioned—and few ever do—planning results in an improved understanding of the situation that facilitates future decision making. Planning and plans help leaders—

Understand situations and develop solutions to problems. Task-organize the force and prioritize efforts. Direct, coordinate, and synchronize action. Anticipate events and adapt to changing circumstances.

UNDERSTAND SITUATIONS AND DEVELOP SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS 2-15. Planning helps commanders and staffs understand situations to include discerning the relationship of the operational and mission variable. Effective planning not only helps leaders understand the land domain, but it helps leaders understand how capabilities in the air, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains and the information environment impact operations on land and vice versa.

2-16. Understanding the situation requires both analysis and synthesis. Analysis is the process of studying a situation by successively dividing it into parts and addressing each part in turn. For example, the initial stages of mission analysis and IPB rely heavily on analysis. Understanding the parts of a situation is necessary; however, understanding the parts alone does not provide an appreciation of the relationships among the parts. That appreciation requires synthesis. Synthesis is thinking about how the parts of a situation work together as a whole rather than in isolation. As part of planning, the commander and staff synthesize results of mission analysis to make sense of the situation before developing COAs.

2-17. Planning also helps leaders identify problems and develop solutions to solve or manage those problems. Not all problems require the same level of planning. Leaders often identify simple problems immediately and quickly decide on a solution—sometimes on the spot. Planning is critical, however, when a problem is actually a set of interrelated issues, and the solution to each affects the others. For unfamiliar situations, planning offers ways to solve the complete set of problems as a whole. In general, the more complex a situation is, the more important and involved the planning effort becomes.

TASK-ORGANIZE THE FORCE AND PRIORITIZE EFFORTS 2-18. When developing their concept of operations, commanders first visualize the decisive operation that directly accomplishes the mission. They then visualize how shaping and sustaining operations support the decisive operation. The decisive operation prioritizes effort and is the focal point around which the plan is developed. When developing associated tasks to subordinate units, commanders ensure subordinates have the capabilities and resources to accomplish their assigned tasks. They do this by task-organizing the force and establishing priorities of support. Commanders consider the following principles of war when task- organizing the force and prioritizing efforts:

Mass: concentrate the effects of combat power at the decisive place and time. Economy of force: allocate minimum-essential combat power to secondary efforts. Unity of command: for every objective, ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander.

2-19. Task-organizing is the act of designing a force, support staff, or sustainment package of specific size and composition to meet a unique task or mission (ADP 3-0). It includes providing assets to subordinate commanders and establishing their command and support relationships. Some assets are retained under the commander’s immediate control to retain flexibility to exploit opportunities or counter threats.

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2-20. Task-organizing results in a task organization—a temporary grouping of forces designed to accomplish a particular mission. The unit’s task organization is stipulated in the base plan or order or addressed in Annex A (Task Organization) to the base plan or order. The OPLAN or OPORD also stipulates changes in the task organization by phase or event. During execution, commanders modify the task organization as required based on the situation through FRAGORDs. (See FM 6-0 for task organization formats in Army plans and orders.)

2-21. Commanders avoid exceeding the span of control of a subordinate headquarters when task-organizing. Span of control refers to the number of subordinate units under a single commander. This number is situation dependent and may vary. Allocating more units to subordinate commanders gives subordinates greater flexibility and increases options and combinations. However, increasing the number of subordinate units increases the number of decisions the commander must make, and that may decrease agility. Running estimates and COA analysis provide the information that helps commanders determine the best task organization to—

Facilitate the commander’s intent and concept of operations. Weight the decisive operation or main effort. Create effective combined arms teams. Retain flexibility to meet unforeseen events and support future operations. Allocate resources with minimum restrictions on their employment.

Army Command and Support Relationships 2-22. Command and support relationships provide the basis for unity of command and are essential to the exercise of mission command. Army command relationships define command responsibility and authority. Army support relationships define the purpose, scope, and effect desired when one capability supports another. Establishing clear command and support relationships is fundamental to organizing for any operation.

2-23. Army command relationships define superior and subordinate relationships between unit commanders. By specifying a chain of command, command relationships unify effort and enable commanders to use subordinate forces with maximum flexibility. Army command relationships include—

Organic. Assigned. Attached. Operational control. Tactical control.

2-24. Army command relationships identify the authorities and degree of control of the gaining Army commander. For example, operational control gives gaining commanders the authority to assign missions and further task-organize forces placed under their operational control. Tactical control on the other hand, gives gaining commanders the authority to assign missions, but not further task-organize forces placed under their tactical control. The type of command relationship often relates to the expected longevity of the relationship between the headquarters involved and quickly identifies the administrative and logistic support that the gaining and losing Army commanders provide.

2-25. A support relationship is established by a superior commander between subordinate commanders when one organization should aid, protect, complement, or sustain another force on a temporary basis. Designating support relationships is an important aspect of mission command in that it provides a flexible means of establishing and changing priorities with minimal additional instruction. Army support relationships are—

Direct support. General support. Reinforcing. General support-reinforcing.

2-26. Each Army support relationship identifies specific authorities and their responsibilities between the supported and supporting units to include who has the authority to sustain, establish communication with,

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position, and set priorities for the supporting force. For example, an artillery unit in direct support of a maneuver unit is positioned and has priorities established by the maneuver unit. A sustainment unit in general support of multiple units is positioned and has priorities of support established by its parent unit.

2-27. Establishing clear command and support relationships is fundamental to organizing for any operation. These relationships are doctrinally defined and establish clear responsibilities and authorities between subordinate and supporting units. Knowing the inherent responsibilities of each command and support relationship allows commanders to effectively organize their forces and helps supporting commanders understand their unit’s role in the organizational structure. (See ADP 3-0 for a detailed discussion of Army command and support relationships.)

Prioritizing Effort 2-28. In addition to task-organizing, commanders establish priorities of support during planning and shift priorities during execution as the situation requires. A priority of support is a priority set by the commander to ensure a subordinate unit has support in accordance with its relative importance to accomplish the mission. Priorities of movement, fires, sustainment, and protection all illustrate priorities of support that commanders use to weight the decisive operation or the main effort if the operation is phased. The main effort is a designated subordinate unit whose mission at a given point in time is most critical to overall mission success (ADP 3-0). The main effort is weighted with the preponderance of combat power—the total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit or formation can apply at a given time (ADP 3-0). Designating a main effort temporarily gives that unit priority of support. Commanders shift resources and priorities to the main effort as circumstances require. Commanders may shift the main effort several times during an operation. When executed, the unit conducting the decisive operation—the operation that directly accomplishes the mission—is always the main effort.

DIRECT, COORDINATE, AND SYNCHRONIZE ACTIONS 2-29. Plans and orders are the principle means commanders use to direct, coordinate, and synchronize actions. Plans and orders also inform those outside the unit how to cooperate and provide support. Good plans direct subordinates by stating what is required (the task) and why (the purpose); they leave how (the method) up to subordinates. They contain the minimum number of control measures needed to coordinate actions and synchronize the warfighting functions to mass the effects of combat power at the decisive point and time.

2-30. Commanders use control measures to assign responsibilities, coordinate fire and maneuver, and control operations. A control measure is a means of regulating forces or warfighting functions (ADP 6-0). Control measures assign responsibilities, coordinate actions between forces, impose restrictions, or establish guidelines to regulate freedom of action. Control measures are essential to coordinating subordinates’ actions and are located throughout the plan. Control measures unburden subordinate commanders to conduct operations within their assigned AO without additional coordination.

2-31. Control measures can be permissive (which allows something to happen) or restrictive (which limits how something is done). For example, a coordinated fire line—a line beyond which conventional surface- to-surface direct fire and indirect fire support means may fire at any time within the boundaries of the establishing headquarters without additional coordination but does not eliminate the responsibility to coordinate the airspace required to conduct the mission (JP 3-09)—illustrates a permissive control measure. A route—the prescribed course to be traveled from a specific point of origin to a specific destination (FM 3-90-1)—illustrates a restrictive control measure. (ADP 1-02 contains definitions and symbols of control measures.)

2-32. Synchronization is the arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose. Plans and orders synchronize the warfighting functions to mass the effects of combat power at the chosen place and time. Synchronization is a means of control, not an end. Commanders balance necessary synchronization against desired agility and initiative.

2-33. Overemphasizing the direction, coordination, and synchronization functions of planning may result in detailed and rigid plans that stifle initiative. Mission command encourages the use of mission orders to avoid creating overly restrictive instructions to subordinates. Mission orders direct, coordinate, and synchronize

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actions while allowing subordinates the maximum freedom of action to accomplish missions within the commander’s intent. (See paragraphs 2-119 through 2-126 for a discussion on mission orders.)

ANTICIPATE EVENTS AND ADAPT TO CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES In general, campaign projects have to be adjusted to conditions (time, weather), the number of the enemy. …The more one foresees obstacles to his plans, the less one will find of them later in the execution. In a word, everything must be foreseen; find the problems and resolve them.

Frederick the Great

2-34. A fundamental tension exists between the desire to plan far into the future to facilitate preparation and coordination and the fact that the farther into the future the commander plans, the less certain the plan will remain relevant. Given the fundamentally uncertain nature of operations, the object of planning is not to eliminate uncertainty but to develop a framework for action in the midst of such uncertainty. Planning provides an informed forecast of how future events may unfold. It entails identifying and evaluating potential decisions and actions in advance to include thinking through consequences of certain actions. Planning involves thinking about ways to influence the future as well as ways to respond to potential events.

2-35. Planning keeps the force oriented on future objectives despite the requirements of current operations. Anticipatory planning is essential for seizing and retaining the initiative by allowing commanders and staffs to consider potential decisions and actions in advance. Anticipatory planning reduces the time between decisions and actions during execution, especially at higher echelons. While some actions are implemented immediately, others require forethought and preparation. For example, changing the direction of attack may be a relatively simple and immediate matter for a battalion; however, changing the scheme of maneuver for a division, including all its support, is complicated and time consuming. Changing priority of fires at division level may take considerable time if artillery units must reposition. If leaders wait until an event occurs to begin planning and preparing for it, units may not be able to react quickly enough—ceding the initiative to the enemy.

2-36. During execution planners continue to develop or refine options for potential enemy action and friendly opportunities. By anticipating potential events beforehand, planning promotes flexibility and rapid decision making during execution. As a result, the force anticipates events and acts purposefully and effectively before the enemy can act or before situations deteriorate. Several tools are available to the commander and planners to assist in adapting to changing circumstance to include—

Decision points. Branches. Sequels.

2-37. A decision point is a point in space and time when the commander or staff anticipates making a key decision concerning a specific course of action (JP 5-0). A decision point is associated to actions by the enemy, the friendly force, or the population and tied to a CCIR. Identifying decision points associated to the execution of a branch or sequel is key to effective planning.

2-38. Planners record decision points on a decision support template and associated matrix. A decision support template is a combined intelligence and operations graphic based on the results of wargaming that depicts decision points, timelines associated with movement of forces and the flow of the operation, and other key items of information required to execute a specific friendly course of action (JP 2-01.3). The decision support matrix provides text to recap expected events, decision points, and planned friendly actions. It describes where and when a decision must be made if a specific action is to take place. It ties decision points to named areas of interest (known as NAIs), targeted areas of interest (known as TAIs), CCIRs, collection assets, and potential friendly response options. The staff refines the decision support template and matrix as planning progresses and during execution.

2-39. Plans and orders often require adjustment beyond the initial stages of the operations. A branch is the contingency options built into the base plan used for changing the mission, orientation, or direction of movement of a force to aid success of the operation based on anticipated events, opportunities, or disruptions caused by enemy actions and reactions (JP 5-0). Branches anticipate situations that require changes to the

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basic plan. Such situations could result from enemy action, friendly action, or weather. Commanders build flexibility into their plans and orders by developing branches to preserve freedom of action in rapidly changing conditions.

2-40. A sequel is the subsequent operation or phase based on the possible outcomes of the current operation or phase (JP 5-0). Sequels are based on outcomes of current operations to include success, stalemate, or defeat. A counteroffensive, for example, is a logical sequel to a defense; an exploitation and pursuit follow successful attacks. Executing a sequel normally begins another phase of an operation, if not a new operation. Commanders consider and develop sequels during planning and revisit them throughout an operation.

PLANNING AND THE LEVELS OF WARFARE 2-41. It is important to understand how Army planning nests with joint planning and how planning differs at the levels of warfare. The levels of warfare are a framework for defining and clarifying the relationship among national objectives, the operational approach, and tactical tasks (ADP 1-01). The three levels are strategic, operational, and tactical. There is no hard boundary between levels of warfare, nor fixed echelon responsible for a particular level.

2-42. The levels of warfare focus a headquarters on one of three broad roles—creating strategy; conducting campaigns and major operations; or sequencing battles, engagements, and actions. The levels of warfare correspond to specific levels of responsibility and planning with decisions at one level affecting other levels. They help commanders visualize a logical arrangement and synchronization of operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks to the appropriate command. Among the levels of warfare, planning horizons differ greatly.

STRATEGIC LEVEL War plans cover every aspect of a war, and weave them all into a single operation that must have a single, ultimate objective in which all particular aims are reconciled. No one starts a war—or rather, no one in his sense ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it. The former is its political purpose; the latter its operational objective.

Carl von Clausewitz

2-43. The strategic level of warfare is the level of warfare at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance, then develops and uses national resources to achieve those objectives (JP 3-0). The focus at this level is the development of strategy—a foundational idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve national and multinational objectives. The strategic level of war is primarily the province of national leadership in coordination with combatant commanders.

2-44. The National Security Council develops and recommends national security policy options for Presidential approval. The President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide their orders, intent, strategy, direction, and guidance via strategic direction to the military (Services and combatant commands) to pursue national interest. They communicate strategic direction to the military through written documents referred to as strategic guidance. Key strategic guidance documents include—

National Security Strategy of the United States. National Defense Strategy of the United States. National Military Strategy of the United States. Joint Strategic Campaign Plan. Unified Command Plan. Guidance for Employment of the Force. Global Force Management Implementation Guidance.

(See JP 5-0 for a detailed discussion of strategic direction and guidance.)

2-45. Based on strategic guidance, GCCs and staffs—with input from subordinate commands (to include the theater army) and supporting commands and agencies—update their strategic estimates and develop theater

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strategies. A theater strategy is a broad statement of a GCC’s long-term vision that bridges national strategic guidance and the joint planning required to achieve national and theater objectives. The theater strategy prioritizes the ends, ways, and means within the limitations established by the budget, global force management processes, and strategic guidance.

Note. Functional combatant commanders also follow this process within their functional areas.

OPERATIONAL LEVEL 2-46. The operational level of warfare is the level of warfare at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas (JP 3-0). Operational-level planning focuses on developing plans for campaigns and other joint operations. A campaign plan is a joint operation plan for a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic or operational objectives within a given time and space (JP 5-0). Joint force commanders (combatant commanders and their subordinate joint task force commanders) and their component commanders (Service and functional) conduct operational-level planning. Planning at the operational level requires operational art to integrate ends, ways, and means while balancing risk. Operational-level planners use operational design and the joint planning process to develop campaign plans, OPLANs, OPORDs, and supporting plans. (JP 5-0 discusses joint planning. JP 3-31 discusses operational-level planning from a land component perspective.)

2-47. The combatant command campaign plan (CCP) operationalizes the GCC’s strategy by organizing and aligning operations and activities with resources to achieve objectives in an area of responsibility. The CCP provides a framework within which the GCC conducts security cooperation activities and military engagement with regional partners. The CCP contains contingency plans that are viewed as branches within the campaign. Contingency plans identify how the command might respond in the event of a crisis. Contingency plans are often phased and have specified end states that seek to re-establish conditions favorable to the United States. Contingency plans have an identified military objective and termination criteria. They may address limited contingency operations or large-scale combat operations.

2-48. The theater army develops a support plan to the CCP. This support plan includes methods to achieve security cooperation, training and exercise programs, and ongoing Army activities within the theater including intelligence, air and missile defense, sustainment, and communications. The theater army also develops supporting plans for contingencies identified by the GCC. These include OPLANs for large-scale ground combat, noncombatant evacuation operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and other crises response activities. Theater army planners routinely develop, review, and update supporting plans to numbered OPLANs to ensure they remain feasible. This includes a review of Army force structure as well as time-phased force and deployment data.

2-49. Corps and below Army units normally conduct Army tactical planning. However, corps and divisions serving as the base headquarters for a joint task force or land component headquarters employ joint planning and develop joint formatted plans and orders. Corps or divisions receive joint formatted plans and orders when directly subordinate to a joint task force or joint land component command. It is important for these headquarters to be familiar with joint Adaptive Planning and Execution. (See CJCSM 3130.03A for joint formats for plans and orders.) Figure 2-1 illustrates the links among the levels of warfare using military actions in the Gulf War of 1991.

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Figure 2-1. Levels of warfare

TACTICAL LEVEL 2-50. The tactical level of warfare is the level of warfare at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces (JP 3-0). Tactical-level planning revolves around how best to achieve objectives and accomplish tasks assigned by higher headquarters. Planning horizons for tactical-level planning are relatively shorter than planning horizons for operational-level planning. Tactical-level planning works within the framework of an operational-level plan and is addressed in Service doctrine or, in the case of multinational operations, the lead nation’s doctrine. Army tactical planning is guided by the MDMP for units with a staff and TLP for small-units without a staff.

2-51. Operational- and tactical-level planning complement each other but have different aims. Operational- level planning involves broader dimensions of time, space, and purpose than tactical-level planning involves. Operational-level planners need to define an operational area, estimate required forces, and evaluate

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requirements. In contrast, tactical-level planning proceeds from an existing operational design. Normally, AOs are prescribed, objectives and available forces are identified, and a general sequence of activities is specified for tactical-level commanders.

OPERATIONAL ART Nothing succeeds in war except in consequence of a well prepared plan.

Napoleon Bonaparte

2-52. Operational art is the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means (JP 3-0). Operational art applies to all types and aspects of operations. It integrates ends, ways, and means while accounting for risk. Applying operational art requires commanders to answer the following questions:

What conditions, when established, constitute the desired end state (ends)? How will the force achieve these desired conditions (ways)? What sequence of actions helps attain these conditions (ways)? What resources are required to accomplish that sequence of actions (means)? What risks are associated with that sequence of actions and how can they be mitigated (risks)?

Operational art encompasses all levels of warfare. It requires creative vision, broad experience, and a knowledge of capabilities, tactics, and techniques across multiple domains. Commanders and staffs employ operational art during ADM and the MDMP.

OPERATIONAL APPROACH 2-53. It is through operational art that commanders develop and translate their operational approach—a description of the broad actions required to achieve the end state—into a concept of operations. An operational approach is the result of the commander’s visualization of what needs to be done in broad terms to solve identified problems. It is the main idea that informs detailed planning. When developing an operational approach, commanders consider ways to employ a combination of defeat mechanisms and stability mechanisms. Defeat mechanisms relate to offensive and defensive operations; stability mechanisms relate to stability operations.

2-54. Army forces use combinations of four defeat mechanisms: destroy, dislocate, disintegrate, and isolate. Destroy means to physically render an enemy force combat-ineffective until it is reconstituted. Dislocate means to employ forces to obtain a significant positional advantage, rendering the enemy’s disposition less valuable or irrelevant. Disintegrate means to disrupt the enemy’s command and control system, degrading their ability to conduct operations while leading to the enemy’s rapid collapse or will to fight. Isolate means to seal off—both physically and psychologically—an enemy from sources of support.

2-55. Applying more than one defeat mechanism simultaneously produces complementary and reinforcing effects not attainable with a single mechanism. Used individually, a defeat mechanism achieves results relative to the amount of effort expended. Using defeat mechanisms in combination creates enemy dilemmas that magnify their effects significantly. Operational art formulates the most effective, efficient way to apply defeat mechanisms. Physically defeating the enemy deprives enemy forces of the ability to achieve those aims. Temporally defeating the enemy anticipates enemy reactions and nullifies them before they can become effective. Cognitively defeating the enemy disrupts decision making and erodes the enemy’s will to fight.

2-56. As with defeat mechanisms, combinations of stability mechanisms produce complementary and reinforcing effects that accomplish the mission more effectively and efficiently than single mechanisms do alone. The four stability mechanisms are compel, control, influence, and support. Compel means to use, or threaten to use, lethal force to establish control and dominance, affect behavioral change, or enforce compliance with mandates, agreements, or civil authority. Control involves imposing civil order. Influence means to alter the opinions, attitudes, and ultimately the behavior of foreign friendly, neutral, adversary, and enemy audiences through messages, presence, and actions. Support establishes, reinforces, or sets conditions necessary for the instruments of national power to function effectively.

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ELEMENTS OF OPERATIONAL ART 2-57. In applying operational art, commanders and their staffs use a set of intellectual tools known as the elements of operational art. These tools help commanders understand, visualize, and describe operations and help to formulate their commander’s intent and planning guidance to include the operational approach. Commanders may use these tools in any operation; however, their application is broadest in the context of long-term operations.

2-58. Not all elements of operational art apply at all levels of warfare. A battalion commander may be concerned about the tempo of an upcoming operation but is probably not concerned with an enemy’s center of gravity. A corps commander may consider all elements of operational art in developing a plan. The application of specific elements of operational art depends on the situation and echelon.

End State and Conditions 2-59. A central aspect of planning is determining the operation’s end state. The end state is the set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander’s objectives (JP 3-0). A condition is a reflection of the existing state of an OE. Thus, a desired condition is a sought-after change to an OE. Since every operation should focus on a clearly defined and attainable end state, accurately describing conditions that represent success is important.

2-60. Commanders explicitly describe end state conditions in their planning guidance to shape the development of an operational approach and COAs. Commanders summarize the operation’s end state in their commander’s intent. A clearly defined end state promotes unity of effort, facilitates integration and synchronization of the force, and guides subordinate initiative during execution.

2-61. Commanders ensure their end state is nested with their higher headquarters’ end state and the overall end state for the joint operation. Subordinate operations within the larger plan often have an end state for that particular operation. In these instances commanders often address conditions for transition beyond the current operation to facilitate follow-on operations or an exploitation.

Centers of Gravity For Alexander, Gustavus Adolphus, Charles XII, and Frederick the Great, the center of gravity was their army. If the army had been destroyed, they would all have gone down in history as failures.

Carl von Clausewitz

2-62. A center of gravity is the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act (JP 5-0). The loss of a center of gravity can ultimately result in defeat. Centers of gravity are not limited to military forces and can be either physical or moral. Physical centers of gravity, such as a capital city or military force, are tangible and typically easier to identify, assess, and target than moral centers of gravity. Forces can often influence physical centers of gravity solely by military means. In contrast, moral centers of gravity are intangible and more difficult to influence; they exist in the cognitive dimension of an information environment. They can include a charismatic leader, powerful ruling elite, or the will of a population.

2-63. As an element of operational art, a center of gravity analysis helps commanders and staffs understand friendly and enemy sources of strength and weakness. This understanding helps to determine ways to undermine enemy strengths by exploiting enemy vulnerabilities while protecting friendly vulnerabilities from enemies attempting to do the same. Understanding friendly and enemy centers of gravity helps the commander and staffs identify decisive points and determine an operational approach to achieve the end state. (See JP 5-0 for more detailed discussions of center of gravity analysis.)

Elements of operational art

End state and conditions Centers of gravity Decisive points Lines of operations and lines

of effort Tempo Phasing and transitions Operational reach Culmination Basing Risk

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Decisive Points 2-64. A decisive point is a geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy or contribute materially to achieving success (JP 5-0). Identifying decisive points helps commanders to select clear, conclusive, attainable objectives that directly contribute to achieving the end state. Geographic decisive points can include port facilities, distribution networks and nodes, and bases of operation. Specific events and elements of an enemy force may also be decisive points. Examples of such events include commitment of an enemy operational reserve and reopening a major oil refinery.

2-65. A common characteristic of decisive points is their importance to a center of gravity. Decisive points are not centers of gravity; they are key to attacking or protecting centers of gravity. A decisive point’s importance may cause the enemy to commit significant resources to defend it. The loss of a decisive point weakens a center of gravity and may expose more decisive points, eventually leading to an attack on the center of gravity itself.

2-66. Generally, more decisive points exist in a given operational area than available forces and capabilities can attack, seize, retain, control, or protect. Accordingly, planners study and analyze decisive points and determine which offer the best opportunity to attack the enemy’s center of gravity, extend friendly operational reach, or enable the application of friendly forces and capabilities. The art of planning includes selecting decisive points that best lead to establishing end state conditions in a sequence that most quickly and efficiently leads to mission success.

2-67. Decisive points identified for action become objectives. An objective can be physical (an enemy force or a terrain feature) or conceptual as a goal (established rule of law). In the physical sense, an objective is a location on the ground used to orient operations, phase operations, facilitate changes of direction, and provide for unity of effort. In the conceptual sense, an objective is the clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which an operation is directed (JP 5-0). Objectives provide the basis for determining tasks to subordinate units. The most important objective forms the basis for developing the decisive operation. Combined with end state conditions, objectives form the building blocks for developing lines of operations and lines of effort.

Lines of Operations and Lines of Effort If the art of war consists in bringing into action upon the decisive point of the theater of operations the greatest possible force, the choice of the line of operations, being the primary means of attaining this end, may be regarded as the fundamental idea in a good plan of a campaign.

Antoine Henri de Jomini

2-68. Lines of operations and lines of effort link objectives in time, space, and purpose to achieve end state conditions as shown in figure 2-2. A line of operations links a base of operations to physical objectives which links to end state conditions. Lines of effort link tasks with goal-oriented objectives that focus toward establishing end state conditions. Commanders describe an operation along lines of operations, lines of effort, or a combination of both in their operational approach. Commanders may designate one line as decisive and others as shaping.

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Figure 2-2. Sample line of operations and line of effort

2-69. A line of operations is a line that defines the directional orientation of a force in time and space in relation to the enemy and links the force with its base of operations and objectives (ADP 3-0). Lines of operations connect a series of intermediate objectives that lead to control of a geographic or force-oriented objective. Operations designed using lines of operations generally consist of a series of actions executed according to a well-defined sequence.

2-70. Lines of operations can be categorized as interior and exterior. The choice of using interior or exterior lines supports a concept based on the length of movement and the supporting lines of sustainment. Staffs choose interior lines based on the fact that lines of movement and sustainment within an enclosed area are shorter than those lines outside the enclosed area. Interior lines are lines on which a force operates when its operations diverge from a central point. Interior lines allow commanders to move quickly against enemy forces along shorter lines of operations.

2-71. Exterior lines are lines on which a force operates when its operations converge on the enemy. This requires the attacking force to be stronger or more mobile than the enemy. Exterior lines allow commanders to concentrate forces against multiple positions on the ground, thus presenting multiple dilemmas to the enemy. Exterior lines facilitate seizing opportunities to encircle and destroy the weaker or less mobile enemy. While commanders operating on interior lines have the opportunity to set the width of the battlefield, commanders operating on exterior lines have set the disposition of their force to deploy them outside their boundaries.

2-72. A line of effort is a line that links multiple tasks using the logic of purpose rather than geographical reference to focus efforts toward establishing a desired end state (ADP 3-0). Lines of effort are essential to long-term planning when positional references to an enemy or adversary have little relevance. In operations involving many nonmilitary factors, lines of effort may be the only way to link tasks to the end state. Lines of effort often enable commanders to visualize how military capabilities can support the other instruments of national power.

Tempo 2-73. Commanders and staff consider tempo both when planning and executing operations. Tempo is the relative speed and rhythm of military operations over time with respect to the enemy (ADP 3-0). It reflects the rate of military action. Controlling tempo helps commanders keep the initiative during combat operations or rapidly establish a sense of normalcy during humanitarian crises. During large-scale ground combat, commanders seek to maintain a higher tempo than the enemy does; a rapid tempo can overwhelm an enemy’s ability to counter friendly actions. During other operations dominated by stability operations tasks, commanders act quickly to control events and deny the enemy positions of advantage. By acting faster than the situation deteriorates, commanders can change the dynamics of a crisis and restore stability.

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2-74. Several factors affect tempo including the friendly force’s status, composition, and mobility. Terrain and weather are other factors. Planning also can accelerate tempo by anticipating decisions and actions in advance. This emphasis on increased tempo, while a guiding principle, is not an unbending rule. Commanders weigh the advantages of acting more quickly against the advantages of preparing more thoroughly.

Phasing and Transitions 2-75. Planning determines the sequence of actions—including the phases and transitions—that best accomplishes the mission. Ideally, commanders plan to accomplish a mission with simultaneous actions throughout the AO. However, operational reach, resource constraints, and the size of the friendly force limits what units can do at one time. In these cases, commanders phase operations. Phasing provides a way to view and conduct operations in manageable parts.

2-76. A phase is a planning and execution tool used to divide an operation in duration or activity (ADP 3-0). Within a phase, a large portion of the force executes similar or mutually supporting activities. Achieving a specified condition or set of conditions typically marks the end of a phase. No standard phasing model exists for Army operations. Commanders phase operations as required by the specific circumstances of the problem they are trying to solve.

2-77. A change in phase usually involves a change of mission, task organization, or rules of engagement. Phasing helps in planning and controlling operations during execution. Phasing may be indicated by time, distance, terrain, or an event. Well-designed phases—

Focus effort. Concentrate combat power in time and space at a decisive point.

2-78. Transitions mark a change of focus between phases or between the ongoing operation and execution of a branch or sequel. Shifting priorities among the offense, defense, and stability also involves transitions. Transitions require planning and preparation so the force can maintain the initiative and tempo of operations. Forces are vulnerable during transitions, so commanders establish clear conditions for their execution. Planning identifies potential transitions and accounts for them throughout execution. Effective commanders consider the time required to plan for and execute transitions. Assessment helps commanders measure progress toward such transitions and take appropriate actions to execute them.

Operational Reach 2-79. While planning operations, it is critical to consider operational reach—the distance and duration across which a force can successfully employ military capabilities (JP 3-0). The concept of operational reach is inextricably tied to the concept of basing and lines of operations. Although geography may constrain or limit reach, units may extend reach by forward positioning capabilities and resources (such as long-range fires) and leveraging host-nation support. Commanders and staffs consider ways to increase their operational reach in each warfighting function to include leveraging joint and multinational capabilities across all domains. For example, requesting and integrating joint intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance in combination with joint fires can significantly increase the unit’s operational reach. This requires commanders and staffs to understand and interface with joint planning and processes such as the joint targeting cycle. Commanders and staffs also consider phasing operations based on operational reach.

Culmination 2-80. The limit of a unit’s operational reach is its culminating point. The culminating point is the point at which a force no longer has the capability to continue its form of operations, offense or defense (JP 5-0). Culmination represents a crucial shift in relative combat power. It is relevant to both attackers and defenders at each level of warfare. While conducting offensive tasks, the culminating point occurs when the force cannot continue the attack and must assume a defensive posture or execute an operational pause. While conducting defensive tasks, it occurs when the force can no longer defend itself and must withdraw or risk destruction. The culminating point is more difficult to identify when Army forces conduct stability tasks. Two conditions can result in culmination: units being too dispersed to achieve security and units lacking required resources to achieve the end state.

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Basing 2-81. Basing is an indispensable part of operational art and linked to lines of operations and operational reach. Determining the location and sequence of establishing bases and base camps is essential for projecting power and sustaining the force. Basing may be joint or single Service and will routinely support both U.S. and multinational forces as well as interagency partners. Commanders designate a specific area as a base or base camp and assign responsibility to a single commander for protection, terrain management, and day-to- day operations. (See JP 3-34 and ATP 3-37.10 for more information on basing, bases, and base camps.)

Risk It is my experience that bold decisions give the best promise of success. But one must differentiate between strategical or tactical boldness and a military gamble. A bold operation is one in which success is not a certainty but which in case of failure leaves one with sufficient forces in hand to cope with whatever situation may arise. A gamble, on the other hand, is an operation which can lead either to victory or to the complete destruction of one’s force.

Field Marshal Erwin Rommel

2-82. Risk, uncertainty, and chance are inherent in all military operations. Success during operations depends on a willingness to identify, mitigate, and accept risk to create opportunities. When considering how much risk to accept with a COA, commanders consider risk to the force and risk to the mission. Commanders need to balance the tension between protecting the force, and accepting risks that must be taken to accomplish their mission. They apply judgment with regard to the importance of an objective, time available, and anticipated cost.

2-83. Mission command requires that commanders and subordinates accept risk, exercise initiative, and act decisively, even when the outcome is uncertain. Commanders focus on creating opportunities rather than simply preventing defeat—even when preventing defeat appears safer. Reasonably estimating and intentionally accepting risk is not gambling. Gambling is making a decision in which the commander risks the force without a reasonable level of information about the outcome. Therefore, commanders avoid gambles. Commanders carefully determine risks, analyze and minimize as many hazards as possible, and then accept risk to accomplish the mission.

2-84. Inadequate planning and preparation puts forces at risk, as does delaying action while waiting for perfect intelligence and synchronization. Reasonably estimating and intentionally accepting risk is fundamental to successful operations. Experienced commanders balance audacity and imagination against risk and uncertainty to strike in a manner, place, and time unexpected by enemy forces. This is the essence of surprise. Planning should identify risks to mission accomplishment. Part of developing an operational approach includes answering the question, “What is the chance of failure or unacceptable consequences in employing the operational approach?” Risks range from resource shortfalls to an approach that alienates a population. Identified risks are communicated to higher headquarters, and risk mitigation guidance is provided in the commander’s planning guidance.

INTEGRATED PLANNING 2-85. Planning activities occupy a continuum ranging from conceptual to detailed as shown in figure 2-3 on page 2-16. Understanding an OE and its problems, determining the operation’s end state, establishing objectives, and sequencing the operation in broad terms all illustrate conceptual planning. Conceptual planning generally corresponds to the art of operations and is the focus of a commander with staff support. The commander’s activities of understanding and visualizing are key aspects of conceptual planning.

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Figure 2-3. Integrated planning

2-86. Detailed planning translates the broad operational approach into a complete and practical plan. Generally, detailed planning is associated with aspects of science, such as movement tables, fuel consumption, target list, weapon effects, and time-distance factors. Detailed planning falls under the purview of the staff, focusing on specifics of execution. Detailed planning works out the scheduling, coordination, or technical problems involved with moving, sustaining, synchronizing, and directing the force. Detailed planning does not mean developing plans with excessive control measures that impede subordinate freedom of action. Planners develop mission orders that establish those controls necessary to coordinate and synchronize the force as a whole. They leave much of the how to accomplish tasks to the subordinate.

2-87. The commander personally leads the conceptual component of planning. While they are engaged in parts of detailed planning, commanders leave most specifics to the staff. Conceptual planning provides the basis for all subsequent planning. The commander’s intent and operational approach provide the framework for the entire plan. This framework leads to a concept of operations and associated schemes of support, such as schemes of intelligence, maneuver, fires, protection, and sustainment. In turn, the schemes of support lead to the specifics of execution, including tasks to subordinate units and detailed annexes to the OPLAN or OPORD. However, the dynamic does not operate in only one direction. Conceptual planning must respond to detailed constraints. For example, the realities of a deployment schedule (a detailed concern) influence the operational approach (a conceptual concern).

2-88. Successful planning requires the integration of both conceptual and detailed thinking. Army leaders employ several methodologies for planning, determining the appropriate mix based on the scope of the problem, time available, and availability of a staff. Planning methodologies include—

Army design methodology. The military decision-making process. Troop leading procedures. Rapid decision-making and synchronization process. Army problem solving.

ARMY DESIGN METHODOLOGY 2-89. Army design methodology is a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe problems and approaches to solving them. ADM is particularly useful as an aid to conceptual planning, but it must be integrated with the detailed planning typically

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associated with the MDMP to produce executable plans and orders. There is no one way or prescribed set of steps to employ the ADM. There are, however, several activities associated with ADM including framing an OE, framing problems, developing an operational approach, and reframing when necessary as shown in figure 2-4. While planners complete some activities before others, the understanding and learning within one activity may require revisiting the learning from another activity. Thus, ADM is iterative in nature.

Figure 2-4. Activities of Army design methodology

2-90. When problems are difficult to identify, the operation’s end state is unclear, or a COA is not self- evident, commanders employ ADM. This is often the case when developing long-range plans for extended operation or developing supporting plans to the CCP and associated contingencies. The results of ADM include an understanding of an OE and problem, the initial commander’s intent, and an operational approach that serves as the link between conceptual and detailed planning. Based on their understanding and learning gained during ADM, commanders issue planning guidance—to include an operational approach—to guide more detailed planning using the MDMP. (See ATP 5-0.1 for techniques for employing ADM.)

2-91. ADM includes interconnected thinking activities that aid in conceptual planning. By first framing an OE and its associated problems, ADM helps commanders and staffs to think about the situation in depth. This in-depth thinking enables them to develop a more informed approach to solve or manage identified problems. During execution, ADM supports organizational learning through reframing. A reframe is a shift in understanding that leads to a new perspective on the problem or its resolution. Reframing is the activity of revisiting earlier hypotheses, conclusions, and decisions that underpin the current operational approach. In essence, reframing reviews what the commander and staff believe they understand about an OE, the problem, and the desired end state.

THE MILITARY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 2-92. The military decision-making process is an iterative planning methodology to understand the situation and mission, develop a course of action, and produce an operation plan or order. It is an orderly, analytical process that integrates the activities of the commander, staff, and subordinate headquarters in the development of a plan or order. The MDMP helps leaders apply thoroughness, clarity, sound

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judgement, logic, and professional knowledge to develop situational understanding and produce a plan or order that best accomplishes the mission.

2-93. The MDMP consists of seven steps. Each step of the MDMP has inputs, a series of sub-steps, and outputs. The outputs lead to an increased understanding of the situation facilitating the next step of the MDMP. Commanders and staffs generally perform these steps sequentially; however, before producing the plan or order, they may revisit several steps in an iterative fashion as they learn more about the situation. The seven steps are—

Step 1 – Receipt of mission. Step 2 – Mission analysis. Step 3 – COA development. Step 4 – COA analysis. Step 5 – COA comparison. Step 6 – COA approval. Step 7 – Orders production, dissemination, and transition.

2-94. Commanders initiate the MDMP upon receipt of, or in anticipation of, a mission. Commanders and staffs often begin planning in the absence of an approved higher headquarters’ OPLAN or OPORD. In these instances, they start planning based on a warning order (WARNORD), a planning order, or an alert order from higher headquarters. This requires active collaboration with the higher headquarters and parallel planning among echelons as the plan or order is developed. (See FM 6-0 for detailed instructions for conducting the MDMP.)

TROOP LEADING PROCEDURES 2-95. The MDMP and TLP are similar but not identical. Troop leading procedures are a dynamic process used by small-unit leaders to analyze a mission, develop a plan, and prepare for an operation. TLP extend the MDMP to the small-unit level. Commanders with a coordinating staff use the MDMP as their primary planning process. Company-level and smaller units lack formal staffs and use TLP to plan and prepare for operations. This places the responsibility for planning primarily on the commander or small-unit leader with assistance from forward observers, supply sergeants, and other specialists in the unit.

2-96. TLP enable small-unit leaders to maximize available planning time while developing effective plans and preparing their units for an operation. TLP consist of eight steps. The sequence of the steps of TLP is not rigid. Leaders modify the sequence to meet the mission, situation, and available time. Leaders may perform some steps concurrently while performing other steps continuously throughout the operation. The eight steps are—

Step 1 – Receive the mission. Step 2 – Issue a warning order. Step 3 – Make a tentative plan. Step 4 – Initiate movement. Step 5 – Conduct reconnaissance. Step 6 – Complete the plan. Step 7 – Issue the order. Step 8 – Supervise and refine.

2-97. Leaders use TLP when working alone or with a small group to solve tactical problems. For example, a company commander may use the executive officer, first sergeant, fire support officer, supply sergeant, and communications sergeant to assist during TLP. (See FM 6-0 for a detailed discussion on conducting TLP.)

RAPID DECISION-MAKING AND SYNCHRONIZATION PROCESS 2-98. The rapid decision-making and synchronization process (RDSP) is a decision-making and planning technique that commanders and staffs commonly use during execution when available planning time is limited. While the MDMP seeks an optimal solution, the RDSP seeks a timely and effective solution within the commander’s intent. Using the RDSP lets leaders avoid the time-consuming requirements of developing

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decision criteria and multiple COAs. Under the RDSP, leaders combine their experiences and intuition to quickly understand the situation and develop a COA. The RDSP is based on an existing order and the commander’s priorities as expressed in the order. The RDSP includes five steps:

Step 1 – Compare the current situation to the order. Step 2 – Determine that a decision, and what type, is required. Step 3 – Develop a course of action. Step 4 – Refine and validate the course of action. Step 5 – Issue the implement the order.

(See chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion decision making during execution and the RDSP.)

ARMY PROBLEM SOLVING 2-99. The ability to recognize and effectively solve problems is an essential skill for Army leaders. Where the previous methodologies are designed for planning operations, Army problem solving is a methodology available for leaders in identifying and solving a variety of problems. Similar in logic to the MDMP, Army problem solving is an analytical approach to defining a problem, developing possible solutions to solve the problem, arriving at the best solution, developing a plan, and implementing that plan to solve the problem. The steps to Army problem solving are—

Step 1 – Gather information. Step 2 – Identify the problem. Step 3 – Develop criteria. Step 4 – Generate possible solutions. Step 4 – Analyze possible solutions. Step 6 – Compare possible solutions. Step 7 – Make and implement the decision.

(See FM 6-0 for a detailed discussion of Army problem solving.)

KEY COMPONENTS OF A PLAN An order should not trespass on the province of a subordinate. It should contain everything which is beyond the independent authority of the subordinate, but nothing more.

Field Service Regulations (1905)

2-100. The mission statement, commander’s intent, and concept of operations are key components of a plan that serve as the framework for an operation. Commanders ensure their mission and commander’s intent nest with those of their higher headquarters. While the commander’s intent focuses on the end state, the concept of operations focuses on the way or sequence of actions by which the force will achieve the end state. The concept of operations expands on the mission statement and commander’s intent. Within the concept of operations, commanders establish objectives as intermediate goals toward achieving the operation’s end state.

MISSION STATEMENT 2-101. The mission is the task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefore (JP 3-0). Commanders analyze a mission based on their higher commander’s intent, specified tasks, and implied tasks. Results of that analysis yield the essential task—the task that when executed accomplishes the mission. The essential task becomes the “what” of the mission statement—a clear statement of the action to be taken and the reason for taking it. The five elements of a mission statement answer these questions:

Who will execute the operation (unit or organization)? What is the unit’s essential task (normally a tactical mission task or tactical enabling task)? Where will the operation occur (AO, objective, engagement areas, or grid coordinates)? When will the operation begin (by time or event)? Why will the force conduct the operation (for what purpose)?

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2-102. The “who,” “where,” and “when” of a mission statement are straightforward. The “what” and “why” are more challenging to write and can confuse subordinates if not stated clearly. The “what” is a task and is expressed in terms of action verbs. (See ADP 3-90 for a list of tactical mission tasks.) These tasks are defined and measurable and can be grouped as “actions by friendly forces” or “effects on enemy forces.” The “why” puts the task into context by describing the reason for performing it. The mission’s purpose facilitates initiative in changing circumstances.

COMMANDER’S INTENT 2-103. The commander’s intent succinctly describes what constitutes success for the operation. It includes the operation’s purpose, key tasks, and conditions that define the end state. When describing the purpose of the operation, the commander’s intent does not restate the “why” of the mission statement. Rather, it describes the broader purpose of the unit’s operation in relationship to the higher commander’s intent and concept of operations.

2-104. Key tasks are those activities the force must perform as a whole to achieve the desired end state (ADP 6-0). During execution—when significant opportunities present themselves or the concept of operations no longer fits the situation—subordinates use key tasks to keep their efforts focused on achieving the desired end state. Examples of key tasks include terrain the force must control or an effect the force must have on the enemy.

2-105. The end state is a set of desired future conditions the commander wants to exist when an operation ends. Commanders describe the operation’s end state by stating the desired conditions of the friendly force in relationship to desired conditions of the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations. A clearly defined end state promotes unity of effort among the force and with unified action partners.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 2-106. The concept of operations is a statement that directs the manner in which subordinate units cooperate to accomplish the mission and establishes the sequence of actions the force will use to achieve the end state. The concept of operations describes how the commander sees the actions of subordinate units fitting together to accomplish the mission. At a minimum, it includes a scheme of maneuver and scheme of fires. Where the commander’s intent focuses on the end state, the concept of operations focuses on the method by which the operation uses and synchronizes the warfighting functions to translate the vision and end state into action.

2-107. The concept of operations describes the combination of offensive, defensive, or stability operations and how these tasks complement each other. It describes the deep, close, support, and consolidation areas; decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations within those areas; and main and supporting efforts.

2-108. In developing the concept of operations, commanders and staffs ensure their concepts nest with that of their higher headquarters. Nested concepts is a planning technique to achieve unity of purpose whereby each succeeding echelon’s concept of operations is aligned by purpose with the higher echelons’ concept of operations. An effective concept of operations describes how the forces will support a mission of the higher headquarters and how the actions of subordinate units fit together to accomplish a mission.

2-109. The operations overlay—part of Annex C (Operations) to an OPLAN or OPORD—supplements the concept of operations by depicting graphic control measures used to direct operations. A graphic control measure is a symbol used on maps and displays to regulate forces and warfighting functions (ADP 6-0). Graphic control measures include symbols for boundaries, fire support coordination measures, some airspace control measures, air defense areas, and obstacles. Commanders establish them to regulate maneuver, movement, airspace use, fires, and other aspects of operations. (See ADP 1-02 for instructions depicting graphic control measures.)

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GUIDES TO EFFECTIVE PLANNING Now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought.

Sun Tzu

2-110. Planning is an inherent and fundamental part of command and control, and commanders are the single most important factor in effective planning. Effective planning requires dedication, study, and practice. Planners must be technically and tactically competent within their areas of expertise and understand basic planning concepts. The following aids in effective planning:

Incorporate the tenets of unified land operations. Commanders focus planning. Develop simple, flexible plans through mission orders. Optimize available planning time. Focus on the right planning horizon. Determine relevant facts and develop assumptions.

INCORPORATE THE TENETS OF UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS 2-111. Tenets of operations are desirable attributes that should be built into all plans and operations and are directly related to the Army’s operational concept (ADP 1-01). Tenets of unified land operations describe the Army’s approach to generating and applying combat power across the range of military operations. Commanders and staffs consider and incorporate the following tenets into all plans:

Simultaneity. Depth. Synchronization. Flexibility.

Simultaneity 2-112. Simultaneity is the execution of related and mutually supporting tasks at the same time across multiple locations and domains (ADP 3-0). Army forces employing capabilities simultaneously across the air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains present dilemmas to adversaries and enemies, while reassuring allies and influencing neutrals. Planners consider the simultaneous application of joint and combined arms capabilities across the range of military operations to overwhelm threats physically and psychologically.

2-113. Simultaneous operations across multiple domains—conducted in depth and supported by military deception—present the enemy with multiple dilemmas. These operations degrade enemy freedom of action, reduce enemy flexibility and endurance, and disrupt enemy plans and coordination. Such operations place critical enemy functions at risk and deny the enemy the ability to synchronize or generate combat power. The application of capabilities in a complementary and reinforcing fashion creates more problems than the enemy commander can solve, which erodes both enemy effectiveness and the will to fight.

Depth 2-114. Depth is the extension of operations in time, space, or purpose to achieve definitive results (ADP 3-0). Commanders use depth to obtain space for effective maneuver, time to conduct operations, and resources to achieve and exploit success. Planners develop ways for forces to engage the enemy throughout their depth, preventing the effective employment of reserves, and disrupting command and control, logistics, and other capabilities not in direct contact with friendly forces. Operations in depth can disrupt the enemy’s decision cycle. They contribute to protection by destroying enemy capabilities before the enemy can use them. In operations, staying power—depth of action—comes from adequate resources. Depth of resources in quantity, positioning, and mobility is critical to executing operations.

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Synchronization 2-115. Synchronization is the arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time (JP 2-0). Synchronization is not the same as simultaneity; it is the ability to execute multiple related and mutually supporting tasks in different locations at the same time. These actions produce greater effects than executing each in isolation. For example, synchronizing information collection, obstacles, direct fires, and indirect fires results in destroying an enemy formation during a defense. When conducting offensive tasks, synchronizing forces along multiple lines of operations temporarily disrupts the enemy organization and creates opportunities for an exploitation.

2-116. Commanders determine the degree of control necessary to synchronize their operations. They balance synchronization with agility and initiative, never surrendering the initiative for the sake of synchronization. Excessive synchronization can lead to too much control, which limits the initiative of subordinates and undermines flexibility.

Flexibility 2-117. Flexibility is the employment of a versatile mix of capabilities, formations, and equipment for conducting operations (ADP 3-0). To achieve tactical, operational, and strategic success, effective commanders adapt to conditions as they change and employ forces in multiple ways. Flexibility facilitates collaborative planning and decentralized execution. Leaders learn from experience (their own and that of others) and apply new knowledge to each situation. Flexible plans help units adapt quickly to changing circumstances during operations. Flexible plans provide options to commanders for addressing new or unforeseen circumstances during execution. Ultimately, flexibility enables commanders to mitigate risk.

Tenets in Action: OPERATION JUST CAUSE

Late on 19 December 1989, a joint force of 7,000 Soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines deployed from U.S. bases bound for Panama. During the early morning hours of 20 December, this force—supported by the United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) forward-deployed forces in Panama—simultaneously hit targets at 26 separate locations across the depth of the country.

The success of the attack against key Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) strongholds required the synchronization of multiple actions by an assortment of U.S. special operations forces and elements from the 82d Airborne Division, the 5th Mechanized Division, the 7th Infantry Divisions, and Marine Corps. These were supported by the Air Force and Navy in various ways, including airlift and sealift, suppression of enemy air defense, and AC-130 gunship strikes. Subordinate initiative during execution contributed greatly to the ability of the joint force to rapidly paralyze PDF response capability.

COMMANDERS FOCUS PLANNING 2-118. The responsibility for planning is inherent in command. Commanders are planners—they are the central figure to effective planning. Often with the most experience, commanders are ultimately responsible for the execution of the plan. As such, the plan must reflect how commanders intend to conduct operations. Commanders ensure the approaches to planning meet the requirements of time, planning horizons, level of detail, and desired outcomes. Commanders ensure that all plans and orders comply with domestic and international laws as well as the Army Ethic. They confirm that the plan or order is relevant and suitable for subordinates. Generally, the more involved commanders are in planning, the faster staffs can plan. Through personal involvement, commanders learn from the staff and others about a situation and ensure the plan reflects their commander’s intent.

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DEVELOP SIMPLE, FLEXIBLE PLANS THROUGH MISSION ORDERS It is my opinion that Army orders should not exceed a page and a half of typewritten text and it was my practice not to issue orders longer than this. Usually they can be done on one page, and the back of the page used for a sketch map.

General George S. Patton, Jr.

2-119. Simplicity—prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and clear, concise orders to ensure thorough understanding—is a principle of war. Effective plans and orders are simple and direct. Staffs prepare clear, concise orders that communicate understanding of the operation by using doctrinally correct military terms and symbols. Using the correct terms and symbols minimizes chances of misunderstanding and aids with brevity. Developing shorter plans helps maintain simplicity. Shorter plans are easier to disseminate, read, and remember.

2-120. Complex plans requiring intricate coordination or having inflexible timelines have a greater potential to fail during execution. Operations are always subject to friction beyond the control of commanders and staffs. Elaborate or complex plans that do not incorporate tolerances for friction have more chances of something irrevocable going wrong. Simple plans are more responsive to changes in enemy behavior, the weather, and issues with friendly forces.

2-121. Simple plans require an easily understood concept of operations. Planners promote simplicity by minimizing details where possible and by limiting the actions or tasks to what the situation requires. Subordinates can then develop specifics within the commander’s intent. For example, instead of assigning a direction of attack, planners can designate an axis of advance.

2-122. Simple plans are not simplistic plans. Simplistic refers to something made overly simple by ignoring the situation’s complexity. Good plans simplify complicated situations. However, some situations require more complex plans than others do. Commanders at all levels weigh the apparent benefits of a complex concept of operations against the risk that subordinates will be unable to understand or follow it. Commanders prefer simple plans because units can understand and execute them more easily.

2-123. Flexible plans help units adapt quickly to changing circumstances. Commanders and planners build opportunities for initiative into plans by anticipating events. This allows them to operate inside of the enemy’s decision cycle or to react promptly to deteriorating situations. Incorporating options to reduce risk adds flexibility to a plan. Identifying decision points and designing branches and sequels ahead of time—combined with a clear commander’s intent—helps create flexible plans.

2-124. Commanders stress the importance of using mission orders as a way of building simple, flexible plans. Mission orders are directives that emphasize to subordinates the results to be attained, not how they are to achieve them (ADP 6-0). Mission orders are not a specific type of order but a reflected style or technique for writing OPLANs, OPORDs, and FRAGORDs. In developing mission orders, commanders focus subordinates on what to do and why to do it without prescribing exactly how to do it. Commanders establish control measures to aid cooperation among forces without imposing needless restrictions on freedom of action.

2-125. Mission orders clearly convey the unit’s mission and commander’s intent. They summarize the situation, describe the operation’s objectives and end state, and provide a simple concept of operations to accomplish the mission. When assigning tasks to subordinate units, mission orders include all components of a task statement: who, what, when, where, and why. However, a task statement emphasizes the purpose (why) of the tasks to guide (along with the commander’s intent) subordinate initiative.

2-126. Mission orders contain the proper level of detail; they are neither so detailed that they stifle initiative nor so general that they provide insufficient direction. The proper level of detail is situationally dependent. Some phases of operations require tighter control over subordinate elements than others require. An air assault’s air movement and landing phases, for example, require precise synchronization. Its ground maneuver plan requires less detail. As a rule, the base plan or order contains only the specific information required to provide the guidance to synchronize combat power at the decisive time and place while allowing subordinates as much freedom of action as possible. Commanders rely on subordinate initiative and coordination to act within the commander’s intent and concept of operations.

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OPTIMIZE AVAILABLE PLANNING TIME You can ask me for anything you like, except for time.

Napoleon Bonaparte

2-127. Time is a critical variable in all operations. Therefore, time management is important in planning. Whether done deliberately or rapidly, all planning requires the skillful use of available time to optimize planning and preparation throughout the unit. Taking more time to plan often results in greater synchronization; however, any delay in execution risks yielding the initiative—with more time to prepare and act—to the enemy.

2-128. When allocating planning time to staffs, commanders ensure subordinates have enough time to plan and prepare their own actions prior to execution. Commanders follow the “one-third, two-thirds rule” as a guide to allocate time available. They use one-third of the time available before execution for their own planning and allocate the remaining two-thirds of the time available before execution to their subordinates for planning and preparation.

2-129. Both collaborative planning and parallel planning help optimize available planning time. Collaborative planning is two or more echelons planning together in real time, sharing information, perceptions, and ideas to develop their respective plans simultaneously. This type of planning speeds planning efforts as organizations share their understanding of the situation, participate in COA development and decision making together, and develop their respective plans or orders as opposed to waiting for a higher echelon to complete the plan prior to beginning planning.

2-130. Parallel planning is two or more echelons planning for the same operations nearly simultaneously facilitated by the use of warning orders by the higher headquarters. In this type of planning, several echelons developing their plans in parallel significantly shorten planning time across the force. The higher headquarters shares information concerning future operations with subordinate units through WARNORDs and other means. Frequent communication between commanders and staffs and sharing of information (such as IPB products) help subordinate headquarters plan. Parallel planning is used when time is of the essence and the likelihood of execution of the plan is high.

2-131. Commanders are careful not to burden subordinates with planning requirements too far into the future, instead enabling subordinates to focus on execution. Generally, the higher the headquarters, the more time and resources staff have available to plan and explore options. Higher headquarters involve subordinates with developing those plans and concepts that have the highest likelihood of being adopted.

FOCUS ON THE RIGHT PLANNING HORIZON The process of preparing combat orders varies widely to the situation. Days or weeks may be devoted to the task by the commander and his staff. On the other hand, instant action may be called for especially in the division and lower units. The commander and his staff must be able to adapt their procedure to any situation encountered.

FM 101-5, Staff Officers Field Manual (1940)

2-132. The defining challenges to effective planning are uncertainty and time. Tension exists when commanders determine how far ahead to plan effectively without preparation and coordination becoming irrelevant. Planning too far into the future may overwhelm the capabilities of planning staffs, especially subordinate staffs. Not planning far enough ahead may result in losing the initiative and being unprepared. Understanding this tension is key to ensuring that the command focuses on the right planning horizon.

2-133. A planning horizon is a point in time commanders use to focus the organization’s planning efforts to shape future events. Planning horizons may be measured in weeks or months or in hours and days depending on the echelon and situation. Organizations often plan simultaneously in several different horizons, especially division and above. To guide their planning efforts, commanders use three planning horizons—short-range, mid-range, and long-range.

2-134. The range of planning directly correlates with the certainty commanders have of attaining the end state. Short-range planning is conducted under conditions of relative certainty when commanders believe

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they can reasonably forecast events, assign resources, and commit to a particular plan. Short-range planning normally results in an OPORD or FRAGORD for execution. In conditions of moderate certainty, mid-range planning focuses on developing several options to the base plan normally resulting in a branch plan or sequel. Beyond the mid-term planning horizon, the situation is often too uncertain to develop detailed operational plans. Instead, commanders develop broad concepts (for example, an OPLAN in concept form) addressing a number of different circumstances over a longer period. These plans vary in level of detail based on assumptions about the future that address “what if?” scenarios.

Note. In addition to planning horizons, commanders also prioritize planning efforts using conceptual focus areas such as a line of effort, a specific objective, or problem set.

DETERMINE RELEVANT FACTS AND DEVELOP ASSUMPTIONS Since all information and assumptions are open to doubt, and with chance at work everywhere, the commander continually finds that things are not as he expected. This is bound to influence his plans, or at least the assumptions underlying them.

Carl von Clausewitz

2-135. Commanders and staffs gather key facts and develop assumptions as they build their plan. A fact is something known to exist or have happened—a statement known to be true. Facts concerning the operational and mission variables serve as the basis for developing situational understanding during planning. When listing facts, planners are careful they are directly relevant to a COA or help commanders make a decision. Any captured, recorded, and most importantly briefed fact must add value to the planning conversation.

2-136. An assumption provides a supposition about the current situation or future course of events, presumed to be true in the absence of facts. Assumptions must be valid (logical and realistic) and necessary for planning to continue. Assumptions address gaps in knowledge that are critical for the planning process to continue. Staffs continually review assumptions to ensure validity and to challenge if they appear unrealistic.

2-137. Commanders and staffs use care with assumptions to ensure they are not based on preconceptions; bias; false historical analogies; or simple, wishful thinking. Additionally, effective planners recognize any unstated assumptions. Accepting a broad assumption without understanding its sublevel components often leads to other faulty assumptions. For example, a division commander might assume a combined arms battalion from the continental United States is available in 30 days. This commander must also understand the sublevel components—adequate preparation, load and travel time, viable ports and airfields, favorable weather, and enemy encumbrance. The commander considers how the sublevel components hinder or aid the battalion’s ability to be available.

2-138. Commanders and staffs continuously question whether their assumptions are valid throughout planning and the operations process. Key points concerning the use of assumptions include—

Assumptions must be logical, realistic, and considered likely to be true. Assumptions are necessary for continued planning. Too many assumptions result in a higher probability that the plan or proposed solution may be

invalid. The use of assumptions requires the staff to develop branches to execute if one or more key

assumptions prove false. Often, an unstated assumption may prove more dangerous than a stated assumption proven wrong.

PLANNING PITFALLS In war, leaders of small units are usually no more than one or two jumps ahead of physical and mental exhaustion. In addition, they run a never-ending race against time. In such conditions long, highly involved orders multiply the ever-present chance of misunderstanding, misinterpretation, and plain oversight.

Infantry in Battle (1939)

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2-139. Commanders and staffs recognize the value of planning and avoid common planning pitfalls. These pitfalls generally stem from a common cause: the failure to appreciate the unpredictability and uncertainty of military operations. Pointing these out is not a criticism of planning, but of planning improperly. Common planning pitfalls include—

Attempting to forecast and dictate events too far into the future. Trying to plan in too much detail. Using the plan as a script for execution. Institutionalizing rigid planning methods.

2-140. The first pitfall, attempting to forecast and dictate events too far into the future, may result from believing a plan can control the future. Planners tend to plan based on assumptions that the future will be a linear continuation of the present. These plans often underestimate the scope of changes in directions that may occur and the results of second- and third-order effects. Even the most effective plans cannot anticipate all the unexpected events. Often, events overcome plans much sooner than anticipated. Effective plans include sufficient branches and sequels to account for the nonlinear nature of events.

2-141. The second pitfall consists of trying to plan in too much detail. Sound plans include necessary details; however, planning in unnecessary detail consumes limited time and resources that subordinates need. This pitfall often stems from the desire to leave as little as possible to chance. In general, the less certain the situation, the fewer details a plan should include. However, planners often respond to uncertainty by planning in more detail to try to account for every possibility. Preparing detailed plans under uncertain conditions generates even more anxiety, which leads to even more detailed planning. Often this over planning results in an extremely detailed plan that does not survive the friction of the situation and constricts effective action. A good plan only includes details needed to coordinate or synchronize actions of two or more subordinate units.

2-142. The third pitfall, using the plan as a script for execution, tries to prescribe the course of events with precision. When planners fail to recognize the limits of foresight and control, the plan can become a coercive and overly regulatory mechanism. Commanders, staffs, and subordinates mistakenly focus on meeting the requirements of the plan rather than deciding and acting effectively.

2-143. The fourth pitfall is the danger of institutionalizing rigid planning methods that leads to inflexible or overly structured thinking. This pitfall tends to make planning rigidly focused on the process and produces plans that overly emphasize detailed procedures. Effective planning provides a disciplined framework for approaching and solving complex problems. Taking that discipline to the extreme often results in subordinates not getting plans on time or getting overly detailed plans.

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Chapter 3

Preparation

The stroke of genius that turns the fate of a battle? I don’t believe in it. A battle is a complicated operation that you prepare laboriously.

Marshal Ferdinand Foch

This chapter addresses the fundamentals of preparations to include its definition and functions. It offers guidelines for effective preparation and addresses specific preparation activities commonly performed within the headquarters and across the force to improve the unit’s ability to execute operations.

FUNDAMENTALS OF PREPARATION 3-1. Preparation consists of those activities performed by units and Soldiers to improve their ability to execute an operation. Preparation creates conditions that improve friendly forces’ opportunities for success and include activities such as rehearsals, training, and inspections. It requires commander, staff, unit, and Soldier actions to ensure the force is ready to execute operations.

3-2. Preparation helps the force transition from planning to execution. Preparation normally begins during planning and continues into execution by uncommitted units. Like the other activities of the operations process, commanders drive preparation activities with a focus on leading and assessing. The functions of preparation include the following:

Improve situational understanding. Develop a common understanding of the plan. Train and become proficient on critical tasks. Task-organize and integrate the force. Ensure forces and resources are positioned.

IMPROVE SITUATIONAL UNDERSTANDING 3-3. Developing and maintaining situational understanding requires continuous effort throughout the operations process as discussed in chapter 1. During preparation, commanders continue to improve their understanding of a situation. They realize that the initial understanding developed during planning may be neither accurate nor complete. As such, commanders strive to validate assumptions and improve their situational understanding as they prepare for operations. Information collection helps leaders better understand the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations. Inspections, rehearsals, and liaison help leaders improve their understanding of the friendly force. Based on new information gained from various preparation activities, commanders refine the plan prior to execution.

DEVELOP A COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF THE PLAN Before the battle begins an Army Commander should assemble all commanders down to the lieutenant-colonel level and explain to them the problem, his intention, his plan, and generally how he is going to fight the battle and make it go the way he wants.…

Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery

3-4. A successful transition from planning to execution requires those charged with executing the order to understand the plan fully. The transition between planning and execution takes place both internally in the

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headquarters and externally between the commander and subordinate commanders. Several preparation activities help leaders develop a common understanding of the plan. Confirmation briefs, rehearsals, and the plans-to-operations transition brief help improve understanding of the concept of operations, control measures, decision points, and command and support relationships. They assist the force with understanding the plan prior to execution.

TRAIN AND BECOME PROFICIENT ON CRITICAL TASKS 3-5. Units train to become proficient in those tasks critical to success for a specific operation. Commanders issue guidance about which tasks to train on and rehearse. They emphasize training that incorporates attached units to ensure they are integrated and to mitigate interoperability challenges prior to execution. Commanders also allocate time during preparation for units and Soldiers to train on unfamiliar tasks prior to execution. For example, a unit unfamiliar with a wet-gap crossing requires significant training and familiarization on employing small boats. Units may need to train on crowd control techniques in support of host-nation elections. Leaders also allocate time for attaining and maintaining proficiency on individual Soldier skills (such as zeroing weapons, combat lifesaving tasks, and language familiarization).

TASK-ORGANIZE AND INTEGRATE THE FORCE 3-6. Task-organizing the force is an important part of planning. During preparation, commanders allocate time to put the new task organization into effect. This includes detaching units, moving forces, and receiving and integrating new units and Soldiers into the force. When units change task organization, they need preparation time to learn the gaining unit’s SOPs and learn their role in the gaining unit’s plan. The gaining unit needs preparation time to assess the new unit’s capabilities and limitations and to integrate new capabilities. Properly integrating units and Soldiers into the force builds trust and improves performance in execution.

ENSURE FORCES AND RESOURCES ARE POSITIONED 3-7. Effective preparation ensures the right forces are in the right place at the right time with the right equipment and other resources ready to execute the operation. Concurrent with task organization, commanders use troop movement to position or reposition forces to the correct locations prior to execution. This includes positioning sustainment units and supplies. Pre-operations checks confirm that the force has the proper and functional equipment before execution.

GUIDES TO EFFECTIVE PREPARATION Nine-tenths of tactics are certain, and taught in books; but the irrational tenth is like the kingfisher flashing across the pool, and that is the test of generals. It can only be ensured by instinct, sharpened by thought practicing the stroke so often that at the crisis it is as natural as a reflex.

T. E. Lawrence

3-8. Like the other activities of the operations process, commanders drive preparation. They continue to understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess. They gather additional information to improve their situational understanding, revise the plan as required, coordinate with other units and partners, and supervise preparation activities to ensure their forces are ready to execute operations. The following guides aid commanders and leaders in effectively preparing for operations:

Allocate time and prioritize preparation efforts. Protect the force. Supervise.

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Prepare: Rangers Train for Seizing Pointe du Hoc The Allied plan for the 1944 invasion of the Normandy coast was divided into five significant landing sights: Juno, Sword, Gold, Utah, and Omaha Beaches. The Canadians would hit Juno Beach while the British stormed Sword and Gold Beaches. The Americans would strike Utah and Omaha Beaches as well as the high cliff between these beaches called Pointe du Hoc. It was on Pointe du Hoc that the Germans had constructed a heavily fortified coastal artillery position. Of note, it had six 155 mm guns facing the English Channel. These big guns enabled a secure defense, as the guns could rain havoc on the invasion force on Omaha Beach and on the ships in the channel. To protect this significant position, the Germans built cement gun encasements, designed an interlocking trench system, including underground trenches, and deployed anti-aircraft artillery. Pointe du Hoc appeared impregnable. The most unexpected route of attack was from the sea. The Americans, however, considered it an accessible assault point. They reasoned that with a well-trained force at low tide, Soldiers could land on the narrow beaches below and ascend the cliff with the assistance of ropes and ladders. Understanding the hazards and vital importance of the landing beaches along the coast, Supreme Allied Commander General Dwight D. Eisenhower assigned the mission for the assault on Pointe du Hoc to Lieutenant Colonel James E. Rudder and elements of the 2d and 5th Ranger Battalions. The Rangers spent considerable time learning new skills and rehearsing for what many considered a suicide mission. While the Rangers received some instruction from British commandos, the Rangers mostly learned cliff climbing by trial and error. The Rangers practiced with various types of ropes and ladders. Eventually rocket-fired rappelling ropes equipped with grappling hooks became the primary tool of choice for ascending the cliff of Pointe du Hoc. Specially designed landing crafts outfitted with rocket launchers deployed the ropes to the tops of the cliff, 100 feet up from the beach. The Rangers also added extension ladders to several of the larger landing craft to extend towards the cliff top. They mounted machine guns on the top rungs of these ladders to suppress German machine gunners. In the weeks leading up to D-Day, the Rangers trained, developed, and tested their newly formed skills on various cliffs along the English coast and on the Isle of Wight. Eisenhower, at 0330 hours on June 5, decided that the favorable weather greenlighted OPERATION OVERLORD by shouting “Ok let’s go.” Shortly before 0400 on June 6, the Rangers manned their landing craft fully prepared for their mission to destroy the German guns at Pointe du Hoc.

ALLOCATE TIME AND PRIORITIZE PREPARATION EFFORTS 3-9. Mission success depends as much on preparation as on planning. Higher headquarters may develop the best of plans; however, plans serve little purpose if subordinates do not receive them in time to understand them, develop their own plans, and prepare for the upcoming operation. As part of the operational timeline, commanders allocate sufficient time for preparation. This includes time for detaching units, moving forces, and receiving and integrating new units and Soldiers into the force. It includes time to rehearse the operation to include designating the type of rehearsals. Commanders prioritize preparation activities by issuing specific instructions in WARNORDs and the OPORD.

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PROTECT THE FORCE 3-10. The force as a whole is often most vulnerable to surprise and enemy attack during preparation. As such, security operations—screen, guard, cover, area security, and local security—are essential during preparation. In addition, commanders ensure integration of the various tasks of the protection warfighting function to safeguard bases, secure routes, recover isolated personnel, and protect the force while it prepares for operations. (See ADP 3-37 for a detailed discussion of protection.) Operations security is an important consideration during preparation. Commanders direct measures to reduce the vulnerabilities of friendly action to enemy observation and exploitation. This includes measures to hide friendly movements, rehearsals, and the movement and concentration of forces.

SUPERVISE 3-11. Attention to detail is critical to effective preparation. Leaders monitor and supervise activities to ensure the unit is ready for the mission. Leaders supervise subordinates and inspect their personnel and equipment. Rehearsals allow leaders to assess their subordinates’ preparations. They may identify areas that require more supervision.

PREPARATION ACTIVITIES If I always appear prepared, it is because before entering on an undertaking, I have meditated for long and have foreseen what may occur. It is not genius which reveals to me suddenly and secretly what I should do in circumstances unexpected by others; it is thought and preparation.

Napoleon Bonaparte

3-12. Preparation activities help commanders, staffs, and Soldiers understand a situation and their roles in upcoming operations. Commanders, units, and Soldiers conduct the activities listed in table 3-1 to help ensure the force is prepared for execution.

Table 3-1. Preparation activities

Coordinate and establish liaison Initiate information collection Initiate security operations Initiate troop movements Complete task organization Integrate new units and Soldiers Train Conduct pre-operations checks and inspections

Initiate sustainment preparation Initiate network preparations Manage terrain Prepare terrain Conduct confirmation briefs Conduct rehearsals Conduct plans-to-operations transition Revise and refine the plan Supervise

COORDINATE AND ESTABLISH LIAISON 3-13. Units and organizations establish liaison in planning and preparation. Establishing liaison helps leaders internal and external to the headquarters understand their unit’s role in upcoming operations and prepare to perform that role. In addition to military forces, many civilian organizations may operate in the operational area. Their presence can both affect and be affected by the commander’s operations. Continuous liaison between the command and unified action partners helps to build unity of effort.

3-14. Liaison is most commonly used for establishing and maintaining close communications. It continuously enables direct, physical communications between commands. Establishing and maintaining liaison is vital to external coordination. Liaison enables direct communications between the sending and receiving headquarters. It may begin with planning and continue through preparing and executing, or it may start as late as execution. Available resources and the need for direct contact between sending and receiving headquarters determine when to establish liaison. (See FM 6-0 for a detailed discussion of liaison.)

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3-15. Establishing liaisons with civilian organizations is especially important in stability operations because of various external organizations and the inherent coordination challenges. Civil affairs units (to include LNOs) are particularly important in coordination with civilian organizations.

INITIATE INFORMATION COLLECTION 3-16. During planning and preparation, commanders take every opportunity to improve their situational understanding prior to execution. This requires aggressive and continuous information collection. Commanders often direct information collection (to include reconnaissance operations) early in planning that continues in preparation and execution. Through information collection, commanders and staffs continuously plan, task, and employ collection assets and forces to collect timely and accurate information to help satisfy CCIRs and other information requirements. (See FM 3-55 for discussion on information collection.)

INITIATE SECURITY OPERATIONS 3-17. Security operations—screen, guard, cover, area security, and local security—are essential during preparation. During preparation, the force is vulnerable to surprise and enemy attacks. Leaders are often away from their units and concentrated together during rehearsals. Parts of the force could be moving to task- organize. Required supplies may be unavailable or being repositioned. Units assigned security missions execute these missions while the rest of the force prepares for the overall operation. Every unit provides local security to its own forces and resources.

INITIATE TROOP MOVEMENTS 3-18. The repositioning of forces prior to execution makes up a significant portion of activities of preparation. Commanders position or reposition units to the correct starting places before execution. Commanders integrate operations security measures with troop movements to ensure these movements do not reveal any intentions to the enemy. Troop movements include assembly area reconnaissance by advance parties and route reconnaissance. They also include movements required by changes to the task organization. Commanders can use WARNORDs to direct troop movements before they issue the OPORD.

COMPLETE TASK ORGANIZATION 3-19. During preparation, commanders complete task-organizing their force to obtain the right mix of capabilities to accomplish a specific mission. The commander may direct task organization to occur immediately before the OPORD is issued. This task-organizing is done with a WARNORD. Doing this gives units more time to execute the tasks needed to affect the new task organization. Task-organizing early allows affected units to become better integrated and more familiar with all elements involved. This is especially important with inherently time-consuming tasks, such as planning technical network support for the organization.

INTEGRATE NEW UNITS AND SOLDIERS 3-20. Commanders, command sergeants major, and staffs help assimilate new units into the force and new Soldiers into their units. They also prepare new units and Soldiers in performing their duties properly and integrating into an upcoming operation smoothly. Integration for new Soldiers includes training on unit SOPs and mission-essential tasks for the operation. It also means orienting new Soldiers on their places and roles in the force and during the operation. This integration for units includes, but is not limited to—

Receiving and introducing new units to the force and the AO. Exchanging SOPs. Conducting briefs and rehearsals. Establishing communications links. Exchanging liaison teams (if required).

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TRAIN In no other profession are the penalties for employing untrained personnel so appalling or so irrevocable as in the military.

General Douglas MacArthur

3-21. Training prepares forces and Soldiers to conduct operations according to doctrine, SOPs, and the unit’s mission. Training develops the teamwork, trust, and mutual understanding that commanders need to exercise mission command and that forces need to achieve unity of effort. Training does not stop when a unit deploys. If the unit is not conducting operations or recovering from operations, it is training. While deployed, unit training focuses on fundamental skills, current SOPs, and skills for a specific mission.

CONDUCT PRE-OPERATIONS CHECKS AND INSPECTIONS 3-22. Unit preparation includes completing pre-operations checks and inspections. These checks ensure units, Soldiers, and systems are as fully capable and ready to execute the mission as time and resources permit. The inspections ensure the force has the resources necessary to accomplish the mission. During pre- operations checks and inspections, leaders also check Soldiers’ ability to perform crew drills that may not be directly related to the mission. Some examples of these include drills that respond to a vehicle rollover or an onboard fire.

INITIATE SUSTAINMENT PREPARATION 3-23. Resupplying, maintaining, and issuing supplies or equipment are major activities during preparation. Repositioning of sustainment assets can also occur. During preparation, sustainment personnel at all levels take action to optimize means (force structure and resources) for supporting the commander’s plan. These actions include, but are not limited to, identification and preparation of bases, coordinating for host-nation support, and improving lines of communications.

INITIATE NETWORK PREPARATIONS 3-24. During preparation, units must tailor the information network to meet the specific needs of each operation. This includes not only the communications, but also how the commander expects information to move between and be available for units and leaders in an AO. Commanders and staffs prepare and rehearse the information network to support the plan by—

Managing available bandwidth. Providing availability and location of data and information. Positioning and structuring network assets. Tracking status of key network systems.

MANAGE TERRAIN 3-25. Terrain management includes allocating terrain by establishing AOs, designating assembly areas, and specifying locations for units. Terrain management is an important activity during preparation as units reposition and stage prior to execution. Commanders assigned an AO manage terrain within their boundaries. Through terrain management, commanders identify and locate units in the area. The operations officer, with support from others in the staff, can then de-conflict operations, control movements, and deter fratricide as units get in position to execute planned missions. Commanders also consider unified action partners located in their AO and coordinate with them for the use of terrain.

PREPARE TERRAIN 3-26. Commanders must understand the terrain and the infrastructure of their AO as early as possible to identify potential for improvement, establish priorities of work, and begin preparing the area. Terrain preparation involves shaping the terrain to gain an advantage, such as building fighting and protective positions, improving cover and concealment, and reinforcing obstacles. Engineer units are critical in assisting

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units in preparing terrain to include building and maintaining roads, trails, airfields, and bases camps prior to and during operations. (See FM 3-34 for a detailed discussion of engineer operations.)

CONDUCT CONFIRMATION BRIEFS 3-27. A confirmation brief is a brief subordinate leaders give to the higher commander immediately after the operation order is given to confirm understanding. It is their understanding of the higher commander’s intent, their specific tasks, and the relationship between their mission and the other units’ missions in the operation. The confirmation brief is a tool used to ensure subordinate leaders understand—

The commander’s intent, mission, and concept of operations. Their unit’s tasks and associated purposes. The relationship between their unit’s mission and those of other units in the operation.

Ideally, the commander conducts confirmation briefs in person with selected staff members of the higher headquarters present.

CONDUCT REHEARSALS Sand-Table Exercises by staffs up to and including corps or army, even on the most rudimentary type of sand table, are extremely helpful prior to an attack.

General George S. Patton, Jr.

3-28. A rehearsal is a session in which the commander and staff or unit practices expected actions to improve performance during execution. Commanders use rehearsals to ensure staffs and subordinates understand the concept of operations and commander’s intent. Rehearsals also allow leaders to practice synchronizing operations at times and places critical to mission accomplishment. Effective rehearsals imprint a mental picture of the sequence of the operation’s key actions and improve mutual understanding among subordinate and supporting units and leaders. The extent of rehearsals depends on available time. In cases of short-notice requirements, detailed rehearsals may not be possible. In these instances, subordinate leaders backbrief their higher commander on how they intend to accomplish the mission. (See FM 6-0 for a discussion of the different types of rehearsals.) Leaders conduct rehearsals to—

Practice essential tasks. Identify weaknesses or problems in the plan. Coordinate subordinate element actions. Improve Soldier understanding of the concept of operations. Foster confidence among Soldiers.

CONDUCT PLANS-TO-OPERATIONS TRANSITION 3-29. The plans-to-operations transition is a preparation activity that occurs within the headquarters. It ensures members of the current operations integration cell fully understand the plan before execution. During preparation, the responsibility for maintaining the plan shifts from the plans (or future operations integrating cell for division and above headquarters) integrating cell to the current operations integration cell (see figure 3-1). This transition is the point at which the current operations integration cell becomes responsible for short-term planning and controlling execution of the OPORD. This responsibility includes answering requests for information concerning the order and maintaining the order through FRAGORDs. This transition enables the plans and future operations integrating cells to focus their planning efforts on sequels, branches, and other planning requirements directed by the commander.

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Figure 3-1. Transition among the integrating cells

3-30. The timing of the plans-to-operations transition requires careful consideration. It must allow enough time for members of the current operations integration cell to understand the plan well enough to coordinate and synchronize its execution. Ideally, the plans or future operations cell briefs members of the current operations integration cell on the transition before the combined arms rehearsal. This brief enables members of the current operations integration cell to understand the upcoming operation as well as identify friction points and issues to solve prior to its execution. The transition brief is a mission brief that generally follows the five-paragraph OPORD format. Additional areas addressed, include—

Decision support products (execution matrixes, decision support templates, decision support matrixes, and risk assessment matrixes). Known friction points. Branches and sequels under considerations. Outstanding requests for information and issues.

3-31. Following the combined arms rehearsal, planners and members of the current operations integration cell review additional planning guidance issued by the commander and modify the plan as necessary. Significant changes may require assistance from the plans cell to include moving a lead planner to the current operations integration cell. The plans cell continues planning for branches and sequels.

REVISE AND REFINE THE PLAN 3-32. Revising and refining the plan is a key activity of preparation. During preparation, assumptions made during planning may be proven true or false. Intelligence analysis and reconnaissance may confirm or deny

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enemy actions or show changed conditions in the AO because of shaping operations. The status of friendly forces may change as the situation changes. Rehearsals may identify coordination issues or other problems needing adjusted. In any of these cases, commanders identify the changed conditions, refine the plan, and issue FRAGORDs.

SUPERVISE 3-33. When leaders supervise, they check details critical to effective preparation. Leaders monitor and supervise activities to ensure the unit is ready for the mission. Leaders supervise subordinates and inspect their personnel and equipment. Rehearsals allow leaders to assess their subordinates’ preparations. They may identify areas that require more supervision.

Large-Unit Preparation: Third Army Readies for OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

At an October 2002 Army commanders’ conference, General Eric Shinseki directed, “From today forward the main effort of the US Army must be to prepare for war with Iraq.” Third Army, already supporting operations in Afghanistan, shifted emphasis from deterring an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait or Saudi Arabia to mounting offensive operations to topple Saddam Hussein.

As OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM changed from possible to probable, the Third Army (also designated as the Coalition Forces Land Component Command [CFLCC]) undertook a number of important tasks designed to prepare for war. From the Army’s perspective, these included revising plans for the invasion, preparing the theater infrastructure, determining the ground forces command and control architecture, augmenting and training headquarters and Soldiers, fielding new equipment, providing theater-wide support, mobilizing the Army Reserve and Army National Guard forces, deploying forces into theater, and moving to the border.

Forces prepared to operate at a scale and scope not seen since OPERATION DESERT STORM with units not used to working together. They conducted a series of exercises to refine the plan and to develop procedures, teamwork, and familiarity across the divisions, corps, CFLCC, and U.S. Central Command. EXERCISE VICTORY STRIKE enabled the V Corps staff to practice planning, preparing, and executing corps operations with the focus of deep fires and maneuver that would be critical to the coming campaign. EXERCISE LUCKY WARRIOR provided the first opportunity for the CFLCC’s major subordinate elements (V Corps, I Marine Expeditionary Force, and coalition forces) to rehearse operations under the CFLCC headquarters. EXERCISE INTERNAL LOOK provided the venue to the final preparations for the anticipated campaign. This venue allowed the joint force and functional components to examine and refine their plans and work out procedures at the combatant command level. V Corps conducted the last significant series of exercises at Grafenwoehr, Germany in January and February of 2003 called EXERCISE VICTORY SCRIMMAGE.

Collective training by units from the smallest sections all the way up to CFLCC headquarters continued through March. Throughout Kuwait, units engaged in last- minute training; resupplied ammunition, fuel, and other supplies; and ensured individual mental and physical preparedness for war by Soldiers. By 18 March, Third Army and its subordinate units were prepared to open the campaign.

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Chapter 4

Execution

No plan of operations goes with any degree of certainty to beyond the first contact with the hostile main force.

Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke

This chapter defines, describes, and offers guidelines for effective execution. It describes the role of the commander and staff during execution followed by a discussion of the major activities of execution. It concludes with a discussion of the rapid decision-making and synchronization process.

FUNDAMENTALS OF EXECUTION 4-1. Execution is the act of putting a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission and adjusting operations based on changes in the situation. In execution, commanders, staffs, and subordinate commanders focus their efforts on translating decisions into actions. They direct action to apply combat power at decisive points and times to achieve objectives and accomplish missions. Inherent in execution is deciding whether to execute planned actions (such as phases, branches, and sequels) or to modify the plan based on unforeseen opportunities or threats.

4-2. Commanders fight the enemy, not the plan. Moltke’s dictum above, rather than condemning the value of planning, reminds commanders, staffs, and subordinate unit leaders the proper relationship between planning and execution. A plan provides a reasonably forecast of execution. However, it remains a starting point, not an exact script to follow. As General George S. Patton, Jr. cautioned, “…one makes plans to fit circumstances and does not try to create circumstances to fit plans.”

4-3. During execution, the situation may change rapidly. Operations the commander envisioned in the plan may bear little resemblance to actual events in execution. Subordinate commanders need maximum latitude to take advantage of situations and meet the higher commander’s intent when the original order no longer applies. Effective execution requires leaders trained in independent decision making, aggressiveness, and risk taking in an environment of mission command.

GUIDES TO EFFECTIVE EXECUTION I am heartily tired of hearing about what Lee is going to do. Some of you always seem to think he is suddenly going to turn a double somersault, and land in our rear and on both of our flanks at the same time. Go back to your command, and try to think what we are going to do ourselves, instead of what Lee is going to do.

Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant

4-4. Execution is a concerted effort to seize and retain the initiative, maintain momentum, and exploit success. Initiative is fundamental to success in any operation, yet simply seizing the initiative is not enough. A sudden barrage of precision munitions may surprise and disorganize the enemy, but if not followed by swift and relentless action, the friendly advantage diminishes and disappears. Successful operations maintain the momentum generated by initiative and exploit successes within the commander’s intent. Guides to effective execution include—

Seize and retain the initiative. Build and maintain momentum. Exploit success.

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SEIZE AND RETAIN THE INITIATIVE 4-5. Operationally, initiative is setting or dictating the terms of action during operations. Army forces do this by forcing the enemy to respond to friendly actions. By presenting the enemy with multiple cross-domain dilemmas, commanders force the enemy to react continuously until the enemy is finally driven into untenable positions. Seizing the initiative pressures enemy commanders into abandoning their preferred options and making costly mistakes. As enemy mistakes occur, friendly forces apply continuous pressure to prevent the enemy from recovering. These actions enable friendly forces to seize opportunities and create new avenues for an exploitation.

4-6. Seizing the initiative ultimately results from forcing an enemy reaction. Commanders identify times and places where they can mass the effects of combat power to relative advantage. To compel a reaction, they threaten something the enemy cares about such as its center of gravity or decisive points leading to it. By forcing the enemy to react, commanders initiate an action-to-reaction sequence that ultimately reduces enemy options to zero. Each action develops the situation further and reduces the number of possibilities to be considered, thereby reducing friendly uncertainty. Each time the enemy must react, its uncertainty increases. Developing the situation by forcing the enemy to react is the essence of seizing the initiative.

4-7. Retaining the initiative involves applying unrelenting pressure on the enemy. Commanders do this by synchronizing the warfighting functions to present enemy commanders with continuously changing combinations of combat power at a tempo they cannot effectively counter. Commanders and staffs use information collection assets to identify enemy attempts to regain the initiative. During execution, commanders create a seamless, uninterrupted series of actions that forces enemies to react immediately and does not allow them to regain synchronization. Ideally, these actions present enemies with multiple dilemmas, the solutions to any one of which increases the enemy’s vulnerability to other elements of combat power.

Take Action I have found again and again that in encounter actions, the day goes to the side that is the first to plaster its opponent with fire. The man who lies low and awaits developments usually comes off second best.

Field Marshal Erwin Rommel

4-8. Commanders and their subordinate leaders create conditions for seizing the initiative with action. Without action, seizing the initiative is impossible. Faced with an uncertain situation, there is a natural tendency to hesitate and gather more information to reduce the uncertainty. Although waiting and gathering information might reduce uncertainty, such inaction will not eliminate it. Waiting may even increase uncertainty by providing the enemy with time to seize the initiative. Effective leaders can manage uncertainty by acting and developing the situation. When the immediate situation is unclear, commanders clarify it by action, not by sitting and gathering information.

Create and Exploit Opportunities 4-9. Events that offer better ways to success are opportunities. Commanders recognize opportunities by continuously monitoring and evaluating the situation. Failure to understand the opportunities inherent in an enemy’s action can surrender the initiative. CCIRs must include information requirements that support exploiting opportunities. Commanders encourage subordinates to act within the commander’s intent as opportunities occur. Shared understanding of the commander’s intent creates an atmosphere conducive to subordinates exercising initiative.

Accept Risk 4-10. Uncertainty and risk are inherent in all military operations. Recognizing and acting on opportunity means taking risks. Reasonably estimating and intentionally accepting risk is not gambling. Carefully determining the risks, analyzing and minimizing as many hazards as possible, and executing a plan that accounts for those hazards contributes to successfully applying military force. Gambling, in contrast, is imprudently staking the success of an entire action on a single, improbable event. Commanders assess risk by answering three questions:

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Am I minimizing the risk of friendly losses? Am I risking the success of the operation? Am I minimizing the risk of civilian casualties and collateral damage?

4-11. When commanders embrace opportunity, they accept risk. It is counterproductive to wait for perfect preparation and synchronization. The time taken to fully synchronize forces and warfighting functions in a detailed order could mean a lost opportunity. It is far better to quickly summarize the essentials, get things moving, and send the details later. Leaders optimize the use of time with WARORDs, FRAGORDs, and verbal updates.

4-12. Commanders exercise the art of command when deciding how much risk to accept. As shown in figure 4-1, the commander has several techniques available to reduce the risk associated in a specific operation. Some techniques for reducing risk take resources from the decisive operation, which reduces the concentration of effects at the decisive point. (See ADP 3-90 for a detailed discussion of the art of tactics and risk reduction.)

Figure 4-1. Risk reduction factors

BUILD AND MAINTAIN MOMENTUM 4-13. Momentum comes from seizing the initiative and executing decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations at a rapid and sustainable tempo. Momentum allows commanders to create opportunities to engage the enemy from unexpected directions with unanticipated capabilities. Having seized the initiative, commanders continue to control the relative momentum by maintaining focus and pressure and controlling the tempo. They ensure that they maintain momentum by anticipating transitions and moving rapidly between types of operations.

4-14. Speed promotes surprise and can compensate for lack of forces. It magnifies the impact of success in seizing the initiative. By executing at a rapid tempo, Army forces present the enemy with new problems before it can solve current ones. Rapid tempo should not degenerate into haste. Ill-informed and hasty action usually precludes effective combinations of combat power; it may lead to unnecessary casualties.

4-15. The condition of the enemy force dictates the degree of synchronization necessary. When confronted by a coherent and disciplined enemy, commanders may slow the tempo to deliver synchronized attacks. As the enemy force loses cohesion, commanders increase the tempo, seeking to accelerate the enemy’s morale and physical collapse.

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EXPLOIT SUCCESS 4-16. Ultimately, only successes that achieve the end state count. To determine how to exploit tactical and operational successes, commanders assess them in terms of the higher commander’s intent. However, success will likely occur in ways unanticipated in the plan. Commanders may gain an objective in an unexpected way. Success signals a rapid assessment to answer these questions:

Does the success generate opportunities that more easily accomplish the objectives? Does it suggest other lines of operations or lines of effort? Does it cause commanders to change their overall intent? Should the force transition to a sequel? Should the force accelerate the phasing of the operation?

4-17. An exploitation demands assessment and understanding of the impact on sustaining operations. Sustainment provides the means to exploit success and convert it into decisive results. Sustainment preserves the freedom of action necessary to take advantage of opportunity. Commanders remain fully aware of the status of units and anticipate sustainment requirements; they recognize that sustainment often determines the depth to which Army forces exploit success.

RESPONSIBILITIES DURING EXECUTION To be at the head of a strong column of troops, in the execution of some task that requires brain, is the highest pleasure of war—a grim one and terrible, but which leaves on the mind and memory the strongest mark; to detect the weak point of an enemy’s line; to break through with vehemence and thus lead to victory; or to discover some key-point and hold it with tenacity; or to do some other distinct act which is afterward recognized as the real cause of success.

General William T. Sherman

4-18. During execution, commanders focus their activities on directing, assessing, and leading while improving their understanding and modifying their visualization. Initially, commanders direct the transition from planning to execution as the order is issued and the responsibility for integration passes from the plans cell to the current operations integration cell. During execution, the staff directs units, within delegated authority, to keep the operation progressing successfully. Assessing allows the commander and staff to determine the existence and significance of variances from the operations as envisioned in the initial plan. The staff makes recommendations to the commander about what action to take concerning identified variances in the plan. During execution, leading is as important as decision making, since commanders influence subordinates by providing purpose, direction, and motivation.

COMMANDERS, SECONDS IN COMMAND, AND COMMAND SERGEANTS MAJOR 4-19. During execution, commanders locate where they can best exercise command and sense the operations. Sometimes this is at the command post. Other times, it is forward with a command group. Effective commanders balance the need to make personal observations, provide command presence, and sense the mood of subordinates from forward locations with their ability to maintain command and control continuity with the entire force. No matter where they are located, commanders are always looking beyond the current operation to anticipate the next operation.

4-20. Seconds in command (deputy commanders, executive officers) are a key command resource during execution. First, they can serve as senior advisors to their commander. Second, they may oversee a specific warfighting function (for example, sustainment). Finally, they can command a specific operation (such as a gap crossing), area, or part of the unit (such as the covering force) for the commander.

4-21. The command sergeant major provides another set of senior eyes to assist the commander. The command sergeant major assists the commander with assessing operations as well as assessing the condition and morale of forces. In addition, the command sergeant major provides leadership and expertise to units and Soldiers at critical locations and times during execution.

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STAFF 4-22. The chief of staff or executive officer is the commander’s principal assistant for directing, coordinating, and supervising the staff. During execution, the chief of staff or executive officer must anticipate events and integrate the efforts of the whole staff to ensure operations are proceeding in accordance with the commander’s intent and visualization. The chief of staff or executive officer assists the commander with coordinating efforts among the plans, future operations, and current operations integration cells.

4-23. In execution, the staff—primarily through the current operations integration cell—integrates forces and warfighting functions to accomplish the mission. The current operations integration cell is the integrating cell in the command post with primary responsibility for coordinating and directing execution. Staff members in the current operations integration cell actively assist the commander and subordinate units in controlling the current operation. They provide information, synchronize staff and subordinate unit or echelon activities, and coordinate support requests from subordinates. The current operations integration cell solves problems and acts within the authority delegated by the commander. It also performs some short-range planning using the rapid decision-making and synchronization process. (See paragraph 4-36 for a discussion beginning on the rapid decision-making and synchronization process.)

EXECUTION ACTIVITIES The commander’s mission is contained in the orders which he has received. Nevertheless, a commander of a subordinate unit cannot plead absence of orders or the non-receipt of orders as an excuse for inactivity in a situation where action on his part is essential, or where a change in the situation upon which the issued orders were based renders such orders impracticable or impossible of execution.

FM 100-5, Operations (1941)

4-24. Execution entails putting the plan into action, and adjusting the plan based on changing circumstances. Friction and uncertainty, especially enemy actions, dynamically affect plans. An accurate situational understanding that accounts for new realties that affect plans provides the basis for commanders to exploit opportunities or counter threats. Major activities of execution include—

Assessment. Decision making. Directing action.

ASSESSMENT 4-25. During execution, assessment helps commanders visualize probable outcomes and determine whether they need to change the plan to accomplish the mission, take advantage of opportunities, or react to unexpected threats. Assessment includes both monitoring the situation and evaluating progress. Monitoring—the continuous observation of those conditions relevant to the current operation—allows commanders and staffs to improve their understanding of the situation. Evaluation—using indicators to measure change in the situation and judge progress—allows commanders to identify variances, their significance, and if a decision is required to alter the plan. (See chapter 5 for a detailed discussion on assessment.)

4-26. A variance is a difference between the actual situation during an operation and the forecasted plan for the situation at that time or event. A variance can be categorized as an opportunity or threat as shown with the vertical lines in figure 4-2 . The first form of variance is an opportunity to accomplish the mission more effectively. Opportunities result from forecasted or unexpected success. When commanders recognize an opportunity, they alter the order to exploit it if the change achieves the end state more effectively or efficiently. The second form of variance is a threat to mission accomplishment or survival of the force. When recognizing a threat, the commander adjusts the order to eliminate the enemy advantage, restore the friendly advantage, and regain the initiative.

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Figure 4-2. Decision making during execution

DECISION MAKING In war obscurity and confusion are normal. Late, exaggerated or misleading information, surprise situations, and counterorders are to be expected.

Infantry in Battle (1939)

4-27. When operations are progressing satisfactorily, variances are minor and within acceptable levels. Commanders who make this evaluation—explicitly or implicitly—allow operations to continue according to the plan. Plans usually identify some decision points; however, unexpected enemy actions or other changes often present situations that require unanticipated decisions. Commanders act when these decisions are required. As commanders assess the operation, they describe their impressions to staffs and subordinates and then discuss the desirability of choices available. Once commanders make decisions, their staffs transmit the necessary directives, normally in a FRAGORD. Decisions made during execution are either execution decisions or adjustment decisions as shown in figure 4-2’s lightly shaded boxes.

Execution Decisions 4-28. Execution decisions implement a planned action under circumstances anticipated in the order such as changing a boundary, committing the reserve, or executing a branch plan. In their most basic form, execution decisions are decisions the commander foresees and identifies for execution during an operation. Commanders are responsible for those decisions but may direct the chief of staff, executive officer, or staff officer to supervise implementation. The current operations integration cell oversees the synchronization and integration needed to implement execution decisions.

Adjustment Decisions 4-29. Adjustment decisions modify the operation to respond to unanticipated opportunities and threats. They often require implementing unanticipated operations and resynchronizing the warfighting functions. Commanders make these decisions, delegating implementing authority only after directing the major change themselves. Adjustments may take one of three forms:

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Reallocating resources. Changing the concept of operations. Changing the mission.

4-30. The simplest adjustment is reallocating resources. This normally provides additional assets to the decisive operation; however, some situations may require reinforcing a shaping operations. Changing the concept of operations adjusts the way the force executes the operation without changing the mission. Commander’s normally do this to exploit an unplanned opportunity or counter an unexpected threat. When reallocating resources or changing the concept of operations does not solve a problem hampering mission accomplishment, the commander may have to change the mission. Commanders change the mission only as a last resort. When they do, the new mission still must accomplish the higher commander’ intent. Table 4-1 summarizes a range of possible actions with respect to decisions made during execution.

Table 4-1. Decision types and related actions

Decision types Actions

Ex ec

ut io

n de

ci si

on s

Minor variances from the plan Operation proceeding according to plan. Variances are within acceptable limits.

To execute planned actions Commander or designee decides which planned actions best

meet the situation and directs their execution. Staff issues fragmentary order. Staff completes follow-up actions.

Anticipated situation Operation encountering variances within the limits for one or more branches or sequels anticipated in the plan.

To execute a branch or sequel Commander or staff reviews branch or sequel plan. Commander receives assessments and recommendations for

modifications to the plan, determines the time available to refine it, and either issues guidance for further actions or directs execution of a branch or sequel.

Staff issues fragmentary order. Staff completes follow-up actions.

A dj

us tm

en t d

ec is

io ns

Unanticipated situation—friendly success Significant, unanticipated positive variances result in opportunities to achieve the end state in ways that differ significantly from the plan.

To make an adjustment decision Commander recognizes the opportunity or threat and determines

time available for decision making. Commander selects a decision-making method. If there is not

enough time for a complete military decision-making process, the commander may direct a single course of action or conduct the rapid decision-making and synchronization process with select staff members.

Depending on time available, commanders may issue verbal fragmentary orders to subordinates followed by a written fragmentary order to counter the threat or exploit an opportunity.

In rare situations, commanders may reframe the problem, change the mission, and develop an entirely new plan to address significant changes in the situation.

Unanticipated situation—enemy threat Significant, unanticipated negative variances impede mission accomplishment.

Decision-Making Tools 4-31. Several decision support tools assist the commander and staff during execution. Among the most important are the decision support template, decision support matrix, execution matrix, and execution checklist. The current operations integration cell uses these tools, among others, to help control operations and to determine when anticipated decisions are coming up for execution.

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4-32. The decision support template depicts decision points, timelines associated with movement of forces and the flow of the operation, and other key items of information required to execute a specific friendly COA. Part of the decision support template is the decision support matrix—a written record of a war-gamed course of action that describes decision points and associated actions at those decision points. The decision support matrix lists decision points, locations of decision points, criteria to be evaluated at decision points, actions that occur at decision points, and the units responsible to act on the decision points.

Decision Making During Execution: Chamberlain at Little Round Top

At 1630 on 2 July 1863, near Little Round Top, a rocky hill near Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, Colonel Joshua Chamberlain’s 358 remaining soldiers of the 20th Maine Regiment were ordered into a defensive line. Minutes later, they came under a violent frontal assault by the 47th Alabama Regiment. While the 20th Maine was repulsing this assault, an officer rushed up to Chamberlain and informed him that another large enemy force was moving to attack their exposed left flank.

Chamberlain immediately ordered a new defensive line at right angles to his existing line; he shifted the entire regiment to the left and back while maintaining continuous fire to the front and masking the movement of his left flank. Minutes later the 20th Maine was assaulted by the 15th Alabama Regiment. During that assault, the 20th Maine fired 20,000 rounds, suffering 30 percent dead and wounded. Chamberlain was bleeding and bruised. His foot bled from a shell fragment and his thigh was severely bruised after a musket ball had struck his scabbard. The 20th Maine miraculously withstood six charges before they ran out of ammunition.

Chamberlain, fearing an overwhelming, decimating rebel attack, realized that by withdrawing he would be giving up key terrain as well as the battle. To the astonishment of his subordinates, he ordered a bayonet charge with the enemy, beginning another fierce charge from only 30 yards. The left half of his regiment began the charge, stunning the Confederates before them. As they came abreast of their own right half, Chamberlain raised high his saber and shouted, “Fix bayonets!” Running downhill, Chamberlain and his men had the clear advantage over the tired rebels. The Alabama men were shocked and fell back. A company of Chamberlain’s men who had formed a screen line on the left flank began firing into the panic-stricken Confederates who, even though they outnumbered the 20th Maine 3 to 1, did not realize the strength of their numbers.

Fearing the worst for his troops, Colonel William C. Oates, the commander of the Alabama regiments, ordered a breakout that turned into a rout and the capture of more than 400 of his men. Afterwards, Chamberlain was awarded the Medal of Honor. His actions serve as one of the finest examples of what a combat leader must be able to be and do to exercise effective mission command.

4-33. An execution matrix is a visual representation of subordinate tasks in relationship to each other over time. An operation can have multiple execution matrices. An execution matrix can cover the entire force for the duration of an operation; a specific portion of an operation (such as an air assault execution matrix); or for a specific warfighting function (such as a fire support execution matrix). Commanders and staffs use the execution matrix to control, synchronize, and adjust operations as required. An execution checklist is a distillation of the execution matrix that list key actions sequentially, units responsible for the action, and an associated code word to quickly provide shared understanding among the commander, staff, and subordinate units on initiation or completion of the action.

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DIRECTING ACTION 4-34. To implement execution or adjustment decisions, commanders direct actions that apply combat power. Based on the commander’s decision and guidance, the staff resynchronizes the operation to mass the maximum effects of combat power to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. This involves synchronizing the operations in time, space, and purpose and issuing directives to subordinates. When modifying the plan, commander and staffs seek to—

Make the fewest changes possible. Facilitate future operations.

4-35. Commanders make only those changes to the plan needed to correct variances. As much as possible, they keep the current plan the same to present subordinates with the fewest possible changes. Whenever possible, commanders ensure that changes do not preclude options for future operations. This is especially important for echelons above brigade.

RAPID DECISION-MAKING AND SYNCHRONIZATION PROCESS 36. The RDSP is a decision-making and planning technique that commanders and staffs commonly use

during execution. While the MDMP seeks the optimal solution, the RDSP seeks a timely and effective solution within the commander’s intent, mission, and concept of operations. Using the RDSP lets leaders avoid the time-consuming requirements of developing decision criteria and multiple COAs. Under the RDSP, leaders combine their experiences and intuition to quickly understand the situation, develop a viable option, and direct adjustments to the current order. When using this technique, the following considerations apply:

Rapid is often more important than detailed analysis. Much of it may be mental rather than written. It should become a battle drill for the current operations integration cells, future operations cells, or both.

37. The RDSP is based on an existing order and the commander’s priorities as expressed in the order. The most important of these are the commander’s intent, concept of operations, and CCIRs. The RDSP includes five steps as shown in figure 4-3. Commanders perform the first two (as denoted in the oval) in any order, including concurrently. The last three (as denoted in the rectangle) are performed interactively until commanders identify a feasible, acceptable, and suitable COA.

Figure 4-3. Rapid decision-making and synchronization process

4-38. The RDSP results in changes to the current order. Commanders often issue orders to subordinates verbally in situations requiring quick reactions. At battalion and higher levels, written FRAGORDs confirm verbal orders to ensure synchronization, integration, and notification of all parts of the force. If time permits, leaders verify that subordinates understand critical tasks. Methods for doing this include the confirmation brief and backbrief. (See FM 6-0 for a detailed discussion of the RDSP.)

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Chapter 5

Assessment

Estimation of the situation is, however, a continuous process, and changed conditions may, at any time, call for a new decision.

FM 100-5, Operations (1941)

This chapter defines assessment and describes its fundamentals. It describes an assessment process and concludes with guides for effective assessment.

FUNDAMENTALS OF ASSESSMENT 5-1. Assessment is the determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective (JP 3-0). Assessment is a continuous activity of the operations process that supports decision making by ascertaining progress of the operation for the purpose of developing and refining plans and for making operations more effective. Assessment results enhance the commander’s decision making and help the commander and the staff to keep pace with constantly changing situations.

5-2. Assessment involves deliberately comparing intended outcomes with actual events to determine the overall effectiveness of force employment. More specifically, assessment helps the commander determine progress toward attaining the desired end state, achieving objectives, and performing tasks. Through professional military judgment, assessment helps answer the following questions:

Where are we? What happened? Why do we think it happened? So what? What are the likely future opportunities and risks? What do we need to do?

5-3. Assessment precedes and guides the other activities of the operations process. During planning, assessment focuses on understanding an OE and building an assessment plan. During preparation, the focus of assessment switches to discerning changes in the situation and the force’s readiness to execute operations. During execution, assessment involves deliberately comparing forecasted outcomes to actual events while using indicators to judge operational progress towards success. Assessment during execution helps commanders determine whether changes in the operation are necessary to take advantage of opportunities or to counter unexpected threats.

5-4. The situation and echelon dictate the focus and methods leaders use to assess. Assessment occurs at all echelons. Normally, commanders assess those specific operations or tasks that they were directed to accomplish. This properly focuses collection and assessment at each echelon, reduces redundancy, and enhances the efficiency of the overall assessment process.

5-5. For units with a staff, assessment becomes more formal at each higher echelon. Assessment resources (to include staff officer expertise and time available) proportionally increase from battalion to brigade, division, corps, and theater army. The analytic resources and level of expertise of staffs available at higher echelon headquarters include a dedicated core group of analysts. This group specializes in operations research and systems analysis, formal assessment plans, and various assessment products. Division, corps, and theater army headquarters, for example, have dedicated plans, future operations, and current operations integration cells. They have larger intelligence staffs and more staff officers trained in operations research and systems

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analysis. Assessment at brigade echelon and lower is usually less formal, often relying on direct observations and the judgment of commanders and their staffs.

5-6. For small units (those without a staff), assessment is mostly informal. Small-unit leaders focus on assessing their unit’s readiness—personnel, equipment, supplies, and morale—and their unit’s ability to perform assigned tasks. Leaders also determine whether the unit has attained task proficiency. If those tasks have not produced the desired results, leaders explore why they have not and consider what improvements could be made for unit operations. As they assess and learn, small units change their tactics, techniques, and procedures based on their experiences. In this way, even the lowest echelons in the Army follow the assessment process.

ASSESSMENT ACTIVITIES 5-7. The situation and type of operations affect the characteristics of assessment. During large-scale combat, assessment tends to be rapid, focused on the level of destruction of enemy units, terrain gained or lost, objectives secured, and the status of the friendly force to include sustainment. In other situations, such as counterinsurgency, assessment is less tangible. Assessing the level of security in an area or the level of the population’s support for the government is challenging. Identifying what and how to assess requires significant effort from the commander and staff.

5-8. Whether conducting major combat operations or operations dominated by stability tasks, assessment consists of the major activities shown in figure 5-1. These activities include—

Monitoring the current situation to collect relevant information. Evaluating progress toward attaining end state conditions, achieving objectives, and performing tasks. Recommending or directing action for improvement.

MONITORING 5-9. Monitoring is continuous observation of those conditions relevant to the current operation. Monitoring allows staffs to collect relevant information, specifically that information about the current situation described in the commander’s intent and concept of operations. Commanders cannot judge progress nor make effective decisions without an accurate understanding of the current situation.

5-10. CCIRs and associated information requirements focus the staff’s monitoring activities and prioritize the unit’s collection efforts. Information requirements concerning the enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations are identified and assigned priorities through reconnaissance and surveillance. Operations officers use friendly reports to coordinate other assessment-related information requirements.

5-11. Staffs monitor and collect information from the common operational picture and friendly reports. This information includes operational and intelligence summaries from subordinate, higher, and adjacent headquarters and communications and reports from liaison teams. Staffs also identify information sources outside military channels and monitor their reports. These other channels might include products from civilian, host-nation, and other government agencies. Staffs apply information management and knowledge management to facilitate disseminating this information to the right people at the right time.

5-12. Staff sections record relevant information in running estimates. Staff sections maintain a continuous assessment of current operations as a basis to determine if operations are proceeding according to the commander’s intent, mission, and concept of operations. In their running estimates, staff sections use this new information and these updated facts and assumptions as the basis for evaluation.

Figure 5-1. Activities of assessment

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EVALUATING While attrition formed an important element of American strategy in Vietnam, it hardly served as the guiding principle. Westmoreland believed that destroying enemy forces would help lead to larger political ends. Even before Westmoreland’s tenure, MACV [Military Advisory Command Vietnam] had realized that quantitative reporting of enemy kills insufficiently measured progress in an unconventional environment. Body counts did not necessarily produce reliable qualitative assessments of the enemy’s military and political strength.

Gregory A. Daddis

5-13. The staff analyzes relevant information collected through monitoring to evaluate the operation’s progress. Evaluating is using indicators to judge progress toward desired conditions and determining why the current degree of progress exists. Evaluation is at the heart of the assessment process where most of the analysis occurs. Evaluation helps commanders determine what is working and what is not working, and it helps them gain insights into how to better accomplish the mission.

5-14. In the context of assessment, an indicator is a specific piece of information that infers the condition, state, or existence of something, and provides a reliable means to ascertain performance or effectiveness (JP 5-0). Indicators should be—

Relevant—bear a direct relationship to a task, effect, object, or end state condition. Observable—collectable so that changes can be detected and measured or evaluated. Responsive—signify changes in the OE in time to enable effective decision making. Resourced—collection assets and staff resources are identified to observe and evaluate.

5-15. The two types of indicators commonly used in assessment include measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs). A measure of performance is an indicator used to measure a friendly action that is tied to measuring task accomplishment (JP 5-0). MOPs help answer questions such as “Was the action taken?” or “Were the tasks completed to standard?” A MOP confirms or denies that a task has been properly performed. MOPs are commonly found and tracked at all levels in execution matrixes. MOPs help to answer the question “Are we doing things right?”

5-16. At the most basic level, every Soldier assigned a task maintains a formal or informal checklist to track task completion. The status of those tasks and subtasks are MOPs. Similarly, operations consist of a series of collective tasks sequenced in time, space, and purpose to accomplish missions. Current operations integration cells use MOPs in execution matrixes, checklists, and running estimates to track completed tasks. Staffs use MOPs as a primary element of battle tracking with a focus on the friendly force. Evaluating task accomplishment using MOPs is relatively straightforward and often results in a “yes” or “no” answer.

5-17. A measure of effectiveness is an indicator used to measure a current system state, with change indicated by comparing multiple observations over time (JP 5-0). MOEs help measure changes in conditions, both positive and negative. MOEs help to answer the question “Are we doing the right things?” MOEs are commonly found and tracked in formal assessment plans.

5-18. Evaluation includes analysis of why progress is or is not being made. Commanders and staffs propose and consider possible causes. In particular, they address the question of whether or not changes in the situation can be attributed to friendly actions. Commanders consult subject matter experts, both internal and external to the staff, on whether their staffs have correctly identified the underlying causes for specific changes in the situation. These experts challenge key facts and assumptions identified in the planning process to determine if the facts and assumptions are still relevant or valid.

5-19. Evaluating also includes considering whether the desired conditions have changed, are no longer achievable, or are not achievable through the current operational approach. Staffs continually challenge the key assumptions made when framing the problem. When an assumption is invalidated, then reframing may be in order.

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RECOMMENDING OR DIRECTING ACTION 5-20. Monitoring and evaluating are critical activities; however, assessment is incomplete without recommending or directing action. Assessment may reveal problems, but unless it results in recommended adjustments, its use to the commander is limited. Ideally, recommendations highlight ways to improve the effectiveness of operations and plans by informing all decisions. (See paragraph 5-29 for a list of potential recommendations.)

5-21. Based on the evaluation of progress, the staff brainstorms possible improvements to the plan and makes preliminary judgments about the relative merit of those changes. Staff members identify those changes possessing sufficient merit and provide them as recommendations to the commander or make adjustments within their delegated authority. Recommendations to the commander range from continuing the operation as planned, to executing a branch, or to making unanticipated adjustments. Making adjustments includes assigning new tasks to subordinates, reprioritizing support, adjusting information collection assets, and significantly modifying the COA. Commanders integrate recommendations from the staff, subordinate commanders, and other partners with their personal assessments. Using those recommendations, they decide if and how to modify the operation to better accomplish the mission.

5-22. Assessment helps identify threats, suggests improvements to effectiveness, and reveals opportunities. The staff presents the results and conclusions of its assessments and recommendations to the commander as an operation develops. Just as the staff devotes time to analysis and evaluation, so too must it make timely, complete, and actionable recommendations. The chief of staff or executive officer ensures the staff completes its analyses and recommendations in time to affect the operation and for information to reach the commander when needed.

Measures of Effectiveness: OPERATION SUPPORT HOPE Mission statements can serve as a primary source from which to develop measures of effectiveness. The first and most urgent task facing planners for OPERATION SUPPORT HOPE in Rwanda, July 1994, was the directive to “stop the dying” from the U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe. Initial action focused on the massive refugee deaths from cholera around Goma, Zaire. The joint task force commander decided to measure effectiveness by whether refugee camp death rates dropped to the level the United Nations determined was consistent with “normal” camp operations. A related mission requirement was to open Kigali airfield for 24-hour operations. Success for this requirement was measured by statistical data that showed the surge in airfield use and cargo throughput after American forces arrived. Both measures of effectiveness derived from the mission statement were used throughout the operation to communicate progress to all participants.

ASSESSMENT PROCESS 5-23. There is no single way to conduct assessment. Every situation has its own distinctive challenges, making every assessment unique. The following steps can help guide the development of an effective assessment plan and assessment activities during preparation and execution:

Step 1 – Develop the assessment approach (planning). Step 2 – Develop the assessment plan (planning). Step 3 – Collect information and intelligence (preparation and execution). Step 4 – Analyze information and intelligence (preparation and execution). Step 5 – Communicate feedback and recommendations (preparation and execution). Step 6 – Adapt plans or operations (planning and execution).

(See ATP 5-0.3 for a detailed discussion of each step of the assessment process.)

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STEP 1 – DEVELOP THE ASSESSMENT APPROACH 5-24. Assessment begins in planning as the commander identifies the operation’s end state, operational approach, and associated objectives and tasks. Concurrently, the staff begins to develop an assessment approach by identifying specific information needed to monitor and analyze conditions associated with attaining the operation’s end state, achieving objectives, and accomplishing tasks. In doing so, the staff tries to answer the following questions:

How will we know we are creating the desired conditions? What information do we need? Who is best postured to provide that information?

5-25. If a higher headquarters assessment plan exists, the staff aligns applicable elements of that assessment plan to the plan they are developing. The assessment approach becomes the framework for the assessment plan and will continue to mature through plan development. The assessment approach should identify the information and intelligence needed to assess progress and inform decision making.

STEP 2 – DEVELOP THE ASSESSMENT PLAN 5-26. This step overlaps Step 1. It focuses on developing a plan to monitor and collect necessary information and intelligence to inform decision making throughout execution. The assessment plan should link end state conditions, objectives, and tasks to observable key indicators. This plan also should include specific staff responsibilities to monitor, collect, and analyze information as well as develop recommendations and assessment products as required.

STEP 3 – COLLECT INFORMATION 5-27. Staffs collect relevant information throughout planning and execution. They refine and adapt information collection requirements as the operations progresses. Staffs and subordinate commands provide information during execution through applicable battle rhythm events and reports. Intelligence staffs continually provide updates about the situation to include information about the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations.

STEP 4 – ANALYZE INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE 5-28. Analysis seeks to identify positive or negative movement toward achieving objectives or attaining end state conditions. Accurate analysis seeks to identify trends and changes that significantly impact the operation. Based on this analysis, the staff estimates the effects of force employment and resource allocation; determines whether forces have achieved their objectives; or realizes that a decision point has emerged.

5-29. Recommendations generated by staff analyses regarding achievement of the objective or attainment of the desired end state conditions, force employment, resource allocation, validity of planning assumptions, and decision points should enable the staff to develop recommendations for consideration. Recommendations can include the following:

Update, change, add, or remove critical assumptions. Transition between phases. Execute branches or sequels. Change resource allocation. Adjust objectives or end state conditions. Change or add tasks to subordinate units. Adjust priorities. Change priorities of effort. Change command relationships. Change task organizations. Adjust decision points. Refine or adapt the assessment plan.

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STEP 5 – COMMUNICATE FEEDBACK AND RECOMMENDATIONS 5-30. Assessment products contain recommendations for the commander based upon the commander’s guidance. Regardless of quality and effort, the assessment process is limited if the communication of its results is deficient or inconsistent with the commander’s personal style of assimilating information and making decisions. Additionally, there may be a requirement to provide input to higher headquarters assessments in which the requirements and feedback could be within a different construct.

STEP 6 – ADAPT PLANS OR OPERATIONS 5-31. Commanders direct changes or provide additional guidance that dictate updates or modifications to operations to drive progress of operations to objectives and end state conditions. Staffs capture the commander’s decisions and guidance to ensure forces take necessary actions. As the operation evolves, the assessment plan will evolve as well.

GUIDES TO EFFECTIVE ASSESSMENT 5-32. Throughout the conduct of operations, commanders integrate their own assessments with those of the staff, subordinate commanders, and other unified action partners in the AO. The following guides aid in effective assessment:

Commander involvement. Integration. Incorporation of the logic of the plan. Caution when establishing cause and effect.

COMMANDER INVOLVEMENT 5-33. The commander’s involvement in operation assessment is essential. The assessment plan should focus on the information and intelligence that directly support the commander’s decision making. Commanders establish priorities for assessment in their planning guidance and CCIRs. By prioritizing the effort, commanders guide the staff’s analysis efforts. Committing valuable time and energy to developing excessive and time-consuming assessment schemes squanders resources better devoted to other operations process activities. Commanders reject the tendency to measure something just because it is measurable. Effective commanders avoid burdening subordinates and staffs with overly detailed assessments and collection tasks. Generally, the echelon at which a specific operation, task, or action is conducted should be the echelon at which it is assessed.

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Commander’s Assessment: Are We Ready to Close on Baghdad Just eight days after crossing the border from Kuwait into Iraq, coalition forces neared the enemy’s outer defensive positions of Baghdad. V Corps had fought its way north from the west side of the Euphrates River as the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) attacked north on the east side. Both forces had weathered a sand storm and logisticians diligently moved supplies, fuel, and ammunition forward. Fighting continued along the V Corps line of operations from As Samawah north to An Najaf. Intense fighting was ongoing along the I MEF’s approach from Basra north to An Nasiriyah. On 28 March 2003, General David D. McKiernan, commander of the coalition force land component command, went forward to meet with his commanders, Generals James T. Conway (I MEF) and William S. Wallace (V Corps) in Jalibah. He wanted to hear directly from his subordinates concerning their “stance” for the transition from the march up-country to closing on Baghdad. The meeting began with McKiernan providing his assessment of enemy forces and results of war gaming from his staff. He then asked some key questions to his commanders, including their satisfaction with the level of risk along the lines of communications back to Kuwait. Both Wallace and Conway had some concerns they believed they needed to address prior to crossing the “red line” that referred to entering the inner defensive cordon outside of Baghdad. Wallace briefed his plan for a series of attacks designed to set the conditions for the assault to isolate Baghdad. McKiernan asked what he needed to set that stance. Wallace responded by saying he needed to position the corps by 31 March to launch his attacks on 1 April. Conway noted that the I MEF was undertaking “a systematic reduction of the bad guys in An Nasiriya” and he wanted 1 United Kingdom Armored Division to execute some “pinpoint armor strikes” in Basra. Conway also noted that Colonel Joe Dowdy (1st Regimental Combat Team commander) was in “a 270-degree fight.” After hearing his commanders, McKiernan decided to “take time to clean up and make sure we have the right stance in our battlespace before we commit into the Baghdad fight, because once we commit to the Baghdad fight, we can’t stop.” Supported by the assessment of his commanders, McKiernan ordered a transition to set conditions to isolate Baghdad.

INTEGRATION 5-34. Assessment requires integration. Assessing progress is the responsibility of all staff sections and not the purview of any one staff section or command post cell. Each staff section assesses the operation from its specific area of expertise. However, these staff sections must coordinate and integrate their individual assessments and associated recommendations across the warfighting functions to produce comprehensive assessments for the commander, particularly in protracted operations. They do this in the assessment working group.

5-35. Most assessment working groups are at higher echelons (division and above) and are more likely to be required in protracted operations. Normally, the frequency of meetings is part of a unit’s battle rhythm. The staff, however, does not wait for a scheduled working group to inform the commander on issues that require immediate attention. Nor does the staff wait to take action in those areas within its delegated authority.

5-36. The assessment working group is cross-functional by design and includes membership from across the staff, liaison personnel, and other unified action partners outside the headquarters. Commanders direct the

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chief of staff, executive officer, or a staff section leader to run the assessment working group. Typically, the operations officer, plans officer, or senior operations research and systems analysis staff section serves as the staff lead for the assessment working group.

5-37. Developing an assessment plan occurs concurrently within the steps of the MDMP. The resulting assessment plan should support the command’s battle rhythm. The frequency with which the assessment working group meets depends on the situation. Additionally, the assessment working group may present its findings and recommendations to the commander for decision. Subordinate commanders may participate and provide their assessments of operations and recommendations along with the staff. Commanders combine these assessments with their personal assessment, consider recommendations, and then direct changes to improve performance and better accomplish the mission.

INCORPORATION OF THE LOGIC OF THE PLAN 5-38. Effective assessment relies on an accurate understanding of the logic (reasoning) used to build the plan. Each plan is built on assumptions and an operational approach. The reasons or logic as to why the commander believes the plan will produce the desired results become important considerations when staffs determine how to assess operations. Recording, understanding, and making this logic explicit helps the staffs recommend the appropriate MOEs and MOPs for assessing the operation.

CAUTION WHEN ESTABLISHING CAUSE AND EFFECT 5-39. Although establishing cause and effect is sometimes difficult, it is crucial to effective assessment. Sometimes, establishing causality between actions and their effects can be relatively straightforward, such as in observing a bomb destroy a bridge. In other instances, especially regarding changes in human behavior, attitudes, and perception, establishing links between cause and effect proves difficult. Commanders and staffs must guard against drawing erroneous conclusions in these instances.

31 July 2019 ADP 5-0 Source Notes-1

Source Notes

This division lists sources by page number. Where material appears in a paragraph, it lists both the page number followed by the paragraph number.

1-1 “The best is…”: General George S. Patton, War as I Knew It (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1947), 354.

1-2 “Everything in war…”: Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Boston, MA: Princeton University Press, 1976), 119.

1-2 “Thus any study…”: B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (New York, NY: Signet Printing, 1974), 351.

1-3 “Diverse are the…”: Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke cited in Major General Werner Widder, “Auftragstaktik and Innere Fuhrung: Trademarks of German Leadership,” Military Review (September-October 2002 English Edition): 4.

1-5 Agility: Rapidly Turning the Third Army to Bastogne, Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate staff, unpublished text, 2018. Based on George S. Patton, Jr., War as I Knew It (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1947), 189–191.

1-6 “It is a mistake…”: Bernard L. Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field-Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, K.G. (Cleveland, OH: The World Publishing Company, 1958), 76.

1-9 “I suppose dozens…”: Field-Marshall Viscount William Slim, Defeat into Victory: Battling Japan in Burma and India, 1942–1945 (New York, NY: Copper Square Press, 2000), 210.

1-12 “Example whether it…”: George Washington. “From George Washington to Major General Stirling, 5 March 1780,” Founders Online, National Archives, accessed April 11, 2019, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-24-02-0525. [Original source: The Papers of George Washington, Revolutionary War Series, vol. 24, 1 January–9 March 1780, ed. Benjamin L. Huggins. Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2016, pp. 630– 632.]

1-13 “If you know…”: Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Lionel Giles (1910), 24–25. 1-14 Collaboration: Meade’s Council of War. Adapted from Steve Dundas’ blog, “A Council of

War: Meade and His Generals Decide to Stay and Fight at Gettysburg July 2nd 1863.” Blog, Padre Steve’s World (https://padresteve.com/2014/04/25/a-council-of-war-meade-and-his- generals-decide-to-stay-and-fight-at-gettysburg-july-2nd-1863/). Accessed 02 April 2018. Dundas cites quotations from Halleck, Meade, and Butterfield found in Stephen W. Sears’ Gettysburg (New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2003), 341–343.

2-1 “To be practical…”: B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (New York, NY: Signet Printing, 1974), 343–344.

2-2 “Logistics comprises the…”: Antoine Henri de Jomini, Art of War , translated by G.H. Mendell and W.P. Craighill (Philadelphia, PA: J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1862; The Internet Archive, 22 February 2009), 69. https://archive.org/details/artwar00mendgoog.

2-3 “I tell this story…”: Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Remarks at the National Defense Executive Reserve Conference,” November 14, 1957. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10951.

2-6 “In general, campaign…”: Frederick the Great as cited in Owen Connolly, On War and Leadership (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 15.

2-7 “War plans cover…”: Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Boston, MA: Princeton University Press, 1976), 579.

Source Notes

Source Notes-2 ADP 5-0 31 July 2019

2-10 “Nothing succeeds in…”: Napoleon Bonaparte, Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations, compiled by Robert Debs Heinl, Jr. (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1967), 239.

2-12 “For Alexander, Gustavus…”: Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Boston, MA: Princeton University Press, 1976), 596.

2-13 “If the art…”: Antoine Henri de Jomini, Art of War (St. Paul, MN: Greenhill Books, 2006), 114.

2-15 “It is my experience…”: Field Marshal Erwin Rommel cited in Owen Connolly, On War and Leadership (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 106.

2-18 “An order should…”: Field Service Regulations: United States Army (obsolete) (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1905), 29.

2-20 “Now the general…”: Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Lionel Giles (1910), 7. 2-22 Tenets in Action: OPERATION JUST CAUSE. FM 100-5, Operations (obsolete)

(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993), 6-3–6-4. 2-22 “It is my…”: General George S. Patton, War as I Knew It (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin

Company, 1947), 357. 2-23 “You can ask…”: Napoleon Bonaparte, Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations,

compiled by Robert Debs Heinl, Jr. (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1967), 325.

2-24 “The process of…”: FM 101-5, Staff Officers’ Field Manual: The Staff and Combat Orders (obsolete) (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1940), 37.

2-25 “Since all information …”: Carl von Clausewitz, On War, translated and edited by M. Howard and P. Paret (Boston, MA: Princeton University Press, 1976), 102.

2-25 “In war, leaders…”: Infantry In Battle (obsolete) (Washington, DC: The Infantry Journal Incorporated, 1939), 161.

3-1 “The stroke of…”: Marshal Ferdinand Foch, Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations, compiled by Robert Debs Heinl, Jr. (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1967), 239.

3-1 “Before the battle…”: Bernard Law Montgomery cited in Owen Connolly, On War and Leadership (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 153.

3-2 “Nine-tenths of tactics…”: T. E. Lawrence, “The Evolution of a Revolt,” The Army Quarterly and Defence Journal, Volume 1 (London: William Clowes & Sons, Ltd., October 1920 and January 1921), 60.

3-3 Prepare: Rangers Train for Seizing Pointe du Hoc. JoAnna M. McDonald, The Liberation of Pointe du Hoc: the 2nd U.S. Rangers at Normandy (Redondo Beach, CA: Rank and File Publications, 2000).

3-4 “If I always…”: Napoleon Bonaparte, Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations, compiled by Robert Debs Heinl, Jr. (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1967), 239.

3-6 “In no other…”: General Douglas MacArthur, Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations, compiled by Robert Debs Heinl, Jr. (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1967), 329.

3-7 “Sand-Table Exercises…”: General George S. Patton, War as I Knew It (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1947), 354.

3-9 Large-Unit Preparation: Third Army Readies for OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM. Adapted from Gregory Fontenot, On Point: United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 29–84.

4-1 “No plan of…”: Helmuth von Moltke, Moltke’s Military Works, Vol. 4, War Lessons, Part I, “Operative Preparations for Battle,” translated by Harry Bell (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Service Schools, 1916), 66.

Source Notes

31 July 2019 ADP 5-0 Source Notes-3

4-1 4-2 “…one makes plans…”: George S. Patton Jr., The Patton Papers, vol. 2, 1940–1945, ed. Martin Blumenson (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1974), 648.

4-1 “I am heartily…”: Ulysses S. Grant quoted in Horace Porter, Campaigning with Grant (New York, NY: The Century Co., 1907), 70.

4-2 “I have found…”: Erwin Rommel, The Rommel Papers, edited by B. H. Liddell-Hart (New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1953), 7.

4-3 “To be at the…”: General William Tecumseh Sherman, Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman (New York, NY: D. Appleton & Company, 1891; The Project Gutenberg, 10 June 2004 [EBook #5853]), 407. https://ia802605.us.archive.org/23/items/thememoirsofgene05853gut/5853.txt.

4-4 “The commander’s mission…”: FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations: Operations (obsolete) (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1941), 24.

4-5 “In war obscurity…”: Infantry In Battle (obsolete) (Washington, DC: The Infantry Journal Incorporated, 1939), 16.

4-7 Decision Making During Execution: Chamberlain at Little Round Top. Vignette adapted from Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain, “Through Blood and Fire at Gettysburg: General Joshua Chamberlain and the 20th Maine,” Hearst’s Magazine Vol. 23 (New York, NY: Charles Schweinier Press, January 1913), 894–909. Available at http://www.joshualawrencechamberlain.com/bloodandfire.php. Also adapted from H. S. Melcher, “The 20th Maine at Little Round Top,” Battles and Leaders of the Civil War Vol. 3, Condensed from the “Lincoln County News,” Waldoboro, Maine, March 13th, 1885. Available at http://www.joshualawrencechamberlain.com/20me7.php.

5-1 “Estimation of the…”: FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations: Operations (obsolete) (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1941), 26.

5-3 “While attrition formed…”: Gregory A. Daddis, No Sure Victory: Measuring U.S. Army Effectiveness and Progress in the Vietnam War (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011), 7.

5-5 Measures of Effectiveness: OPERATION SUPPORT HOPE. Adapted from John E. Lange “Civilian-Military Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance: Lessons from Rwanda,” Parameters (Summer 1998): 106–122.

5-6 Commander’s Assessment: Are We Ready to Close on Baghdad. Adapted from Gregory Fontenot, On Point: United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 245.

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31 July 2019 ADP 5-0 Glossary-1

Glossary

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. Where Army and joint definitions differ, (Army) precedes the definition. Terms for which ADP 5-0 is the proponent are marked with an asterisk (*). The proponent publication for other terms is listed in parentheses after the definition.

SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ADM Army design methodology ADP Army doctrine publication

ADRP Army doctrine reference publication AO area of operations

ATP Army techniques publication CCIR commander’s critical information requirement

CCP combatant command campaign plan CJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual

COA course of action DA Department of the Army FM field manual

FRAGORD fragmentary order GCC geographic combatant commander

IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield JP joint publication

LNO liaison officer MDMP military decision-making process

MOE measure of effectiveness MOP measure of performance

OE operational environment OPLAN operation plan OPORD operation order

RDSP rapid decision-making and synchronization process SOP standard operating procedure TLP troop leading procedures

Glossary

Glossary-2 ADP 5-0 31 July 2019

U.S. United States WARNORD warning order

SECTION II – TERMS *Army design methodology

A methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe problems and approaches to solving them.

assessment The determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective. (JP 3-0)

battle rhythm A deliberate, daily schedule of command, staff, and unit activities intended to maximize use of time and synchronize staff actions. (JP 3-33)

branch The contingency options built into the base plan used for changing the mission, orientation, or direction of movement of a force to aid success of the operation based on anticipated events, opportunities, or disruptions caused by enemy actions and reactions. (JP 5-0)

campaign plan A joint operation plan for a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic or operational objectives within a given time and space. (JP 5-0)

center of gravity The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. (JP 5-0)

*collaborative planning Two or more echelons planning together in real time, sharing information, perceptions, and ideas to develop their respective plans simultaneously.

combat power (Army) The total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit or formation can apply at a given time. (ADP 3-0)

command and control The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. (JP 1)

commander’s critical information requirement An information requirement identified by the commander as being critical to facilitating timely decision making. (JP 3-0)

commander’s intent A clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired military end state that supports mission command, provides focus to the staff, and helps subordinate and supporting commanders act to achieve the commander’s desired results without further orders, even when the operation does not unfold as planned. (JP 3-0)

commander’s visualization The mental process of developing situational understanding, determining a desired end state, and envisioning an operational approach by which the force will achieve that end state. (ADP 6-0)

*confirmation brief A brief subordinate leaders give to the higher commander immediately after the operation order is given to confirm understanding.

Glossary

31 July 2019 ADP 5-0 Glossary-3

*concept of operations (Army) A statement that directs the manner in which subordinate units cooperate to accomplish the mission and establishes the sequence of actions the force will use to achieve the end state.

control measure A means of regulating forces or warfighting functions. (ADP 6-0)

coordinated fire line A line beyond which conventional surface-to-surface direct fire and indirect fire support means may fire at any time within the boundaries of the establishing headquarters without additional coordination but does not eliminate the responsibility to coordinate the airspace required to conduct the mission. (JP 3-09)

culminating point The point at which a force no longer has the capability to continue its form of operations, offense or defense. (JP 5-0)

decision point A point in space and time when the commander or staff anticipates making a key decision concerning a specific course of action. (JP 5-0)

*decision support matrix A written record of a war-gamed course of action that describes decision points and associated actions at those decision points.

decision support template A combined intelligence and operations graphic based on the results of wargaming that depicts decision points, timelines associated with movement of forces and the flow of the operation, and other key items of information required to execute a specific friendly course of action. (JP 2-01.3)

decisive point A geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy or contribute materially to achieving success. (JP 5-0)

depth The extension of operations in time, space, or purpose to achieve definitive results. (ADP 3-0)

end state The set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander’s objectives. (JP 3-0)

essential element of friendly information A critical aspect of a friendly operation that, if known by a threat would subsequently compromise, lead to failure, or limit success of the operation and therefore should be protected from enemy detection. (ADP 6-0)

*evaluating Using indicators to judge progress toward desired conditions and determining why the current degree of progress exists.

*execution The act of putting a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission and adjusting operations based on changes in the situation.

*execution matrix A visual representation of subordinate tasks in relationship to each other over time.

flexibility The employment of a versatile mix of capabilities, formations, and equipment for conducting operations. (ADP 3-0)

Glossary

Glossary-4 ADP 5-0 31 July 2019

friendly force information requirement Information the commander and staff need to understand the status of friendly force and supporting capabilities. (JP 3-0)

graphic control measure A symbol used on maps and displays to regulate forces and warfighting functions. (ADP 6-0)

indicator In the context of assessment, a specific piece of information that infers the condition, state, or existence of something, and provides a reliable means to ascertain performance or effectiveness. (JP 5-0)

information collection An activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of sensors and assets as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. (FM 3-55)

intelligence preparation of the battlefield The systematic process of analyzing the mission variables of enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations in an area of interest to determine their effect on operations. (ATP 2-01.3)

key tasks Those activities the force must perform as a whole to achieve the desired end state. (ADP 6-0)

knowledge management The process of enabling knowledge flow to enhance shared understanding, learning, and decision making. (ADP 6-0)

leadership The activity of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization. (ADP 6-22)

levels of warfare A framework for defining and clarifying the relationship among national objectives, the operational approach, and tactical tasks. (ADP 1-01)

line of effort (Army) A line that links multiple tasks using the logic of purpose rather than geographical reference to focus efforts toward establishing a desired end state. (ADP 3-0)

line of operations A line that defines the directional orientation of a force in time and space in relation to the enemy and links the force with its base of operations and objectives. (ADP 3-0)

main effort A designated subordinate unit whose mission at a given point in time is most critical to overall mission success. (ADP 3-0)

measure of effectiveness An indicator used to measure a current system state, with change indicated by comparing multiple observations over time. (JP 5-0)

measure of performance A indicator used to measure a friendly action that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. (JP 5-0)

*military decision-making process An iterative planning methodology to understand the situation and mission, develop a course of action, and produce an operation plan or order.

Glossary

31 July 2019 ADP 5-0 Glossary-5

mission The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefore. (JP 3-0)

mission command (Army) The Army’s approach to command and control that empowers subordinate decision making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation. (ADP 6-0)

mission orders Directives that emphasize to subordinates the results to be attained, not how they are to achieve them. (ADP 6-0)

*monitoring Continuous observation of those conditions relevant to the current operation.

multinational operations A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. (JP 3-16).

*nested concepts A planning technique to achieve unity of purpose whereby each succeeding echelon’s concept of operations is aligned by purpose with the higher echelons’ concept of operations.

objective The clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which an operation is directed. (JP 5-0)

operational approach A broad description of the mission, operational concepts, tasks, and actions required to accomplish the mission. (JP 5-0)

operational art The cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means. (JP 3-0)

operational environment A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (JP 3-0)

operational level of warfare The level of warfare at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas. (JP 3-0)

operational reach The distance and duration across which a force can successfully employ military capabilities. (JP 3-0)

*operations process The major command and control activities performed during operations: planning, preparing, executing, and continuously assessing the operation.

*parallel planning Two or more echelons planning for the same operations nearly simultaneously facilitated by the use of warning orders by the higher headquarters.

phase (Army) A planning and execution tool used to divide an operation in duration or activity. (ADP 3-0)

*planning The art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and determining effective ways to bring that future about.

Glossary

Glossary-6 ADP 5-0 31 July 2019

*planning horizon A point in time commanders use to focus the organization’s planning efforts to shape future events.

*preparation Those activities performed by units and Soldiers to improve their ability to execute an operation.

priority intelligence requirement An intelligence requirement that the commander and staff need to understand the threat and other aspects of the operational environment. (JP 2-01)

*priority of support A priority set by the commander to ensure a subordinate unit has support in accordance with its relative importance to accomplish the mission.

*rehearsal A session in which the commander and staff or unit practices expected actions to improve performance during execution.

risk management The process to identify, assess, and control risks and make decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits. (JP 3-0)

route The prescribed course to be traveled from a specific point of origin to a specific destination. (FM 3-90-1)

*running estimate The continuous assessment of the current situation used to determine if the current operation is proceeding according to the commander’s intent and if planned future operations are supportable.

sequel The subsequent operation or phase based on the possible outcomes of the current operation or phase. (JP 5-0)

simultaneity The execution of related and mutually supporting tasks at the same time across multiple locations and domains. (ADP 3-0)

situational understanding The product of applying analysis and judgment to relevant information to determine the relationships among the operational and mission variables. (ADP 6-0)

strategic level of warfare The level of warfare at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance, then develops and uses national resources to achieve those objectives. (JP 3-0)

synchronization The arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time. (JP 2-0)

tactical level of warfare The level of warfare at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. (JP 3-0)

targeting The process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities. (JP 3-0)

*task organization (Army) A temporary grouping of forces designed to accomplish a particular mission.

Glossary

31 July 2019 ADP 5-0 Glossary-7

task-organizing The act of designing a force, support staff, or sustainment package of specific size and composition to meet a unique task or mission. (ADP 3-0)

tempo The relative speed and rhythm of military operations over time with respect to the enemy. (ADP 3-0)

tenets of operations Desirable attributes that should be built into all plans and operations and are directly related to the Army’s operational concept. (ADP 1-01)

*troop leading procedures A dynamic process used by small-unit leaders to analyze a mission, develop a plan, and prepare for an operation.

unified land operations Simultaneous execution of offense, defense, stability, and defense support of civil authorities across multiple domains to shape operational environments, prevent conflict, prevail in large-scale ground combat, and consolidate gains as part of unified action. (ADP 3-0)

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31 July 2019 ADP 5-0 References-1

References

All URLs accessed on 17 June 2019.

REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS Readers require these publications for fundamental concepts, terms, and definitions. DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. June 2019. ADP 1-02. Terms and Military Symbols. 14 August 2018. ADP 3-0. Operations. 31 July 2019.

RELATED PUBLICATIONS These publications are referenced in this publication.

JOINT PUBLICATIONS Joint publications and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directives are available at

https://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/. CJCSM 3130.03A. Planning and Execution Planning Formats and Guidance. JP 1. Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. 25 March 2013. JP 2-0. Joint Intelligence. 22 October 2013. JP 2-01. Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations. 05 July 2017. JP 2-01.3. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment. 21 May 2014. JP 3-0. Joint Operations. 17 January 2017. JP 3-09. Joint Fire Support. 10 April 2019. JP 3-16. Multinational Operations. 01 March 2019. JP 3-31. Joint Land Operations. 24 February 2014. JP 3-33. Joint Task Force Headquarters. 31 January 2018. JP 3-34. Joint Engineer Operations. 06 January 2016. JP 5-0. Joint Planning. 16 June 2017.

ARMY PUBLICATIONS Army doctrinal publications are available at https://armypubs.army.mil/. ADP 1-01. Doctrine Primer. 31 July 2019. ADP 2-0. Intelligence. 31 July 2019. ADP 3-37. Protection. 31 July 2019. ADP 3-90. Offense and Defense. 31 July 2019. ADP 6-0. Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces. 31 July 2019 ADP 6-22. Army Leadership. 31 July 2019. ATP 2-01.3. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. 01 March 2019. ATP 3-37.10/MCRP 3-40D.13. Base Camps. 27 January 2017. ATP 3-60. Targeting. 07 May 2015. ATP 5-0.1. Army Design Methodology. 01 July 2015.

References

References-2 ADRP 5-0 31 July 2019

ATP 5-0.3/MCRP 5-1C/NTTP 5-01.3/AFTTP 3-2.87. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Operation Assessment. 18 August 2015.

ATP 5-19. Risk Management. 14 April 2014. ATP 6-0.5. Command Post Organization and Operations. 01 March 2017. ATP 6-01.1. Techniques for Effective Knowledge Management. 06 March 2015. FM 3-0. Operations. 06 October 2017. FM 3-16. The Army in Multinational Operations. 08 April 2014. FM 3-34. Engineer Operations. 02 April 2014. FM 3-55. Information Collection. 03 May 2013. FM 3-90-1. Offense and Defense, Volume 1. 22 March 2013. FM 6-0. Commander and Staff Organization and Operations. 05 May 2014. FM 27-10. The Law of Land Warfare. 18 July 1956.

OBSOLETE PUBLICATIONS This section contains references to obsolete historical doctrine. The Archival and Special Collections

in the Combined Arms Research Library (CARL), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas contains copies. These publications are obsolete doctrine publications referenced for citations only.

Field Service Regulations: United States Army. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1905. FM 101-5. Staff Officers Field Manual. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1940. FM 100-5. Field Service Regulations: Operations. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office,

1941. FM 100-5. Operations. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993.

OTHER PUBLICATIONS This section contains other references. All websites accessed 28 June 2018. Allied Tactical Publication 3.2.2. Command and Control of Allied Forces. 15 December 2016. Blumenson, Martin ed. The Patton Papers. Vol. 2. 1940–1945. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Co.,

1974. Chamberlain, Joshua Lawrence. “Through Blood and Fire at Gettysburg: General Joshua Chamberlain

and the 20th Maine.” Hearst’s Magazine. Vol. 23. January 1913, 894–909. Available at http://www.joshualawrencechamberlain.com/bloodandfire.php.

Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Boston, MA: Princeton University Press, 1976. Connolly, Owen. On War and Leadership. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002. Daddis, Gregory A. No Sure Victory: Measuring U.S. Army Effectiveness and Progress in the Vietnam

War. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011. Dundas, Steve. Blog. “A Council of War: Meade and His Generals Decide to Stay and Fight at

Gettysburg July 2nd 1863.” Padre Steve’s World. https://padresteve.com/2014/04/25/a- council-of-war-meade-and-his-generals-decide-to-stay-and-fight-at-gettysburg-july-2nd- 1863/.

Eisenhower, Dwight D. “Remarks at the National Defense Executive Reserve Conference.” November 14, 1957. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/233951.

Fontenot, Gregory. On Point: United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004.

Global Force Management Implementation Guidance. 2016. This document is classified and not releasable to the public.

Guidance for Employment of the Force. 2015. This document is classified and not releasable to the public.

References

31 July 2019 ADP 5-0 References-3

Harrison, Gordon A. Cross-Channel Attack. Washington, DC: Center of Military History United States Army, 2002.

Hart, B. H. Liddell. Strategy. New York, NY: Signet Printing, 1974. Heinl, Robert Debs Jr., ed. Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations. Annapolis, MD: United

States Naval Institute, 1967. Historical Division. Utah Beach to Cherbourg. Washington, DC: History Division, Department of the

Army, 1949. Infantry in Battle. Washington, DC: The Infantry Journal Incorporated, 1939. John E. Lange “Civilian-Military Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance: Lessons from Rwanda.”

Parameters. Summer 1998, 106–122. Joint Strategic Campaign Plan. This document is classified and not releasable to the public. Jomini, Antoine Henri de. Art of War. Translated by G. H. Mendell and W. P. Craighill. Philadelphia,

PA: J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1862. 17 November 2006. https://books.google.com/books?id=nZ4fAAAAMAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_at b#v=onepage&q&f=false.

Lawrence, T. E. “The Evolution of a Revolt.” The Army Quarterly Volume 1. London: William Clowes & Sons, Ltd. October 1920 and January 1921, 60.

McDonald, JoAnna M. The Liberation of Pointe du Hoc: the 2nd U.S. Rangers at Normandy. Redondo Beach, CA: Rank and File Publications, 2000.

Melcher, H. S. “The 20th Maine at Little Round Top.” Battles and Leaders of the Civil War Vol. 3. Condensed from the “Lincoln County News.” Waldoboro, Maine, March 13th, 1885. Available at http://www.joshualawrencechamberlain.com/20me7.php.

Moltke, Helmuth von. Moltke’s Military Works Vol. 4, War Lessons, Part I. “Operative Preparations for Battle.” Translated by Harry Bell. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Service Schools, 1916.

Montgomery, Bernard L. The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery. Cleveland, OH: The World Publishing Company, 1958.

National Defense Strategy of the United States. 2018. https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jel/other_pubs/nds2018.pdf.

National Military Strategy of the United States. 2015. https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jel/other_pubs/nms_2015.pdf.

National Security Strategy of the United States. 2017. https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jel/other_pubs/nss2017.pdf.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization Standardization Agreement 2199. Command and Control of Allied Land Forces.

Patton, George S. War as I Knew It. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1947. Porter, Horace. Campaigning with Grant. New York, NY: The Century Co., 1907. Rommel, Erwin. The Rommel Papers. Edited by B. H. Liddell-Hart. New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace,

and Company, 1953. Sears, Stephen W. Gettysburg. New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2003. Sherman, William Tecumseh. Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman. New York, NY: Penguin Books,

2000. Slim, Viscount William. Defeat into Victory: Battling Japan in Burma and India, 1942–1945. New

York, NY: Copper Square Press, 2000. Sun Tzu. Sun Tzu on the Art of War. Translated by Lionel Giles. London: Luzac and Co. 1910. Unified Command Plan. 2011. Washington, George. “From George Washington to Major General Stirling, 5 March 1780.” Founders

Online, National Archives. https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-24-02- 0525.

References

References-4 ADRP 5-0 31 July 2019

Widder, Werner. “Auftragstaktik and Innere Fuhrung: Trademarks of German Leadership.” Military Review. September–October 2002 (English Edition), 3–9.

PRESCRIBED FORMS This section contains no entries.

REFERENCED FORMS Unless otherwise indicated, DA forms are available on the Army Publishing Directorate website:

https://armypubs.army.mil/. DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.

31 July 2019 ADP 5-0 Index-1

Index

Entries are by paragraph number.

A actions, direct, coordinate, and

synchronize, 2-29–2-33 directing, 4-34–4-35 sequencing, 2-75 taking, 4-8

activities, assessment, 5-7–5-23 battle rhythm, 1-82–1-83 execution, 4-24–4-35 operations process, 1-20–1-24 planning, 2-85 preparation, 3-12–3-33

adjustment decisions, 4-29 analysis, goals, 5-29

span of control and, 2-21 Army command relationships,

2-22–2-24 Army design methodology, 2-89–

2-91 defined, 2-89

Army Ethic, operations process, 1-19

Army support relationships, 2-25– 2-26

art of command, risk, 4-12 art of planning, 2-11–2-13 assess, commander, 1-49

effectiveness, 1-49 assessment, activities, 5-7–5-23

approach, 5-24–5-25 characteristics, 5-7 defined, 5-1 directing action, 5-20–5-22 during execution, 4-16–4-17 effective, 5-32–5-39 execution, 4-25–4-26 formal, 5-5 fundamentals, 5-1–5-6 guides to, 5-32–5-39 informal, 5-6 measures, 5-15 operations process and, 1-24 resources, 5-5 results from, 5-22 working group, 5-35–5-36

assessment approach, 5-24–5-25 assessment plan, 5-33

developing, 5-26, 5-37 assessment process, 5-23–5-31 assumptions, develop, 2-135–

2-138

B–C basing, 2-81 battle rhythm, activities, 1-82

characteristics, 1-82 operations process and,

1-¬81–1-83 branch, defined, 2-39 brief, confirmation, 3-27 campaign plan, defined, 2-46 cause and effect, 5-39 CCIR, defined, 1-40

influences on, 1-41 visualization and, 1-40–1-43

center of gravity, 2-62–2-63 decisive point and, 2-65 defined, 2-62 use of, 2-63

challenges, analysis, 5-18 assessment and, 5-23, 5-39 battle rhythm, 1-83 developing solutions, 1-34,

2-15–2-17 multinational operations, 1-29 operations, 1-5–1-6 planning, 2-132, 2-139–2-143 plans, 2-33 situations, 1-25 thinking and, 1-69

changes, plans, 2-38 checks, conduct, 3-22 circumstances, adapt to, 2-34–

2-40 collaboration, operations process,

1-61–1-62 shared understanding, 1-33

collaborative planning, defined, 2-129

command, risk and, 1-78 command and control, defined,

1-11 implementing, 1-15

commander’s critical information requirement. See CCIR.

commander’s estimate, situational understanding and, 1-57

commander’s intent, 2-103–2-105 defined, 1-38

commander’s planning guidance, visualization and, 1-39

commander’s visualization, 2-18 characteristics of, 1-38–1-44 defined, 1-34 describe, 1-37 execution, 4-25

commanders, battle rhythm and, 1-83 center of gravity, 2-63 considerations, 2-18, 4-36 critical thinking, 1-66 decisions, 4-11 drive the operations process,

1-11–1-46 focus, 4-18 guidance, 2-60, 2-128 initiative, 4-5 involvement, 5-33 operational art, 2-52 planning, 2-87 planning focus, 2-118 preparation guides, 3-8 responsibilities, 2-94, 2-116,

3-18, 4-34 role, 1-31 support to, 4-31 support to, 2-64 tools of, 2-30

communication, situational understanding and, 1-63

communications, liaison, 3-14 concept of operations, 2-106–

2-109 defined, 2-106 operational art, 2-53

conceptual planning, 2-85 Army design methodology,

2-91 conditions, creating, 4-8

end state, 2-59–2-61 evaluating, 5-19

Index

Entries are by paragraph number.

Index-2 ADRP 5-0 31 July 2019

confirmation brief, defined, 3-27 control measure, 2-30–2-31

defined, 2-30 coordination, liaison, 3-13–3-15

plans, 2-120 risk, 1-80 targeting and, 1-77

creative thinking, 2-11 apply, 1-65–1-70 approach for, 1-68 results from, 1-67

critical thinking, apply, 1-65–1-70 results from, 1-66

culminating point, defined, 2-80

D decision making, 4-27 decision point, defined, 2-37 decision support matrix, defined,

4-32 decision support template, 4-32

defined, 2-38 decisions, types of execution,

4-27–4-30 decisive point, 2-64–2-67

defined, 2-64 defeat mechanisms, applying,

2-55 types, 2-54

depth, defined, 2-114 describe, commanders

visualization, 1-37–1-44 detailed planning, 2-86 direct, commanders, 1-45 domains, multiple, 2-113 drive the operations process,

principle, 1-31–1-49

E efforts, prioritize, 2-18–2-28 end state, 2-105

conditions and, 2-59–2-61, 2-68

defined, 2-59 environment, effects of, 1-25

mission command, 1-13 essential element of friendly

information, defined, 1-44 ethical reasoning, thinking and,

1-69 evaluating, 5-13–5-19

defined, 5-13 results of, 5-21

events, forecast, 2-140

plan for, 2-34–2-40, 5-2 execution, activities, 4-24–4-35

defined, 4-1 fundamentals, 4-1–4-3 guides, 4-4–4-17 operations process, 1-23 responsibilities, 4-18–4-23

execution decisions, 4-28 execution matrix, defined, 4-33

F facts, determine, 2-135–2-138 feedback, 5-30 flexibility, defined, 2-117

execution and, 4-3 lack of, 2-142, 2-143

forces, integration, 3-21 positioning, 3-7, 3-18 protect, 3-10 task organize, 2-18–2-28

framework, operation, 2-100 friendly force information

requirement, defined, 1-43 functions, planning, 2-14–2-40 fundamentals, the operations

process, 1-1–1-72

G–H–I gambling, risk, 2-83 goal, operations process, 1-17 graphic control measure, defined,

2-109 guidance, assessment, 5-3

planning, 1-39 guides, execution, 4-4–4-17 human endeavor, 1-4 indicator, defined, 5-14

types, 5-15–5-17 influences, CCIR and, 1-41 information, analysis, 2-136, 5-28

assessment, 5-9 gather, 2-135 mission variables, 1-52–1-53 operational variables, 1-52–

1-53information collection, 1-59, 5-11, 5-27

defined, 1-74 integrating process, 1-74–1-75 preparation, 3-16 results from, 1-75 steps of, 1-74

information requirements, 5-10 decisions on, 1-40

initiative, execution and, 4-4 seize and retain, 4-5–4-12

inspections, conduct, 3-22 integrate, task-organize and, 3-6

warfighting functions, 1-71 integrating processes, types of,

1-71–1-81 integration, 5-34–5-37

forces, 4-23 intelligence, situational

understanding and, 1-59–160 intelligence preparation of the

battlefield. See IPB. intelligence process, 1-60 interrelated options, planning and,

2-12–2-13 IPB, defined, 1-72

described, 1-49 integrating process, 1-72–1-73 steps of, 1-73

J–K–L joint, plan, 2-49 joint forces, support to, 1-10 key tasks, defined, 2-104 knowledge management, defined,

1-81 large-scale ground combat,

characteristics, 1-6 lead, commanders, 1-46–1-48 leaders, considerations, 3-11

qualities, 1-14 responsibilities, 3-33, 5-4 support to, 2-14 tasks, 4-21

leadership, defined, 1-46 levels of warfare, defined, 2-41

planning and, 2-41–2-51 roles, 2-42

liaison, coordinate, 3-13–3-15 situational understanding and,

1-63–1-64 line of effort, 2-68–2-72

defined, 2-72 line of operations, 2-68–2-72

categories of, 2-70 defined, 2-69 exterior, 2-71 interior, 2-70 use of, 2-68

location, commander, 1-48 logic, plan building and, 5-38

M managing, time, 2-127 measure, assessment, 5-15–5-17

graphic control, 2-109

Index

Entries are by paragraph number.

31 July 2019 ADP 5-0 Index-3

measure of effectiveness, defined, 5-17

measure of performance, defined, 5-15

mechanism, defeat, 2-54–2-55 stability, 2-56

military action, rate, 2-73 military decision-making process,

2-92–2-94 defined, 2-92

mission, defined, 2-101 mission command, 1-11–1-14

approach, 1-1 defined, 1-12 principles of, 1-14 risk and, 2-83

mission order, defined, 2-124 details in, 2-126 plans, 2-119–2-126

mission statement, 2-101–2-102 elements, 2-101

mission variables, situational understanding and, 1-52–1-53

momentum, build and maintain, 4-13–4-15

monitoring, action and, 5-20 assessment, 5-9–5-12 defined, 5-9

movements, troop, 3-18 multinational operations, defined,

1-28

N–O nature of operations, 1-1–1-8

dynamic and uncertain, 1-5– 1-6

human endeavor, 1-4 nested concepts, defined, 2-108 network, preparation, 3-24 objective, decisive point and, 2-67

principle of war, 1-7 operational approach, defined,

1-35 operational art and, 2-53–2-56 visualize and, 1-36

operational art, 2-52–2-84 applying, 2-57–2-58 defined, 2-52 elements of, 2-57–2-84

operational concept, Army’s, 1-9 operational framework, initial, 1-36 operational level, planning, 2-46–

2-49 operational level of warfare,

defined, 2-46

operational reach, defined, 2-79 operational variables, situational

understanding and, 1-52–1-53 operations, adapting, 5-31

command and control, 1-11 context, 1-55 human endeavors in, 1-4 joint, 2-46 nature of, 1-1–1-8 political purpose of, 1-7–1-8 purpose, 2-103 security, 3-17

operations process, activities, 1-20–1-24 assessment, 1-24 by echelon, 1-26–1-27 changing character, 1-25–1-27 commander’s role, 1-31–1-49 defined, 1-15 employment, 1-16 framework, 1-15–1-29 fundamentals of, 1-1–1-72 goal, 1-17 multinational operations, 1-28–

1-29 principles of, 1-30–1-70

opportunities, exploiting, 4-9 momentum, 4-13 risk and, 4-10

order, 2-109 details, 4-38 plan and, 2-5–2-7 rapid decision-making and

synchronization process, 4-37

task organization and, 3-20 organization, communications,

3-15

P–Q parallel planning, defined, 2-130 phase, change, 2-77

defined, 2-76 transitions and, 2-75–2-78

planners, considerations, 2-112 planning, activities, 2-85

aids, 2-110 assessment, 5-24 challenges, 2-84, 2-132 commander input, 2-87 defined, 2-1 detail, 2-141 effective, 2-110–2-138 functions of, 2-14–2-40 fundamentals, 2-1–2-7 goals, 2-51 guidance, 1-20–1-21 guides for, 2-110–2-138

integrated, 2-85–2-99 levels of warfare, 2-41–2-51 liaison, 3-13 methodologies, 2-88 nesting, 2-50 operations process, 1-21 pitfalls, 2-139–2-143 plans and, 2-1–2-5 range, 2-134 science and art of, 2-8–2-13 techniques, 2-4 time, 2-35 value of, 2-6–2-7

planning horizon, defined, 2-133 focus, 2-132–2-134

plans, adapting, 5-31 assessment, 5-33, 5-37 challenges to, 2-33 combatant command

campaign, 2-47 complex, 2-120 components of, 2-100–2-109 developing, 2-119–2-126 effects on, 4-24 execution and, 4-2 flexibility, 2-123, 4-35 joint, 2-49 long-range, 2-90 modifying, 4-35 order and, 2-5–2-7 refine, 2-36, 3-32 simple, 2-121–2-122 support, 2-48 task organization in, 2-20 understanding, 3-4

policy, security, 2-44 positioning, commanders, 4-19

forces and resources, 3-7 pre-operation, checks, 3-22 preparation, activities, 3-12–3-33

defined, 3-1 functions, 3-2–3-7 fundamentals, 3-1–3-7 guides to, 3-8–3-11 liaison, 3-13 operations process, 1-22 prioritize, 3-9

presence, lead, 1-47 principle of war, simplicity, 2-119 priorities, determining, 2-18–2-28

preparation efforts, 3-9 priority intelligence requirement,

1-25 defined, 1-42

priority of support, defined, 2-28 problem, identifying, 2-90

solving, 2-97

Index

Entries are by paragraph number.

ADRP 5-0 31 July 2019

R rapid decision-making and

synchronization process, 2-98, 4-36–4-38

readiness, assessment, 5-3 reasoning, ethical, 1-69 recommendations, creating, 1-56 reframing, Army design

methodology, 2-91 rehearsal, defined, 3-28 relationships, command and

support, 2-22–2-27 resources, 3-23

adjusting, 4-30 assessment, 5-5 positioning, 3-7

risk, accept, 2-82, 4-10–4-12 decision making, 4-28 operational art, 2-82–2-84

risk management, defined, 1-79 integrating processes, 1-78–

1-80 role, commander, 1-18, 1-31

leaders, 1-18 operations process, 1-31–1-49 staff, 1-18 strategic, 1-9

running estimate, defined, 1-54 situational understanding and,

1-54–1-58

S science of planning, 2-8–2-10 security, force, 3-10

policy, 2-44 security operations, preparation,

3-17 sequel, defined, 2-40 shared understanding,

collaboration, 1-33 simplicity, 2-119 simultaneity, 2-112–2-113

defined, 2-112 situational understanding, build

and maintain, 1-50–1-64 defined, 1-50 preparation, 3-3 tools to share, 1-51–1-64

situations, understanding, 2-15– 2-17

solutions, developing, 2-15–2-17 span of control, 2-21 speed, 4-14

Index-4

stability mechanisms, efforts from, 2-56

staff, considerations, 3-30, 5-24– 5-25, 5-29 coordination, 5-34 decisive points and, 2-66 execution, 4-22–4-23 responsibilities, 2-104, 5-12,

5-21 support to, 4-31

strategic level, planning, 2-43– 2-45

strategic level of warfare, defined, 2-43

strategy, update, 2-45 structure, planning, 2-3–2-4 subordinates, support to, 2-131

tasks, 4-20 success, exploit, 4-16–4-17 supervise, details, 3-33 supervise, preparation and, 3-11 support plan, 2-48 sustainment, preparation, 3-23 synchronization, 2-32, 2-115–

2-116 defined, 2-115 initiative and, 4-6 momentum and, 4-15 plan, 2-47

synchronize, force, 1-71

T tactical level, planning, 2-50–2-51 tactical level of warfare, defined,

2-50 targeting, defined, 1-76

integrating processes, 1-76– 1-77

steps of, 1-76 task organization, defined, 2-20

preparation, 3-19 task-organizing, defined, 2-19

integrating and, 3-6 tasks, critical, 2-104, 3-5 tempo, 2-73–2-74

defined, 2-73 influenced by, 2-74

tenets of operations, defined, 2-111

tenets of unified land operations, planning aid, 2-111–2-117

terrain, management, 1-62, 3-25 preparation, 3-26

thinking, detailed and conceptual, 2-88 influences of, 1-65 operations process and, 1-65–

1-70 time, optimize for planning,

2-127–2-131 planning, 2-35 prioritize, 3-9 transition, 3-30

tools, decision making, 4-31–4-33 intellectual, 2-57

training, critical tasks, 3-5 preparation, 3-21

transition, phasing and, 2-75–2-78 plans to operations, 3-29–3-31 priorities and, 2-78 understanding, 3-4

troop leading procedures, 2-95– 2-98 defined, 2-95 steps, 2-96

trust, liaison and, 1-64

U uncertainty, planning, 2-14

plans, 2-34 understand, 1-12–1-13

commanders, 1-32–1-33 preparation, 3-12

understanding, 2-85 improve situational, 3-3 opportunities, 4-9 sharing, 1-51 situations, 2-15–2-17 subordinates, 3-27 transition, 3-4

unified land operations, defined, 1-9 operational concept, 1-9–1-10

V variables, situational

understanding and, 1-52–1-53 variance, 4-26

decision making, 4-28 visualize, activities to, 1-35

commanders, 1-34–1-36

W–X–Y–Z warfare, levels of, 2-41–2-51 warfighting functions, integrating,

1-71 working group, assessment, 5-35–

5-36

ADP 5-0 31 July 9

DISTRIBUTION: Active Army, Army National Guard, and United States Army Reserve: istributed in

110412 DP 5-0.

1919807

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  • Cover
  • Contents
  • Preface
  • Acknowledgements
  • Introduction
  • Chapter 1- Fundamentals of the Operations Process
  • Chapter 2- Planning
  • Chapter 3- Preparation
  • Chapter 4- Execution
  • Chapter 5- Assessment
  • Source Notes
  • Glossary
  • References
  • Index

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ADP_6-0_MISSION COMMAND - Command and Control of Army Forces.pdf

This publication is available at the Army Publishing Directorate site

(https://armypubs.army.mil/) and the Central Army Registry site

(https://atiam.train.army.mil/catalog/dashboard).

*ADP 6-0

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

This publication supersedes ADP 6-0, dated 17 May 2012, and ADRP 6-0, dated 17 May 2012.

ADP 6-0 i

Army Doctrine Publication

No. 6-0 Headquarters

Department of the Army Washington, D.C., 31 July 2019

Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces

Contents

Page

PREFACE.................................................................................................................... iii

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ vii

Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION TO MISSION COMMAND ............................................................ 1-1 The Nature of Operations .......................................................................................... 1-1 Unified Land Operations ............................................................................................ 1-2 Mission Command ..................................................................................................... 1-3 Principles of Mission Command ................................................................................ 1-6 The Role of Subordinates in Mission Command ..................................................... 1-14 Command and Control ............................................................................................ 1-16 The Command and Control Warfighting Function ................................................... 1-19 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 1-21

Chapter 2 COMMAND................................................................................................................ 2-1 Nature of Command .................................................................................................. 2-1 Elements of Command .............................................................................................. 2-1 The Role of Commanders in Operations ................................................................. 2-12 Guides to Effective Command ................................................................................. 2-16 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 2-24

Chapter 3 CONTROL ................................................................................................................. 3-1 Nature of Control ....................................................................................................... 3-1 Elements of Control ................................................................................................... 3-3 Control Measures .................................................................................................... 3-10 Guides to Effective Control ...................................................................................... 3-14 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 3-17

Chapter 4 THE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM ............................................................ 4-1 Command and Control System Defined .................................................................... 4-1 Organizing for Command and Control ..................................................................... 4-13 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 4-15

SOURCE NOTES ................................................................................ Source Notes-1

GLOSSARY ................................................................................................ Glossary-1

REFERENCES ........................................................................................ References-1

Preface

ii ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

INDEX ............................................................................................................... Index-1

Figures

Introductory figure-1. Logic map ........................................................................................................ x

Figure 1-1. Levels of control .......................................................................................................... 1-6

Figure 1-2. Combat power model ................................................................................................ 1-20

Figure 2-1. Achieving understanding ............................................................................................. 2-4

Figure 2-2. The operations process ............................................................................................. 2-13

Figure 2-3. The commander’s role in the operations process ..................................................... 2-14

Figure 2-4. Commander’s visualization ....................................................................................... 2-15

Figure 2-5. Map of Ruhr encirclement ......................................................................................... 2-19

Figure 3-1. Reciprocal nature of control ........................................................................................ 3-4

Figure 3-2. Map of Austerlitz, the initial situation ......................................................................... 3-12

Figure 3-3. Map of Austerlitz operations ...................................................................................... 3-13

Figure 4-1. Components of a command and control system ......................................................... 4-1

Tables

Introductory table-1. New, modified, and removed Army terms ....................................................... ix

Table 3-1. Operational variables .................................................................................................... 3-5

Table 3-2. Mission variables .......................................................................................................... 3-6

Vignettes

Von Moltke and Auftragstaktik ....................................................................................................... 1-4

Command Based on Shared Understanding and Trust: Grant’s Orders to Sherman, 1864 ......... 1-9

Initiative: U.S. Paratroopers in Sicily ............................................................................................ 1-13

Corporal Alvin York and Mission Command ................................................................................ 1-15

Assuming Command: General Ridgway Takes Eighth Army ........................................................ 2-2

Risk Acceptance: OPERATION HAWTHORN, Dak To, Vietnam.................................................. 2-8

Mutual Trust and Shared Understanding: VII Corps and the Ruhr Encirclement ........................ 2-18

Levels of Control and German Auftragstaktik ................................................................................ 3-2

Crosstalk in the Desert-VII Corps in the Gulf War ....................................................................... 3-10

Control in Austerlitz ...................................................................................................................... 3-11

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 iii

Preface

ADP 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces, provides a discussion of the

fundamentals of mission command, command and control, and the command and control warfighting

function. It describes how commanders, supported by their staffs, combine the art and science of command

and control to understand situations, make decisions, direct actions, and lead forces toward mission

accomplishment.

To comprehend the doctrine contained in ADP 6-0, readers should understand the nature of operations and

the fundamentals of unified land operations described in ADP 3-0, Operations. Army leadership attributes

and competencies are vital to exercising command and control, and readers should also be familiar with the

fundamentals of leadership in ADP 6-22, Army Leadership, and FM 6-22, Leader Development. The Army

Ethic guides decisions and actions while exercising command and control, and readers must understand the

ideas in ADP 6-22. As the operations process is the framework for exercising command and control, readers must also understand the fundamentals of the operations process established in ADP 5-0, The Operations

Process.

The doctrine in ADP 6-0 forms the foundation for command and control tactics, techniques, and procedures.

For an explanation of these tactics and procedures, see FM 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization and

Operations. For an explanation of the techniques associated with command and control, see ATP 6-0.5,

Command Post Organization and Operations, as well as other supporting techniques publications.

The principal audience for ADP 6-0 is Army commanders, leaders, and unit staffs. Mission command

demands more from subordinates at all levels, and understanding and practicing the mission command

principles during operations and garrison activities are imperative for all members of the Army Profession.

The Army historically fights with joint and multinational partners as part of a coalition, and ADP 6-0 is

nested with joint and multinational doctrine. Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters that require joint

capabilities to conduct operations, or serving as a joint task force or multinational headquarters, should also

refer to applicable doctrine concerning command and control of joint or multinational forces.

ADP 6-0 implements North Atlantic Treaty Organization standardization agreement 2199, Command and

Control of Allied Land Forces.

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable U.S.,

international, and, in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure their

Soldiers operate in accordance with the Army Ethic, the law of war, and the rules of engagement. (See

FM 27-10 for a discussion of the law of war.)

ADP 6-0 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the

glossary and the text. Terms for which ADP 6-0 is the proponent publication (the authority) are marked with

an asterisk (*) in the glossary. Definitions for which ADP 6-0 is the proponent publication are boldfaced in

the text. For other definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent

publication follows the definition.

ADP 6-0 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and

United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

The proponent of ADP 6-0 is the United States Army Combined Arms Center. The preparing agency is the

Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, Mission Command Center of Excellence. Send comments and

recommendations on a DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to

Commander, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-MCD (ADP 6-0),

300 McPherson Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2337; by email to

[email protected]; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.

This page intentionally left blank.

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 v

Acknowledgements

The copyright owners listed here have granted permission to reproduce material from their works. The Source

Notes lists other sources of quotations and photographs.

Excerpts from On War by Carl von Clausewitz. Edited and translated by Peter Paret and Michael E.

Howard. Copyright © 1976, renewed 2004 by Princeton University Press.

Quotes reprinted courtesy B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2d rev. ed. Copyright © 1974 by Signet

Printing. Copyright © renewed 1991 by Meridian.

Excerpts from War as I Knew It by General George S. Patton. Copyright © 1947 by Beatrice Patton

Walters, Ruth Patton Totten, and George Smith Totten. Copyright © renewed 1975 by MG

George Patton, Ruth Patton Totten, John K. Waters, Jr., and George P. Waters. Reprinted by

permission of Houghton Mifflin Company. All rights reserved.

Quote reprinted courtesy Field-Marshall Viscount William Slim, Defeat into Victory: Battling Japan in

Burma and India, 1942–1945. Copyright © 1956 by Viscount William Slim. Copyright ©

renewed 2000 by Copper Square Press.

Quote courtesy Logan Nye, “How the ‘Little Groups of Paratroopers’ Became Airborne Legends,” We

Are the Mighty, 8 April 2016. Online

http://freerepublic.com/focus/f-chat/3535576/posts?page=12.

Quote courtesy Field-Marshal Earl Wavell, Soldiers and Soldiering or Epithets of War. Oxford, United

Kingdom: Alden Press, 1953.

Excerpts from Matthew B. Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway. Copyright © 1956

by Matthew B. Ridgway. Copyright © 1956 The Curtis Publishing Company. Reprinted by

permission of Andesite Press, 2017.

Quote courtesy Gary Klein, Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions. Copyright © 1999.

Quote courtesy Field Marshall Carver, cited in ADP AC 71940, Land Operations. Copyright © 2017

by British Ministry of Defence Crown.

Excerpts from William Joseph Slim, Unofficial History. Copyright © 1959 by Field-Marshal Sir

William Slim. Reprinted 1962 by Orion Publishing Group.

Excerpts from William M. Connor, “Establishing Command Intent, A Case Study: The Encirclement

of the Ruhr, March 1945” in The Human in Command: Exploring The Modern Military

Experience. Edited by Carol McCann and Ross Pigeau. Copyright © 2000 by Kluwer

Academic/Plenum Press.

Quote courtesy Ulysses S. Grant, Memoirs and Selected Letters: Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant,

Selected Letters, 1839-1865, vol. 2. Edited by William S. McFeely and Mary Drake McFeely.

Copyright © 1990 by Literary Classics of the United States.

Quote courtesy Genghis Khan: The Emperor of All Men. Edited by Harold Lamb. Copyright © 1927

by Harold Lamb. Reprinted, New York: Doubleday, 1956. All rights reserved.

Quote courtesy Erwin Rommel, The Rommel Papers. Edited by B. H. Liddell Hart. Copyright © 1953

by B. H. Liddell Hart.

Excerpts from Robert A. Doughty, The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France. Copyright ©

1990 by Robert A. Doughty.

Quote courtesy Richard E Simpkin and John Erickson, Deep Battle: The Brainchild of Marshal

Tukhachevskii. Copyright © 1987 Brassey’s Defence.

Quote courtesy George S. Patton, Military Essays and Articles by George S. Patton, Jr. General, U.S.

Army 02605 1885 – 1945. Edited by Charles M. Province. Copyright © 2002 by the George

S. Patton, Jr. Historical Society. All rights reserved.

Acknowledgements

vi ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

Quote reprinted courtesy Erin Johnson, “Schwarzkopf Speaks of Leadership at Symposium,” The

Daily Universe, 21 October 2001. Online https://universe.byu.edu/2001/10/11/schwarzkopf-

speaks-of-leadership-at-symposium/.

Quote courtesy Lt.-Col. Simonds, Commandant, “Address to Canadian Junior War Staff Course,

24 April 1941.” Online https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-

defence/services/military-history/history-heritage/official-military-history-

lineages/reports.html.

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 vii

Introduction

This revision to ADP 6-0 represents an evolution of mission command doctrine based upon lessons learned

since 2012. The use of the term mission command to describe multiple things—the warfighting function, the

system, and a philosophy—created unforeseen ambiguity. Mission command replaced command and control,

but in practical application it often meant the same thing. This led to differing expectations among leadership

cohorts regarding the appropriate application of mission command during operations and garrison activities.

Labeling multiple things mission command unintentionally eroded the importance of mission command,

which is critical to the command and control of Army forces across the range of military operations.

Differentiating mission command from command and control provides clarity, allows leaders to focus on

mission command in the context of the missions they execute, and aligns the Army with joint and

multinational partners, all of whom use the term command and control.

Command and control—the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over

assigned and attached forces—is fundamental to the art and science of warfare. No single specialized military

function, either by itself or combined with others, has a purpose without it. Commanders are responsible for

command and control. Through command and control, commanders provide purpose and direction to

integrate all military activities towards a common goal—mission accomplishment. Military operations are

inherently human endeavors, characterized by violence and continuous adaptation by all participants.

Successful execution requires Army forces to make and implement effective decisions faster than enemy

forces. Therefore, the Army has adopted mission command as its approach to command and control that

empowers subordinate decision making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation.

The nature of operations and the patterns of military history point to the advantages of mission command.

Mission command traces its roots back to the German concept of Auftragstaktik (literally, mission-type

tactics). Auftragstaktik was a result of Prussian military reforms following the defeat of the Prussian army

by Napoleon at the Battle of Jena in 1809. Reformers such as Gerhard von Scharnhorst, August von

Gneisenau, and Helmuth von Moltke sought to develop an approach for planning campaigns and

commanding large armies over extended battlefields. At the heart of the debate was a realization that

subordinate commanders in the field often had a better understanding of what was happening during a battle

than the general staff, and they were more likely to respond effectively to threats and fleeting opportunities

if they were allowed to make decisions based on this knowledge. Subordinate commanders needed the

authority to make decisions and act based on changing situations and unforeseen events not addressed in the

plan. After decades of debate, professionalization of the army, practical application during the

Danish-Prussian War of 1864, the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, and the Franco-Russian War of 1870,

Auftragstaktik was codified in the 1888 German Drill Regulation.

In Auftragstaktik, commanders issue subordinate commanders a clearly defined goal, the resources to

accomplish the goal, and a time frame to accomplish the goal. Subordinate commanders are then given the

freedom to plan and execute their mission within the higher commander’s intent. During execution,

Auftragstaktik demanded a bias for action within the commander’s intent, and it required leaders to adapt to

the situation as they personally saw it, even if their decisions violated previous guidance or directives. To

operate effectively under this style of command requires a common approach to operations and subordinates

who are competent in their profession and trained in independent decision making.

Aspects of mission command, including commander’s intent, disciplined initiative, mission orders, and

mutual trust, have long been part of U.S. Army culture. The most successful U.S. Army commanders have

employed elements of mission command since the 18th century. Grant’s orders to Sherman for the campaign

of 1864 and Sherman’s supporting plan are models of clear commander’s intent, mission orders, and

understanding based on mutual trust. (See the vignette on page 1-9.) When addressing operations orders, the

Army’s 1905 Field Service Regulation contained the following passage that served as an early discussion of

mission orders:

Introduction

viii ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

An order should not trespass on the province of the subordinate. It should contain

everything which is beyond the independent authority of the subordinate, but nothing more.

When the transmission of orders involves a considerable period of time, during which the

situation may change, detailed instructions are to be avoided. The same rule holds when

orders may have to be carried out under circumstances which the originator of the order

cannot completely forecast; in such cases letters of guidance is more appropriate. It should

lay stress upon the object to be attained, and leave open the means to be employed.

Eisenhower’s general plan and intent for the 1944 invasion of Europe and defeat of Nazi Germany is an

example of mission command that guided Allied forces as they fought their way from Normandy to the Rhine

and beyond. A more recent example is the 3rd Infantry Division’s march to Baghdad in 2003 and the

subsequent “thunder runs” that showed the world that the Iraqi regime was defeated. Retired General David

Perkins (a brigade commander during this operation) writes, “These thunder runs were successful because

the corps and division-level commanders established clear intent in their orders and trusted their

subordinates’ judgment and abilities to exercise disciplined initiative in response to a fluid, complex problem,

underwriting the risks that they took.”

Mission command requires tactically and technically competent commanders, staffs, and subordinates

operating in an environment of mutual trust and shared understanding. It requires building effective teams

and a command climate in which commanders encourage subordinates to take risks and exercise disciplined

initiative to seize opportunities and counter threats within the commander’s intent. Through mission orders,

commanders focus their subordinates on the purpose of an operation rather than on the details of how to

perform assigned tasks. This allows subordinates the greatest possible freedom of action in the context of a

particular situation. Finally, when delegating authority to subordinates, commanders set the necessary

conditions for success by allocating resources to subordinates based on assigned tasks.

Commanders need support to exercise command and control effectively. At every echelon of command,

commanders are supported by the command and control warfighting function—the related tasks and a system

that enables commanders to synchronize and converge all elements of combat power. Commanders execute

command and control through their staffs and subordinate leaders.

This publication provides fundamental principles on mission command, command and control, and the

command and control warfighting function. Key updates and changes to this version of ADP 6-0 include—

 Combined information from ADP 6-0 and ADRP 6-0 into a single document.

 Command and control reintroduced into Army doctrine.

 An expanded discussion of command and control and its relationship to mission command.

 Revised mission command principles.

 Command and control system reintroduced, along with new tasks, and an updated system

description.

 Expanded discussion of the command and control system.

ADP 6-0 contains 4 chapters:

Chapter 1 provides an overview of mission command, command, and control. It describes the nature of

operations and the Army’s operational concept, and how it is enabled by the mission command. It then

discusses the function of command and control, and how commanders create conditions for mission

command to flourish. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the command and control warfighting

function.

Chapter 2 defines and describes command. It describes the nature of command, provides the elements of

command, describes the role of the commander in operations, and offers guides to effective command.

Chapter 3 defines and describes control and its relationship to command. It discusses the elements of control

and guides to effective control. Finally, this chapter discusses the importance of knowledge management and

information management as they relate to control.

Chapter 4 discusses the command and control system that performs the functions necessary to exercise

command and control. This includes a discussion of the people, processes, networks, and command posts

Introduction

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 ix

that are components of the command and control system. It also discusses command post design and

organization considerations.

Introductory table-1 lists modified terms and acronyms. The introductory figure-1 on page x illustrates the

ADP 6-0 logic map.

Introductory table-1. New, modified, and removed Army terms

Term or Acronym Remarks

art of command No longer defines term.

authority No longer defines term.

civil considerations ADP 6-0 is now the proponent for the term and modifies the definition.

command and control Adopts the joint definition.

command and control system New Army definition.

commander’s visualization ADP 6-0 is now the proponent for the term.

common operational picture Modifies the definition.

data New definition.

essential element of friendly information ADP 6-0 is now the proponent for the term and modifies the definition.

information New definition.

information protection No longer defines term.

information system No longer defines term.

knowledge New term and definition.

key tasks ADP 6-0 is now the proponent for the term.

mission command New Army definition.

mission command system Rescinds term.

mission command warfighting function Rescinds term.

prudent risk Rescinds term.

relevant information New term.

science of control No longer defines term.

situational understanding ADP 6-0 is now the proponent for the term.

understanding New term and definition.

Introduction

x ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

Introductory figure-1. Logic map

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 1-1

Chapter 1

Introduction to Mission Command

The situations that confront a commander in war are of infinite variety. In spite of the most

careful planning and anticipation, unexpected obstacles, frictions, and mistakes are

common occurrences in battle. A commander must school himself to regard these events

as commonplace and not permit them to frustrate him in the accomplishment of his mission.

FM 100-5, Operations (1941)

This chapter sets the context for understanding mission command and command and

control by describing the nature of operations and summarizing the Army’s operational

concept. It defines and describes mission command as the Army’s approach to

command and control that enables unified land operations. Then it defines and

describes command and control, their relationship to each other, and their elements.

The chapter concludes with a discussion of the command and control warfighting

function.

THE NATURE OF OPERATIONS

1-1. Military operations fall along a competition continuum that spans cooperation to war. Between these extremes, societies maintain relationships. These relationships include economic competition, political or

ideological tension, and at times armed conflict. Violent power struggles in failed states, along with the

emergence of major regional powers like Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea seeking to gain strategic

positions of advantage, present challenges to the joint force. Army forces must be prepared to meet these

challenges across the range of military operations during periods of competition and war.

1-2. The range of military operations is a fundamental construct that helps relate military activities and operations in scope and purpose against the backdrop of the competition continuum. The potential range of

military activities and operations extends from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence, up

through large-scale combat operations in war. Whether countering terrorism as part of a limited contingency

operation, or defeating a peer threat in large-scale ground combat, the nature of conflict is constant. Military

operations are—

 Human endeavors.

 Conducted in dynamic and uncertain environments.

 Designed to achieve a political purpose.

HUMAN ENDEAVOR

1-3. War is a human endeavor—a clash of wills characterized by the threat or application of force and violence, often fought among populations. It is not a mechanical process that can be precisely controlled by

machines, calculations, or processes. Nor is it conducted in carefully controlled and predictable

environments. Fundamentally, all war is about changing human behavior. It is both a contest of wills and a

contest of intellect between two or more sides in conflict, with each trying to alter the behavior of the other

side. During operations, Army forces face thinking and adaptive enemies, differing agendas among the actors

involved, and the variable perceptions of public opinion both inside and outside of an area of operations. As

friendly forces seek to impose their will on enemy forces, the enemy forces resist and seek to impose their

will on friendly forces. A similar dynamic occurs among civilian groups whose own desires influence and

are influenced by military operations. All sides act, react, learn, and adapt. Appreciating these relationships

is essential to understanding the fundamental nature of operations.

Chapter 1

1-2 ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

DYNAMIC AND UNCERTAIN

War is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which action in war is

based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty....The commander must work

in a medium which his eyes cannot see; which his best deductive power cannot always

fathom; and with which, because of constant changes, he can rarely become familiar.

Carl von Clausewitz

1-4. War, especially land combat, is inherently dynamic and uncertain. The complexity of friendly and enemy organizations, unique combinations of terrain and weather, and the dynamic interaction among all

participants create uncertainty. Chance and friction further increase the potential for chaos and uncertainty

during operations. Chance pertains to unexpected events or changes beyond the control of friendly forces,

while friction describes the obstacles that make the execution of even simple tasks difficult. Both are always

present for all sides during combat.

1-5. The scale, scope, tempo, and lethality of large-scale ground combat exacerbates the dynamic and uncertain nature of war, delaying or making precise cause-and effect determinations difficult. The unintended

effects of operations often cannot be anticipated and may not be readily apparent. War is inherently chaotic,

demanding an approach to the command and control of operations that does not attempt to impose perfect

order, but rather makes allowances for uncertainty created by chance and friction.

DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE A POLITICAL PURPOSE

[T]he role of grand strategy—higher strategy—is to co-ordinate and direct all the

resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards the attainment of the political object of

the war— the goal defined by fundamental policy.

B.H. Liddell-Hart

1-6. All U.S. military operations share a common fundamental purpose—to achieve specific objectives that support attainment of the overall political purpose of the operation. Objective—directing every military

operation towards a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal—is a principle of war. In large-scale ground

combat, the purpose of operations may be to destroy the enemy’s capabilities and will to fight. The purpose

of operations short of large-scale combat may be more nuanced and difficult to define, and they may require

support to achieve multiple objectives. These operations frequently involve setting conditions that improve

positions of relative advantage compared to that of a specific adversary and contribute to achieving strategic

aims in an operational area without large-scale ground combat. In either case, all operations are designed to

achieve the political purpose set by national authorities.

UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS

1-7. The Army operational concept for conducting operations as part of a joint team is unified land operations. Unified land operations is the simultaneous execution of offense, defense, stability, and defense

support of civil authorities across multiple domains to shape operational environments, prevent conflict,

prevail in large-scale ground combat, and consolidate gains as part of unified action (ADP 3-0). The goal of

unified land operations is to achieve the joint force commander’s end state by applying landpower as part of

unified action. (See ADP 3-0 for a detailed discussion of unified land operations.)

1-8. The Army’s primary mission is to organize, train, and equip its forces to conduct prompt and sustained land combat to defeat enemy ground forces and seize, occupy, and defend land areas. During the conduct of

unified land operations, Army forces support the joint force through four strategic roles:

 Shape operational environments.

 Prevent conflict.

 Prevail during large-scale ground combat.

 Consolidate gains.

1-9. An operational environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0). Army forces assist in

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shaping an operational environment by providing trained and ready forces to geographic combatant

commanders in support of their combatant commander’s campaign plans. Shaping activities include security

cooperation, military engagement, and forward presence to promote U.S. interests and assure allies. The

theater army and subordinate Army forces assist the geographic combatant commander in building partner

capacity and capability and promoting stability across an area of responsibility. Army operations to shape are

continuous throughout a geographic combatant commander’s area of responsibility and occur before, during,

and after a specific joint operation. If operations to shape are successful, they may prevent conflict and negate

the requirement to conduct large-scale ground combat operations.

1-10. Army operations to prevent conflict are designed to deter undesirable actions by an adversary through the positioning of friendly capabilities and demonstrating the will to use them. Army forces may have a

significant role in the execution of directed flexible deterrent options or flexible response options.

Additionally, Army prevent activities may include mobilization, force tailoring, and other pre-deployment

activities; initial deployment into a theater, including echeloning command posts; and development of

intelligence, communications, sustainment, and protection infrastructure to support the joint force

commander.

1-11. While the Army may conduct combat operations at various levels across the range of military operations, Army forces must be manned, equipped, and trained for large-scale ground combat. During

large-scale ground combat operations, Army forces focus on the defeat and destruction of enemy ground

forces as part of the joint team. Army forces close with and destroy enemy forces, exploit success, and break

an opponent’s will to resist. Army forces attack, defend, conduct stability tasks, and consolidate gains to

achieve national objectives.

1-12. Operations to consolidate gains include activities to make enduring any temporary operational success and set the conditions for a stable environment allowing for a transition of control to legitimate authorities.

Army forces deliberately plan to consolidate gains during all phases of an operation. In some instances, Army

forces will be in charge of integrating forces and synchronizing activities to consolidate gains. In other

situations, Army forces will be in support. While Army forces consolidate gains throughout an operation,

consolidating gains becomes the focus of Army forces after large-scale combat operations have concluded.

(See FM 3-0 for a detailed discussion of how Army forces shape operational environments, prevent conflict,

conduct large-scale ground combat, and consolidate gains.)

MISSION COMMAND

Never tell people how to do things. Tell them what to do and they will surprise you with

their ingenuity.

General George S. Patton, Jr.

1-13. Army operations doctrine emphasizes shattering an enemy force’s ability and will to resist, and destroying the coherence of enemy operations. Army forces accomplish these things by controlling the

nature, scope, and tempo of an operation and striking simultaneously throughout the area of operations to

control, neutralize, and destroy enemy forces and other objectives. The Army’s command and control

doctrine supports its operations doctrine. It balances coordination, personal leadership, and tactical flexibility.

It stresses rapid decision making and execution, including rapid response to changing situations. It

emphasizes mutual trust and shared understanding among superiors and subordinates.

1-14. Mission command is the Army’s approach to command and control that empowers subordinate decision making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation. Mission command supports

the Army’s operational concept of unified land operations and its emphasis on seizing, retaining, and

exploiting the initiative.

1-15. The mission command approach to command and control is based on the Army’s view that war is inherently chaotic and uncertain. No plan can account for every possibility, and most plans must change

rapidly during execution to account for changes in the situation. No single person is ever sufficiently informed

to make every important decision, nor can a single person keep up with the number of decisions that need to

be made during combat. Subordinate leaders often have a better understanding of what is happening during

a battle, and are more likely to respond effectively to threats and fleeting opportunities if allowed to make

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decisions and act based on changing situations and unforeseen events not addressed in the initial plan in order

to achieve their commander’s intent. Enemy forces may behave differently than expected, a route may

become impassable, or units could consume supplies at unexpected rates. Friction and unforeseeable

combinations of variables impose uncertainty in all operations and require an approach to command and

control that does not attempt to impose perfect order, but rather accepts uncertainty and makes allowances

for unpredictability.

1-16. Mission command helps commanders capitalize on subordinate ingenuity, innovation, and decision making to achieve the commander’s intent when conditions change or current orders are no longer relevant.

It requires subordinates who seek opportunities and commanders who accept risk for subordinates trying to

meet their intent. Subordinate decision making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation help

manage uncertainty and enable necessary tempo at each echelon during operations. Employing the mission

command approach during all garrison activities and training events is essential to creating the cultural

foundation for its employment in high-risk environments.

Von Moltke and Auftragstaktik

Helmuth von Moltke (1800-1891) was appointed chief of the Prussian general staff in 1857. One of the important concepts he promulgated was Auftragstaktik (literally, “mission tactics”), a command method stressing decentralized initiative within an overall strategic design. Moltke understood that, as war progressed, its uncertainties diminished the value of any detailed planning that might have been done beforehand. He believed that, beyond calculating the initial mobilization and concentration of forces, “…no plan of operations extends with any degree of certainty beyond the first encounter with the main enemy force.” He believed that, throughout a campaign, commanders had to make decisions based on a fluid, constantly evolving situation. For Moltke, each major encounter had consequences that created a new situation, which became the basis for new measures. Auftragstaktik encouraged commanders to be flexible and react immediately to changes in the situation as they developed. It replaced detailed planning with delegation of decision-making authority to subordinate commanders within the context of the higher commander's intent. Moltke realized that tactical decisions had to be made on the spot; therefore, great care was taken to encourage initiative by commanders at all levels.

Moltke believed that commanders should issue only the most essential orders. These would provide only general instructions outlining the principal objective and specific missions. Tactical details were left to subordinates. For Moltke, “the advantage which a commander thinks he can attain through continued personal intervention is largely illusory. By engaging in it he assumes a task that really belongs to others, whose effectiveness he thus destroys. He also multiplies his own tasks to a point where he can no longer fulfill the whole of them.”

Moltke's thoughts, codified in the 1888 German field regulation, were imbued into the culture of the Germany Army.

SUBORDINATE DECISION MAKING

1-17. Successful commanders anticipate future events by developing branches and sequels instead of focusing on details better handled by subordinates during current operations. The higher the echelon, the

more time commanders should devote to future operations and the broader the guidance provided to

subordinates. Subordinates empowered to make decisions during operations unburden higher commanders

from issues that distract from necessary broader perspective and focus on critical issues. Mission command

allows those commanders with the best situational understanding to make rapid decisions without waiting

for higher echelon commanders to assess the situation and issue orders.

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1-18. Commanders delegate appropriate authority to deputies, subordinate commanders, and staff members based upon a judgment of their capabilities and experience. Delegation allows subordinates to decide and act

for their commander in specified areas. Delegating decision-making authority reduces the number of

decisions made at the higher echelons and reduces response time at lower echelons. In addition to determining

the amount of decision-making authority they will delegate, commanders also identify decisions that are their

sole responsibility and cannot be delegated to subordinates.

1-19. When delegating authority to subordinates, commanders strive to set the necessary conditions for success. They do this by assessing and managing risk. Taking risk is inherent at all levels of command.

Commanders and staffs assess hazards and recommend controls to help manage risk, rather than forcing

unnecessary risk decisions on subordinates. Risk, including ethical risk, should be identified and mitigated

by the higher level commander to the greatest extent possible. Two ways of managing risk are by managing

the number of tasks assigned to subordinates and by providing the appropriate resources to accomplish those

tasks. These resources include information, forces, materiel, and time.

1-20. While commanders can delegate authority, they cannot delegate responsibility. Subordinates are accountable to their commanders for the use of delegated authority, but commanders remain solely

responsible and accountable for the actions of their subordinates.

DECENTRALIZED EXECUTION

1-21. Decentralized execution is the delegation of decision-making authority to subordinates, so they may make and implement decisions and adjust their assigned tasks in fluid and rapidly changing situations.

Subordinate decisions should be ethically based and within the framework of their higher commander’s

intent. Decentralized execution is essential to seizing, retaining, and exploiting the operational initiative

during operations in environments where conditions rapidly change and uncertainty is the norm. Rapidly

changing situations and uncertainty are inherent in operations where commanders seek to establish a tempo

and intensity that enemy forces cannot match.

1-22. Decentralized execution requires disseminating information to the lowest possible level so subordinates can make informed decisions based on a shared understanding of both the situation and their

commander’s intent. This empowers subordinates operating in rapidly changing conditions to exercise

disciplined initiative within their commander’s intent. Generally, the more dynamic the circumstances, the

greater the need for initiative to make decisions at lower levels. It is the duty of subordinates to exercise

initiative to achieve their commander’s intent. It is the commander’s responsibility to issue appropriate intent

and ensure subordinates are prepared in terms of education, training, and experience to exercise initiative.

1-23. The commander’s intent provides a unifying idea that allows decentralized execution within an overarching framework. It provides guidance within which individuals may exercise initiative to accomplish

the desired end state. Understanding the commander’s intent two echelons up further enhances unity of effort

while providing the basis for decentralized decision making and execution throughout the depth of a

formation. Subordinates who understand the commander’s intent are far more likely to exercise initiative

effectively in unexpected situations. Under the mission command approach to command and control,

subordinates have both responsibility and authority to fulfill the commander’s intent.

LEVELS OF CONTROL

1-24. Determining the appropriate level of control, including delegating decisions and determining how much decentralized execution to employ, is part of the art of command. The level and application of control

is constantly evolving and must be continuously assessed and adjusted to ensure the level of control is

appropriate to the situation. Commanders should allow subordinates the greatest freedom of action

commensurate with the level of acceptable risk in a particular situation. The mission variables (mission,

enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations) influence

how much control to impose on subordinates. Other considerations include—

 Enemy disposition and capabilities.

 Level of synchronization and integration required.

 Higher echelon headquarters constraints.

 Level of risk.

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 Level of legal and ethical ambiguity.

 Rules of engagement.

 Level of unit cohesion.

 Level of training.

 Level of trust.

 Level of shared understanding.

(See figure 1-1 for a sample of the considerations for determining the appropriate level of control.)

1-25. Different operations and phases of operations may require tighter or more relaxed control over subordinate elements than other phases. Operations that require the close synchronization of multiple units,

or the integration of effects in a limited amount of time, may require more detailed coordination, and be

controlled in a more centralized manner. Examples of this include combined arms breaches, air assaults, and

wet gap crossings. Conversely, operations that do not require the close coordination of multiple units, such

as a movement to contact or a pursuit, offer many opportunities to exercise initiative. These opportunities

may be lost if too much emphasis is placed on detailed synchronization. Even in a highly controlled operation,

subordinates must still exercise initiative to address unexpected problems and achieve their commander's

intent when existing orders no longer make sense in the context of execution.

Figure 1-1. Levels of control

PRINCIPLES OF MISSION COMMAND

1-26. Mission command requires competent forces and an environment of mutual trust and shared understanding among commanders, staffs, and subordinates. It requires effective teams and a command

climate in which subordinates are required to seize opportunities and counter threats within the commander’s

intent. Commanders issue mission orders that focus on the purpose of an operation and essential coordination

measures rather than on the details of how to perform assigned tasks, giving subordinates the latitude to

accomplish those tasks in a manner that best fits the situation. This minimizes the number of decisions a

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single commander makes and allows subordinates the greatest possible freedom of action to accomplish tasks.

Finally, when delegating authority to subordinates, commanders set the necessary conditions for success by

allocating appropriate resources to subordinates based on assigned tasks. Successful mission command is

enabled by the principles of—

 Competence.

 Mutual trust.

 Shared understanding.

 Commander’s intent.

 Mission orders.

 Disciplined initiative.

 Risk acceptance.

COMPETENCE

1-27. Tactically and technically competent commanders, subordinates, and teams are the basis of effective mission command. An organization’s ability to operate using mission command relates directly to the

competence of its Soldiers. Commanders and subordinates achieve the level of competence to perform

assigned tasks to standard through training, education, assignment experience, and professional development.

Commanders continually assess the competence of their subordinates and their organizations. This

assessment informs the degree of trust commanders have in their subordinates’ ability to execute mission

orders in a decentralized fashion at acceptable levels of risk.

1-28. Training and education that occurs in both schools and units provides commanders and subordinates the experiences that allow them to achieve professional competence. Repetitive, realistic, and challenging

training creates common experiences that develop the teamwork, trust, and shared understanding that

commanders need to exercise mission command and forces need to achieve unity of effort. (See ADP 7-0 for

doctrine on individual and collective training.)

1-29. Leaders supplement institutional and organizational training and education with continuous self-development. Self-development is particularly important for the skills that rely on the art of command,

which is further developed by reading and studying the art of war. These skills can also be developed through

coursework, simulations and experience. (See chapter 2 for discussion on the art of command.)

MUTUAL TRUST

1-30. Mutual trust is shared confidence between commanders, subordinates, and partners that they can be relied on and are competent in performing their assigned tasks. There are few shortcuts to gaining the trust

of others. Trust is given by leaders and subordinates, and built over time based on common shared

experiences. It is the result of upholding the Army values, exercising leadership consistent with Army

leadership principles, and most effectively instilled by the leader’s personal example.

1-31. Mutual trust is essential to successful mission command, and it must flow throughout the chain of command. Subordinates are more willing to exercise initiative when they believe their commander trusts

them. They will also be more willing to exercise initiative if they believe their commander will accept and

support the outcome of their decisions. Likewise, commanders delegate greater authority to subordinates who

have demonstrated tactical and technical competency and whose judgment they trust.

1-32. At the lowest tactical levels the ability to trust subordinate formations to execute their collective tasks and battle drills is essential. Building that trust is critical to rapid decision making in high pressure situations;

commanders should be focused more on the problem to be solved when giving guidance than the methods

that their subordinates might use. Subordinates must trust that commanders will employ mission orders to

the maximum extent possible once they have demonstrated the attributes and competencies expected.

1-33. Commanders must also trust their colleagues who are commanding adjacent and supporting forces, and they must earn their trust as well. When a commander exercises initiative, trust gives other commanders

the same level of confidence to synchronize their actions with those of that commander. Such actions

synchronize operations without requiring detailed instructions from higher echelons. Once established and

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sustained, trust allows each echelon to focus on operations as a whole instead of on the actions of individual

subordinates.

1-34. Trust is based on personal qualities, such as professional competence, character, and commitment. Soldiers must see values in action before such actions become a basis for trust. Trust is built through shared

experiences and training deliberately developed by commanders or through the conduct of operations. During

shared experiences, two-way communication and interaction among the commander, subordinates, and

Soldiers reinforces trust. Soldiers expect to see members of the chain of command accomplishing the mission

while taking care of their welfare and leading by example through shared hardships and danger.

1-35. Trust is also a product of a common background, education, understanding of doctrine, and a common language for operations. In some situations, trust may be based solely on a common understanding of an

approach to operations. This understanding creates a basic level of trust that, until proven otherwise, new

team members or adjacent units will conduct operations to a common standard. During large-scale ground

combat operations where task organizations are likely to change rapidly and often, commanders and staffs

must assume a basic level of trust regarding the level of competence among new teams.

SHARED UNDERSTANDING

1-36. A critical challenge for commanders, staffs, and unified action partners is creating shared understanding of an operational environment, an operation’s purpose, problems, and approaches to solving

problems. Unified action partners are those military forces, governmental and nongovernmental

organizations, and elements of the private sector with whom Army forces plan, coordinate, synchronize, and

integrate during the conduct of operations (ADP 3-0). Shared understanding of the situation, along with the

flow of information to the lowest possible level, forms the basis for unity of effort and subordinates’ initiative.

Effective decentralized execution is not possible without shared understanding.

1-37. Shared understanding starts with the Army’s doctrine and professional military education that instills a common approach to the conduct of operations, a common professional language, and a common

understanding of the principles of mission command. Army professionals understand the most current Army

doctrine to ensure a minimum level of shared understanding for the conduct of operations. It is this shared

understanding that allows even hastily task-organized units to operate effectively.

1-38. Commanders and staffs actively create shared understanding throughout the operations process (planning, preparation, execution, and assessment). They collaboratively frame an operational environment

and its problems, and then they visualize approaches to solving those problems.

1-39. Collaboration is more than coordination. It is multiple people and organizations working together towards a common goal by sharing knowledge and building consensus. It requires dialogue that involves the

candid exchange of ideas or opinions among participants and encourages frank discussions in areas of

disagreement. Throughout the operations process, commanders, subordinate commanders, staffs, and unified

action partners collaborate by sharing and questioning information, perceptions, and ideas to understand

situations and make decisions.

1-40. Through collaboration, commanders create a learning environment that allows participants to think critically and creatively and share their ideas, opinions, and recommendations without fear of reproach.

Effective collaboration requires candor and a free, yet mutually respectful, exchange of ideas. Participants

must feel free to make viewpoints based on their expertise, experience, and insight. This includes sharing

ideas that contradict the opinions held by those of higher rank. Successful commanders listen to novel ideas

and counterarguments. Effective collaboration is not possible unless commanders enable it.

1-41. Commanders establish a culture of collaboration in their organization. They recognize that they do not know everything, and they recognize that they may have something to learn from even the most junior

subordinate. Commanders establish a command climate by their personal example, coaching, counseling,

and mentoring where collaboration routinely occurs throughout their organization. Successful commanders

invest the time and effort to visit with Soldiers, subordinate leaders, and unified action partners to understand

their issues and concerns. Through such interactions, subordinates and partners gain insight into their

commander’s leadership style and expectations.

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1-42. Shared understanding both supports and derives from trust. However, like trust, it requires time to establish, and commanders cannot assume shared understanding. Shared understanding is perishable, and

commanders and their subordinates must adequately communicate to maintain shared understanding of the

situation, problems, and potential solutions. Commanders can develop shared understanding in their

organizations through training and by creating an environment of collaboration and dialogue.

1-43. An important source of shared understanding is open and clear communications between leaders and Soldiers. Commanders can also aid shared understanding by exhibiting a demeanor and personal mannerisms

that reinforce, or at least do not contradict, their spoken message. Units develop the ability to communicate

through familiarity, trust, a shared philosophy, and experiences. Sharing a common perception of military

problems also leads to shared understanding.

1-44. There is a hierarchical component of shared understanding. At each echelon of command, commanders will have a slightly different understanding of the situation. Having a common perception of military

problems does not imply any requirement to come to identical solutions; under mission command,

understanding what outcome to achieve is more important than agreement on how to achieve it. Activities

that can lead to shared understanding include collaboration among commanders and staffs, professional

development meetings, terrain walks, and professional discussions.

Command Based on Shared Understanding and Trust: Grant’s Orders to Sherman, 1864

In a letter to MG William T. Sherman, dated 4 April 1864, LTG Ulysses S. Grant outlined his 1864 campaign plan. LTG Grant described MG Sherman’s role by writing, “It is my design, if the enemy keep quiet and allow me to take the initiative in the spring campaign, to work all parts of the army together, and somewhat towards a common centre.… You I propose to move against Johnston’s army, to break it up and to get into the interior of the enemy’s country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their War resources. I do not propose to lay down for you a plan of campaign, but simply to lay down the work it is desirable to have done and leave you free to execute it in your own way. Submit to me, however, as early as you can, your plan of operation.” MG Sherman responded to LTG Grant immediately in a letter dated 10 April 1864. He sent LTG Grant, as requested, his specific plan of operations, demonstrating that he understood LTG Grant’s intent: “...That we are now all to act in a common plan, converging on a common center, looks like enlightened war.... I will not let side issues draw me off from your main plan, in which I am to Knock Joe [Confederate GEN Joseph E.] Johnston, and do as much damage to the resources of the enemy as possible....I would ever bear in mind that Johnston is at all times to be kept so busy that he cannot, in any event, send any part of his command against you or [Union MG Nathaniel P.] Banks.”

COMMANDER’S INTENT

I suppose dozens of operation orders have gone out in my name, but I never, throughout

the war, actually wrote one myself. I always had someone who could do that better than I

could. One part of the order I did, however, draft myself—the intention. It is usually the

shortest of all paragraphs, but it is always the most important, because it states—or it

should—just what the commander intends to achieve. It is the one overriding expression of

will by which everything in the order and every action by every commander and soldier in

the army must be dominated. It should, therefore, be worded by the commander, himself.

Field Marshall William Joseph Slim

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1-45. The commander’s intent is a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired military end state that supports mission command, provides focus to the staff, and helps subordinate

and supporting commanders act to achieve the commander’s desired results without further orders, even

when the operation does not unfold as planned (JP 3-0). The higher echelon commander’s intent provides the

basis for unity of effort throughout the force. Each commander’s intent nests within the commander’s intent

two levels up. During planning, the initial commander’s intent drives course of action development. During

execution, the commander’s intent establishes the limits within which a subordinate may exercise initiative.

1-46. The commander's intent succinctly describes what constitutes success for the operation. Commanders convey their intent in a format they determine most suitable to the situation. It may include the operation's

purpose, key tasks, and conditions that define the end state. When describing the purpose of the operation,

the commander's intent does not restate the “why” of the mission statement. Rather, it describes the broader

purpose of the unit's operation in relationship to the higher commander's intent and concept of operations.

Doing this allows subordinates to gain insight into what is expected of them, what constraints apply, and,

most importantly, why the mission is being conducted. If it is longer than a brief paragraph it is probably too

long.

1-47. Key tasks are those significant activities the force must perform as a whole to achieve the desired end state. Key tasks are not specified tasks for any subordinate unit; however, they may be sources of implied

tasks. During execution—when significant opportunities present themselves or the concept of operations no

longer fits the situation—subordinates use key tasks to keep their efforts focused on achieving the desired

end state. Examples of key tasks include terrain the force must control or an effect the force must have on

the enemy. Commanders include the purpose of each associated key task to facilitate subordinate decision

making and disciplined initiative.

1-48. The end state is a set of desired future conditions the commander wants to exist when an operation ends. Commanders may describe the operation's end state by stating the desired conditions of the friendly

force in relationship to desired conditions of the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations. A clearly defined

end state promotes unity of effort among the force and with unified action partners.

1-49. The commander’s intent becomes the basis on which staffs and subordinate leaders develop plans and orders. A well-crafted commander’s intent conveys a clear image of an operation’s purpose and desired end

state. The commander’s intent provides a focus for subordinates to coordinate their separate efforts.

Commanders personally prepare their commander’s intent. When possible, they deliver it in person.

Face-to-face delivery ensures shared understanding of what the commander wants by allowing immediate

clarification of specific points. Individuals can then exercise initiative within the overarching guidance

provided in the commander’s intent.

1-50. Commanders write and communicate their commander’s intent to describe the boundaries within which subordinates may exercise initiative while maintaining unity of effort. A clear and succinct

commander’s intent that lower-level leaders can remember and understand, even without an order, is key to

maintaining unity of effort. Soldiers two echelons down should easily remember and clearly understand the

commander’s intent. Commanders collaborate with subordinates to ensure they understand the commander’s

intent. Subordinates who understand the commander’s intent are far more likely to exercise disciplined

initiative in unexpected situations.

1-51. Mission command requires that subordinates use their judgment and initiative to make decisions that further their higher commander’s intent. Subordinates use the commander’s intent, together with the mission

statement and concept of the operation, to accomplish the mission. Empowered with trust, shared

understanding, and commander’s intent, they can develop the situation, adapt, and act decisively in uncertain

conditions.

MISSION ORDERS

An order should not trespass upon the province of a subordinate. It should contain

everything that the subordinate must know to carry out his mission, but nothing more… An

order must be simple and understandable, being framed to suit the intelligence and

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understanding of the recipient. Above all, it must be adapted to the circumstances under

which it will be received and executed.

FM 100-5, Tentative Field Service Regulations, Operations (1939)

1-52. An order is a communication—verbal, written, or signaled—that conveys instructions from superiors to subordinates. The five-paragraph format (situation, mission, execution, sustainment, and command and

signal) is the standard for issuing Army orders. Army commanders issue orders to give guidance, assign

tasks, allocate resources, and delegate authority.

1-53. Mission command requires commanders to issue mission orders. Mission orders are directives that emphasize to subordinates the results to be attained, not how they are to achieve them. Mission orders

enable subordinates to understand the situation, their commander’s mission and intent, and their own tasks.

Subordinate commanders decide how to accomplish their own mission. The commander’s intent and concept

of operations set guidelines that provide unity of effort while allowing subordinate commanders to exercise

initiative in planning, preparing, and executing their operations.

1-54. A mission order is not a separate type of order; rather, it is a technique for writing orders that allows subordinates maximum freedom of action in accomplishing missions. Mission orders should succinctly state

the mission, task organization, commander’s intent and concept of operations, tasks to subordinate units, and

minimum essential coordinating instructions. Tasks to subordinate units include all the standard elements

(who, what, when, where, and why) with particular emphasis on the purpose (why).

1-55. Mission orders should focus on the essential tasks a subordinate is to accomplish and not an extended list of every task a unit may be required to accomplish. It should never repeat items that are part of the

standard operating procedures or are commonly understood by the force. Mission orders should not contain

directives to a subordinate that dictate how a task is to be accomplished. That is the province of the

subordinate.

1-56. Mission orders contain the proper level of detail in the context of a particular situation; they are neither so detailed that they stifle initiative nor so general that they provide insufficient direction. The proper level

of detail is situationally dependent. Some phases of operations require tighter control over subordinate

elements than other phases require. An air assault’s air movement and landing phases, for example, require

precise synchronization. Its ground maneuver plan requires less detail. As a rule, the base plan or order

contains only the specific information required to provide the guidance to synchronize combat power at the

decisive time and place while allowing subordinates as much freedom of action as possible. Commanders

rely on subordinates’ initiative and coordination to act within the commander’s intent and concept of

operations.

1-57. Graphics that accompany mission orders should be drawn in a manner that allows maximum flexibility during execution. They should provide enough control for those activities requiring synchronization, but they

should avoid constraining subordinates’ freedom of action within their areas of operation. Ideally graphics

provide enough references such as checkpoints and phase lines for subordinate leaders to use them as a basis

of shared understanding when deviation from the base order becomes necessary. Inherently flexible graphics

and mission orders together create conditions for initiative and rapid decision making.

1-58. Using mission orders does not mean commanders do not supervise subordinates during operations. Subordinates are accountable to their commanders for the use of delegated authority, but commanders remain

solely responsible and accountable for the actions over which subordinates exercise delegated authority.

Thus, commanders have the responsibility to check on their subordinates and provide directions and guidance

as required to focus their activities. Commanders should emphasize mission orders during training when

actual consequences are low, allowing subordinates to develop their own solutions to problems, and

intervening only when necessary to avoid a serious problem. This is valuable both for subordinates to gain

experience in problem solving and confidence in exercising initiative and for commanders to develop an

understanding of the capabilities of subordinates.

DISCIPLINED INITIATIVE

Every individual from the highest commander to the lowest private must always remember

that inaction and neglect of opportunities will warrant more severe censure than an error

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of judgment in the action taken. The criterion by which a commander judges the soundness

of his own decision is whether it will further the intentions of the higher commander.

FM 100-5, Tentative Field Service Regulations, Operations (1941)

1-59. Disciplined initiative refers to the duty individual subordinates have to exercise initiative within the constraints of the commander’s intent to achieve the desired end state. Simply put, disciplined initiative is

when subordinates have the discipline to follow their orders and adhere to the plan until they realize their

orders and the plan are no longer suitable for the situation in which they find themselves. This may occur

because the enemy does something unforeseen, there is a new or more serious threat, or a golden opportunity

emerges that offers a greater chance of success than the original course of action. The subordinate leader then

takes action on their own initiative to adjust to the new situation and achieve their commander’s intent,

reporting to the commander about the new situation when able to do so.

1-60. Leaders and subordinates who exercise disciplined initiative create opportunity by taking action to develop a situation without asking for further guidance. Commanders rely on subordinates to act to meet their

intent, not simply adhere to a plan that is no longer working. A subordinate’s initiative may be the starting

point for seizing, retaining, and exploiting the operational initiative by forcing an enemy to respond to

friendly action.

1-61. Operational initiative is the setting of tempo and terms of action throughout an operation (ADP 3-0). Under mission command, subordinates are required, not just permitted, to exercise disciplined initiative in

the absence of orders, when current orders no longer apply, or when an opportunity or threat presents itself.

The collective effect of multiple subordinates exercising disciplined initiative over time sets the conditions

for friendly forces to seize the operational initiative in chaotic and ambiguous situations.

1-62. The commander’s intent defines the limits within which subordinates may exercise initiative. It gives subordinates the confidence to apply their judgment in ambiguous situations because they know the mission’s

purpose and desired end state. They can, on their own responsibility, take actions that they think will best

accomplish the mission when communication with higher echelons is intermittent or decisions must be made

immediately.

1-63. When exercising initiative, neither commanders nor subordinates are independent actors. Subordinates consider at least two factors when deciding when to exercise initiative:

 Whether the benefits of the action outweigh the risk of desynchronizing the overall operation.

 Whether the action will further the higher commander’s intent.

1-64. The main consideration in exercising initiative is the urgency of the situation. If time permits, subordinates attempt to communicate their new situation and recommended course of action to their

commander. When subordinates communicate their intentions to their commander, their commander can

assess the implications for the overall force, and for other operations, and set in motion supporting actions.

However, subordinates must depart from their orders when they are unable to contact their commander or

when there is a limited amount of time to seize a fleeting opportunity. If doubt exists about whether to contact

their commander or depart from orders and act to seize a fleeting opportunity, subordinates should act, if they

can do so within their commander’s intent.

1-65. Fostering a command climate that encourages initiative requires commanders to accept risk and underwrite the good faith mistakes of subordinates in training, before the unit is committed to combat.

Commanders set conditions for subordinates to learn and gain the experience they need to operate on their

own. Subordinates learn to trust that they have the authority and responsibility to act, knowing their

commander will back their decisions. Because mutual trust and shared understanding constitute the

foundation of subordinate initiative, commanders train subordinates to act within the commander’s intent in

uncertain situations.

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Initiative: U.S. Paratroopers in Sicily When paratroopers assaulted Sicily during the night of July 9-10, 1943, they suffered some of the worst weather that could affect that kind of a mission. The men were supposed to conduct two airborne assaults and form a buffer zone ahead of the 7th Army’s amphibious assault on the island, but winds of up to 40 knots blew them far from their intended drop zones. The 3,400 paratroopers in the assault took heavy losses before a single pair of boots even touched the ground. But what happened next would become airborne legend. It became the story of the “The little groups of paratroopers.” The little groups of paratroopers did not find cover or spend hours trying to regroup. They rucked up wherever they were and immediately began attacking everything nearby that happened to look like it belonged to the German or Italian militaries. They tore down communications lines, demolished enemy infrastructure, set up both random and planned roadblocks, ambushed Axis forces, and attacked enemy positions. A group of 16 German pillboxes that controlled key roads was neutralized despite the attacking force having only a fraction of their planned strength. This mischief had a profound effect on the defenders. The Axis forces assumed that the paratroopers were attacking in strength at each spot where a paratrooper assault was reported. So, while many little groups of paratroopers had only a few men, German estimates reported much stronger formations. The worst reports stated that there were 10 times as many attackers as were actually present. German commanders were hard-pressed to rally against what seemed to be an overwhelming attack. Some conducted limited counterattacks at what turned out to be ghosts while others remained in defensive positions or, thinking they were overrun, surrendered to American forces that were a fraction of their size. The operation was a success, thanks in large part to the actions of little groups of paratroopers acting on their own initiative across the island until they could find a unit to form up with. Axis forces began withdrawing from the island on July 25 and Lt. Gen. George S. Patton took Messina, the last major city on Sicily, on August 17.

RISK ACCEPTANCE

Given the same amount of intelligence, timidity will do a thousand times more damage in

war than audacity.

Carl von Clausewitz

1-66. In general terms, risk is the exposure of someone or something valued to danger, harm, or loss. Because risk is part of every operation, it cannot be avoided. Commanders analyze risk in collaboration with

subordinates to help determine what level of risk exists and how to mitigate it. When considering how much

risk to accept with a course of action, commanders consider risk to the force and risk to the mission against

the perceived benefit. They apply judgment with regard to the importance of an objective, time available, and

anticipated cost. Commanders need to balance the tension between protecting the force and accepting and

managing risks that must be taken to accomplish their mission.

1-67. The greatest opportunity may come from the course of action with the most risk. An example of this would be committing significant forces to a potentially costly frontal attack to fix the bulk of enemy forces

in place to set the conditions for their envelopment by other forces. Another would be taking a difficult but

unexpected route in order to achieve surprise.

1-68. While each situation is different, commanders avoid undue caution or commitment of resources to guard against every perceived threat. An unrealistic expectation of avoiding all risk is detrimental to mission

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accomplishment. Waiting for perfect intelligence and synchronization may increase risk or close a window

of opportunity. Mission command requires that commanders and subordinates manage accepted risk, exercise

initiative, and act decisively, even when the outcome is uncertain.

1-69. Reasonably estimating and intentionally accepting risk is not gambling. Gambling is making a decision in which the commander risks the force without a reasonable level of information about the outcome.

Therefore, commanders avoid gambles. Commanders carefully determine risks, analyze and minimize as

many hazards as possible, and then accept risk to accomplish the mission.

THE ROLE OF SUBORDINATES IN MISSION COMMAND

1-70. The mission command approach to command and control requires active participation by personnel of all ranks and duty positions. Subordinate officers, noncommissioned officers, and Soldiers all have important

roles in the exercise of mission command. During operations, subordinates are delegated authority, typically

through orders and standard operating procedures, to make decisions within their commander’s intent.

Commanders expect subordinates to exercise this authority to further the commander’s intent when changes

in the situation render orders irrelevant, or when communications are lost with higher echelon headquarters.

1-71. Because mission command decentralizes decision-making authority and grants subordinates significant freedom of action, it demands more of subordinates at all levels. Commanders must train and

educate subordinates so they demonstrate good judgment when exercising initiative. Subordinates must be

competent in their respective fields, and they must be confident they will have the commander’s support to

make and implement decisions. They must embrace opportunities to assume responsibility for achieving the

commander’s intent.

1-72. Subordinates do not wait for a breakdown in communications or a crisis situation to learn how to act within the commander’s intent. Subordinates look for every opportunity to demonstrate and exercise

initiative. To the greatest extent possible, they report what they intend to do and then execute unless their

commander specifically denies them permission.

1-73. As subordinates realize their commander will support sound decisions, their trust increases, and they become more willing to exercise initiative. As commanders see subordinates perform in uncertain situations,

they gain trust in their subordinates’ judgment and ability.

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Corporal Alvin York and Mission Command On the morning of 8 October 1918, Soldiers of the 82nd Division began an attack to sever the German supply network in the Argonne Forest. Among the men in this push was CPL Alvin York, a squad leader in the 328th Infantry Regiment. Initially, the American attack seemed to go well as forward-deployed Germans seemingly retreated in the face of superior numbers. However, this was a ruse, as the Germans were falling back into prepared positions. Once the Americans were in the middle of the kill zone, the Germans opened fire. This was quickly followed by German artillery ripping gaping holes in the American line. Among the first to fall was CPL York’s platoon leader, LT Kirby Stewart, and as the casualties mounted, the American attack quickly foundered. With LT Stewart dead, SGT Harry Parsons assumed command of CPL York’s platoon. After surveying the situation, he ordered SGT Bernard Early, CPL York, CPL Murray Savage, and CPL William Cutting to advance with their squads to a defile to the south. From here, SGT Parsons surmised that they just might be able to get behind the German lines and eliminate the machine guns that were holding up the advance. After dodging German fire, SGT Early led his 16 men to the defilade, then up a cut in the valley that led behind the German positions. They slowly worked their way around the German infantry and subsequently surprised and captured some 70 German soldiers, which included the battalion commander. While the Americans tried to line up their prisoners, a machine-gun crew on a nearby hill yelled to the captured Germans to take cover and then opened fire. The blast of bullets killed six Americans and wounded three. CPL York was the highest ranking Soldier not hit, and he took charge of the remaining seven men. With the surviving Americans and German prisoners clinging to the ground, CPL York seized the initiative. He charged up the hill, outflanked the German machine gun and an infantry platoon, killing 19. Seeing a large group of German reinforcements arriving from further up the hill, CPL York decided to go back to his men. As he trotted down the hill, he was spotted by a German officer who ordered a bayonet charge to kill the American. Seeing a platoon of Germans charging, CPL York slid on his side, pulled out his 1911 Colt automatic pistol, and began picking off enemy soldiers from back to front. Seeing this, the German battalion commander, who had been captured earlier, slowly got up off of the ground and approached CPL York. Standing behind CPL York, he cautiously yelled above the din, “English?” CPL York replied, “American!” In exasperation, the German commander answered, “Good Lord! If you won’t shoot anymore, I will make them give up. CPL York and his men quickly organized their prisoners, which now numbered 100, into a formation and began marching them out of the forest. During the march back to the American lines, the Americans ended up walking into another group of Germans. CPL York shrewdly secured their surrender as well, and in the end he came out with 132 prisoners. This saved his unit from destruction, thwarted a German counterattack, and allowed the 82nd Division to achieve its objective. For his heroism, CPL York was promoted to sergeant, awarded the Medal of Honor, and would go down in history as America’s most celebrated hero of the First World War.

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COMMAND AND CONTROL

If intercommunication between events in front and ideas behind are not maintained, then

two battles will be fought—a mythical headquarters battle and an actual front-line one, in

which case the real enemy is to be found in our own headquarters.

Major General J.F.C. Fuller

1-74. Mission command is the Army’s approach to command and control. Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in

the accomplishment of mission (JP 1). Command and control (also known as C2) is fundamental to the art

and science of warfare. No single activity in operations is more important than command and control.

Command and control by itself will not secure an objective, destroy an enemy target, or deliver supplies. Yet

none of these activities could be coordinated towards a common objective, or synchronized to achieve

maximum effect, without effective command and control. It is through command and control that the

countless activities a military force must perform gain purpose and direction. The goal of command and

control is mission accomplishment.

1-75. The focal point of command and control is the commander. Commanders assess situations, make decisions, and direct action. They provide purpose, direction, and motivation to instill the will to win.

Commanders seek to understand the situation, visualize an end state and operational approach, and describe

that end state and operational approach in their commander’s intent and planning guidance. During execution,

commanders direct the actions of subordinates and adjust operations based on changes to the situation and

feedback from subordinate units, external organizations, and their staffs.

1-76. The Army’s framework for organizing and putting command and control into action is the operations process. The operations process consists of the major command and control activities performed during

operations (planning, preparing, executing, and continuously assessing). Commanders, supported by their

staffs, employ the operations process to drive the conceptual and detailed planning necessary to understand,

visualize, and describe their operational environment; make and articulate decisions; and direct, lead, and

assess military operations. (See chapter 2 for more information on the role of the commander. See ADP 5-0

for details on conducting the operations process.)

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMMAND AND CONTROL

1-77. Command and control are interrelated. Command resides with commanders and includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing,

directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of missions. It also includes

responsibility for the health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel. Command emphasizes a

commander’s lawful assignment of authority and the responsibility that accompanies that authority.

1-78. Effective command is impossible without control. Control is inherent in command and includes collecting, processing, displaying, storing and disseminating relevant information. Commanders, supported

by their staffs, control operations by receiving and communicating information to build shared understanding

and to direct, coordinate, and synchronize the actions of subordinate units. Commander’s intent, orders,

control measures, and standard operating procedures all assist with the control of operations. Determining

the appropriate level of control in a particular situation is a critical command responsibility.

1-79. Command and control is not a one-way, top-down process. In application, command and control is multidirectional, with feedback from lower echelons, from higher echelons, laterally, and from sources

outside the chain of command. It includes the reciprocal flow of information between commanders, staffs,

subordinates, and other organizations in an area of operations as they work to achieve shared understanding

and adjust to continuously changing circumstances in an operational environment.

Command

I believe firmly in a “personal” command, i.e. that a commander should never attempt to

control an operation or a battle by remaining at his H.Q. or be content to keep touch with

his subordinates by cable, [radio], or other means of communication. He must as far as

possible see the ground for himself to confirm or correct his impressions of the map; his

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31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 1-17

subordinate commanders to discuss their plans and ideas with them; and the troops to

judge of their needs and their morale.

Field-Marshall Earl Wavell

1-80. Command is the authority that a commander in the armed forces lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment (JP 1). Command is personal—an individual person commands, not an

organization or a headquarters. Command is considered more art than science, because it incorporates

intangible elements that require judgment in application. The key elements of command are—

 Authority.

 Responsibility.

 Decision making.

 Leadership.

1-81. Inherent in command is the authority that a military commander lawfully exercises over subordinates, including the authority to assign tasks and the responsibility for their successful completion. Authority

derives from two sources: official authority and personal authority. Official authority is a function of rank

and position and is bestowed by law and regulation. This authority to enforce orders by law is one of the key

elements of command and distinguishes military commanders from other leaders and managers. Personal

authority is a function of personal influence and derives from factors such as experience, reputation, skill,

character, and personal example. It is bestowed by the other members of the organization. Official authority

provides the power to act, but it is rarely enough for success on its own; the most effective commanders also

possess a high degree of personal authority.

1-82. With authority comes responsibility. Commanders are legally and ethically responsible for their decisions and for the actions, accomplishments, and failures of their subordinates. Commanders may delegate

authority, but delegation does not absolve commanders of their responsibility to the higher echelon

commander. Commanders are always accountable for what happens or fails to happen in their command.

1-83. Commanders exercise their authority through decision making and leadership. Decision making refers to selecting a course of action as the one most favorable to accomplish the mission, and includes making

adjustments to plans during the execution of an operation. Decision making includes knowing whether to

decide or not, then when and what to decide, and finally, understanding the consequences. Commanders use

understanding, visualization, description, and direction to make and communicate their decisions.

Commanders rely on their education, experience, knowledge, and judgment in applying authority as they

decide (plan how to achieve the end state) and lead (direct their forces during preparation and execution), all

while assessing progress.

1-84. Leadership refers to influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation, while operating to accomplish the mission and improve the organization. It is the unifying and multiplying element

of combat power. Commanders lead through a combination of personal example, persuasion, and

compulsion. Commanders employ leadership to translate decisions into effective action by forces.

Control

1-85. Control is the regulation of forces and warfighting functions to accomplish the mission in accordance with the commander’s intent. Commanders exercise control over all forces in their area of

operations, aided by their command and control system. Staffs aid the commander in exercising control by

supporting the commander’s decision making; assisting subordinate commanders, staffs and units; and

keeping units and organizations outside the headquarters informed.

1-86. Control is more science than art because it relies on objectivity, empirical methods, and analysis. Control demands commanders and staffs understand those aspects of operations that they can analyze and

measure. These include the physical capabilities and limitations of friendly and enemy organizations and

systems. Control also requires a realistic appreciation for time and distance factors and the time required to

initiate and complete certain actions. Units are bound by factors such as movement rates, supply

consumption, weapons effects, and ethical and legal considerations.

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1-87. The proper application of control incorporates some level of art, since commanders must use judgment with regard to the abilities of subordinates and the likelihood that friction is part of every operation. The key

elements of control are—

 Direction.

 Feedback.

 Information.

 Communication.

1-88. Commanders, assisted by their staffs, direct the actions of their subordinates within their commander’s intent, the unit’s mission, and the concept of operations. Commanders provide direction and communicate

information, usually in plans and orders that provide subordinate forces their tasks and instruct them how to

cooperate within a broader concept of operations. In the process, they receive feedback from subordinates

and supporting forces that allows commanders to update their visualization and modify plans. This feedback

creates a reciprocal flow of information that leads to a shared understanding among all participants.

1-89. Central to providing direction and receiving feedback is information. The amount of information that is available makes managing information and turning it into effective decisions and actions critical to success

during operations. Commanders and staffs employ knowledge management techniques to add clarity to

information, speed its dissemination, and support situational understanding and decision making. (See

chapter 3 for more information on knowledge management and information management)

1-90. Commanders and staffs disseminate information among people, elements, and places. Communication is more than mere transmission of information. It is an activity that allows commanders, subordinates, and

unified action partners to create shared understanding that supports action. It is a means to exercise control

over forces. Communication links information to decisions and decisions to action. Communication among

the parts of a command enables their coordinated action. Effective commanders understand the importance

of using multiple means of communication to ensure shared understanding. They use multidirectional

communication and suitable means of collaboration to ensure clear understanding of the commander’s intent.

They also anticipate those times when communication is likely to be intermittent, and they adjust their level

of control accordingly.

COMMAND AND CONTROL IN MULTINATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS

1-91. Multinational operations is a collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of the coalition or alliance (JP 3-16). Multinational

operations are driven by common agreement among the participating alliance or coalition partners. While

each nation has its own interests and often participates within the limitations of national caveats, all nations

bring value to an operation. Each nation’s force has unique capabilities, and each usually contributes to the

operation’s legitimacy in terms of international or local acceptability. Army forces should anticipate that

most operations will be multinational operations and plan accordingly.

1-92. Multinational operations present unique command and control challenges. These include cultural and language issues, interoperability challenges, national caveats on the use of respective forces, the sharing of

information and intelligence, and rules of engagement. Establishing standard operating procedures and

liaison with multinational partners is critical to effective command and control. When commanding and

controlling forces within a multinational training or operational setting, Army commanders should be familiar

with and employ multinational doctrine and standards ratified by the United States. For example, Allied

Tactical Publication 3.2.2 applies to Army forces during the conduct of North Atlantic Treaty Organization

operations. (See FM 3-16 for a detailed discussion on multinational operations.)

DOMAIN COMMAND AND CONTROL CONSIDERATIONS

1-93. While Army commanders are primarily concerned with command and control in the land domain, command and control occurs in all domains across the range of military operations. Through command and

control, Army forces converge effects from all domains (land, air, maritime, space, cyberspace), as well as

the information environment and the electromagnetic spectrum, to accomplish missions. Each domain has a

unique set of characteristics that influences how capabilities are synchronized and converged throughout an

operation. Convergence is the continuous integration of capabilities from multiple domains, the

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31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 1-19

electromagnetic spectrum, and the information environment, to create multiple dilemmas for the enemy. In

order to effectively converge effects from all domains, Army forces must understand the authorities,

processes, procedures, and time it takes to receive and assess effects from other domains and for Army forces

to create effects in those domains.

1-94. Army forces have effectively integrated capabilities and synchronized actions in the land, air, and maritime domains for decades, and the authorities, processes, and procedures are well established. However,

the military application of technologies to the space and cyberspace domains, as well as the information

environment and the electromagnetic spectrum, require special consideration in planning to converge effects

within or across domains. Liaisons can assist commanders with integrating capabilities resident in domains

other than land. (See chapter 4 for a discussion on liaisons.)

THE COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFIGHTING FUNCTION

1-95. A warfighting function is a group of tasks and systems united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives (ADP 3-0). Warfighting functions are the physical means

that tactical commanders use to execute operations and accomplish missions assigned by higher level

commanders. The purpose of warfighting functions is to provide an intellectual organization for common

critical capabilities available to commanders and staffs at all echelons.

1-96. Operations executed through simultaneous offensive, defensive, stability, or defense support of civil authorities operations require the continuous generation and application of combat power. Combat power is

the total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit or formation can

apply at one time (ADP 3-0). Combat power includes all capabilities provided by unified action partners that

are integrated and synchronized with the commander’s objectives to achieve unity of effort in sustained

operations.

1-97. Combat power has eight elements: leadership, information, command and control, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection. The elements facilitate Army forces accessing

joint and multinational fires and assets. The Army collectively describes the last six elements as warfighting

functions. Commanders apply combat power through the warfighting functions using leadership and

information. Leadership is a multiplying and unifying element of combat power. Information enables

commanders at all levels to make informed decisions about the application of combat power and achieve

definitive results.

1-98. The command and control warfighting function is the related tasks and a system that enable commanders to synchronize and converge all elements of combat power (ADP 3-0). The primary purpose of

the command and control warfighting function is to assist commanders in integrating the other elements of

combat power (movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, protection, information and

leadership) to achieve objectives and accomplish missions. The command and control warfighting function

consists of the command and control warfighting function tasks and the command and control system, as

depicted in figure 1-2 on page 1-20.

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Figure 1-2. Combat power model

COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFIGHTING FUNCTION TASKS

1-99. The command and control warfighting function tasks focus on integrating the activities of the other elements of combat power to accomplish missions. Commanders, assisted by their staffs, integrate numerous

processes and activities within their headquarters and across the force through the mission command

warfighting function. These tasks are—

 Command forces (described in chapter 2).

 Control operations (described in chapter 3).

 Drive the operations process (described in chapter 2).

 Establish the command and control system (described in chapter 4).

COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM

1-100. Commanders need support to effectively exercise command and control. At every echelon of command, each commander establishes a command and control system—the arrangement of people,

processes, networks, and command posts that enable commanders to conduct operations. The command

and control system supports the commander’s decision making, disseminates the commander’s decisions to

subordinates, and facilitates controlling forces. Commanders employ their command and control system to

enable the people and formations conducting operations to work towards a common purpose. All the

equipment and procedures exist to achieve this end. Commanders organize the four components of their

command and control system to support decision making and facilitate communication. The most important

of these components is people. (See chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of the command and control system.)

People

1-101. A commander’s command and control system is based on people. The human aspects of operations remain paramount regardless of the technology associated with the system. Therefore, commanders base their

command and control systems on human characteristics more than on equipment and processes. Trained

personnel are essential to an effective command and control system. Technology cannot support command

and control without them.

Processes

1-102. Commanders establish and use processes and procedures to organize activities within their headquarters and throughout the force. A process is a series of actions or steps taken to achieve a specific

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end, such as the military decision-making process. In addition to the major activities of the operations process,

commanders and staffs use several integrating processes to synchronize specific functions throughout the

operations process. The integrating processes are—

 Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (described in ATP 2-01.3).

 Information collection (described in FM 3-55).

 Targeting (described in ATP 3-60).

 Risk management (described in ATP 5-19).

 Knowledge management (See ATP 6-01.1)

1-103. Procedures are standard, detailed steps that prescribe how to perform specific tasks (CJCSM 5120.01). Procedures govern actions within the command and control system to make it more

effective and efficient. For example, standard operating procedures often provide detailed unit instructions

on how to configure common operational picture (COP) displays. Adhering to processes and procedures

minimizes confusion, misunderstanding, and hesitation as commanders frequently make rapid decisions to

meet operational requirements.

1-104. Processes and procedures can increase organizational competence, for example, by improving a staff’s efficiency or by increasing the tempo. Processes and procedures can be especially useful in improving

the coordination of Soldiers who must cooperate to accomplish repetitive tasks, such as those needed for the

internal functioning of a command post. Units avoid applying procedures blindly to the wrong tasks or the

wrong situations, which can lead to ineffective, even counterproductive, performance.

Networks

1-105. Generally, a network is a grouping of things that are interconnected for a purpose. Networks enable commanders to communicate information and control forces. Networks enable successful operations.

Commanders determine their information requirements and focus their staffs and organizations on using

networks to meet these requirements. These capabilities relieve staffs from handling routine data, and they

enable extensive information sharing, collaborative planning, execution, and assessment that promote shared

understanding. Each network consists of—

 End-user applications.

 Information services and data.

 Network transport and management.

Command Posts

1-106. Command posts provide a physical location for the other three components of a command and control system (people, processes, and networks). Command posts vary in size, complexity and focus.

Command posts may be comprised of vehicles, containers, and tents, or located in buildings. Commanders

systematically arrange platforms, operation centers, signal nodes, and support equipment in ways best suited

for a particular operational environment. (See FM 6-0 and ATP 6-0.5 for more information on command

posts.)

CONCLUSION

1-107. Command and control is fundamental to all operations. Mission command—the Army’s approach to command and control—underpins how the U.S. Army fights. Mission command concentrates on the

objective of an operation, not on every task necessary to achieve it. Mission command emphasizes timely

decision making, understanding of the higher commander’s intent, and the clear responsibility of

subordinates to exercise initiative within that intent to achieve the desired end state. Mission command relies

on decentralized execution and subordinate initiative within the commander’s intent to provide unity of effort.

1-108. The fundamental basis of mission command is tactically and technically competent commanders and subordinates with a shared understanding of purpose who can be trusted to make ethical and effective

decisions in the absence of further guidance. This allows commanders to focus on their intent, and it allows

staffs to generate the mission orders essential to decentralized execution. Subordinates are empowered to

decide when to adapt their assigned tasks to achieve the overall purpose of an operation. This requires

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commanders to accept risk on their subordinates’ behalf and subordinates to assume responsibility for the

initiative necessary for success.

1-109. In practice, mission command tends to be decentralized, informal, and flexible. Plans, orders, and graphics should be as simple and concise as possible, designed for maximum flexibility during execution. By

decentralizing decision-making authority, mission command increases tempo and improves subordinates’

abilities to act quickly in fluid and chaotic situations.

1-110. Commanders cannot exercise command and control alone except in the simplest and smallest of units. Even at the lowest level, commanders need support to exercise command and control effectively. At

every echelon of command, each commander has a command and control system. Commanders arrange

people, processes, and networks into command posts to best facilitate their exercise of authority and direction

to accomplish the mission.

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 2-1

Chapter 2

Command

When you are commanding, leading [soldiers] under conditions where physical exhaustion and

privations must be ignored, where the lives of [soldiers] may be sacrificed, then, the efficiency of

your leadership will depend only to a minor degree on your tactical ability. It will primarily be

determined by your character, your reputation, not much for courage—which will be accepted as a

matter of course—but by the previous reputation you have established for fairness, for that high

minded patriotic purpose, that quality of unswerving determination to carry through any military

task assigned to you.

General of the Army George C. Marshall Speaking to officer candidates in September 1941

This chapter begins with a discussion of the nature and elements of command. It then

describes the role of the commander in operations. The chapter concludes with a

discussion of guides to effective command.

NATURE OF COMMAND

Command is the authority that a commander in the armed forces lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using

available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling

military forces for the accomplishment of missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale,

and discipline of assigned personnel.

Command is personal. In Army regulations and doctrine, an individual is given the authority to command, not an institution or group. The legal and ethical responsibilities of a commander exceed those of

any other leader of similar rank who is serving in a staff position. The commander alone is responsible for

what the command does or fails to do.

Command is more art than science because it requires judgment and depends on actions only human beings can perform. The art of command comprises the creative and skillful exercise of authority through

timely decision making and leadership. Commanders constantly use judgment gained from experience and

training to delegate authority, make decisions, determine the appropriate degree of control, and allocate

resources. Proficiency in the art of command stems from years of schooling, self-development, introspection,

and operational and training experiences. It also requires a deep understanding of the science of war.

The basic techniques of command do not change between echelons. However, direct leadership within a command decreases as the level of command increases, and applying organizational leadership as described

in ADP 6-22 becomes more relevant. Officers prepare for higher command by developing and exercising

their skills when commanding at lower levels.

ELEMENTS OF COMMAND

The elements of command are authority, responsibility, decision making, and leadership. The definition of command refers explicitly to authority. With authority comes the responsibility to carry forward

an assigned task to a successful conclusion. Commanders exercise their authority by making decisions and

leading their command in implementation of those decisions. Successful commanders develop skill in each

element through maturity, experience, and education.

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AUTHORITY

Authority is the right and power to judge, act, or command. Legal authority to enforce orders under the law is a key aspect of command and distinguishes military commanders from staff officers, and civilian

leaders. Commanders understand that operations affect and are affected by human interactions. As such, they

seek to establish personal authority. A commander’s personal authority reinforces that commander’s legal

authority. Personal authority ultimately arises from the actions of commanders and the resulting trust and

confidence generated by these actions. Commanders earn respect and trust by upholding laws, adhering to

the Army ethic, applying Army leadership principles, and demonstrating tactical and technical expertise.

Assuming Command: General Ridgway Takes Eighth Army

After secretly crossing the Yalu River in mid-October 1950, the Chinese 13th Army Group launched its first offensive against United Nations forces on 25 October. By the end of November, the 13th Army Group had pushed most of the Eighth U.S. Army out of northwest Korea. By mid-December, the Eighth Army had retreated south of the 38th Parallel. To add to the United Nations forces’ troubles, the Eighth Army commander, GEN Walton Walker, was killed in a jeep accident on 23 December.

Back in Virginia while visiting friends before Christmas, then Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, GEN Matthew Ridgway, recalls the phone call he received from the Army Chief of Staff, GEN Joe Collins. “Matt, “he said, “I’m sorry to tell you that Johnny Walker has been killed in a jeep accident in Korea. I want you to get your things together and get out there just as soon as you can.”

In his book, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway, GEN Ridgway describes his initial thoughts on assuming command of the Eighth Army:

“Quickly I ran over in my mind all that I knew of the situation. As Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, the map of Korea had become as familiar to me as the lines in my hand. I knew our strength, and our weakness. I knew personally all the top commanders in Eighth Army, except General Oliver Smith of the 1st Marine Division, and from what I knew of him, I knew I could depend on him implicitly.

Armed with this background knowledge, what should I do? Quickly, a pattern of action took place in my mind. First, of course, I would report to General MacArthur, and receive from him his estimate of the situation and broad general directives concerning operations. Next, I would assume command—and this, I knew, must be done in one simple, brief, sincere statement which would convey to Eighth Army my supreme confidence that it could turn and face and fight and defeat the Chinese horde that had sprung so suddenly from beyond the Yalu. Once this was done, I would meet with Eighth Army staff and get from them their appraisal of the situation. After that, I would call on every commander in his battle area, look into his face and the faces of his men, and form my own opinion of his firmness and resolution—or the lack thereof. Once these things were done, then I could begin to plan, could make the big decision whether to stand and hold, or to attack.”

Under GEN Ridgway's leadership, the Chinese offensive was slowed and finally brought to a halt at the battles of Chipyong-ni and Wonju. He then led his troops in Operation Thunderbolt, a counter-offensive in early 1951.

Commanders may delegate authority to subordinates to accomplish a mission or assist in fulfilling their responsibilities. This includes delegating authority to members of their staffs. Delegation allows subordinates

to decide and act for their commander, or in their commander’s name, in specified areas. When delegating

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authority, commanders still remain accountable to their superiors for mission accomplishment, for the lives

and care of their Soldiers, and for effectively using Army resources. Therefore, commanders use judgment

in determining how much authority to delegate.

RESPONSIBILITY

Commanders are legally and ethically accountable for the decisions they make or do not make, and for the actions, accomplishments, and failures of their subordinates. Commanders may delegate authority, but

they still retain overall accountability for the actions of their commands.

Command responsibilities include mission accomplishment; the health, welfare, morale, and discipline of Soldiers; and the use and maintenance of resources. In most cases, these responsibilities do not

conflict; however, the responsibility for mission accomplishment sometimes conflicts with the responsibility

for Soldiers or the stewardship of resources. The importance of the mission informs commanders how much

risk to Soldiers and equipment to accept. When there is conflict among the three, mission accomplishment

comes before Soldiers, and Soldiers come before concerns for resources. Commanders try to keep such

conflicts to an absolute minimum.

DECISION MAKING

The commander must permit freedom of action to his subordinates insofar that this does

not endanger the whole scheme. He must not surrender to them those decisions for which

he alone is responsible.

German Field Service Regulation, Truppen Fuhrung (1935)

Decision making involves applying both the art and science of war. Many aspects of military operations—movement rates, fuels consumption, weapons effects—can be reduced to numbers, calculations,

and tables. They belong to the science of war and are important to understanding what is possible with the

resources available. Other aspects—the impact of leadership, complexity of operations, and uncertainty about

the enemy—belong to the art of war. Successful commanders focus the most attention on those aspects

belonging to the art of war.

For Army forces, decision making focuses on selecting a course of action that is most favorable to accomplishing the mission. Decision making can be deliberate, using the military decision-making process

and a full staff, or decision making can be done very quickly by the commander alone. A commander’s

decisions ultimately guide the actions of the force.

Decision making requires knowing if, when, and what to decide as well as understanding the consequences of that decision. Critical to decision making is the ability to make decisions without perfect

information, knowing when enough information allows acceptable decisions, and the willingness to act on

imperfect information. Striking the balance between acting now with imperfect information and acting later

with better information is essential to the art of command.

Understanding

Success in operations demands timely and effective decisions based on applying judgment to available information and knowledge. As such, commanders and staffs seek to build and maintain situational

understanding throughout an operation. Situational understanding is the product of applying analysis and

judgment to relevant information to determine the relationships among the operational and mission

variables. Situational understanding allows commanders to make effective decisions and regulate the actions

of their force with plans appropriate for the situation. It enables commanders and staffs to assess operations

accurately. Commanders and staffs continually strive to maintain their situational understanding and work

through periods of reduced understanding as a situation evolves. Effective commanders accept that

uncertainty can never be eliminated, and they train their staffs and subordinates to function in uncertain

environments.

Knowledge management and information management assist commanders with progressively adding meaning at each level of processing and analyzing to help build and maintain their situational understanding.

Knowledge management and information management are interrelated activities that support commanders'

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decision making. There are four levels of meaning. From the lowest level to the highest level, they include

data, information, knowledge, and understanding. At the lowest level, processing transforms data into

information. Analysis then refines information into knowledge. Commanders and staffs then apply judgment

to transform knowledge into understanding. Commanders and staffs continue a progressive development of

learning, as organizations and individuals assign meaning and value at each level. (See figure 2-1.)

Figure 2-1. Achieving understanding

In the context of decision making, data consists of unprocessed observations detected by a collector of any kind (human, mechanical, or electronic). In typical organizations, data often flows to

command posts from subordinate units. Subordinate units push data to inform higher headquarters of events

that facilitate situational understanding. Data can be quantified, stored, and organized in files and databases;

however, data only becomes useful when processed into information.

In the context of decision making, information is data that has been organized and processed in order to provide context for further analysis. The amount of information that is available makes managing

information and using it to make effective decisions critical to success during operations. Commanders and

staffs apply experience and judgment to information to gain shared understanding of events and conditions

in which they make decisions during operations. Effective command and control requires further developing

information into knowledge so commanders can achieve understanding

In the context of decision making, knowledge is information that has been analyzed and evaluated for operational implications. It is also comprehension gained through study, experience, practice, and

human interaction that provides the basis for expertise and skilled judgment. Staffs work to improve and

share tacit and explicit knowledge.

Tacit knowledge resides in an individual's mind. It is the purview of individuals, not technology. All individuals have a unique, personal store of knowledge gained from experience, training, and other people.

This knowledge includes an appreciation for nuances, subtleties, and work-arounds. Intuition, mental agility,

effective responses to crises, and the ability to adapt are forms of tacit knowledge. Leaders use tacit

knowledge, their own and that of their subordinates, to solve complex problems and make decisions.

Explicit knowledge consists of information that can be organized, applied, and transferred using digital (such as computer files) or non-digital (such as paper) means. Explicit knowledge lends itself to rules, limits,

and precise meanings. Examples of explicit knowledge include doctrinal publications, orders, and databases.

Explicit knowledge is primarily used to support situational awareness and shared understanding as it applies

to decision making.

In the context of decision making, understanding is knowledge that has been synthesized and had judgment applied to comprehend the situation's inner relationships, enable decision making, and drive

action. Understanding is judgment applied to knowledge in the context of a particular situation.

Understanding is knowing enough about the situation to change it by applying action. Judgment is based on

experience, expertise, and intuition. Ideally, true understanding should be the basis for decisions. However,

uncertainty and time preclude achieving perfect understanding before deciding and acting. (See chapter 3 for

more information on knowledge management and information management.)

Critical and Creative Thinking

Commanders and staffs apply critical and creative thinking, including ethical reasoning, to decision making. Critical thinking examines a problem in depth from multiple points of view. It determines whether

adequate justification exists to accept conclusions as true based on a given inference or argument. Critical

thinkers apply judgment about what to believe or what to do in response to facts, experience, or arguments.

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Creative thinking involves thinking in new, innovative ways using imagination, insight, and different ideas. Leaders often face unfamiliar problems or old problems requiring new solutions. Even situations that

appear familiar require creative solutions, since an enemy force will adapt to past friendly approaches.

Leaders look at different options to solve problems using lessons from similar circumstances in the past, as

well as innovative approaches that come from new ideas. Creatively combining old and new ideas can create

difficult dilemmas for an enemy force.

Commanders choose a decision-making approach based on the situation. There are generally two approaches to making decisions: analytic and intuitive. In certain situations, commanders may take a more

deliberate approach, using systematic analysis. In other situations, commanders may rely heavily on intuition.

Effective commanders consider their experience, their staff’s experience, and the time and information

available when considering their decision-making approach.

Analytic Decision Making

Analytic decision making generates several alternative solutions, compares those solutions to a set of criteria, and selects the best course of action. It aims to produce the optimal solution by comparing options.

It emphasizes analytic reasoning guided by experience, and commanders use it when time is available. This

approach offers several advantages. Analytic decision making—

 Is methodical and allows the breakdown of tasks into recognizable elements.

 Ensures commanders consider, analyze, and evaluate relevant factors and employ techniques such

as war-gaming.

 Provides a systematic approach when a decision involves processing large amounts of information.

 Helps resolve conflicts among courses of action.

 Gives inexperienced personnel a logically structured approach.

Analytic decision making presents some disadvantages. It is often time-consuming, relies on large amounts of information, and requires clearly established evaluation criteria. While it is methodical, changes

in conditions may require a complete reevaluation, which could delay decisions. When using this approach,

commanders weigh the need for analysis against time considerations. Analytic decision making is not

appropriate for all situations, especially during execution, when forces must adapt to rapidly changing

situations. (An example of analytic decision making is the military decision-making process found in

FM 6-0.)

Intuitive Decision Making

Intuition depends on the use of experience to recognize key patterns that indicate the

dynamics of the situation. Because patterns can be subtle, people often cannot describe

what they noticed, or how they judged a situation as typical or atypical.

Gary Klein, Sources of Power

Intuitive decision making is reaching a conclusion in a way that is not expressly known by the decision maker. It normally involves pattern recognition based on knowledge, judgment, experience, education,

intelligence, boldness, perception, and character. Intuitive decision making—

 Focuses on assessment of the situation more than on comparing multiple options.

 Usually results in a decision for an acceptable course of action instead of the optimal course of

action derived from an analytical approach.

 May be more effective when time is short.

 Relies on a commander’s experience and ability to recognize the key elements and implications

of a particular problem or situation.

 Tends to focus on the larger picture more than on individual components.

Intuitive decision making is faster than analytic decision making, but it requires an adequate level of experience to recognize an acceptable course of action. There is a difference between sound intuition and

uninformed assumptions. When using intuitive decision making, leaders should be aware of their own biases

and the differences between their current operational environment and those they experienced in the past.

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By emphasizing experienced judgment over deliberate analysis, commanders increase tempo and retain flexibility to deal with uncertainty. The intuitive approach is consistent with the fact that there are no

perfect solutions to battlefield problems. Even when making intuitive decisions, commanders may have time

available to employ more analytic techniques. Time permitting, commanders use their staffs to validate

intuitive decisions to ensure they are feasible, acceptable, and suitable.

In practice, the two approaches are rarely mutually exclusive. When time is not critical, commanders use an analytical approach or incorporate analysis into their intuitive decisions. Commanders blend intuitive

and analytic decision making to help them remain objective and make timely, effective decisions.

Commanders avoid making decisions purely by intuition and incorporate analysis into their intuitive

decisions. Commanders seek as much analysis as possible within the time available. In situations requiring

immediate decisions, this analysis may be no more than the commander’s own rapid mental development,

analysis, and selection of a course of action—which may appear completely intuitive. Combining both

approaches best accounts for the many factors that affect decisions. An example of an approach that combines

analytic and intuitive decision making is the rapid decision-making and synchronization process found in

FM 6-0.

Judgment

Despite the years of thought and oceans of ink which have been devoted to the elucidation

of war its secrets still remain shrouded in mystery….War is an art and as such is not

susceptible of explanation by fixed formulae. Yet from the earliest time there has been an

unending effort to subject its complex and emotional structure to dissection, to enunciate

rules for its waging, to make tangible its intangibility.

General George S. Patton, Jr.

Commanders make decisions using judgment acquired from experience, training, and study. Experience contributes to judgment by providing a basis for rapidly identifying practical courses of actions

and dismissing impractical ones. Commanders use judgment to assess information, situations, or

circumstances shrewdly and draw feasible conclusions. Skilled judgment helps commanders form sound

opinions and make sensible decisions.

Judgment is required for selecting the critical time and place to act. Commanders act by assigning missions, prioritizing, managing risk, allocating resources, and leading. Thorough knowledge of the science

of war, a strong ethical sense, and an understanding of enemy and friendly capabilities form the basis of the

judgment commanders require.

Judgment becomes more refined as commanders become more experienced. Increasing their knowledge, developing their intellect, and gaining experience allow commanders to develop the greater

judgment required for increased responsibilities. In addition to decision-making, commanders apply their

judgment to—

 Identify, accept, and mitigate risk.

 Delegate authority.

 Prioritize resources.

 Direct the staff.

Identify, Mitigate, and Accept Risk

Commanders use judgment when identifying risk by deciding how much risk to accept, mitigating risk where possible, and managing the risk they must accept. They accept risk when seizing opportunities. They

reduce risk with foresight and planning, while regularly examining any assumptions associated with previous

risk-related decisions.

Consideration of risk begins during planning as commanders and staffs assess risk, including ethical risk, for each course of action and propose control measures. They collaborate and integrate input from

subordinates, staff, and unified action partners. They determine how to mitigate identified risks. This includes

delegating management of certain risks to subordinate commanders who in turn develop appropriate

mitigation measures. Commanders then allocate the resources they deem appropriate to mitigate risks.

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Commanders must continuously assess how risk may be accumulating over time as operations progress, both at their own echelon as well as for their subordinates. Changes in the nature of an operation,

the number and types of tasks assigned, available combat power, or changes in the threat may all change the

level of risk subordinates must mitigate and accept. A series of discrete decisions about seemingly unrelated

issues can, over time, potentially change the level of risk in ways that are not readily apparent to a

commander. However, this cumulative risk may be understood by one or more subordinates directly impacted

by changing conditions or new decisions. It is therefore critical that commanders clearly communicate risk

concerns to higher and lower echelons to ensure shared understanding and informed decision making.

Assumptions initially made during planning may change or compound over time, raising the level of risk. Risks that were acceptable in one context and based on one set of assumptions may be untenable when

the context of the operation changes. In some instances, the situation may change to the point that a

commander needs to take action to adjust the level of risk subordinate commanders are required to take when

the perceived benefit no longer outweighs the likely cost. For example, a unit performing in an economy of

force role with a particular task organization may be directed to detach additional units to support other efforts

to the point where it can no longer effectively accomplish its mission. The higher level commander is unlikely

to have sufficient situational awareness to understand precisely when the threshold of acceptable risk for

mission accomplishment has been crossed without a continuous dialogue with that subordinate commander.

It is as much the responsibility of the subordinate to keep higher echelons informed as it is the responsibility

of the higher level commander to seek risk analysis from the subordinate.

Inculcating risk acceptance goes hand in hand with creating an environment where subordinates are not only encouraged to take risks, but also one where mistakes are tolerated. Commanders realize that

subordinates may not accomplish all tasks initially and that errors may occur. Commanders train subordinates

to act within the commander’s intent in uncertain situations. Commanders give subordinates the latitude to

make mistakes and learn.

During training, commanders might allow subordinates to execute an excessively risky tactical decision, keeping the safety of Soldiers in mind, as a teaching point. They then instruct subordinates afterward

on how to determine a more appropriate level of tactical risk. This sort of coaching helps commanders gain

trust in their subordinates’ judgment and initiative, and it builds subordinates’ trust in their commander.

During operations, commanders may need to intervene when a subordinate accepts tactical risk that exceeds

the benefits expected.

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Risk Acceptance: OPERATION HAWTHORN, Dak To, Vietnam

At 0230, 7 June 1966, a battalion of the 24th NVA (North Vietnamese Army) Regiment attacked an artillery firebase manned by elements of 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, beginning the battle of Dak To. While the forces at the firebase defeated this attack, two battalions of the 101st Airborne were lifted in by helicopters to envelop the 24th NVA Regiment in the Dak To area. One battalion, 1/327th, attacked north up Dak Tan Kan valley, while the other, 2/502d, attacked toward the south. The 1/327th encountered the NVA first and fixed them. The 2/502d established a blocking position initially but then began a sweep south to link up with 1/327th.

The 2/502d used its famous “checkerboard” technique in its advance, breaking down into small units, with squad-size patrols searching designated areas into which the battalion had divided its area of operations. This technique covered ground, but the squads were too weak to face stiff opposition. Company commanders had to assess indicators, decide when they indicated the presence of heavy enemy forces, and assemble their companies for action. As C Company advanced on 12 June, its commander, CPT William Carpenter Jr., sensed those indicators and concentrated his company, but it was surrounded and in danger of being overrun by an estimated NVA battalion. As he spoke to his battalion commander, LTC Hank Emerson (“the Gunfighter”), the sounds of the screaming, charging enemy could be heard over the radio. CPT Carpenter reportedly called for an air strike “right on top of us.” The only air support available was armed with napalm; when it hit, it broke the enemy attack and saved the company. A day later, another company linked up with C Company, and they continued the mission. The battle of Dak To was a staggering defeat for the NVA. CPT Carpenter’s action can be considered a necessary risk. The survival of his force was at stake. The NVA would have destroyed C Company before another company could relieve it.

CPT Carpenter later stated privately that he realized the survival of his company was at stake, but that he did not actually call the air strike directly in on his position. Instead, he told the forward air controller to use the smoke marking his company’s position as the aiming point for the air strike. He knew that using conventional air strike techniques and safe distances would not defeat the enemy. He also reasoned that the napalm would “splash” forward of his position, causing more enemy than friendly casualties. The air strike did just that. Thus, CPT Carpenter exercised judgment based on experience. CPT Carpenter believed he was taking a high risk from the standpoint of troop safety. But he accepted that risk, made a decision, and acted. His actions saved his company and contributed to a major NVA defeat. CPT Carpenter and his first sergeant, 1SG Walter Sabaulaski, received the Distinguished Service Cross for their heroism.

Delegate Authority

If it is necessary for a commander to interfere constantly with a subordinate, one or the

other should be relieved.

Field Marshal Richard Michael Carver

Commanders use judgment to determine how much authority to delegate to subordinates and how much they are able to decentralize execution. Commanders delegate authority and set the level of their

personal oversight of delegated tasks based on their assessment of the skill and experience of their

subordinates. When delegating authority to subordinates, commanders do everything in their power to set

conditions for their success. Commanders allocate sufficient resources to their subordinates so their

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subordinates can accomplish their missions. Resources include people, units, services, supplies, equipment,

networks, information, and time. Commanders allocate resources through task organization and established

priorities of support.

Under the mission command approach, delegated authority is proportional to the extent of commanders’ trust in the abilities of their subordinates. Commanders delegate authority and set the level of

their personal involvement in delegated tasks based on their assessment of the competence and experience of

their subordinates. Ideally, once commanders delegate authority, they supervise to the minimum level

required to ensure subordinates’ and mission success.

Commanders delegate authority verbally, in writing through plans, orders, or standard operating procedures, or by both methods. Examples of delegated authority are authority over an area of expertise or

technical specialty, a geographic area, or specific kinds of actions. Commanders may limit delegated

authority in time, or they may use an enduring approach. Commanders should ensure members of the

command, especially the staff and subordinate commanders, understand to whom and what authorities have

been delegated. Delegation not only applies to subordinate commanders but also to members of the staff.

Prioritize Resources

Commanders allocate resources to accomplish the mission. Allocating resources requires judgment because resources can be limited. Considerations for prioritizing resources include how to—

 Effectively accomplish the mission.

 Protect the lives of Soldiers.

 Apply the principles of mass and economy of force.

 Posture their force for subsequent operations.

The primary consideration for allocating resources is how their use contributes to effective mission accomplishment. Commanders do not determine how to accomplish a mission based on conserving resources

or giving all subordinates an equal share; they allocate resources efficiently to ensure effectiveness. The

objective—to accomplish the mission—guides every element of operations. A plan that does not accomplish

the mission, regardless of how well it conserves resources, is not effective.

The next priority is to protect the lives of Soldiers. Commanders determine how to protect the lives of Soldiers before considering how to conserve material resources. They use material resources generously to

save lives. If there are different but equally effective ways to accomplish the mission, a commander considers

ways which use fewer resources.

The third aspect of resource allocation is based on two of the principles of war—mass and economy of force. The principle of mass means that commanders always weight the main effort with the greatest

possible combat power to overwhelm an enemy force and ensure mission accomplishment. Economy of force

refers to allocating the minimum essential combat power to all supporting efforts. Supporting efforts typically

receive fewer resources than the main effort. Commanders must accept risk in supporting efforts in order to

weight the main effort.

Commanders determine the amount of combat power essential to each task and allocate sufficient resources to accomplish it. When allocating resources, commanders consider the cost to the force and the

effects of the current operation on the ability to execute follow-on operations. If subordinates believe they

have not received adequate resources, or believe accomplishing their mission would produce an unacceptable

cost to the force, they inform their commander. The commander then decides whether to accept risk, allocate

more resources, or change the plan.

The fourth aspect of applying judgment to resource allocation concerns posturing the force for subsequent operations. Commanders balance immediate mission accomplishment with resource

requirements for subsequent operations. Commanders accomplish their missions at the least cost to the force,

so they do not impair its ability to conduct follow-on operations. They visualize short-term and long-term

effects of their resource use and determine priorities. At lower echelons, commanders focus more on the

immediate operation—the short term. At progressively higher echelons, commanders give more

consideration to long-term operations.

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Direct the Staff

Commanders rely on and expect initiative from the staff as much as from subordinate commanders. Delegating authority allows commanders to use their time for the more creative aspects of command (the

art). Commanders delegate authority and set the level of their personal involvement in staff activities based

on their assessment of the skill and experience of their subordinates. This assessment requires skilled

judgment.

Within their headquarters, commanders exercise their judgment to determine when to intervene and participate personally in staff operations, as opposed to letting their staffs operate on their own based on

guidance. Commanders cannot do everything themselves or make every decision; such participation does not

give staffs the experience mission command requires. However, commanders cannot simply approve staff

products produced without their input. Commanders participate in staff work where it is necessary to guide

their staffs. They use their situational understanding and commander’s visualization to provide guidance from

which their staffs produce plans and orders. In deciding when and where to interact with subordinates, the

key is for commanders to determine where they can best use their limited time to greatest effect—where their

personal intervention will pay the greatest dividend.

LEADERSHIP

As each man’s strengths gives out, as it no longer responds to his will, the inertia of the

whole gradually comes to rest on the commander’s will alone. The ardor of his spirit must

rekindle the flame of purpose in all others; his inward fire must revive their hope.

Carl von Clausewitz

Leadership is the activity of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization (ADP 6-22). Leadership involves taking responsibility

for decisions, being loyal to subordinates, inspiring and directing assigned forces and resources toward a

purposeful end, establishing a team climate that engenders success, demonstrating moral and physical

courage in the face of adversity, and providing the vision that both focuses and anticipates the future course

of events. Leadership requires the attributes and competencies that describe what leaders are expected to be.

(See ADP 6-22 for more information on Army leadership.)

Professional competence, personality, and the will of strong commanders represent a significant part of any unit’s combat power. While leadership requirements differ with unit size and type, all leaders must

demonstrate character and ethical standards. Leaders must know and understand their subordinates. They

must act with courage and conviction in battle. Leaders build trust and teamwork. During operations they

know where to be to make decisions or to influence the action by their personal presence.

Commanders recognize that military operations take a toll on the moral, physical, and mental stamina of the people making up their formations. They understand that experience, interpersonal relationships, and

the environment influence the people conducting operations. Leaders account for these factors when

motivating people to accomplish tasks in the face of danger and hardship. Setting a good personal example

is critical to effective leadership.

Commanders are both leaders and followers. Being a responsible subordinate is part of being a good leader. Responsible subordinates support the chain of command and ensure their command supports the larger

organization and its purpose. Successful commanders recognize the responsibilities they and their

subordinates have to the next higher echelon and the larger formation overall.

Commanders know the status of their forces. Command sergeants major, first sergeants, and platoon sergeants play vital roles in providing commanders awareness about the morale and physical condition of

their Soldiers. Commanders need to know when circumstances may prevent friendly forces from performing

to their full potential. For example, a subordinate unit may have recently received inexperienced

replacements, may have lost cohesion due to leader casualties, or may be extremely fatigued due to an

extended period of operations.

Commanders press the fight tenaciously and aggressively. They accept risks and push Soldiers to the limits of their endurance for as long as possible to retain the operational initiative. They act aggressively to

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exploit fleeting opportunities. Effective commanders recognize when to push Soldiers to their limits and

when to let them rest to prevent individual and collective collapse. Even the most successful combat actions

can render units incapable of further operations.

Leadership is an important component of mitigating the effects of stress. Stress is an integral part of military service in general and in combat operations in particular. Leaders must learn to mitigate stress for

their subordinates and cope with it themselves. (See ATP 6-22.5 for more information on combat and

operational stress control). Two aspects of leadership that are unique to command are command presence

and the location of the commander.

Command Presence

Command presence is the influence commanders have on those around them through their personal demeanor, appearance, and conduct. It requires contact with others, both physically and through voice

command and control systems. Commanders use their presence to gather and share information and assess

operations through personal interaction with subordinates. Establishing command presence makes the

commander’s knowledge and experience available to subordinates and provides encouragement. It allows

commanders to assess intangibles like morale, and provide direct feedback on subordinate performance.

Commanders employing the mission command approach ask questions without second-guessing their

subordinate’s performance unless absolutely necessary. Skilled commanders communicate tactical and

technical knowledge that goes beyond plans and procedures. Command presence establishes a background

for all plans and procedures so that subordinates can understand how and when to adapt them to achieve the

commander’s intent. Commanders can establish command presence in a variety of ways, including—

 Being seen and heard.

 Sharing risk and hardship.

 Setting a good personal example.

 Ensuring their commander’s intent is widely understood.

 Providing clear face-to-face commander’s guidance.

 Backbriefs and rehearsals.

Directly engaging subordinates and staffs allows commanders to motivate, build trust and confidence, exchange information, and assess the human aspects of operations. It allows commanders to assess the morale

and stamina of subordinate units. Commanders use their presence to overcome uncertainty and chaos and

maintain the focus of their forces. They communicate in a variety of ways, adjusting their communication

style to fit the situation and the audience. They communicate both formally and informally, through

questions, discussions, conversations, and other direct or indirect communication. Commanders position

themselves where they can best command without losing the ability to respond to changing situations.

Location of the Commander

One of the most valuable qualities of a commander is a flair for putting himself in the right

place at the vital time.

Field Marshal Sir William Slim

Commanders command from their personal location. One of the fundamental dilemmas facing all commanders is where to position themselves during operations. As far as conditions allow, commanders

should be forward where they can be seen and heard to best influence the decisive operation or main effort.

Commanding forward allows commanders to assess the state of operations face to face with their subordinates

and achieve shared understanding. It allows them to gather as much information as possible about actual

combat conditions when making decisions. However, commanding forward does not mean taking over a

subordinate’s responsibilities.

Commanders consider their position in relation to the forces they command and the mission. Their location can have important consequences, not only for the command but also for executing operations. The

command and control system helps commanders position themselves forward without losing access to the

information and analysis available from their command posts.

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At the lowest levels, commanders lead by personal example, acquire much information themselves, decide personally, and communicate face to face with those they direct. Typically, they position themselves

well forward to directly influence the decisive operation. However, even at these levels, commanders cannot

always command their whole unit directly.

In larger tactical- and operational-level commands, command posts are normally the focus of information flow and planning. However, commanders cannot always visualize the battlefield to direct and

synchronize operations from command posts. Commanders often assess the situation up front, face to face

with subordinate commanders and their units. Commanders employ their command and control system so

they can position themselves wherever they can best command without losing the situational understanding

that enables them respond to opportunities and changing circumstances. The command and control system

allows commanders to obtain the information they need to assess operations and risks, and make necessary

adjustments, from anywhere in an area of operations.

Commanders realize that they might not always be where the critical action is occurring. This probability reinforces the necessity of training subordinates to operate using the mission command approach.

Commanders can then rely on subordinates to restore or exploit the situation without their presence or

personal intervention.

Where a commander is located can bring the leadership element of combat power directly to an operation, especially when that location allows for personal presence and the ability to directly observe events

and see things that might not be conveyed by the command and control system. Being physically present can

allow a commander to assess a much broader set of indicators of the unit’s condition. Commanders gain

firsthand appreciation for the human aspects of a situation that can rarely be gained any other way. Equally

important, commanders can actually see terrain and weather conditions which might not be clearly explained

by maps or whether reports. They can avoid the delays and distortions that occur as information travels down

and up the chain of command. Finally, by their presence, commanders direct emphasis to critical spots and

focus efforts on them. Some of the factors that influence a commander’s location include—

 The need to understand the situation.

 The need to make decisions.

 The need to communicate.

 The need to motivate subordinates.

The commander’s forward presence demonstrates a willingness to share danger and hardship. It also allows commanders to appraise for themselves a subordinate unit’s condition, including its leaders’ and

Soldiers’ morale. Forward presence allows commanders to sense the human aspects of conflict, particularly

when fear and fatigue reduce effectiveness.

Commanders cannot let the perceived advantages of improved information technology compromise their obligation to personally lead by example. Face-to-face discussions and forward presence allow

commanders to see things that may not be conveyed by the command and control system.

THE ROLE OF COMMANDERS IN OPERATIONS

Commanders must remember that the issuance of an order, or the devising of a plan, is

only about five per cent of the responsibility of command. The other ninety-five percent is

to insure, by personal observation, or through the interposing of staff officers, that the

order is carried out.

General George S. Patton, Jr.

Commanders are the central figures in command and control. Commanders, assisted by their staffs, integrate numerous processes and activities within their headquarters and across the force as they exercise

command and control. Throughout operations, commanders balance their time between leading their staffs

through the operations process and providing purpose, direction, and motivation to subordinate commanders

and leaders.

The Army’s framework for exercising command and control is the operations process—the major command and control activities performed during operations: planning, preparing, executing, and

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continuously assessing the operation (ADP 5-0). Commanders use the operations process to drive the

conceptual and detailed planning necessary to understand, visualize, and describe their operational

environment and the operation’s end state; make and articulate decisions; and direct, lead, and assess

operations as shown in figure 2-2.

Figure 2-2. The operations process

The activities of the operations process are not discrete; they overlap and recur as circumstances demand. Planning, preparing, and executing do not always have distinct start and end points. Planning is a

continuous activity within the process. While preparing for one operation, or during its execution, units are

refining the current plan or planning for future operations. Preparation always overlaps with planning, and it

continues throughout execution for some subordinate units. Assessing surrounds and permeates the other

three activities as commanders and staffs judge progress toward accomplishing tasks and achieving

objectives. Subordinate echelons or units within the same command may be in different stages of the

operations process at any given time. (See ADP 5-0 for a detailed discussion of the operations process and

the commander’s role in planning, preparing, executing, and assessing operations.)

Commanders, staffs, and subordinate units employ the operations process to integrate and synchronize the warfighting functions across multiple domains and synchronize forces to accomplish missions. This

includes integrating numerous processes such as intelligence preparation of the battlefield, the military

decision-making process, and the targeting process within the headquarters and with higher echelon,

subordinate, supporting, and supported units. The unit’s battle rhythm integrates and synchronizes the various

processes and activities that occur within the operations process.

Commanders are the most important participants in the operations process. While staffs perform essential functions that amplify the effectiveness of operations, commanders drive the operations process

through understanding, visualizing, describing, directing, leading, and assessing operations as shown in

figure 2-3 on page 2-14. Accurate and timely running estimates maintained by staffs assist commanders in

understanding the situation and making decisions throughout the operations process.

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Figure 2-3. The commander’s role in the operations process

UNDERSTAND

An operational environment encompasses physical areas of the air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains as well as the information environment, the electromagnetic spectrum, and other factors.

Understanding an operational environment and associated problems is fundamental to establishing a

situation’s context and visualizing operations. The interrelationship of the air, land, maritime, space, and

cyberspace domains and the information environment requires a cross-domain understanding of an

operational environment. While understanding the land domain is essential, commanders consider the

influence of other domains and the information environment on land operations. They also consider how land

power can influence operations in the other domains. For example, commanders consider how friendly and

enemy air and missile defense capabilities influence operations in the air domain. Included within these areas

are the enemy, friendly, and neutral actors who are relevant to a specific operation.

Part of understanding an operational environment includes identifying and understanding problems. In the context of operations, an operational problem is a discrepancy between the current state of an operational

environment and the desired end state. An operational problem includes those issues that impede commanders

from accomplishing missions, achieving objectives, and attaining the desired end state.

Commanders collaborate with their staffs, other commanders, and unified action partners to build a shared understanding of their operational environment and associated problems. Planning, intelligence

preparation of the battlefield, and running estimates help commanders develop an initial understanding of

their operational environment. Commanders direct reconnaissance and develop the situation to improve their

understanding. Commanders circulate within the area of operations as often as possible, collaborating with

subordinate commanders and speaking with Soldiers. Using personal observations and inputs from others

(including running estimates from their staffs), commanders improve their understanding of their operational

environment throughout the operations process. Ideally, perfect understanding should be the basis for

decisions. However, commanders realize that uncertainty and time preclude achieving perfect understanding

before deciding and acting.

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VISUALIZE

As commanders begin to understand their operational environment, they start visualizing a desired end state and potential solutions to solve or manage identified problems. Collectively, this is known as

commander’s visualization—the mental process of developing situational understanding, determining

a desired end state, and envisioning an operational approach by which the force will achieve that end

state. Figure 2-4 depicts activities associated with developing the commander’s visualization.

In building their visualization, commanders first seek to understand those conditions that represent the current situation. Next, commanders envision a set of desired future conditions that represents the operation’s

end state. Commanders complete their visualization by conceptualizing an operational approach—a broad

description of the mission, operational concepts, tasks, and actions required to accomplish the mission

(JP 5-0).

Figure 2-4. Commander’s visualization

DESCRIBE

Commanders describe their visualization to their staffs and subordinate commanders to facilitate shared understanding and purpose throughout the force. During planning, commanders ensure subordinate

commanders understand their visualization well enough to begin course of action development. During

execution, commanders describe modifications to their visualization in updated planning guidance and

directives resulting in fragmentary orders that adjust the original operation order. Commanders describe their

visualization in doctrinal terms, refining and clarifying it as circumstances require. Commanders describe

their visualization in terms of—

 Commander’s intent.

 Planning guidance, including an operational approach.

 Commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs).

 Essential elements of friendly information.

DIRECT

Commanders direct action to achieve results and lead forces to mission accomplishment. Commanders make decisions and direct action based on their situational understanding maintained by continuous

assessment. Throughout the operations process, commanders direct forces by—

 Preparing and approving plans and orders.

 Establishing command and support relationships.

 Assigning and adjusting tasks, control measures, and task organization.

 Positioning units to maximize combat power.

 Positioning key leaders at critical places and times to ensure supervision.

 Allocating resources to exploit opportunities and counter threats.

 Committing the reserve as required.

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LEAD

Commanders lead by example and personal presence. Leadership inspires subordinates to accomplish things that they otherwise might not. Where a commander locates within an area of operations is an important

consideration for effective mission command. Through leadership, commanders provide purpose, direction,

and motivation to subordinate commanders, their staffs, and Soldiers. There is no standard pattern or simple

prescription; different commanders lead differently. Commanders balance their time among command posts

and staffs, subordinate commanders, forces, and other organizations to make the greatest contribution to

success. (See ADP 6-22 for a detailed discussion of leadership)

ASSESS

Commanders continuously assess the situation to better understand current conditions and determine how an operation is progressing. Continuous assessment helps commanders anticipate and adapt the force to

changing circumstances. Commanders incorporate the assessments of their staffs, subordinate commanders,

and unified action partners into their personal assessment of the situation. Based on their assessment,

commanders adjust their visualization and modify plans to adapt the force to changing circumstances.

A commander’s focus on understanding, visualizing, describing, directing, leading, or assessing throughout operations varies during different operations process activities. For example, during planning

commanders focus more on understanding, visualizing, and describing. During execution, commanders often

focus more on directing, leading, and assessing—while improving their understanding and modifying their

visualization as needed. (See ADP 5-0 for a detailed discussion on assessing operations.)

GUIDES TO EFFECTIVE COMMAND

There will be neither time nor opportunity to do more than prescribe the several tasks of

the several subordinates.... [I]f they are reluctant (afraid) to act because they are

accustomed to detailed orders… if they are not habituated to think, to judge, to decide and

to act for themselves ... we shall be in sorry case when the time of “active operations”

arrives.

Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King

The guides to effective command help commanders fulfill the fundamental responsibilities of command. A commander’s use of these guides must fit the situation, the commander’s personality, and the

capability and understanding of subordinates. Command cannot be scripted. These guides apply at all levels

of command. Mission command provides a common baseline for command during operations and garrison

activities. These guides aid commanders in effectively exercising command and inculcating mission

command:

 Create a positive command climate.

 Ensure unity of effort.

 Train subordinates on command and control and the application of mission command.

 Make timely and effective decisions and act.

CREATE A POSITIVE COMMAND CLIMATE

Morale is a state of mind. It is that intangible force which will move a whole group of men

to give their last ounce to achieve something, without counting the cost to themselves; that

makes them feel they are part of something greater than themselves.

Field Marshall Sir William Slim

Commanders create their organization’s tone—the characteristic atmosphere in which people work. This is known as the command climate. It is directly attributable to the leader’s values, skills, and actions. A

positive climate facilitates team building, encourages initiative, and fosters collaboration, mutual trust, and

shared understanding. Commanders shape the climate of their organization, no matter what the size.

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Successful commanders recognize that all subordinates contribute to mission accomplishment. They establish clear and realistic goals and communicate their goals openly. Commanders establish and maintain

open, candid communication between subordinate leaders. They encourage subordinates to bring creative

and innovative ideas to the forefront. They also seek feedback from subordinates. The result is a command

climate that encourages initiative.

A positive command climate instills a sense of trust within units. It facilitates a strong sense of discipline, comradeship, self-respect, and morale. It helps Soldiers develop a desire to do their fair share and

to help in the event of need. In turn, Soldiers know their leaders will guard them from unnecessary risk.

In a positive command climate, the expectation is that everyone lives by and upholds the moral principles of the Army Ethic. The Army Ethic must be espoused, supported, practiced, and respected. Mission

command depends on a command climate that encourages subordinate commanders at all levels to take the

initiative. Commanders create a positive command climate by—

 Accepting subordinates’ risk taking and errors.

 Building mutual trust and shared understanding.

 Communicating with subordinates.

 Building teams.

(See AR 600-20, ADP 6-22, and FM 6-22 for more information on creating a positive command climate.)

Accept Subordinates’ Risk Taking and Errors

Judgment comes from experience and experience comes from bad judgment.

General Omar N. Bradley

Exercising initiative requires a command climate that promotes risk taking. Commanders inculcate the willingness to accept risk into their commands through leading by example and accepting subordinates’ risk

taking. They accept risk during training and operations. They assess the judgment of their subordinates’ risk

taking, either at the time of decision, if time permits, or during after action reviews.

Commanders allow subordinates to accept risk. In training, commanders might allow subordinates to execute an excessively risky decision, as long as it does not endanger lives, as a teaching point. This training

helps commanders gain trust in their subordinates’ judgment and initiative and builds subordinates’ trust in

their commander.

Inculcating risk acceptance among subordinates requires that commanders accept risk themselves. Subordinates will not always succeed, particularly when inexperienced. However, with risk acceptance in the

command climate, subordinates learn, gaining the experience required to operate on their own. In addition,

subordinates learn to trust their commander to give them authority to act, knowing their commander will

back their decisions.

Commanders do not underwrite subordinate mistakes when a subordinate operates outside of the commander's intent or displays poor judgment that endangers life or mission accomplishment. Nor do

commanders tolerate a subordinate who repeatedly makes the same mistakes, does not learn, or violates the

Army Ethic. Discriminating between which mistakes to underwrite as teaching points and which mistakes

are unacceptable in a military leader is part of the art of command.

Build Mutual Trust and Shared Understanding

Mutual trust and shared understanding are critical to subordinates’ exercise of initiative. Mutual trust and shared understanding of the commander’s intent frees commanders to move about the battlefield.

Commanders know their subordinates understand the desired end state, and subordinates know their

commander will support their decisions. Additionally, this command climate allows commanders to operate,

knowing subordinates will accurately and promptly report both positive and negative information. Mutual

trust and shared understanding are critical to the tempo of large-scale combat operations.

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Mutual Trust and Shared Understanding: VII Corps and the Ruhr Encirclement

First Army’s VII Corps, under MG J. Lawton Collins, entered action in Europe on 6 June 1944. MG Collins’ staff served with him almost uninterruptedly before and through the campaign. This familiarity helped ensure that MG Collins’ subordinates would understand and carry through his intent in issuing and executing their own orders. MG Collins’ command techniques supported subordinates’ exercise of initiative. He discussed his principal decisions, important enemy dispositions, and principal terrain features with major subordinate commanders. If he could not assemble these commanders, he visited them individually as time permitted, with priority given to the commander of the decisive operation. During operations, he visited major subordinate units to obtain information on enemy reactions and major difficulties encountered, again giving priority to units conducting the decisive operation. His general and special staff officers visited other units to report critical matters to the corps chief of staff. Upon returning to headquarters, MG Collins met with his staff to review the day’s events and the changes he had directed. After that, his G-3 prepared and distributed a daily operations memorandum confirming MG Collins’ oral instructions and adding any other information or instructions developed during the staff meeting. During the European campaign, VII Corps issued only 20 field orders, an average of two per month, to direct operations.

For the Ruhr encirclement, First Army’s mission was to break out from its Rhine River bridgehead at Remagen, link up with Third Army in the Hanau-Giessen area, and join Ninth Army of 21st Army Group near Kassel-Paderborn. The attack began on 25 March 1945, with VII Corps attacking and passing through the enemy’s main defensive positions. By this time, GA Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force, had decided to isolate the Ruhr from north and south by encirclement, the junction point being the Kassel-Paderborn area. On 26 March, VII Corps took Altenkirchen and, on 27 March, crossed the Dill River. First Army assigned VII Corps as the decisive operation for the linkup with Ninth Army at Paderborn. MG Collins had only 3d Armored Division and 104th Infantry Division available, and the objective was more than 100 kilometers away. Nevertheless, 3d Armored Division, commanded by MG Maurice Rose, was directed to reach Paderborn in one day, and MG Rose, in turn, assigned his subordinates decisive and shaping operations to accomplish that mission. The decisive operation halted 25 kilometers short of Paderborn at 2200 on 29 March. The next day MG Rose was killed in action. As the Germans strongly defended Paderborn, 3d Armored Division’s lead elements were held 10 kilometers from the town. The corps received intelligence of German counterattack forces building around Winterberg, southwest of Paderborn. To counter this, 104th Infantry Division took the road junctions of Hallenberg, Medebach, and Brilon. First Army ordered III and V Corps to shield VII Corps from any attacks from outside the ring.

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As the situation developed, MG Collins adapted the corps plan to his situational understanding, while remaining within the framework of the higher echelon commander’s intent. By 31 March, German attacks against 104th Infantry Division, increasing German resistance around Paderborn, 3d Armored Division’s reorganization necessitated by MG Rose’s death, and preparation of a coordinated attack against Paderborn required MG Collins to contact the Ninth Army commander and suggest a change in the linkup point. They agreed on the village of Lippstadt, halfway between Paderborn and the lead elements of 2d Armored Division (the right-flank division of Ninth Army). The linkup was effected on 1 April, closing the Ruhr pocket. MG Collins personally led a task force from 3d Armored Division, overcoming weak resistance in its push west, linking up with elements of 2d Armored Division at 1530 at Lippstadt. Later that day, VII Corps successfully overcame the German defenses at Paderborn. The encirclement trapped Army Group B, including Field Marshal Model, 5th Panzer and 15th Armies, and parts of 1st Parachute Army, along with seven corps, 19 divisions, and antiaircraft and local defense troops—a total of nearly 350,000 soldiers. The reduction of the Ruhr pocket would take another two weeks. (See figure 2-5.)

Figure 2-5. Map of Ruhr encirclement

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The Ruhr had been selected as an objective even before the Allies landed in Europe. All major commanders appear to have understood this. However, 12th Army Group only gave the actual orders for the encirclement in late March 1945, when the success of First Army’s breakout had become clear. The actual linkup was eventually effected between VII Corps and Ninth Army, principally on MG Collins’ understanding of the higher echelon commander’s intent and initiative by his subordinates. He practiced a technique similar to mission orders, giving only one or two immediate objectives to each major subordinate command and a distant objective toward which to proceed, without specific instructions. This gave his subordinates freedom to act and exercise initiative, while still providing essential elements needed for coordination among the subunits. Knowing the overall commander’s intent enabled commanders on both sides of the encirclement to direct efforts toward its fulfillment. When lack of lateral communications hindered coordination, subordinates took the initiative to accomplish the mission and fulfill the commander’s intent as they understood it. At 3d Armored Division, subordinates’ understanding of the corps’ commander’s intent allowed operations to resume the day after Rose was killed. When the original objective, achieving a linkup at Paderborn, could no longer be accomplished, MG Collins proposed an alternative linkup point. Finally, with elements of his corps defending at Winterberg, attacking at Paderborn, and moving to Lippstadt, MG Collins positioned himself with the task force from 3d Armored Division to make the decisive operation that day for his corps, First Army, and 12th Army Group.

Communicate with Subordinates

General Meade was an officer of great merit, with drawbacks to his usefulness that were

beyond his control…. [He] made it unpleasant at times, even in battle, for those around

him to approach him even with information.

General Ulysses S. Grant

Communicating with subordinates contributes to the shared understanding fundamental to mission command. Effective commanders take positive steps to encourage, rather than impede, communications

among and with their subordinates and staff. Candor and the free exchange of ideas contribute to trust.

Commanders make themselves available and accessible for communications and open to new information.

They create a climate where collaboration routinely occurs throughout their organization through personal

example, coaching, and mentorship.

Successful commanders invest the time and effort to visit and engage with Soldiers, subordinate leaders, and unified action partners to understand their issues and concerns. Through these interactions,

subordinates and partners gain insight into the commander’s leadership style and concerns.

Build Teams

Army organizations rely on effective teams to complete tasks, achieve objectives, and accomplish missions. The ability to build and maintain effective teams throughout military operations is an essential skill

for all Army commanders, staffs, and leaders.

Army team building is a continuous process of enabling a group of people to reach their goals and improve effectiveness through leadership and various exercises, activities and techniques (FM 6-22). The

goal of Army team building is to improve the quality of the team and how it works together to accomplish

the mission. Using doctrinal terms and symbols is one method of fostering teamwork. Often, the only basis

for trust and teamwork in situations that require rapid task organization is a common language and approach

to operations. Training and rehearsals also provide opportunities to foster teamwork. Teambuilding is

essential to achieving the effective teams required of mission command. (See ATP 6-22.6 for more

information on teams and teamwork.)

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Building an effective team is challenging, but the positive benefits of teamwork in an effective team are well worth the effort and time it takes. These benefits enhance the performance of the team, improve the

skills of the individual team members, and build important relationships with unified action partners.

Commanders must foster teamwork among task-organized units. Commanders initiate team building, both inside and outside their organizations, as early as possible, and they maintain it throughout operations.

Commanders must trust and earn the trust of their unified action partners and key leaders within the

operational area. Overcoming differences in cultures, mandates, and organizational capabilities is key to

building mutual trust with unified action partners and key leaders.

Commanders use interpersonal relationships to build teams within their own organizations and with unified action partners. Uniting all the diverse capabilities necessary to achieve success in operations requires

collaborative and cooperative efforts that focus those capabilities toward a common goal. Where military

forces typically demand unity of command, a challenge for building teams with unified action partners is to

forge unity of effort—coordination and cooperation toward common objectives. (See JP 3-08 for more

information on teambuilding with unified action partners.)

ENSURE UNITY OF EFFORT

Unity of effort is the coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization, which is the product of successful unified

action (JP 1). Establishing a culture of collaboration provides and enhances unity of effort. The commander’s

intent provides the unifying idea that allows decentralized execution within an overarching framework.

Unity of command is one of the principles of war and the preferred method for achieving unity of effort. Commanders always adhere to unity of command when task-organizing Army forces. Under unity of

command, every mission falls within the authority and responsibility of a single, responsible commander.

Unity of command requires that two commanders may not exercise the same command relationship over the

same force at any one time.

Unity of command may not be possible in some operations that include unified action partners. When unity of command is not possible, commanders must achieve unity of effort through cooperation and

coordination to build trust among all elements of the force—even if they are not part of the same command

structure.

The commander’s intent provides guidance within which subordinates are expected to exercise initiative to accomplish overall goals. Understanding the commander’s intent two echelons up further

enhances unity of effort while providing the basis for decentralized decision making and execution.

Subordinates who understand the commander’s intent are more likely to exercise disciplined initiative in

unexpected situations. Under mission command, subordinates have an absolute responsibility to fulfill the

commander’s intent.

TRAIN SUBORDINATES IN COMMAND AND CONTROL AND THE APPLICATION OF MISSION

COMMAND

Commanders develop a basic level of control within their organizations when they create a culture that embraces mission command at every level. The time spent inculcating mission command into training,

education, and problem solving prior to operations saves time and simplifies command and control during

operations. Commanders cannot expect subordinates to respond effectively to a mission command approach

once operations commence if they have not developed subordinates comfortable in its use beforehand.

Leaders have an obligation to ensure that their subordinates are capable of performing their assigned tasks to Army standards under a variety of circumstances. Leaders generally provide more direction or

guidance and control until they are satisfied that subordinates understand tasks, conditions, and standards and

can operate within the commander’s intent. Increased confidence in the ability of subordinates generally

leads to more latitude in the way that subordinates are given to complete their assigned missions, since

commanders can trust that the subordinates understand the purpose of what they are being told to do.

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The ability to provide general guidance oriented on the purpose of a mission saves time during execution for both commanders and subordinates and maximizes flexibility should conditions change or

communication become intermittent. It also minimizes the chances that subordinates will waste resources on

tasks no longer relevant to the purpose of a particular operation. The effort put into developing subordinate

leaders and their teams saves critical time in combat and allows commanders to assume more tactical risk

when the situation is unclear and communication is intermittent.

Effective mission command requires well-developed subordinates capable of decentralized execution of missions and tasks. Training must create common, repetitive, shared experiences that build trust

and allow commands to acquire competence in shared understanding. Trained teams are able to communicate

explicitly and implicitly, conduct decentralized operations, and achieve unity of effort in uncertain situations.

Noncommissioned officers are key enablers of mission command, and they must be trained in the mission command principles to effectively support their commander and lead their Soldiers.

Noncommissioned officers are required to exercise disciplined initiative to make decisions and take actions

to further their commander’s intent. They must actively work to understand the commander’s intent two

levels up and relay that intent to their Soldiers. They train to develop mutual trust and shared understanding

with their commanders and their Soldiers.

Noncommissioned officers enforce standards and discipline and develop their subordinates as they build teams. They are trained to operate under mission orders and decide for themselves how best to achieve

their commander’s intent. With information available to all levels of command and increasing dispersion on

the battlefield, noncommissioned officers must be comfortable in exercising initiative to make decisions and

act.

As part of training subordinates in command and control and mission command, commanders must prepare their subordinates for positions of increased responsibility. To this end, they promote leader qualities

and assess subordinates’ potential for future appointments to command and staff positions.

Promote Leader Qualities

Commanders promote leader qualities by developing them in themselves and in their subordinates at least two echelons down. These qualities are described in the Army leadership requirements model. This

model describes the attributes and competencies required of Army leaders. But qualities alone do not make

successful commanders. Successful commanders develop a balance among those qualities. The fact that an

officer has been appointed a commander does not automatically endow that commander with these qualities.

Rather, all officers develop them to prepare for command. In general, the higher the echelon of command,

the wider the scope of qualities required. In addition, the emphasis on and among the qualities changes with

the echelon of command. (See ADP 6-22 for more information on the Army leadership requirements model.)

All commanders emphasize the Warrior Ethos. The Warrior Ethos is a set of principles by which every Soldier lives, and it states—

 I will always place the mission first.

 I will never accept defeat.

 I will never quit.

 I will never leave a fallen comrade behind.

The Warrior Ethos is perishable, so commanders continually affirm, develop, and sustain it.

Developing it demands inculcating self-discipline in the commander, subordinates, and the command. It

requires tough, realistic training that develops the resiliency needed to endure extremes of weather, physical

exertion, and lack of sleep and food. Commanders develop the will, determination, and the confidence that

they, their subordinates, and their formations will accomplish all missions regardless of conditions.

Training and education can develop much of the knowledge and many of the skills commanders require. In particular, training devices, simulations, and exercises can enhance clarity of thought and

judgment, including decision making. Developing leader qualities and practicing leadership skills is

necessary for subordinates to decide and act effectively during operations.

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Assess Subordinates

No man is more valiant than Yessoutai; no one has rarer gifts. But, as the longest marches

do not tire him, as he feels neither hunger nor thirst, he believes that his officers and

soldiers do not suffer from such things. That is why he is not fitted for high command.

Genghis Khan

Once appointed, commanders assume the role of coach and mentor to their subordinates. They study the personalities and characteristics of their subordinate commanders. Some need significant direction; others

work best with little or no guidance. Some tire easily and require encouragement and moral support. Others,

perhaps uninspired in peace, excel in conflict and war. Matching talent to tasks is an important function of

command. Commanders judge Soldiers so they can appoint the right subordinates to the right positions at the

right times. Assessing individuals and handling them to the best effect applies to staffs as well as subordinate

commanders. Commanders also assess subordinates by giving them experiences and opportunities to grow

through assignments that challenge their abilities. Recognizing subordinates’ strengths and limits is vital to

effectively exercising command.

One of a commander’s most important duties is evaluating subordinates to identify talent—potential future candidates for senior appointments to command and staff positions. To assess the command qualities

of subordinates objectively, commanders place individuals in circumstances where they must make decisions

and live with the consequences. In these situations, subordinates must know their commander has enough

confidence in them to permit honest mistakes. Training gives commanders opportunities to assess

subordinates on the qualities commanders should possess. In particular, assessing subordinates should

confirm whether they exhibit the necessary balance of intelligence, professionalism, and common sense

required to carry the added responsibilities that go with promotion.

An important aspect of assessing subordinates is determining the extent to which they are both willing and able to apply the mission command approach to the command and control of their units. Since

commanders evaluate two echelons down during training and leader development, and observe subordinate

leader behavior one and two echelons down during training and operations, under both garrison and field

conditions, they have multiple opportunities for assessing internalization of the mission command approach.

(See FM 6-22 for further discussion on assessing subordinates.)

MAKE TIMELY DECISIONS AND ACT

I have found again and again that in encounter actions, the day goes to the side that is the

first to plaster its opponent with fire. The man who lies low and awaits developments

usually comes off second best.

Field Marshal Erwin Rommel

Timely decisions and actions are essential for effective command and control. Commanders who demonstrate the agility to consistently make appropriate decisions faster than their opponents have a

significant advantage. By the time the slower commander decides and acts, the faster one has already changed

the situation, rendering the slower commander’s actions irrelevant. With such an advantage, the faster

commander can dictate the tempo and maintain the operational initiative.

A mission command approach makes it easier for commanders to make timely decisions that exploit opportunities because they spend less time focused on subordinates’ tasks. Effective commanders—

 Take the enemy situation, capabilities, and reaction times into account when making decisions.

 Consider the impact of their decisions—the cause and effect.

 Make decisions quickly—even with incomplete information.

 Adopt a satisfactory course of action with acceptable risk as quickly as possible.

 Delegate decision making authority to the lowest echelon possible to obtain faster decisions during

operations.

 Support decentralized execution by maintaining shared understanding with subordinates and

frequently with adjacent commanders.

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Commanders change and combine intuitive and analytical decision making techniques as the situation requires. Because uncertainty and the tempo of large-scale combat operations drive most decisions,

commanders emphasize intuitive decision making and develop their subordinates accordingly. However,

when time is available and depending on the operational context of a situation, commanders and staffs use

the military decision-making process or Army design methodology during planning.

Commanders can alter planning to fit time-constrained circumstances. In time-constrained conditions, commanders assess the situation, update their commander’s visualization, and direct their staffs

to perform those activities needed to support the required decisions. Streamlined processes permit

commanders and staffs to shorten the time needed to issue orders when the situation changes. To an outsider,

it may appear that experienced commanders and staffs omit key steps. In reality, they use existing products

or perform steps mentally. Commanders ensure their staffs are trained on all Army decision-making

methodologies. (See ADP 5-0 for more information on the Army decision-making process.)

Commanders and staffs constantly assess where an operation is in relation to the end state and make adjustments to accomplish the mission and posture the force for future operations. The commander’s

visualization and the staffs’ running estimates are the primary assessment tools. Keeping running estimates

current is essential to ensuring commanders are aware of feasible options. Staffs continuously replace

outdated facts and assumptions in their running estimate with new information. They perform analysis and

form new, or revise existing, conclusions and recommendations. The commander’s visualization identifies

decisions commanders expect to make and focuses their staffs’ running estimates. Up-to-date running

estimates provide the recommendations commanders need to make timely decisions during execution. (See

FM 6-0 for more information on running estimates.)

CONCLUSION

Good morale and a sense of unity in a command cannot be improvised; they must be

thoroughly planned and systematically promoted. They are born of just and fair treatment,

a constant concern for the soldier’s welfare, thorough training in basic duties,

comradeship among men and pride in self, organization, and country. The establishment

and maintenance of good morale are incumbent upon every command and are marks of

good leadership.

FM 100-5, Operations (1941)

The role of commanders is to direct and lead from the beginning of planning throughout execution, and continually assess and adjust operations to achieve their intent. Commanders drive the operations

process. They understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess operations in complex, dynamic

environments. Throughout operations, commanders, subordinate commanders, staffs, and unified action

partners collaborate actively, sharing and questioning information, perceptions, and ideas to better understand

situations and make decisions. Commanders encourage disciplined initiative through mission orders and a

climate of mutual trust and shared understanding. Guided by their experience, knowledge, education,

intelligence, and intuition, commanders apply leadership to translate decisions into action. Commanders

synchronize forces and capabilities in time, space, and purpose to accomplish missions.

Ultimately, command reflects everything a commander understands about the nature of war, warfighting doctrine, training, leadership, organizations, materiel, and soldiers. It is how commanders

organize their forces, structure operations, and direct the synchronized effects of organic and allocated assets

toward their visualized end state. Command is built on training and shared understanding by all Soldiers

within a command about how it operates. It is the expression of the commander’s professional competence

and leadership style, and the translation of the commander’s vision to the command. However, command

alone is not sufficient to translate that vision and to assure mission accomplishment; control, the subject of

chapter 3, is also necessary.

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 3-1

Chapter 3

Control

The test of control is the ability of a leader to obtain the desired result from his command.

Infantry in Battle, 1939

This chapter begins with a discussion of the nature of control and its elements. It next

addresses the various types of control measures. The chapter concludes with a

discussion of guides for effective control.

NATURE OF CONTROL

Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties

accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has

experienced war.…Friction…makes the apparently easy so difficult.

Carl von Clausewitz

3-1. Within command and control, control is the regulation of forces and warfighting functions to accomplish the mission in accordance with the commander’s intent. Commanders exercise control to direct

and adjust operations as conditions dictate. Unlike aspects of command, which remain relatively similar

among echelons, control functions increase in complexity at each higher echelon. Control extends over the

entire force and may include control of the airspace over an area of operations below the coordinating altitude.

(See FM 3-52 for more discussion of airspace control).

3-2. Control allows commanders to monitor and receive feedback regarding the situation during operations. Based on this information, commanders can modify their visualization and direct changes to an operation as

necessary. In the broadest terms, control helps commanders answer two questions:

 What is the actual situation compared with the desired end state?

 Are adjustments to the plan necessary to reconcile the situation with the desired end state?

3-3. Control, as contrasted with command, is more science than art. As such, it relies on objectivity, facts, empirical methods, and analysis. The science of control supports the art of command. Commanders and staffs

use the science of control to understand the physical and procedural constraints under which units operate.

Units are bound by such factors as movement rates, fuel consumption, weapons effects, rules of engagement,

and other legal considerations. Commanders and staffs strive to understand aspects of operations they can

analyze and measure, such as the physical capabilities and limitations of friendly and enemy organizations.

3-4. Control requires a realistic appreciation of time and distance factors, including the time required to initiate, complete and assess directed actions. There is art in anticipating likely points of friction and factors

beyond subordinate control that invariably lead to delays during execution. The higher the echelon and the

larger a formation, the longer it takes to complete assigned tasks, which in turn requires an earlier decision

to achieve a desired effect or end state. The planning necessary to facilitate adequate control should always

incorporate time tolerances that account for the friction inherent in operations.

3-5. Commanders, aided by staffs, use control to regulate forces and the functions of subordinate and supporting units. Staffs give commanders their greatest support in providing control. However, for control to

be effective, commanders must actively participate in exercising it.

3-6. One of mission command’s strengths is that it provides a measure of self-regulation during the conduct of operations. Under mission command, control tends to be decentralized and flexible whenever possible in

the context of operations. Orders and plans rely on subordinates’ abilities to coordinate among themselves to

create shared understanding and synchronize operations. By delegating decision-making authority to

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facilitate decentralized execution, mission command increases tempo by improving a subordinate’s ability to

act in rapidly changing situations. As a result, the mission command approach to command and control is

inherently less vulnerable to disrupted communications.

Levels of Control and German Auftragstaktik

German tactical successes throughout the early years of WWII are often touted as a prime example of an unfettered mission command style with few considerations of control. In practice this was not actually true. The German emphasis on decentralization and initiative came from their tradition of Auftragstaktik, or mission-oriented tactics. It was a military culture that relied on subordinate commanders and junior leaders to recognize the overall intent of a mission, and take necessary actions to ensure the mission intent was met even if actions appeared to countermand prior guidance and orders. The German campaign against France in May of 1940 is a case study of positive and negative applications of the German army’s approach to command and control. In 46 days, the German army routed Allied forces and established control of the whole of Western Europe. This happened in part because of the weaknesses of their adversaries, particularly the French.

French doctrine emphasized control by senior level commanders to enable “methodical battle.” It required carefully planned and synchronized employment of fires and maneuver forces, and essentially relied upon a centralized, deliberate approach at every echelon. Such an approach assumed excellent communications, good situational awareness, and a similarly deliberate approach by the enemy. Methodical battle was ill-suited for situations requiring rapid decision making and initiative at all echelons, situations that occurred repeatedly between 10 and 20 May 1940.

While Auftragstaktik ensured tactical commanders had the flexibility to adjust their plans as necessary, there were negative repercussions associated with the undisciplined use of initiative beyond the constraints of the commander’s intent. Because some subordinate German commanders felt unduly restricted by their assigned routes, they failed to direct the proper march discipline for their difficult movement through the Ardennes. This disregard for movement plans threatened to disrupt complex march tables essential to moving large forces through the restrictive terrain of the Ardennes Forest. There was little room for initiative under such conditions, unless it was exercised in support of the plan as devised. Any deviation from the plan would have second and third order effects throughout the column. On the morning of the second day of the campaign, von Kleist sent out a message to his subordinate commanders that said the problems encountered during the move through Luxembourg were caused primarily by independent decisions being made by lower level leaders, and if conditions worsened offenders would be punished with the death penalty.

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The German XIX Corps commander, GEN Heinz Guderian, repeatedly clashed with his superior, GEN Von Kleist, commander of the Panzer Gruppe, with regard to the movements and orientation of his corps. He achieved significant positive results during the first week of the operations, even as he argued with his commander and disobeyed or ignored multiple directives intended to reduce risk to the overall operation. At the end of the first week of fighting, GEN Guderian offered his resignation during a disagreement about the necessity for a short tactical pause after crossing the Meuse. To his surprise, GEN von Kleist accepted it, an indicator that even in the German Army challenging the constraints of a higher commander’s intent had consequences. If GEN Guderian had not been so difficult during the initial phases of the operation where control was critical to its overall success, he may have enjoyed greater support at the critical point where initiative and risk taking would contribute more to achieve operational and strategic level success. Effective application of the mission command approach requires judgment in establishing the degree of control required in a particular situation. Once German forces were engaged in close combat with French forces along the Meuse River, the focus was to cross as rapidly as possible, which meant that subordinate commanders were expected to demonstrate initiative continuously and lead from the front. Circumstances were much different than they were on the approach march. Balance between obedience and initiative must be struck in every unique context, and effectively achieving that balance is central to mission command.

ELEMENTS OF CONTROL

3-7. Commanders use control to direct and coordinate the actions of subordinate forces to meet their intent. They communicate information and receive feedback from subordinates to achieve greater shared

understanding of the situation. This allows commanders to update their visualization with respect to the

current situation, the end state or their operational approach, and adjust operations to reflect those changes.

The elements of control are—

 Direction.

 Feedback.

 Information.

 Communication.

3-8. Command and control, specifically control, is not a one-way activity in which commanders direct while subordinates comply with orders. In application, command and control is multidirectional, with feedback and

influence from sources below, above, laterally, as well as outside the chain of command, as shown in figure

3-1 on page 3-4. It includes the reciprocal flow of information between commanders, staffs, subordinate

forces and other external organizations as they seek shared understanding, adjust operations as necessary,

and achieve objectives. This occurs in an environment where an enemy force is seeking to disrupt the friendly

force’s ability to effectively command and control its forces.

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Figure 3-1. Reciprocal nature of control

DIRECTION

3-9. A key element of control is direction. To direct means to communicate information related to a decision that initiates and governs actions of subordinate and supporting units. Commanders, through their command

and control system, direct subordinates by establishing objectives, assigning tasks, and providing instruction

on how forces will cooperate to accomplish the mission.

3-10. The primary means for communicating direction include plans and orders. Mission orders (a technique for developing plans and orders) focus subordinates on what to do and why to do it without prescribing

exactly how to do it. (See chapter 1 for more information on mission orders.) Other key tools for providing

direction include execution matrices, the decision support template, and control measures. Control measures

are directives to subordinate units that assign responsibilities, coordinate fires and maneuver, and control

operations. Commanders establish control measures to aid cooperation among forces while minimizing

restrictions on freedom of action as much as possible. (See paragraphs 3-40 to 3-45 for a detailed discussion

of control measures.)

FEEDBACK

3-11. Feedback is information commanders receive during operations. Commanders use feedback to compare the actual situation with the plan and then decide if the plan requires any changes or adjustments.

Feedback takes many forms, including information, knowledge, experience, and wisdom. Feedback comes

from many sources: subordinates, higher headquarters, or adjacent, supporting, and supported forces. It

arrives continuously: before, during, or after operations. Feedback helps commanders and subordinates gain

shared understanding. For feedback to be effective, it should identify any differences between the desired

end state and the current situation. New information that conflicts with the expectations established during

planning requires commanders and staffs to validate those expectations or revise them to reflect reality. This

contributes to an accurate understanding that allows commanders to exploit fleeting opportunities, respond

to developing situations, modify plans, or reallocate resources.

3-12. Feedback should not flow only from lower to higher headquarters; it should also flow from higher to lower headquarters. Normally information from higher echelons to lower echelon headquarters consists of

information to adjust the subordinates’ resources, plans, or missions. Multidirectional information flow

produces shared understanding between higher commanders and subordinate forces that supports exercise of

mission command.

3-13. Effective commanders seek feedback from subordinates who are comfortable providing both positive and negative reports. Commanders whose command climates make subordinates reluctant to share bad news

are likely to be poorly informed and operate from faulty assumptions that put operations at risk.

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INFORMATION

Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false; and most are

uncertain.…reports turn out to be lies, exaggerations, errors, and so on.

Carl von Clausewitz

3-14. Operations produce large amounts of information. While much of this information may be important to the staff or the conduct of operations, it may not be relevant information for the commander. Relevant

information is all information of importance to the commander and staff in the exercise of command

and control. Relevant information provides the basis for creating and maintaining the COP, and it is the

basis for achieving situational understanding. Relevant information also facilitates a commander’s decision

making and the ability to provide timely orders and guidance.

3-15. Commanders assess information in the context of a particular situation. For example, in some situations, information that is somewhat incomplete or imprecise may be better than no information at all,

especially when time for execution is limited. However, effective commanders take action with their staffs

and subordinates to reduce the likelihood of receiving inaccurate, late, or unreliable information, which is of

no value when making decisions. They do this by setting expectations, conducting training, and providing

education.

3-16. Staffs provide commanders and subordinates information relevant to their operational environment and the progress of operations. They use operational variables (political, military, economic, social,

information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time—known as PMESII-PT) and mission variables

(mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available and civil considerations—

known as METT-TC) as major subject categories to group relevant information. (See FM 6-0 for discussion

of the operational and mission variables.)

Operational Variables

3-17. Commanders and staffs analyze and describe an operational environment in terms of eight interrelated operational variables: political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment,

and time (known as PMESII-PT). The operational variables are fundamental to developing a comprehensive

understanding of an operational environment. Table 3-1 provides a brief description of each variable.

Table 3-1. Operational variables

Variable Description

Political Describes the distribution of responsibility and power at all levels of governance— formally constituted authorities, as well as informal or covert political powers

Military Explores the military and paramilitary capabilities of all relevant actors (enemy, friendly, and neutral) in a given operational environment

Economic Encompasses individual and group behaviors related to producing, distributing, and consuming resources

Social Describes the cultural, religious, and ethnic makeup within an operational environment and the beliefs, values, customs, and behaviors of society members

Information Describes the nature, scope, characteristics, and effects of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information

Infrastructure Is composed of the basic facilities, services, and installations needed for the functioning of a community or society

Physical environment

Includes the geography and manmade structures, as well as the climate and weather in the area of operations

Time Describes the timing and duration of activities, events, or conditions within an operational environment, as well as how the timing and duration are perceived by various actors in the operational environment

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Mission Variables

3-18. Mission variables describe characteristics of the area of operations, focusing on how they might affect a mission. Incorporating the analysis of the operational variables into the mission variables ensures Army

leaders consider the best available relevant information about conditions that pertain to the mission. Using

the operational variables as a source of relevant information for the mission variables allows commanders to

refine their situational understanding of their operational environment and to visualize, describe, direct, lead

and assess operations. Table 3-2 provides a brief description of each of the mission variables. (See FM 6-0

for detailed discussion of the operational and mission variables.)

Table 3-2. Mission variables

Variable Description

Mission Commanders and staffs view all of the mission variables in terms of their impact on mission accomplishment. The mission is the task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefore. It is always the first variable commanders consider during decision making. A mission statement contains the "who, what, when, where, and why" of the operation.

Enemy The second variable to consider is the enemy’s dispositions (including organization, strength, location, and tactical mobility), doctrine, equipment, capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action.

Terrain and weather

Terrain and weather analysis are inseparable and directly influence each other’s impact on military operations. Terrain includes natural features (such as rivers and mountains) and manmade features (such as cities, airfields, and bridges). Commanders analyze terrain using the five military aspects of terrain expressed in the memory aid OAKOC: observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key and decisive terrain, obstacles, cover and concealment. The military aspects of weather include visibility, wind, precipitation, cloud cover, temperature, and humidity.

Troops and support available

This variable includes the number, type, capabilities, and condition of available friendly troops and support. These include supplies, services, and support available from joint, host nation, and unified action partners. They also include support from civilians and contractors employed by military organizations, such as the Defense Logistics Agency and the Army Materiel Command.

Time available Commanders assess the time available for planning, preparing, and executing tasks and operations. This includes the time required to assemble, deploy, and maneuver units in relationship to the enemy and conditions.

Civil considerations

Civil considerations are the influence of manmade infrastructure, civilian institutions, and attitudes and activities of the civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within an area of operations on the conduct of military operations. Civil considerations comprise six characteristics, expressed in the

memory aid ASCOPE: areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events.

3-19. Commanders determine information requirements and set information priorities. They avoid requesting excessive amounts of information, which may reduce the staffs’ chances of finding what is

actually important in a particular situation. The quest for information is time consuming; commanders who

demand complete information place unreasonable burdens upon subordinates. Subordinates pressured to

worry over every detail rarely have the desire to exercise initiative. At worst, excessive information demands

corrupt the trust required for a mission command approach. Commanders describe the relevant information

they need to inform decision making by establishing CCIRs.

Commander’s Critical Information Requirement

It is in the minds of commanders that the issue of battle is really decided.

B.H. Liddell Hart

3-20. A commander’s critical information requirement is an information requirement identified by the commander as being critical to facilitating timely decision making (JP 3-0). Commanders designate an

information requirement as a CCIR based on likely decisions and their visualization of the operation. CCIRs

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help to bring clarity to large volumes of information. Always promulgated by a plan or order, commanders

limit the number of CCIRs to focus the efforts of limited collection assets. The fewer the CCIRs, the easier

it is for staffs to remember, recognize, and act on each one. CCIRs should change with the situation over

time. Commanders add and delete them throughout an operation based on the information needed for specific

decisions. Once approved, a CCIR falls into one of two categories: priority intelligence requirements and

friendly force information requirements.

3-21. A priority intelligence requirement is an intelligence requirement that the commander and staff need to understand the threat and other aspects of the operational environment. (JP 2-01). Priority intelligence

requirements identify the information about an enemy force and other aspects of the operational environment

that a commander considers most important to the plan or decisions. Intelligence about civil considerations

may be as critical as intelligence about enemy forces. Intelligence officers manage priority intelligence

requirements for commanders as part of the intelligence process.

3-22. A friendly force information requirement is information the commander and staff need to understand the status of friendly force and supporting capabilities (JP 3-0). Friendly force information requirements

identify the information about the mission, troops and support available, and time available for friendly forces

that the commander considers most important to the plan or decisions. In coordination with staffs, the

operations officers manage friendly force information requirements for commanders.

3-23. Commanders also describe information they want protected as essential elements of friendly information. An essential element of friendly information is a critical aspect of a friendly operation that,

if known by a threat would subsequently compromise, lead to failure, or limit success of the operation

and therefore should be protected from enemy detection. Although essential elements of friendly

information are not CCIRs, they have the same priority. Essential elements of friendly information establish

elements of information to protect rather than ones to collect. Their identification is the first step in the

operations security process and central to the protection of information.

3-24. Commanders cannot recognize all their information requirements. There is information that results from an extraordinary event, an unseen opportunity, or a new threat. This is exceptional information—

specific and immediately vital information that directly affects the success of the current operation. It may

directly affect mission accomplishment or survival of the force, and usually reveals the need for a decision.

It would have been a CCIR if it had been foreseen. Therefore, it is treated as a CCIR and is reported to the

commander immediately. Identifying exceptional information requires initiative from subordinate

commanders and staffs, shared understanding of the situation, and a thorough understanding of the

commander’s intent. It also requires professional judgment; if there is doubt it is better to report.

3-25. Commanders can neither make decisions nor act to implement them without information. The amount of information available makes managing information and turning it into effective decisions and actions

critical to success during operations. Since effective command and control depends on getting relevant

information to the right person at the right time, knowledge management, information management, and

foreign disclosure are crucial to command and control.

Knowledge Management

He who wars walks in a mist through which the keenest eye cannot always discern the right

path.

Sir William Napier

3-26. Knowledge management is the process of enabling knowledge flow to enhance shared understanding, learning, and decision making. Knowledge flow refers to the ease of movement of

knowledge within and among organizations. Knowledge must flow to be useful. The purpose of knowledge

management is to align people, processes, and tools within the organizational structure and culture to achieve

shared understanding. This alignment improves collaboration and interaction between leaders and

subordinates. Knowledge management leads to better decisions and increases flexibility, integration, and

synchronization. Sound knowledge management practices include—

 Collaboration among personnel at different locations.

 Rapid knowledge transfer between units and individuals.

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3-27. Knowledge management provides the methods and means to efficiently share knowledge and distribute relevant information where and when it is needed. Knowledge management organizes, applies, collects,

codifies, and exchanges information between people. It seeks to align people and processes with appropriate

tools to help units learn, adapt, and improve mission performance.

3-28. Knowledge management is supported by four tasks that bring an organization closer to situational and shared understanding. The four knowledge management tasks are creating knowledge, organizing

knowledge, applying knowledge, and transferring knowledge. (See ATP 6-01.1 for more information on

knowledge management.) Two important aspects of knowledge management are information management

and foreign disclosure.

3-29. Information management is the science of using procedures and information systems to collect, process, store, display, disseminate, and protect data, information, and knowledge products.

Information management supports, underpins, and enables knowledge management. The two are linked to

facilitate understanding and decision making. Information management is a technical discipline that involves

the planning, storing, manipulating, and controlling of information throughout its life cycle in support of the

commander and staff. Information management employs both staff management and processes to make

information available to the right person at the right time. Information management provides a structure so

commanders and staffs can process and communicate relevant information and make decisions. Effective

information management contributes to the knowledge management tasks of knowledge creation and

supports shared understanding for all unit members.

3-30. Generally, information management relates to the tasks of collection, processing, display, storage, distribution, and protection of data and information. In contrast, knowledge management uses information to

create, organize, apply, and transfer knowledge to support achieving understanding, making decisions, and

ultimately taking effective action.

3-31. Information management provides the timely and protected distribution of relevant information to commanders and staff elements. It supports and is a component of knowledge management. (See FM 6-0.2

for a discussion of information management.)

3-32. Foreign disclosure is a critical part of interoperability with multinational partners. Conducting operations with unified action partners affects the way the force collects and disseminates information. The

disclosure of classified and controlled unclassified information to foreign representatives is governed by

policy and regulations. Keeping as much information unclassified as possible improves interoperability,

operational effectiveness, and trust.

3-33. Determining what information or intelligence may be disclosed is based on the policies, directives, and laws that govern national disclosure policy and the release of classified information. While conducting

operations, commanders and staffs ensure they know other nations’ positions on intelligence sharing and

ensure that intelligence is shared to the degree possible, especially if required for mission accomplishment

and force protection. Early information sharing during planning ensures that unified action partner

requirements are clearly stated, guidance supports the commander’s intent, and the force uses procedures

supportable by other nations. (See AR 380-10 for more discussions on foreign disclosure.)

COMMUNICATION

3-34. Commanders and staffs disseminate and share information among people, elements, and places. Communication is more than the simple transmission of information. It is a means to exercise control over

forces. Communication links information to decisions and decisions to action. Communication among the

parts of a command supports their coordinated action. Effective commanders do not take communication for

granted. They use multidirectional communication and suitable communication media to achieve objectives.

Commanders choose appropriate times, places, and means to communicate. They use face-to-face talks,

written and verbal orders, estimates and plans, published memos, electronic mail, and other methods of

communication appropriate for a particular situation.

3-35. Communication has an importance far beyond exchanging information. Commanders and staffs continuously communicate to learn, exchange ideas, and create sustained shared understanding. Information

needs to flow up and down the chain of command as well as laterally to adjacent units and organizations.

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Separate from the quality or meaning of information exchanged, communication strengthens bonds within a

command. It is an important factor in building trust, cooperation, cohesion, and mutual understanding.

3-36. Humans communicate verbally by what they say and in their manner of speaking. They also communicate nonverbally with gestures and body language. Commanders pay attention to verbal and

nonverbal feedback to ascertain the effectiveness of their communication and the manner in which it is

received. Commanders should conduct face-to-face talks with their subordinates to ensure subordinates fully

understand them. This does not mean they do not keep records of information communicated or follow-up

with written documentation. Records are important as a means of affirming understanding and for later study

and critique. Records support understanding over time, whereas memory may distort or even omit elements

of the information required or passed.

3-37. In many cases, commanders are tempted to rely too much on written communications; especially email. Email messages, written papers, briefs, and directives do not have the same impact as oral orders,

consultations, and briefings. Staffs possess the ability to produce vast amounts of documents; however, just

because the capability exists does not mean it should be used. Quality communication is superior to quantity

for enabling a mission command approach to command and control.

3-38. Commanders should assume that communications will be disrupted during operations. Commanders’ intent and orders should be written in a way that enables achieving objectives when communication is

intermittent and situational awareness is problematic. Mission orders and application of the mission

command approach to command and control mitigates the need for continuous communication.

Channels

3-39. Information normally moves throughout a force along various transmission paths or channels. Commanders and staffs transfer information horizontally and vertically. Structure, in the form of command

and support relationships, establishes channels that streamline information dissemination by ensuring the

right information passes promptly to the right people. Commanders and staffs communicate through three

channels—command, staff, and technical:

 Command channels are direct chain-of-command transmission paths. Commanders and authorized

staff officers use command channels for command-related activities.

 Staff channels are staff-to-staff transmission paths between headquarters and are used for

control-related activities. Staff channels transmit planning information, status reports, controlling

instructions, and other information to support mission command. The intelligence and sustainment

networks are examples of staff channels.

 Technical channels are the transmission paths between two technically similar units, offices, or

staff sections that perform a technical function requiring special expertise or control the

performance of technical functions. Technical channels are typically used to control performance

of technical functions. They are not used for conducting operations or supporting another unit’s

mission. An example is network operations. The activities for the operation, management, and

control of communications transport is routinely performed by network operations control centers.

3-40. Crosstalk between subordinate commanders can transfer information and lead to decision making without the higher echelon commander becoming involved, except to affirm, either positively or through

silence, the decisions or agreements of subordinates. However, commanders must train their subordinates to

crosstalk, so they can quickly and competently exchange information, create shared understanding, and make

and implement decisions.

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Crosstalk in the Desert-VII Corps in the Gulf War

On the morning of 17 January 1991, the day after the start of U.S. Central Command’s major air operations against Iraq, the VII Corps Commander, LTG Frederick M. Franks Jr., was with the 1st Infantry Division as it honed tank and Bradley gunnery skills in the desert of Saudi Arabia. While there, he received a spot report from BG John Landry, corps chief of staff, over FM radio: “55 Iraqi tanks have crossed the Kuwaiti Border, heading southwest toward Hafir al-Batin and are engaging Egyptian coalition forces in what may be the beginnings of an Iraqi preemptive strike.”

Within seconds, COL Johnnie Hitt, commander of the corps’ 11th Aviation Brigade, entered the net indicating he had monitored the report and alerted two Apache battalions that could respond in 30 minutes if necessary. At the same time, COL Don Holder, commander of the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, the corps unit closest to the reported enemy force, called to notify LTG Franks that he had issued orders for 1st Squadron to send a unit forward to recon and make contact with enemy forces. Those were the immediate and correct actions taken by commanders as a result of eavesdropping on the command net and having the confidence to act—confidence developed through training, teamwork, and trust among the key players of the VII Corps team.

Structure

3-41. Organizational structure helps commanders communicate information and exercise control. Structure refers to a defined organization that establishes relationships, information flow, and guides interactions

among elements. It also includes procedures for coordinating among an organization’s groups and activities.

Commanders establish control with a defined organization. Structure is both internal (such as a command

post) and external (such as command and support relationships among subordinate forces). (See ATP 6-0.5

for information on organizing Army command post operations and FM 3-0 for information on command and

support relationships.) The most basic organization in control is a hierarchy. In military terms, this

relationship is between the commander and staff, and subordinate forces.

CONTROL MEASURES

3-42. Commanders use control measures to assign responsibilities, coordinate fire and maneuver, and control operations. A control measure is a means of regulating forces or warfighting functions. Control measures

provide control without requiring detailed explanations. Control measures help commanders direct actions

by establishing responsibilities and limits that prevent subordinate unit actions from impeding one another.

They foster coordination and cooperation between forces without unnecessarily restricting freedom of action.

3-43. Control measures may be detailed (such as an operation order) or simple (such as a checkpoint). Control measures include, but are not limited to—

 Plans and orders.

 Laws and regulations.

 Unit standard operating procedures.

3-44. Some control measures are graphic. A graphic control measure is a symbol used on maps and displays to regulate forces and warfighting functions. Graphic control measures are always prescriptive.

They include symbols for boundaries, fire support coordination measures, some airspace control measures,

air defense areas, and minefields. Commanders establish them to regulate maneuver, movement, airspace

use, fires, and other aspects of operations. In general, all graphic control measures should relate to easily

identifiable natural or man-made terrain features. (See ADP 1-02 for illustrations of graphic control measures

and rules for their use.)

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3-45. Control measures are established under a commander’s authority; however, commanders may authorize staff officers and subordinate leaders to establish them. Commanders may use control measures for

several purposes: to assign responsibilities, require synchronization between forces, impose restrictions, or

establish guidelines to regulate freedom of action. Certain control measures belong to the commander alone,

and may not be delegated. These include the commanders’ intent, unit mission statement, planning guidance,

and CCIRs and essential elements of friendly information.

3-46. Good control measures foster freedom of action, decision making, initiative, and reporting during operations. Commanders tailor their use of control measures to conform to the higher echelon commander’s

intent. They also consider the mission, terrain, and amount of authority delegated to subordinates. Effectively

employing control measures requires commanders and staffs to understand their purposes and ramifications,

including the permissions or limitations imposed on subordinates’ freedom of action and initiative. Each

measure should have a specific purpose: mass the effects of combat power, synchronize subordinate forces’

operations, minimize the possibility of fratricide, or comply with the law of armed conflict.

3-47. The most important control measure is the boundary. Boundaries define the area of operations assigned to a commander. Commanders have full freedom of action to conduct operations within the boundaries of

their area of operations unless the order establishing the area of operations includes constraints.

Control in Austerlitz Napoleon’s La Grande Armée of 1805 had spent two years training along the coast of the English Channel to invade England. On 3 September 1805, after the Third Coalition formed, Napoleon moved that army against the first opposing force that presented itself. His desired end state was to defeat it before the rest of the coalition forces could join the campaign. Napoleon marched east with 200,000 men. He defeated an Austrian army at Ulm in Bavaria by 20 October 1805 and pursued an approaching Russian army down the Danube River toward Vienna. On 23 November, he halted his pursuit east of Brunn (present-day Brno, Czech Republic) near the village of Austerlitz, 700 miles from the Channel coast. The Russian army had joined another Austrian army to form a force that numbered 85,000 to Napoleon’s 53,000. Napoleon decided to entice the coalition force to attack him before others could reinforce it. He displayed his weakness in numbers, which he let the coalition commanders see, and withdrew his main body from the Pratzen Heights, key terrain in the area he had selected for battle. The coalition force occupied that terrain on 30 November and prepared for battle. Napoleon had two corps moving to reinforce his main body, increasing its strength to 73,000 before the battle: one joined him on 1 December; the other, with 50 hours to march 80 miles from Vienna, would not arrive until the day of the battle. (See figure 3-2 on page 3-12.)

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Napoleon planned to show weakness on his right flank, which was held by a single division. This display would encourage the coalition commanders to attack there. He would hold on his left flank and attack the coalition center, where the coalition had taken forces to carry out its attack on his right. With his forces attacking in the center, Napoleon could either roll up the coalition forces attacking to his left, or more decisively envelop those attacking his right. Key to this was the timely (for him), unexpected (for the coalition) arrival of the corps from Vienna (under Marshal Davout). It reinforced his right as the coalition attack began.

The attack against Napoleon’s right began at 0600 on 2 December and had intensified by 0700. A coalition attack against his left also threatened but had not yet commenced. Davout’s lead forces reinforced the French right by 0700, and the fight there continued for the next two hours; a French force of 10,600 occupied a coalition force of nearly 50,000. By 0800, Napoleon, from his command post, could directly observe most of the coalition force moving against his right. The Pratzen Heights, key terrain that he had given up to entice the coalition commanders to give battle, was now uncovered. By 0830, Napoleon had also received reports about the tenacious, successful fight of his right and that his left was still secure.

Figure 3-2. Map of Austerlitz, the initial situation

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Hidden from coalition view but within striking distance of the key terrain were two French divisions, 16,000 men and 16 guns, under command of “the finest maneuverer in Europe,” Marshal Soult. Through the initial fight, Soult chafed to commence his attack, but Napoleon restrained him. At 0845, Napoleon turned to Soult and asked, “How long will it take you to move your divisions to the top of Pratzen Heights?” “Less than 20 minutes, sire,” Soult answered. “Very well, we’ll wait another quarter of an hour,” decided Napoleon. By then, Napoleon knew that a coalition force had begun attacking his left. At 0900, Napoleon turned to Soult and directed him to attack: “One sharp blow and the war’s over.” By 0930, Soult had taken the Pratzen Heights and was well on the way to securing it. The French left now also attacked the coalition right with coordinated infantry and cavalry actions under Marshals Lannes and Murat. By noon, this French shaping operation drove the coalition right back four miles, making it unable to move against the decisive operation on the Pratzen. Stationing himself in the center, Napoleon remained informed of events on both flanks but did not direct subordinate actions. Napoleon’s situational understanding and ability to regulate his forces were enhanced by a semaphore (signal flag) station at his command post and relay stations throughout the area of operations. (See figure 3-3.)

Figure 3-3. Map of Austerlitz operations

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Soult’s assault of the Pratzen only began the struggle in the center. The Russian commander, Marshal Kutuzov, recognized the danger and recalled forces from attacking the French right to counter Soult’s attack. The battle against this counterattack began about 1000 and continued through 1100. By noon, Napoleon had moved his command post and his reserve up to the Pratzen. The Russian Imperial Guard mounted another counterattack against the center at 1300, but the well-positioned French reserves, in coordination with Soult’s forces, defeated them by 1400 after much hard fighting.

This left Napoleon with the initiative to envelop either coalition wing. Napoleon had an accurate’ situational understanding. He knew the coalition right could neither intervene against him nor support the coalition center. He was also aware that nearly half of the coalition force still engaged the French right, with a lake to their south. Accordingly, he directed his center to wheel south (to its right), taking the coalition left in the rear and destroying it. He left one corps in the center to secure the Pratzen Heights and his rear, while Soult’s corps and Napoleon’s Imperial Guard executed the envelopment to the south. By 1430, the coalition commander in the south recognized the peril to his force and directed its retreat. About half escaped the encirclement by 1500. Some of the encircled coalition forces attempted to escape over the frozen lake to the south, but French artillery fired at the ice, breaking it and cutting off that avenue, while drowning over 200 men. By 1500, the coalition right wing began to retreat as well, and by 1630, as dark fell, all firing stopped. The coalition army was destroyed, with over one-third of its force lost.

Napoleon’s ability to employ the necessary level of control was major factor in this victory. It allowed him to move his Army across Europe and regulate his forces’ execution of a complex scheme of maneuver while decisively engaged with an adaptive opponent. The timeliness of Napoleon’s decisions, which were the result of significant preparations and thought, rendered his enemies’ reactions progressively more irrelevant as the battle went on.

GUIDES TO EFFECTIVE CONTROL

...avoid taking “firm control” or a “tight rein” over the battle...these measures are likely

to hold back the offensive during a penetration or pursuit and thus damage their chances

of success.

Marshal of the Soviet Union, Mikhail N. Tukhachevskiy

3-48. The guides to effective control govern how commanders use the elements of control to accomplish missions. Effective control enables a command to adapt to change. Because of feedback, control is cyclic

and continuous, not a series of discrete actions. It is a process of dynamic, interactive cooperation. Control

begins in planning and continues throughout the operations process. The guides to effective control are—

 Allow subordinates maximum freedom of decision and action.

 Create, maintain, and disseminate the COP.

 Use common doctrinal procedures, graphics, and terms.

 Encourage flexibility and adaptability.

ALLOW SUBORDINATES MAXIMUM FREEDOM OF DECISION AND ACTION

3-49. Effective commanders impose minimum constraints on subordinates to enable freedom of action while meeting the overall intent. They exercise the control necessary to effect coordination and synchronization

among subordinate and supporting forces. Commanders monitor this coordination and allocate available

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resources or shift priorities to support the actions of subordinate commanders. Allowing subordinates

maximum freedom of action requires a mission command approach.

3-50. In most instances, lower echelon commanders have the clearest understanding of their own situations. They are generally better suited than higher echelon commanders to develop those situations. Even two or

more subordinate commanders working together may solve a problem better and faster than the higher

echelon commander. This type of coordination, involving direct communication among subordinate

commanders, is critical for effective decentralized execution. Commanders emphasize lateral coordination at

every opportunity.

3-51. Commanders should avoid establishing excessive limits on their subordinates’ freedom of action. These limits may come in the form of overly detailed orders that inhibit initiative and force subordinates to

refer large numbers of decisions to their higher headquarters. Excessive detail may be a result of emphasizing

process or procedure rather than an outcome—directing things already addressed in doctrine or standard

operating procedures.

3-52. Commanders limit information requests to that which is critical to decision making. Excessive requests for information may burden subordinates with reporting and distract them from executing their operation.

They can also affect the requesting unit, because it must process the responses. One cause of excessive

requests is the search for perfect situational understanding. Another stems from poor information

management. No one can predict all information requirements before operations begin; however,

commanders and staffs must balance new information requirements against the impact that finding and

providing that information will have on subordinates’ operations. Excessive or redundant reporting can create

unnecessary stress or fatigue for subordinate units. This situation may result in subordinates failing to respond

to an important request and depriving the higher commander of critical information needed to make decisions.

3-53. Commanders consider these items when deciding how to exercise control:

 Limit control measures to those necessary to effect essential coordination.

 Limit information requirements to the minimum needed to exercise command and control.

 Give subordinates as much leeway for initiative as possible.

CREATE, MAINTAIN AND DISSEMINATE THE COMMON OPERATIONAL PICTURE

3-54. The COP is key to achieving and maintaining situational understanding. The common operational

picture is a display of relevant information within a commander’s area of interest tailored to the user’s

requirements and based on common data and information shared by more than one command. Although the COP is ideally a single display, it may include more than one display and information in other

forms, such as graphical representations or written reports.

3-55. The COP facilitates collaborative planning and helps commanders at all echelons achieve shared situational understanding. Shared situational understanding allows commanders to visualize the effects of

their decisions on other elements of the force and the overall operation. Mission command allows

subordinates to use the COP in conjunction with the commander’s intent to guide their exercise of disciplined

initiative.

3-56. Commanders achieve situational understanding by applying judgment to the COP. Relevant information provides the basis for constructing the COP, and primarily consists of information which the

staff provides through analysis and evaluation. Data and information from all echelons and shared among

users create the COP. Some sources of this information include reports, running estimates, and information

provided by liaison officers.

3-57. Maintaining an accurate COP is difficult for many reasons: delayed or inaccurate friendly and intelligence reporting, terrain data availability, and a constantly changing operational environment that

change circumstances, often in unforeseen ways. Fog and friction often degrade the accuracy of the COP, or

render all or part of it incorrect do to latency, enemy deception plans, or incorrect reporting. Staffs, based on

guidance from the commander, must work to rapidly and accurately portray the meaning and the necessary

level of information which help the commander maintain situational understanding and update his

visualization. Staffs should only display information that is relevant to the commander’s decision-making,

and avoid overloading their commander with unnecessary details.

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3-58. Units continually refine the COP during operations based on information they receive. By collaborating and sharing relevant information and tailoring it to their needs, separate echelons create their own COPs that

show what their commanders need to know, as the situation requires.

3-59. Command posts draw on a common set of relevant information within a shared database to create a digital COP. When a digital COP is not possible due to the operational environment or network interruptions,

command posts employ an analog COP. Creation of a COP is done manually with physical maps and overlays

that require training to employ effectively. The use of overlays or gathering subordinates around a common

map or graphic are examples of applying the COP concept in an analog command post.

3-60. Maintaining a COP between units within any organization is a challenge. Maintaining a COP between different countries in a multinational environment is more of a challenge. The difficulty level varies based

on language differences and technical compatibility of systems. Often unified action partners will not have

the technical capability or compatible systems to create and share a digital COP. Commander’s must

recognize and plan for this possibility.

USE DOCTRINALLY CORRECT TERMS AND GRAPHICS

A doctrine of war consists first in a common way of objectively approaching the subject;

second, in a common way of handling it.

Ferdinand Foch; Precepts, 1919

3-61. Language used when communicating should be simple, clear, and easily understood. An understanding of common doctrinal procedures, graphics, and terms contributes to the simplicity and clarity essential to

mutual understanding and shortens the amount of explicit communication needed to convey or explain an

order or plan. Doctrinal terms and graphics enable shared understanding by communicating in a commonly

understood way. However, there are situations where staffs may need to create nonstandard graphics or

modify existing graphics to portray the environment, an adaptive opponent, or other elements. They should

do this only when standard graphics are unsuitable, and they must ensure that subordinates and adjacent units

understand nonstandard terms and graphics.

3-62. Doctrine clearly distinguishes between descriptive and prescriptive information. Most doctrine is descriptive; it must be applied with judgment in the context of a particular situation. Unthinking adherence

to every aspect of doctrine in inappropriate situations is not congruent with a mission command approach.

There are some reasons that Army forces must apply some aspects of doctrine prescriptively—done without

deviation. Prescriptive doctrine derives from the need to—

 Adhere to the Army Ethic, laws of war, national law, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and

often Army regulations.

 Precisely use terms, symbols, and the language of the profession to ensure a common

understanding.

 Adhere to control measures to ensure coordination, ensure synchronization, and prevent fratricide.

 Use report, message, and order formats to ensure information is reported rapidly, accurately, and

in a commonly understood manner.

ENCOURAGE FLEXIBILITY AND ADAPTABILITY

3-63. Control allows organizations to respond to change, whether due to threat or friendly actions, or environmental conditions. The mission command approach provides flexibility and adaptability, allowing

subordinates to recognize and respond effectively to emerging conditions and to correct for the effects of fog

and friction. Control informed by a mission command approach provides information that allows

commanders to base their decisions and actions on the results of friendly and opponent actions, rather than

rigid adherence to the plan. Commanders seek to build flexibility and adaptability into their plans.

3-64. Control supports flexibility and adaptability in two ways. First, it identifies the need to change the plan. It does this through anticipating or forecasting possible opponent actions and by identifying unexpected

variances—opportunities or threats—from the plan. This occurs throughout the operations process. Second,

control helps commanders develop and implement options to respond to these changes in a timely manner.

Flexibility and adaptability provided by the appropriate level of control reduces an opposing force’s available

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options while maintaining or expanding friendly options. Effective control provides for timely action before

opposing forces can accomplish their objectives, allowing for the modification of plans as the situation

changes.

3-65. Instead of rigidly adhering to the plan, control focuses on information about emerging conditions. The mission command approach to control provides flexibility by—

 Allowing friendly forces to rapidly change their tasks, their task organization, or their plan in

response to changing circumstances.

 Producing information about options to respond to changing conditions.

 Communicating the commander’s decisions quickly and accurately.

 Providing for rapid reframing when the plan changes during execution.

 Allowing collaborative planning and execution to respond to the progress of operations.

CONCLUSION

3-66. Control is essential to the ability of commanders to counter the effects of enemy action, fog, and friction during operations, and it allows commanders to turn decisions into effective action. Knowledge management

supports control by providing structure to communications and transforming information into knowledge in

support of situational understanding and decision making. Commanders exercise control through the

operations process and the command and control system discussed in chapter 4.

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Chapter 4

The Command and Control System

Staff systems and mechanical communications are valuable, but above and beyond them

must be the commander; not as a disembodied brain linked to his men by lines of wire and

waves of ether; but as a living presence, an all pervading visible personality…

General George S. Patton, Jr

This chapter expands on the command and control system that performs the functions

necessary to exercise command and control. First, it defines the command and control

system and its purpose. It then describes the individual components of the command

and control system, followed by a discussion of organizing for command and control.

Finally, this chapter concludes with a discussion of design considerations when

establishing a command and control system.

COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM DEFINED

4-1. Commanders cannot exercise command and control alone. Even at the lowest levels, commanders need support to exercise command and control. At every echelon of command, each commander has a command

and control system to provide that support. The command and control system is the arrangement of people,

processes, networks, and command posts that enable commanders to conduct operations.

4-2. The command and control system consists of all the resources used to support command and control and enhances the commander’s ability to conduct operations. Commanders organize a command and control

system to—

 Support the commander’s decision making.

 Collect, create, and maintain relevant information and prepare products to support the

commander’s and leaders’ understanding and visualization.

 Prepare and communicate directives.

4-3. To provide these three overlapping functions, commanders must effectively locate, design, and organize the four components of their command and control system (depicted in figure 4-1): people,

processes, networks, and command posts.

Figure 4-1. Components of a command and control system

PEOPLE

4-4. The most important component of the command and control system is people—those who assist commanders and exercise control on their behalf. An effective command and control system accounts for the

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characteristics and limits of human nature. Simultaneously, it exploits and enhances uniquely human skills.

People dedicated to the command and control system include commanders, seconds in command, command

sergeants major, staffs, and liaison officers.

Commanders

4-5. Where the commander locates within the area of operations, and at what time, are important considerations for effective command and control. No standard pattern or simple prescription exists for

command presence; different commanders lead differently. Commanders balance their time among the

command post and staff, subordinate commanders, forces, and other organizations to make the greatest

contribution to success. (See chapter 2 for more discussion on the location of the commander.)

4-6. Command posts serve as the focus for information exchange, planning, and analysis. They provide commanders direct access to the staff and allow them to communicate with superior, subordinate, and

supporting commanders. While at a command post, commanders provide vital face-to-face guidance to staff

members when developing plans and controlling operations. By moving to the locations of subordinates or

to critical points in an area of operations, commanders can better assess and influence the state of operations.

They can personally gauge the condition of their units and leaders and consult directly with subordinate

commanders performing critical tasks. By being forward, commanders can also motivate subordinates

through personal example.

Seconds in Command

4-7. At all levels, the second in command is the commander’s principal assistant. The second in command may be a deputy commander, an assistant commander, or the executive officer. Commanders determine the

duties and responsibilities of their deputy and assistant commanders. These duties and responsibilities are

formally declared and outlined in a memorandum or standard operating procedure signed by the commander.

Usually, at company through brigade echelons, the executive officer is the second in command. In a theater

army, corps, or division, the deputy or assistant commander extends the commander’s span of control in areas

and functions that the commander designates

4-8. Deputy or assistant commanders normally do not have staffs. When they have specific responsibilities, the headquarters staff assists them as their commander prescribes. Deputy or assistant commanders may give

orders to the staffs within the authority the commander delegates to them. They may go to the chief of staff

at any time for staff assistance. If a deputy or assistant commander needs to form a team for a specific purpose,

the commander may form one from headquarters elements or subordinate units, or make a subordinate unit’s

headquarters available.

4-9. In organizations with more than one deputy or assistant, the commander will designate which one is the second in command. Delegating authority to the seconds in command reduces the burden on commanders

and allows them to focus on particular areas or concerns while their seconds in command concentrate on

others. Normally, commanders delegate authority to seconds in command to act in their name for specific

functions and responsibilities.

4-10. A second in command has important responsibilities in these circumstances:

 Temporary absence of the commander.

 Succession of command.

 Delegation of authority.

 Deputies of joint and multinational forces.

Temporary Absence of the Commander

4-11. Officers who are second in the chain of command may assume duties as delegated, either explicitly or by standard operating procedures, when the commander is temporarily absent from the command post or

resting. Lack of sleep can impair judgment and creative thinking capabilities. A commander’s sleep plan

should include delegating authority to the second in command during selected times to give the commander

time to sleep. Commanders may also be absent from the command temporarily. In this case, the second in

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31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 4-3

command may assume command temporarily and make decisions that continue operations in accordance

with the commander’s intent and policies.

Succession of Command

When placed in command-take charge…

GEN H. Norman Schwarzkopf

4-12. Commanders may be killed, wounded, medically incapacitated, or relieved of command. In these situations, the second in command normally assumes command. At brigade and lower echelons, executive

officers normally assume command. At higher echelons, deputy or assistant commanders may not be senior

to subordinate unit commanders. In this case, the operations order specifies succession of command, and the

second in command exercises command until the designated successor assumes command. However,

commanders may designate a second in command who is junior to subordinate commanders as their successor

in command. (See AR 600-20 for regulatory guidance.)

4-13. Seconds in command must be able to assume command at any time. They must stay informed of the situation. Commanders inform their second in command of any changes to their visualization or intent. The

chief of staff keeps the second in command informed of staff actions. Commanders continually train their

seconds in command for command at their level.

Delegation of Authority

4-14. Delegating authority to the second in command reduces the burden of commanders’ responsibilities and allows them to focus on particular areas or concerns while their seconds in command concentrate on

others. Normally, commanders delegate authority to their seconds in command to act in their name for

specific fields of interest and responsibility. Doing this decentralizes decision making while allowing the

commander to keep overall command.

Deputies of Joint and Multinational Forces

4-15. When an Army headquarters serves as the headquarters of a joint or multinational force, appointing a deputy commander from another service or a multinational partner is often appropriate. These deputy

commanders may also exercise command over forces of their Service or nation. They can serve as important

advisers to the Army commander. They can facilitate understanding among participating Service or national

forces. In this case, succession of command depends on joint and multinational doctrine, law, or international

agreement.

Command Sergeants Major

4-16. The command sergeant major is the senior noncommissioned officer of the command at battalion and higher levels. Command sergeants major carry out policies and enforce standards for the performance,

individual training, and conduct of enlisted Soldiers. They give advice and initiate recommendations to

commanders and staffs in matters pertaining to enlisted Soldiers. In operations, commanders employ their

command sergeant majors throughout the area of operations to extend command influence, assess morale of

the force, and assist during critical events. Company first sergeants and platoon sergeants perform similar

functions at company and platoon levels.

Staffs

A lazy commander, if he is brilliant, may succeed; but a lazy staff officer is a menace.

Lt.-Col. Simonds, Commandant, Canadian Junior War Staff Course

4-17. Staffs support commanders in making and implementing decisions and in integrating and synchronizing combat power. Effective staffs multiply a unit’s effectiveness. They provide timely and

relevant information and analysis, make estimates and recommendations, prepare plans and orders, assist in

controlling operations, and assess the progress of operations for the commander. Primary responsibilities of

any staffs are to—

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 Support the commander.

 Assist subordinate commanders, staffs, and units.

 Inform units and organizations outside the headquarters.

Support the Commander

4-18. Staffs support commanders in understanding, visualizing, and describing the operational environment; making and articulating decisions; and directing, leading, and assessing military operations. Staffs make

recommendations and prepare plans and orders for their commander. Staff products consist of timely and

relevant information and analysis, such as that found in their running estimates. Staffs use knowledge

management to extract that information from the vast amount of available information. Staffs synthesize this

information and provide it to commanders in the form of running estimates to help commanders build and

maintain their situational understanding.

4-19. Staffs also prepare and disseminate information to subordinates for execution to assist commanders in controlling operations. While commanders often personally disseminate their commander’s intent and

planning guidance, they rely on their staffs to communicate the majority of their guidance in the form of

plans and orders. Staffs must communicate their commander’s decisions, and the intentions behind them,

efficiently and effectively throughout the force.

4-20. Staffs support and advise their commander within their area of expertise. While commanders make key decisions, they are not the only decision makers. Trained and trusted staff members, given decision

making authority based on the commander’s intent, free commanders from routine decisions. This enables

commanders to focus on key aspects of operations.

Assist Subordinate Commanders, Staffs, and Units

4-21. Effective staffs establish and maintain a high degree of coordination and cooperation with staffs of higher echelon, lower echelon, supporting, supported, and adjacent units. Staffs help subordinate

headquarters understand the larger context of operations. They do this by first understanding their higher

echelon headquarters’ operations and commander’s intent, and nesting their own operations with their higher

headquarters. They then actively collaborate with subordinate commanders and staffs to facilitate a shared

understanding of the operational environment. Examples of staffs assisting subordinate units include

performing staff coordination, staff assistance visits, and staff inspections.

Inform Units and Organizations Outside the Headquarters

4-22. Staffs keep their units well informed. Staffs also keep adjacent, coalition, allied, and civilian organizations informed with relevant information according to security classification and need to know.

Staffs have an obligation to establish working relationships with unit members. As soon as a staff receives

information and determines its relevancy, that staff passes that information to the appropriate headquarters.

The key is relevance, not volume. Masses of data inhibit mission command by distracting staffs from relevant

information. Effective knowledge management helps staffs identify the information commanders and staff

elements need, and its relative importance.

4-23. Information should reach recipients based on their need for it. Sending incomplete information sooner is better than sending complete information too late to matter. When forwarding information, the sending

staff highlights key information for each recipient and clarifies the commander’s intent. Such highlighting

and clarification assists receivers in analyzing the content of the information received in order to determine

that information that may be of particular importance to the higher and subordinate commanders. The sending

staff may pass information directly, include its analysis, or add context to it. Common, distributed databases

can accelerate this function; however, they cannot replace the personal contact that adds perspective.

Common Staff Duties and Responsibilities

4-24. Staff members have specific duties and responsibilities associated with their area of expertise. However, all staff sections share a common set of duties and responsibilities:

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31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 4-5

 Advising and informing their commander.

 Building and maintaining running estimates.

 Providing recommendations.

 Preparing plans, orders, and other staff writing.

 Assessing operations.

 Managing information within their area of expertise.

 Identifying and analyzing problems.

 Conducting staff assistance visits.

 Performing risk management.

 Performing intelligence preparation of the battlefield.

 Conducting staff inspections.

 Conducting staff research.

 Performing staff administrative procedures.

 Exercising staff supervision over their area of expertise.

Characteristics of Good Staff Members

4-25. Good staff members understand how to effectively communicate with their commander, and they can discern what information is vital to their commander’s ability to command and control. They seek a shared

understanding of the operational environment with their commander and with the commanders of both higher

and subordinate headquarters. This shared understanding includes the commander’s visualization of the

operational approach, including the commander’s intent. Good staff members—

 Are competent. They are experts in doctrine and the processes and procedures associated with

their branch or functional area, as well as the operations process. They understand the duties of

other staff members enough to accomplish coordination both vertically and horizontally.

 Bring clarity. They are able to clearly articulate and effectively present information, orally, in

writing, and visually. They help simplify problems in complex operational environments by

explaining the meaning of information and not simply providing raw data to the commander.

 Exercise candor. They tell the commander what they believe, not what the commander wants to

hear. They are willing to tell the commander both good and bad news. Any staff work eventually

affects Soldiers, who execute staff officer recommendations approved by the commander. Staff

officers never forget their recommendations affect Soldiers.

 Exercise initiative. They anticipate requirements rather than waiting for instructions. They

anticipate what the commander needs to accomplish the mission and prepare answers to potential

questions before they are asked.

 Apply critical and creative thinking. As critical thinkers, staff members discern truth in

situations where direct observation is insufficient, impossible, or impractical. They determine

whether adequate justification exists to accept conclusions as true, based on a given inference or

argument. As creative thinkers, staff members look at different options to solve problems. They

use proven approaches (drawing from previous similar circumstances) or innovative approaches

(coming up with completely new ideas). In both instances, staff members use creative thinking to

apply imagination and depart from the old way of doing things.

 Are adaptive. They recognize and adjust to changing conditions in the operational environment

with appropriate, flexible, and timely actions. They rapidly adjust and continuously assess plans,

tactics, techniques, and procedures.

 Are flexible. They avoid becoming overwhelmed or frustrated by changing requirements and

priorities. Commanders may change their minds or redirect their commands after receiving

additional information or a new mission and may not inform their staffs of the reason for a change.

Staff members remain flexible and adjust to any changes. They set priorities when there are more

tasks to accomplish than time allows. They learn to manage multiple commitments

simultaneously.

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 Possess discipline and self-confidence. They understand that all staff work serves the

commander, even if the commander rejects the resulting recommendation. Staff members do not

give a “half effort” even if they think the commander will disagree with their recommendations.

Alternative and possibly unpopular ideas or points of view assist commanders in making the best

possible decisions.

 Are team players. They cooperate with other staff members within and outside their headquarters.

This practice contributes to effective collaboration and coordination.

Staff Relationships

4-26. Staff effectiveness depends in part on relationships of the staff with commanders and other staffs. Collaboration aids in developing shared understanding and visualization among staffs at different echelons.

A staff acts on behalf of, and derives its authority from, its commander. Although commanders are the

principal decision makers, individual staff officers make decisions within their authority based on broad

guidance and unit standard operating procedures. Commanders insist on frank collaboration between

themselves and their staff officers. A staff gives honest, independent thoughts and recommendations, so

commanders can make the best possible decisions. Once their commander makes a decision, staff officers

support and implement the commander’s decision even if the decision differs from their recommendations.

4-27. Teamwork within a staff and between staffs produces the staff integration essential to synchronized operations. A staff works efficiently with complete cooperation from all staff sections. A force operates

effectively in cooperation with all headquarters. Commanders and staffs foster this positive climate during

training and sustain it during operations. However, frequent personnel changes and augmentation to their

headquarters adds challenges to building and maintaining the team. While all staff sections have clearly

defined functional responsibilities, none can operate effectively in isolation. Therefore, coordination is

extremely important. Commanders ensure staff sections are properly equipped and manned. This allows

staffs to efficiently work within their headquarters and with their counterparts in other headquarters.

Commanders ensure staff integration through developing the unit’s battle rhythm, including synchronizing

various meetings, working groups, and boards.

4-28. The basis for staff organization depends on the mission, each staff’s broad areas of expertise, and regulations and laws. While staffs at every echelon and type of unit are structured differently, all staffs share

some similarities. (See FM 6-0 for an expanded discussion of staffs.)

Liaison Officers

4-29. Liaison is that contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces or other agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. Most commonly used for

establishing and maintaining close communications, liaison continuously enables direct, physical

communications between commands and with unified action partners. Commanders use liaison during

operations and normal daily activities to facilitate a shared understanding and purpose among organizations,

preserve freedom of action, and maintain flexibility. Liaison provides commanders with relevant information

and answers to operational questions, thus enhancing the commander’s situational understanding.

4-30. Liaison activities augment the commander’s ability to synchronize and converge all elements of combat power into their concept of operation and scheme of maneuver. They include establishing and

maintaining physical contact and communications between elements of military forces and nonmilitary

agencies during operations. Liaison activities ensure—

 Cooperation and understanding among commanders and staffs of different headquarters.

 Coordination on tactical matters to achieve unity of effort.

 Synchronization of lethal and nonlethal effects.

 Understanding of implied or inferred coordination measures to achieve synchronized results.

4-31. A liaison officer represents a commander or staff officer. Liaison officers transmit information directly, bypassing headquarters and staff layers. A trained, competent, trusted, and informed liaison officer, either a

commissioned or a noncommissioned officer, is the key to effective liaison. Liaison officers must have the

commander’s full confidence and sufficient experience for the mission. At higher echelons, the complexity

of operations often requires more senior ranking liaison officers.

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31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 4-7

4-32. Based on the situation, commanders may receive or request liaison elements (individuals and teams) to assist them with command and control. Liaison elements include but are not limited to—

 An air liaison officer.

 A naval gunfire liaison officer.

 An Army space support team.

 A psychological operations planner.

 An Army cyberspace operations support team.

 An Army field support team.

 A digital liaison detachment

 Liaisons to and from subordinate, adjacent, and supporting units.

 Liaisons to and from unified action partners.

(See FM 6-0 for more discussion on liaison.)

Processes

4-33. Commanders establish and use systematic processes and procedures to organize the activities within their headquarters and throughout the force. Processes are a series of actions directed to an end state, such as

the military decision-making process. In addition to the major activities of the operations process,

commanders and staffs use several integrating processes to synchronize specific functions throughout the

operations process. The integrating processes are—

 Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (described in ATP 2-01.3).

 Information collection (described in FM 3-55).

 Targeting (described in ATP 3-60).

 Risk management (described in ATP 5-19).

 Knowledge management (described in chapter 3)

4-34. Procedures govern actions within the command and control system to make it more effective and efficient. They allow for complex actions to take place without detailed guidance every time the procedure

is initiated. For example, standard operating procedures often provide detailed unit instructions on how to

configure COP displays. Adhering to processes and procedures minimizes confusion, misunderstanding, and

hesitation as commanders make frequent, rapid decisions to meet operational requirements.

4-35. Procedures can increase organizational competence by improving a staff’s efficiency or by increasing the tempo. Procedures can be especially useful in improving the coordination of Soldiers who must cooperate

to accomplish repetitive tasks, such as the internal functioning of a command post.

4-36. Command and control procedures are designed for simplicity and speed: they should be simple enough to perform quickly and smoothly under conditions of extreme stress. They should be efficient enough to

increase tempo. Streamlined staff-planning sequences are preferable to deliberate, elaborate ones.

4-37. Commanders establish procedures to streamline operations and written orders and help integrate new Soldiers and attachments. Usually spelled out in unit standard operating procedures, procedures also help

commanders make decisions faster by providing relevant information in standard, easy-to-understand

formats. Procedures describe routine actions, thus eliminating repetitive decisions, such as, where to put

people in a command post, how to set up a command post, and march formations.

4-38. Procedures facilitate continuity of operations when leaders become unable to perform their duties. Subordinates can step in and use procedures to continue to operate. When Soldiers are tired or stressed, their

decision making capability is degraded. Standard operating procedures help individuals and units continue

to accomplish many tasks because they are routine.

4-39. Procedures do not cover every possible situation. Units avoid applying procedures blindly to the wrong tasks or the wrong situations, which can lead to ineffective, even counterproductive, performance.

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Networks

4-40. Networks in the command and control system collect, process, store, display, disseminate, and protect information worldwide. They enable the execution of command and control, and they support operations

through the wide dissemination of data and relevant information.

4-41. Networks enable commanders to communicate information and control forces whether mounted or dismounted, and they are key enablers of successful operations. Commanders systematically establish

networks to connect people and allow sharing of information and resources. The Army’s primary network is

the Department of Defense information network-Army. This network consists of—

 End-user applications.

 Information services and data.

 Network transport and management.

End-User Applications

4-42. Commanders determine their information requirements and focus their staffs and organizations on using the application layer to meet these requirements. End-user applications include automated information

systems, software, and user devices that allow users to display and disseminate information, and the policies

and procedures for their use. This includes telephones, tablets, laptops, software applications, and user

interfaces. End-user applications allow people to leverage the network’s capabilities.

4-43. End-user applications directly affect how commanders communicate and how their staffs collaborate. They promote unity of effort by allowing commanders to view and understand their areas of operation,

communicate the commander’s intent, and disseminate relevant information. When operated by well-trained

personnel and used properly, these applications can give commanders an information advantage over

opponents by reducing the time required to make a decision, improving combined arms coordination, and

synchronizing the warfighting functions. Applications can simultaneously support current and future

operations as well as plans.

Information Services and Data

4-44. The primary purpose of information services and data is to facilitate timely and accurate decision making and execution by processing and managing information. The services and data include all the

information services, servers, and data standards that collect, process, and store information. This includes

the servers, data storage and distribution, cloud and edge servers, and software and data standards that allow

the display of a COP as meaningful visual images that directly impart knowledge and increase understanding.

4-45. Information services and data include the information management processes that support knowledge management. Information and knowledge management reduce the time and effort commanders spend

assimilating information and developing situational understanding. Information services and data support

shared situational understanding.

Network Transport and Management

4-46. Network transport is processes, equipment, and transmission media that provide connectivity and move data between networking devices and facilities. Network transport is a system of systems including the

people, equipment, and facilities that provide end-to-end communications connectivity for network

components (FM 6-02). The primary purpose of network transport is to move data between networking

devices and facilities. Network transport devices include radios, Wi-Fi, microwave and satellite

communications, and cable and wire.

4-47. Network management equipment controls the movement of data around the battlefield. Network management devices include switches, routers, and communications security equipment. Network

management also includes software designed to operate and secure all aspects of the network, including

end-user applications, information services, data, and network transport. This software is distinct from

end- user applications in that it provides functions to control and secure the network, rather than user services.

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4-48. Successful commanders understand that networks may be degraded through threat or environmental factors during operations. They develop methods and measures to mitigate the impact of degraded networks.

This mitigation may be through exploiting the potential of technology or through establishing trust, creating

shared understanding, or providing a clear intent using mission orders.

4-49. Effective commanders use technology to enable a mission command approach to command and control, not to micromanage operations. Equipment that improves the ability to monitor the situation at lower

levels increases the temptation to directly control subordinates’ actions and thereby undermine mission

command. Moreover, such use tends to fix the higher echelon commander’s attention at too low a level.

Commanders who focus at too low a level risk losing sight of the larger overall picture. Consequently,

increased network capabilities bring the need for increased understanding and discipline. Just because

technology allows detailed supervision does not mean commanders should employ it in that manner.

Effective mission command requires senior commanders to give the on-scene commander freedom to

exercise initiative.

COMMAND POSTS

4-50. Effective command and control requires continuous, and often immediate, close coordination, synchronization and information sharing across the staff. To promote this, commanders organize their staffs

and other components of the command and control system into command posts to assist them in effectively

conducting operations. A command post is a unit headquarters where the commander and staff perform their

activities (FM 6-0). Often divided into echelons, each echelon of the headquarters is a command post

regardless of whether the commander is present or not. When necessary, commanders control operations

from other locations away from the command post. In all cases, the commander alone exercises command

when in a command post or elsewhere.

4-51. Command posts are facilities that include personnel, processes and procedures, and networks that assist commanders in command and control. Commanders employ command posts to help control operations

through continuity, planning, coordination, and synchronizing of the warfighting functions. Commanders

organize their command posts flexibly to meet changing situations and requirements of different operations.

4-52. Command post functions directly relate to assisting commanders in understanding, visualizing, describing, directing, leading, and assessing operations. Different types of command posts, such as the main

command post or the tactical command post, have specific functions by design. Functions common to all

command posts include—

 Conducting knowledge management, information management, and foreign disclosure.

 Building and maintaining situational understanding.

 Controlling operations.

 Assessing operations.

 Coordinating with internal and external organizations.

 Performing command post administration.

Conducting Knowledge Management, Information Management, and Foreign Disclosure

4-53. When combined, knowledge management, information management, and foreign disclosure enable the provision of relevant information to the right person at the right time and in a usable format. Knowledge

management, information management, and foreign disclosure facilitate understanding and decision making.

4-54. Commanders and unified action partners must receive combat information and intelligence products in time and in an appropriate format to facilitate shared understanding and support decision making. Timely

dissemination of information is critical to the success of multinational operations. Dissemination is deliberate

and ensures consumers receive combat information and intelligence products to support operations.

Therefore, information should be shared to the maximum extent allowed by law, regulation, and

government-wide policy.

4-55. Developing and managing a unit’s battle rhythm is a key aspect of effective knowledge management. A unit’s battle rhythm establishes various meetings, working groups, and planning teams to assist

commanders and staffs with integrating the warfighting functions, coordinating activities, and making

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effective decisions throughout the operations process. The battle rhythm arranges the sequence and timing of

reports, meetings, and briefings based on the commander’s preference, higher headquarters requirements,

and the type of operations. There is no standard battle rhythm for all units. Depending on echelon and type

of operations, commanders and staffs develop and adjust their battle rhythm based on the situation. Managed

by the chief of staff or executive officer, a unit’s battle rhythm facilitates decision making and routine

interactions among commanders, staffs, forces, and unified action partners. (See ATP 6-0.5 for techniques

on building a unit’s battle rhythm.)

Building and Maintaining Situational Understanding

4-56. Effective knowledge management and information management are essential to building and maintaining situational understanding. Building and maintaining situational understanding helps in

establishing the situation’s context, developing effective plans, assessing operations, and making quality

decisions during execution. Command post activities that contribute to this include—

 Receiving information, including reports from subordinate units.

 Analyzing information.

 Generating, distributing, and sharing information and knowledge products, to including reports

required by higher headquarters.

 Conducting battle tracking.

 Conducting update and information briefings.

4-57. Running estimates and the COP are key products used for building and maintaining situational understanding. A running estimate is the continuous assessment of the current situation used to determine if

the current operation is proceeding according to the commander’s intent and if planned future operations are

supportable (ADP 5-0). In their running estimates, each command post cell and staff section continuously

considers the effects of new information and they update—

 Facts.

 Assumptions.

 Friendly force status.

 Enemy activities and capabilities.

 Civil considerations.

 Conclusions and recommendations.

4-58. The staff uses its running estimates to advise the commander and make recommendations. Information in running estimates also helps build the COP. Maintaining the COP within a command post and with other

command posts assists commanders and staffs in maintaining situational understanding and promoting a

shared understanding throughout the command.

Controlling Operations

4-59. Personnel within command posts assist commanders in controlling operations, including coordinating, synchronizing, and integrating actions within their delegated authority. They also integrate and synchronize

resources in accordance with their commander’s priority of support. Staff members monitor and evaluate the

progress of operations and make or recommend adjustments to operations in accordance with their

commander’s intent. While all command posts assist commanders in controlling operations, different

command posts are assigned specific control responsibilities. For example, a brigade commander may

employ the brigade tactical command post to control battalion air assault operations.

Assessing Operations

4-60. Personnel within command posts continuously assess operations. Assessment is the determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective (JP 3-0).

Assessment involves deliberately comparing forecasted outcomes with actual events to determine the overall

effectiveness of force employment. More specifically, assessment helps commanders and staffs in

determining progress toward attaining the desired end state, achieving objectives, and performing tasks. It

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also involves continuously monitoring and evaluating the operational environment to determine which

changes might affect the conduct of operations. (See ADP 5-0 for a detailed discussion of assessment.)

Coordinating with Internal and External Organizations

4-61. Units do not operate in isolation. They synchronize their actions with those of others. Coordination is essential to this synchronization. Personnel within command posts continuously coordinate with higher

echelon, lower echelon, adjacent, supporting, and supported units, and with unified action partners.

Coordination helps—

 Develop shared understanding.

 Ensure a thorough understanding of the commander’s intent and concept of operations.

 Inform an organization on issues so that it may adjust plans and actions as required.

 Avoid conflict and duplication of effort among units.

 Ensure synchronization of effects and efforts between supporting and supported units.

Performing Command Post Administration

4-62. Commanders staff, equip, and organize command posts to support 24-hour operations. As such, command post personnel and equipment must be protected and sustained. This requires an effective standard

operating procedure and personnel trained on command post administration, including—

 Establishing the command post.

 Displacing the command post.

 Providing security.

 Maintaining continuity of operations.

 Executing sleep plans.

 Managing stress.

ORGANIZATION AND EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS

4-63. Command posts provide locations from which commanders, assisted by their staffs, command operations and integrate and synchronize combat power to accomplish missions across the range of military

operations. Commanders organize the other components of the command and control system into command

posts based on mission requirements and the situation that will best assist them in exercising mission

command. Planning considerations for command post organization and employment can be categorized as—

 Those contributing to effectiveness.

 Those contributing to survivability.

In many cases, these factors work against each other and therefore neither can be optimized. Tradeoffs are

made to acceptably balance effectiveness and survivability.

Effectiveness

4-64. Command post personnel, equipment, and facilities are arranged to facilitate coordination, exchange of information, and rapid decision making. A command post must effectively communicate with higher

echelon, subordinate, adjacent, supporting, and supported units and have the ability to move as required.

Considerations for command post effectiveness include design layout, standardization, continuity, and

capacity.

Design Layout

4-65. Well-designed command posts integrate command and staff efforts. Within a command post, the location of staffs are arranged to facilitate internal communication and coordination. This arrangement may

change over the course of operations as the situation changes. Other layout considerations include—

 The ease of information flow.

 User interface with communications systems.

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 The positioning of information displays for ease of use.

 The integrating of complementary information on maps and displays.

 Adequate workspace for the staff and commander.

 The ease of displacement (including setup, tear-down, and movement).

Standardization

4-66. Standardization increases the efficiency of command post operations. Commanders develop detailed standard operating procedures for all aspects of command post operations, including command post layout,

battle drills, meeting requirements, and reporting procedures. Command post standard operating procedures

are enforced and revised throughout training. Doing this makes many command post activities routine.

Trained staffs are prepared to effectively execute drills and procedures in demanding, stressful times during

operations.

Continuity

4-67. Command posts must be manned, equipped, and organized to control operations without interruptions. Commanders organize command posts in order to support continuous operations. To support continuous

operations, unit standard operating procedures address shift plans, rest plans, and procedures for loss of

communications with the unit commander, subordinates, or other command posts.

4-68. Maintaining continuity during displacement of a command post or catastrophic loss requires designating alternate command posts and passing control between command posts. Continuity of command

requires commanders to designate seconds in command and inform them of all critical decisions. Primary

staff officers should also designate alternates.

Capacity

4-69. Command posts should be manned and organized to manage the information needed to operate effectively. The capacity to plan, prepare, execute, and continuously assess operations concerns both staffing

and the network, as does the ability to manage relevant information. Command post personnel must be trained

and have the requisite tactical and technical proficiency.

Survivability

4-70. Command post survivability is vital to mission success and is measured by the capabilities of the threat in the context of the situation. Survivability may be obtained at the price of effectiveness. Depending on the

threat, command posts need to remain small and highly mobile—especially at lower echelons. Command

posts are easily acquired and targeted when they are concentrated. Considerations for command post

survivability include dispersion, size, redundancy, mobility, electronic and thermal signatures, and

camouflage and concealment. Additional measures include cover or shielding by terrain features or urban

structures. (See ATP 3-37.34 for more information on command post survivability.)

Dispersion

4-71. Dispersing command posts enhances the survivability of the commander’s command and control system. Commanders place minimum resources forward and keep more elaborate facilities back. This makes

it harder for enemies to find and attack them. It also decreases support and security requirements forward.

Depending on the situation, commanders may leave personnel and equipment at home station to perform

detailed analysis and long-range planning for operations.

Size

4-72. A command post’s size affects its mobility and survivability. Large command posts can increase capacity and ease face-to-face coordination. Their size, however, makes them vulnerable to multiple types of

acquisitions and attack. Smaller command posts are easier to protect, but they may lack capacity to control

operations effectively. The key to success is achieving the right balance.

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Redundancy

4-73. Reducing command post size cuts signature and enhances mobility. However, some personnel and equipment redundancy is required for continuous operations. In operations, personnel and equipment are lost

or fail under stress. Having the right amount of redundancy allows command posts to continue to operate

effectively when this happens.

Mobility

4-74. Command posts must deploy efficiently and move within the area of operations as the situation requires. Command post mobility is important, especially at lower echelons during combat operations.

Lower-echelon command posts and those employed forward in the combat zone may need to move quickly

and often. Both small size and careful transportation planning facilitates rapid displacement of command

posts.

ORGANIZING FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL

4-75. How commanders organize a command and control system can complicate or simplify execution. Organizational decisions establish the chain of command (command and support relationships) and task

organization. They can influence where commanders obtain information, whom they rely on for advice, and

how they supervise execution of their decisions. Organizational decisions affect the structure of the flow of

recommendations to commanders. In large part, the organization establishes formal communication channels

and determines how commanders distribute information throughout their forces.

4-76. Commands operate most efficiently and effectively when Soldiers consider themselves part of a team or larger organization. Organization serves the important function of providing sources of group identity for

soldiers assigned to a command. A command operates most effectively when soldiers consider themselves

members of one or more groups characterized by high levels of loyalty, cooperation, morale, and

commitment. This supports mission command.

4-77. Information flows vertically within the chain of command, but the organization should not limit its flow to the chain of command. Information also must flow laterally among adjacent, supported, and

supporting units. Information flows informally and unofficially—between individuals according to personal

relationships—as well as within formal channels. Informal channels provide important redundancy.

GUIDES TO ORGANIZING FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL

4-78. When organizing for command and control, commanders consider—

 The chain of command.

 Span of control.

 Unit integrity.

 Degraded environments.

The Chain of Command

4-79. The chain of command is the succession of commanding officers from a superior to a subordinate through which command is exercised (JP 1). The commander at each level responds to orders from a higher

commander and, in turn, issues orders to subordinates. In this way, the chain of command fixes responsibility

and sources of authority at each echelon while, at the same time, distributing them broadly throughout the

force. Each commander has designated authority and responsibility in a given area of operations or area of

responsibility. Command and support relationships specify the type and degree of authority one commander

has over another, and the type and degree of support one commander provides to another.

Command and Support Relationships

4-80. Establishing clear command and support relationships is fundamental to organizing for operations. These relationships prescribe clear responsibilities and authorities among subordinate and supporting units.

Some forces are given command or support relationships that limit their commander’s authority to prescribe

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additional relationships. Knowing the inherent responsibilities of each command and support relationship

allows commanders to establish clear responsibilities when organizing their forces. (See ADP 3-0 for more

information on command and support relationships.)

4-81. Commanders designate command and support relationships within their authority to weight the decisive operation and support the concept of operations. Task organization also helps subordinate and

supporting commanders understand their roles in the operation and contribute to achieving the commander’s

intent. Command and support relationships carry with them varying responsibilities to subordinate units by

parent and gaining units.

Allocating Resources

4-82. Mission command requires commanders to have authority over or access to all resources required to accomplish the mission. Accordingly, commanders organize resources as well as forces when making

organizational decisions. This resource organization may be implicit in the command and support

relationships established; however, it may differ partly or completely from them, as in establishing priorities

including fires, work, or sustainment. In any case, the resource organization must not violate unity of

command and should support unity of effort. Further, this organization or allocation of resources should have

minimum restrictions on their use, permitting subordinates to further reallocate or to employ them as the

tactical situation requires.

Span of Control

The average human brain finds its effective scope in handling three to six other brains.

General Sir Ian Hamilton

4-83. Organization should ensure reasonable span of control, which refers to the number of subordinates or activities under the control of a single commander. A commander’s span of control should not exceed that

commander’s capability to command effectively. The optimal number of subordinates is situation-dependent.

The more fluid and fast-changing the situation, the fewer subordinate elements a commander can supervise

closely. Within this situation-dependent range, a greater number of subordinates allows greater flexibility,

and increases options and combinations. However, as the number increases, commanders, at some point, lose

the ability to consider each unit individually and begin to think of the units as a single, inflexible mass. At

this point, the only way to reintroduce flexibility is to group elements into a smaller number of parts, creating

another echelon of command.

4-84. Narrowing the span of control—that is, lessening the number of immediate subordinates—deepens the organization by adding layers of command. The more layers of command in an organization, the longer it

takes for information to move up or down the organization. Consequently, the organization may become

slower and less responsive. Conversely, an effort to increase tempo by eliminating echelons of command or

flattening an organization necessitates widening the span of control. Commanders balance width and depth,

so that the command and control organization fits the situation.

4-85. An effective organization enables the commander and subordinate commanders to command without information overload. The commander establishes his span of control and organizes the command and control

system so as to be able to exercise command and control under all circumstances, including degraded

environments.

Unit Integrity

4-86. Mission command requires subordinate commands capable of operating in the absence of detailed orders. Forming such task-organizations increases each commander’s freedom of action. Effective

commanders are flexible: they task-organize forces to suit the situation. This might include creating

nonstandard, temporary teams or task forces. However, commanders reconcile the need for organizational

flexibility with the requirement to create shared understanding and mutual trust. These characteristics result

from familiarity and stable working relationships.

4-87. One way to balance these demands is to observe unit integrity when organizing for command and control. Commanders must take into account the impact on mission command when task-organizing forces.

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Whenever possible, commanders should task-organize based on standing headquarters and habitually

associated elements. When this is not feasible and organizations are formed from a wide variety of units,

commanders must allow time for training and establishing functional working relationships and procedures.

4-88. Once a force is task-organized and committed, commanders do not change the task-organization during operations unless the benefits clearly outweigh the disadvantages. Reorganizations cost time, momentum,

effort, and tempo. Commanders also consider logistical factors, as the time required to change

task-organization may counter any organizational advantages.

Degraded Environments

4-89. When organizing for command and control, commanders consider the impact of degraded environments on the command and control system. The command and control system may be degraded as

the result of hostile actions to contest the use of space and the information environment or due to the lack of

resources to provide sufficient network coverage in an area of operations. The degradation may not be

technological. The use of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives, or adverse

weather, may create physical conditions that cause interference in the electromagnetic spectrum and degrade

the command and control system. All of these may interfere with a commander’s ability to exercise command

and control.

4-90. In order to mitigate this risk and successfully conduct operations in degraded environments, commanders cannot become over reliant on technological capabilities. Commanders ensure their personnel

are trained on analog and manual command and control processes and are comfortable operating in degraded

environments. Understanding the functions performed by automated systems is critical to understanding what

functions must be performed in an analog environment. Commanders ensure standard operating procedures

are in place that will help the command and control system maintain its ability to function. Personnel should

be trained and proficient in—

 Continuous operations.

 Maintaining the COP.

 Manual information sharing.

 Staff integration and crosstalk.

 Manual running estimates.

 Command post battle drills.

4-91. One way to deal with degraded communications is through primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (PACE) communication planning. A PACE plan establishes the primary, alternate, contingency,

and emergency methods of communications, typically from higher echelons to lower echelons. Establishing

a PACE plan requires care that an alternate or contingency method of communications does not rely on the

primary. The key to a good PACE plan is to establish redundancy so that communications are always

available. Most units will have two PACE plans: one for communications to higher echelon headquarters and

one for subordinate units. A PACE plan for a higher echelon headquarters will likely be established by that

headquarters. (See ATP 6-0.5 for more information on PACE planning.)

4-92. Ultimately, the doctrinal solution to operating in degraded environments is mission command. Even under severely degraded conditions, Army forces continue to make decisions and act in the absence of orders,

when existing orders no longer fit the situation, or when unforeseen opportunities arise.

CONCLUSION

4-93. Commanders alone cannot exercise command and control. At each echelon of command, commanders have a command and control system to provide support. That system is more than equipment; it consists of

all the resources available to commanders to help them exercise authority and direction. How commanders

organize, locate, and design their command and control systems directly affect their ability to conduct

operations. A properly designated commander and a well-designed command and control system provides

for continuity of command and control.

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31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 Source Notes-1

Source Notes

This division lists sources by page number. Where material appears in a paragraph, it

lists both the page number followed by the paragraph number.

viii “An order should…”: Field Service Regulation (obsolete) (Washington DC: Government

Printing Office, 1905), 29.

viii “These thunder runs…”: Lieutenant General David G. Perkins, “Mission Command:

Reflections from the Combined Arms Commander,” Army Magazine, Volume 62 (June

2012), 32.

1-1 “The situations that…”: FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations: Operations (obsolete)

(Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1941), 24.

1-2 “War is the …”: Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. M. Howard and P. Paret

(Boston, MA: Princeton University Press, 2004), 101–102.

1-2 “The role of …”: B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2d rev. ed. (Toronto, Canada: Meridian, 1991),

321-22.

1-3 “Never tell people …”: General George S. Patton, War as I Knew It (Boston, MA: Houghton

Mifflin Company, 1947), 357.

1-4 Von Moltke and Auftragstaktik Adapted from Helmuth von Moltke, Moltke’s Military

Works, Vol. 4, War Lessons, Part I, “Operative Preparations for Battle,” trans. Harry Bell

(Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Service Schools, 1916), 65–67.

1-9 Command Based on Shared Understanding and Trust: Grant’s Orders to Sherman,

1864. Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant (New York, NY: Charles L.

Webster & Company, 1885–1886). Online https://www.fulltextarchive.com/page/Personal-

Memoirs-of-U-S-Grant--Volume-Two9/. War of the Rebellion: Serial 059 Pages 0313–0315

Chapter XLIV. CORRESPONDENCE, ETC. - UNION. (no date). Retrieved from

https://ehistory.osu.edu/books/official-records/059/0313.

1-9 “I suppose dozens of …”: William Slim, Defeat Into Victory: Battling Japan in Burma and

India, 1942–1945 (London: Casell, 1956; reprint New York, NY: Cooper Square Press,

2000), 210–211.

1-10 “An order should not …”: FM 100-5. Tentative Field Service Regulations: Operations

(obsolete) (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1939), 109.

1-11 “Every individual from the …”: FM 100-5. Tentative Field Service Regulations: Operations

(obsolete) (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1941), 32.

1-13 Initiative: U.S. Paratroopers in Sicily. Logan Nye, “How the ‘Little Groups of

Paratroopers’ Became Airborne Legends,” We Are the Mighty. Posted on 8 April 2016.

Online http://freerepublic.com/focus/f-chat/3535576/posts?page=12.

1-13 “Given the same …”: Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. M. Howard and P. Paret

(Boston, MA: Princeton University Press, 2004), 191.

1-15 Corporal Alvin York and Mission Command. Vignette adapted from Douglas V.

Mastriano, “Thunder in the Argonne! SGT Alvin York and Mission Command,” INFANTRY

(July–September 2015), 71–75.

1-16 “If intercommunication between …”: J. F. C. Fuller, Infantry in Battle (Washington, DC: The

Infantry Journal, Incorporated, 1939), 179.

1-16 “I believe firmly in …”: Field-Marshal Earl Wavell, Soldiers and Soldiering or Epithets of

War (Oxford, United Kingdom: Alden Press, 1953), 127.

Source Notes

Source Notes-2 ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

2-1 “When you are…”: George C. Marshall: in Selected Speeches and Statements of General of

the Army George C. Marshall, ed. H.A. DeWeerd (Washington, D.C.: The Infantry Journal,

1945), 176.

2-2 Assuming Command: General Ridgway Takes Eighth Army. Matthew B. Ridgway,

Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway (New York, NY: Harper, 1956; reprinted by

Andesite Press, 2017), 195-199.

2-3 “The commander must …”: Truppen Fuhrung: German Field Regulations, Volume 1, (1935),

paragraph 37.

2-5 “Intuition depends on…”: Gary Klein, Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions

(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1999), 33.

2-6 “Despite the years…”: General George S. Patton, “The Secret of Victory,” speech given on 26

March 1926. Military Essays and Articles by George S. Patton, Jr. General, U.S. Army 02605

1885 – 1945. ed. Charles M. Province. San Diego, California: The George S. Patton, Jr.

Historical Society, 2002. Online http://www.pattonhq.com/pdffiles/vintagetext.pdf.

2-8 Risk Acceptance: OPERATION HAWTHORN, Dak To, Vietnam. Based on John M.

Carland, Combat Operations: Stemming the Tide, May 1965 to October 1966, The United

States Army in Vietnam, CMH Pub 91-5 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, US

Army: GPO, 2000), 277–287.

2-8 “If it is necessary …”: Field Marshall Carver cited in ADP AC 71940, Land Operations

(Bristol, United Kingdom: Land Warfare Development Centre, 2017), 9-7.

2-10 “As each man’s…”: Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. M. Howard and P. Paret

(Boston, MA: Princeton University Press, 2004), 104.

2-11 “One of the…”: William Joseph Slim, Unofficial History (New York, NY: Orion Publishing

Group, 1962), 156.

2-12 “Commanders must remember…”: General George S. Patton, War as I Knew It (Boston, MA:

Houghton Mifflin Company, 1947), 357.

2-16 “There will be…”: Admiral E. J. King, CINCLANT Serial 053, 21 January 1941. Online

https://www.usnwc.edu/Portals/16/PCO%20Alumni%20Content/ADM-King-Serial-

053.pdf?ver=2017-10-23-121408-920.

2-16 “Morale is a state…”: William Joseph Slim, Defeat Into Victory: Battling Japan in Burma

and India, 1942–1945 (London: Casell, 1956; reprint New York, NY: Cooper Square Press,

2000), 182.

2-17 “Judgment comes from experience…”: Simon Bolivar Buckner, as quoted by Omar N.

Bradley, “Leadership: An Address to the US Army War College, 07 Oct. 71,” Parameters 1

(3) (1972): 8.

2-18 Mutual Trust and Shared Understanding: VII Corps and the Ruhr Encirclement.

William M. Connor “Establishing Command Intent, a Case Study: The Encirclement of the

Ruhr, March 1945” in The Human in Command: Exploring The Modern Military Experience,

ed. Carol McCann and Ross Pigeau. Toronto, Canada: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Press, 2000.

2-20 “General Meade was…”: Ulysses S. Grant, Memoirs and Selected Letters: Personal Memoirs

of U.S. Grant, Selected Letters, 1839-1865, vol. 2, ed. William S. McFeely and Mary Drake

McFeely (New York, NY: Library of America, 1990), 770.

2-23 “No man is …”: Genghis Khan: The Emperor of All Men, ed. Harold Lamb (New York, NY:

Robert McBride, 1927; reprint, New York: Doubleday, 1956), 46.

2-23 “I have found again …”: Erwin Rommel. The Rommel Papers, ed. B. H. Liddell Hart (New

York, NY: Harcourt, Brace, 1953), 7.

2-24 “Good morale and…”: FM 100-5, Operations (obsolete) (Washington, DC: Army Publishing

Directorate, 1941), 20–21.

3-1 “The test of …”: J.F.C. Fuller, as quoted in Infantry in Battle (Washington, DC: The Infantry

Journal, Incorporated, 1939; reprint, Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General

Staff College: GPO, 1981), 169.

Source Notes

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 Source Notes-3

3-1 “Everything in war ….”: Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. M. Howard and P. Paret

(Boston, MA: Princeton University Press, 2004), 119 and 121.

3-2 Levels of Control and German Auftragstaktik. Adapted from Robert A. Doughty, The

Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940 (Hamden, CT: The Shoe String Press,

Inc., 1990), 32–36.

3-5 “Many intelligence reports in….”: Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. M. Howard

and P. Paret (Boston, MA: Princeton University Press, 2004), 117.

3-6 “It is in ….” B. H. Liddell Hart cited in Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations, ed.

Robert D. Heinl Jr., (Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute, 1966), 61.

3-7 “He who wars walks …”: Sir William Napier cited in Dictionary of Military and Naval

Quotations, ed. Robert D. Heinl Jr., (Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute, 1966), 61.

3-10 Crosstalk in the Desert-VII Corps in the Gulf War. Based on TRADOC Pam 525-100-1,

Leadership and Command on the Battlefield: Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM

(obsolete) (Fort Monroe, VA: HQ, TRADOC, 1992), 28.

3-14 “...avoid taking….” paraphrased from Richard E. Simpkin and John Erickson, Deep Battle:

The Brainchild of Marshal Tukhachevskii (London: Brassey’s Defence, 1987), 150.

3-16 “A doctrine of war …”: Ferdinand Foch cited in Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations,

ed. Robert D. Heinl Jr., (Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute, 1966), 95.

4-1 “Staff systems and…”: General George S. Patton, Jr. “The Secret of Victory.” 1926 cited in

Military Essays and Articles by George S. Patton, Jr. General, U.S. Army 02605 1885 – 1945.

ed. Charles M. Province. San Diego, California: The George S. Patton, Jr. Historical Society,

2002. Online http://www.pattonhq.com/pdffiles/vintagetext.pdf.

4-3 “When placed in…”: General H. Norman Schwarzkopf cited in Johnson, Erin. "Schwarzkopf

speaks of leadership at symposium." The Daily Universe. 21 October 2001. Online

https://universe.byu.edu/2001/10/11/schwarzkopf-speaks-of leader at symposium/.

4-3 “A lazy commander…”: Address by Lt.-Col. Simonds, Commandant, Canadian Junior War

Staff Course, 12 April 1941 (as related by Major C.P Stacey, Historical Officer, C.M.H.Q.).

Online https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/military-

history/history-heritage/official-military-history-lineages/reports/military-headquarters-1940-

1948/closing-exercises-canadian-junior-war-staff-course.html.

4-14 “The average human…”: General Sir Ian Hamilton, The Soul and Body of an Army (London,

United Kingdom: Edward Arnold & Co., 1921), 229.

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31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 Glossary-1

Glossary

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. Where Army and

joint definitions differ, (Army) precedes the definition. Terms for which ADP 6-0 is the

proponent are marked with an asterisk (*). The proponent publication for other terms

is listed in parentheses after the definition.

SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

1SG first sergeant

ADP Army doctrine publication

AR Army regulation

ATP Army techniques publication

C2 command and control

CCIR commander’s critical information requirement

CJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual

COP common operational picture

CPL corporal

CPT captain

DA Department of the Army

FM field manual

GA General of the Army

GEN general

JP joint publication

LTG lieutenant general

MG major general

NVA North Vietnamese Army

PACE primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency

SGT sergeant

U.S. United States

SECTION II – TERMS

Army team building

A continuous process of enabling a group of people to reach their goals and improve effectiveness

through leadership and various exercises, activities and techniques. (FM 6-22)

assessment

The determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an

objective. (JP 3-0)

chain of command

The succession of commanding officers from a superior to a subordinate through which command is

exercised. (JP 1)

Glossary

Glossary-2 ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

*civil considerations

The influence of manmade infrastructure, civilian institutions, and attitudes and activities of the

civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within an area of operations on the conduct of military

operations.

combat power

(Army) The total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit or

formation can apply at one time. (ADP 3-0)

command

The authority that a commander in the armed forces lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of

rank or assignment. (JP 1)

command and control

The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and

attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. (JP 1)

*command and control system

(Army) The arrangement of people, processes, networks, and command posts that enable commanders

to conduct operations.

command and control warfighting function

The related tasks and a system that enable commanders to synchronize and converge all elements of

combat power. (ADP 3-0)

commander’s critical information requirement

An information requirement identified by the commander as being critical to facilitating timely

decision making. (JP 3-0)

commander’s intent

A clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired military end state that

supports mission command, provides focus to the staff, and helps subordinate and supporting

commanders act to achieve the commander’s desired results without further orders, even when the

operation does not unfold as planned. (JP 3-0)

*commander’s visualization

The mental process of developing situational understanding, determining a desired end state, and

envisioning an operational approach by which the force will achieve that end state.

command post

A unit headquarters where the commander and staff perform their activities. (FM 6-0)

*common operational picture

(Army) A display of relevant information within a commander’s area of interest tailored to the user’s

requirements and based on common data and information shared by more than one command.

*control

The regulation of forces and warfighting functions to accomplish the mission in accordance with the

commander’s intent.

*control measure

A means of regulating forces or warfighting functions.

*data

In the context of decision making, unprocessed observations detected by a collector of any kind

(human, mechanical, or electronic).

*essential element of friendly information

A critical aspect of a friendly operation that, if known by a threat would subsequently compromise,

lead to failure, or limit success of the operation and therefore should be protected from enemy

detection.

Glossary

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 Glossary-3

friendly force information requirement

Information the commander and staff need to understand the status of friendly force and supporting

capabilities. (JP 3-0)

*graphic control measure

A symbol used on maps and displays to regulate forces and warfighting functions.

*information

In the context of decision making, data that has been organized and processed in order to provide

context for further analysis.

*information management

(Army) The science of using procedures and information systems to collect, process, store, display,

disseminate, and protect data, information, and knowledge products.

*key tasks

Those significant activities the force must perform as a whole to achieve the desired end state.

*knowledge

In the context of decision making, information that has been analyzed and evaluated for operational

implications.

*knowledge management

The process of enabling knowledge flow to enhance shared understanding, learning, and decision

making.

leadership

The activity of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the

mission and improve the organization. (ADP 6-22)

*mission command

(Army) The Army’s approach to command and control that empowers subordinate decision making

and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation.

*mission orders

Directives that emphasize to subordinates the results to be attained, not how they are to achieve them.

multinational operations

A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually

undertaken within the structure of the coalition or alliance. (JP 3-16)

network transport

A system of systems including the people, equipment, and facilities that provide end-to-end

communications connectivity for network components. (FM 6-02)

operational approach

A broad description of the mission, operational concepts, tasks, and actions required to accomplish the

mission. (JP 5-0)

operational environment

A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of

capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (JP 3-0)

operational initiative

The setting of tempo and terms of action throughout an operation. (ADP 3-0)

operations process

The major command and control activities performed during operations: planning, preparing,

executing, and continuously assessing the operation. (ADP 5-0)

Glossary

Glossary-4 ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

priority intelligence requirement

An intelligence requirement that the commander and staff need to understand the threat and other

aspects of the operational environment. (JP 2-01)

procedures

Standard, detailed steps that prescribe how to perform specific tasks. (CJCSM 5120.01)

*relevant information

All information of importance to the commander and staff in the exercise of command and control.

running estimate

The continuous assessment of the current situation used to determine if the current operation is

proceeding according to the commander’s intent and if planned future operations are supportable.

(ADP 5-0)

*situational understanding

The product of applying analysis and judgment to relevant information to determine the relationships

among the operational and mission variables.

*understanding

In the context of decision making, knowledge that has been synthesized and had judgment applied to

comprehend the situation's inner relationships, enable decision making, and drive action.

unified action partners

Those military forces, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and elements of the private

sector with whom Army forces plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate during the conduct of

operations. (ADP 3-0)

unified land operations

The simultaneous execution of offense, defense, stability, and defense support of civil authorities

across multiple domains to shape operational environments, prevent conflict, prevail in large-scale

ground combat, and consolidate gains as part of unified action. (ADP 3-0)

unity of effort

Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily

part of the same command or organization, which is the product of successful unified action. (JP 1)

warfighting function

A group of tasks and systems united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish

missions and training objectives. (ADP 3-0)

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 References-1

References

All websites accessed on 17 July 2019.

REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS These documents must be available to intended users of this publication.

DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. June 2019.

ADP 1-02. Terms and Military Symbols. 14 August 2018.

RELATED PUBLICATIONS These publications are referenced in this publication.

JOINT AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PUBLICATIONS

Most joint publications are available online: http://www.jcs.mil/doctrine/.

Most DOD publications are available at the Department of Defense Issuances Web site:

https://www.esd.whs.mil/DD/.

CJCSM 5120.01A. Joint Doctrine Development Process. 29 December 2014.

JP 1. Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. 25 March 2013.

JP 2-01. Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations. 5 July 2017.

JP 3-0. Joint Operations. 17 January 2017.

JP 3-08. Interorganizational Cooperation. 12 October 2016.

JP 3-16. Multinational Operations. 1 March 2019.

JP 5-0. Joint Planning. 16 June 2017.

ARMY PUBLICATIONS

Most Army doctrinal publications are available online: https://armypubs.army.mil/.

ADP 1-01. Doctrine Primer. 31 July 2019. ADP 3-0. Operations. 31 July 2019.

ADP 5-0. The Operations Process. 31 July 2019.

ADP 6-22. Army Leadership. 31 July 2019.

ADP 7-0. Training. 31 July 2019.

AR 380-10. Foreign Disclosure and Contacts with Foreign Representatives. 14 July 2015.

AR 600-20. Army Command Policy. 6 November 2014.

ATP 2-01.3/MCRP 2-3A. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace. 1 March 2019.

ATP 3-37.34/MCTP 3-34C. Survivability Operations. 16 April 2018.

ATP 3-60. Targeting. 7 May 2015.

ATP 5-19. Risk Management. 14 April 2014.

ATP 6-0.5. Command Post Organization and Operations. 1 March 2017.

ATP 6-01.1. Techniques for Effective Knowledge Management. 6 March 2015.

ATP 6-22.5. A Leader’s Guide to Soldier Health and Fitness. 10 February 2016.

ATP 6-22.6. Army Team Building. 30 October 2015.

FM 3-0. Operations. 6 October 2017.

References

References-2 ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

FM 3-16. The Army in Multinational Operations. 8 April 2014.

FM 3-52. Airspace Control. 20 October 2016.

FM 3-55. Information Collection. 3 May 2013.

FM 6-0. Commander and Staff Organization and Operations. 5 May 2014.

FM 6-02. Signal Support to Operations. 22 January 2014.

FM 6-22. Leader Development. 30 June 2015.

FM 27-10. The Law of Land Warfare. 18 July 1956.

OBSOLETE PUBLICATIONS

This section contains references to obsolete historical doctrine. The Archival and Special Collections

in the Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) on Fort Leavenworth in Kansas contains

copies. These publications are obsolete doctrine publications referenced for citations only.

Field Service Regulation (obsolete). Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1905.

FM 100-5. Tentative Field Service Regulations, Operations. (obsolete) Washington DC: Government

Printing Office, 1939.

FM 100-5. Field Service Regulations: Operations (obsolete).Washington DC: Government Printing

Office, 1941.

TRADOC Pam 525-100-1, Leadership and Command on the Battlefield: Operations JUST CAUSE

and DESERT STORM (obsolete) Fort Monroe, VA: HQ, TRADOC, 1992.

OTHER PUBLICATIONS

Allied Tactical Publication 3.2.2. Command and Control of Allied Land Forces. 15 December 2016.

Bradley, General of the Army Omar N. “Leadership: An Address to the US Army War College, 7

October, 1971.” Parameters 1 (3) (1972): 8.

Carland, John M. Combat Operations: Stemming the Tide, May 1965 to October 1966. Center of

Military History Publication 91-5, The United States Army in Vietnam. Washington, DC:

Center of Military History, U.S. Army: GPO, 2000.

Carver, Field Marshal Richard. ADP AC 71940, Land Operations. Bristol, United Kingdom: Land

Warfare Development Centre, 2017.

Clausewitz, Carl von. On War, trans. and ed. M. Howard and P. Paret. Boston, MA: Princeton

University Press, 2004.

Connor, William M. “Establishing Command Intent, a Case Study: The Encirclement of the Ruhr,

March 1945” in The Human in Command: Exploring The Modern Military Experience, ed.

Carol McCann and Ross Pigeau. Toronto, Canada: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Press, 2000.

Doughty, Robert A. The Breaking Point, Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940. Hamden, CT: The Shoe

String Press INC, 1990.

Fuller, J.F. C. Infantry in Battle. Washington, DC: The Infantry Journal, Incorporated, 1939. Reprint,

Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College: GPO, 1981.

Grant Ulysses S. Ulysses S. Grant, Memoirs and Selected Letters: Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant,

Selected Letters, 1839-1865, vol. 2, ed. William S. McFeely and Mary Drake McFeely. New

York, NY: Library of America, 1990.

Hamilton, General Sir Ian. The Soul and Body of an Army. London, United Kingdom: Edward Arnold

& CO. 1921.

Heinl, Colonel Robert Debs Jr. Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations. Annapolis, MD: U.S.

Naval Institute, 1966.

King, Fleet Admiral Ernest J. CINCLANT Serial 053, 21 January 1941.

https://www.usnwc.edu/Portals/16/PCO%20Alumni%20Content/ADM-King-Serial-

053.pdf?ver=2017-10-23-121408-920.

Klein, Gary. Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1999.

References

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 References-3

Lamb, Harold. ed. Genghis Khan: The Emperor of All Men. New York: Robert McBride, 1927; reprint,

New York: Doubleday, 1956.

Liddell Hart, B.H. Strategy, 2d rev. ed. Toronto, Canada: Meridian, 1991.

Marshall, George C. Selected Speeches and Statements of General of the Army George C. Marshall,

ed. H.A. DeWeerd. Washington, D.C.: The Infantry Journal, 1945.

Mastriano, Douglas V. “Thunder in the Argonne! SGT Alvin York and Mission Command,” Infantry.

Fort Benning, GA: U.S. Army Infantry School. July–September 2015.

Moltke, Helmuth von, Moltke’s Military Works, Vol. 4, War Lessons, Part I, “Operative Preparations

for Battle,” trans. Harry Bell, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Service Schools, 1916.

Nye, Logan. “How the ‘Little Groups of Paratroopers’ Became Airborne Legends,” We Are the

Mighty, 8 April 2016. http://freerepublic.com/focus/f-chat/3535576/posts?page=12.

Patton, General George S. Military Essays and Articles by George S. Patton, Jr. General, U.S. Army

02605 1885 – 1945. ed. Charles M. Province. San Diego, California: The George S. Patton, Jr.

Historical Society, 2002. http://www.pattonhq.com/pdffiles/vintagetext.pdf.

Patton, General George S. War as I Knew It. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1947.

Perkins, Lieutenant General David G. “Mission Command: Reflections from the Combined Arms

Commander,” Army Magazine, Volume 62. June 2012. 32

Ridgway, Matthew B. Soldier: Memoirs of Matthew B Ridgway. New York, NY: Harper, 1956;

reprinted by Andesite Press, 2017.

Rommel, Field Marshal Erwin. The Rommel Papers. ed. B.H. Liddell Hart. New York, NY: Harcourt,

Brace, 1953.

Schwarzkopf, General Norman H. quoted by Johnson, Erin. “Schwarzkopf Speaks of Leadership at

Symposium.” The Daily Universe. 21 October 2001.

https://universe.byu.edu/2001/10/11/schwarzkopf-speaks-of-leadership-at-symposium.

Simonds, Commandant, Closing Exercises, Canadian Junior War Staff Course, CHHQ Report # 22.

London, England. 24 April 1941. https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-

defence/services/military-history/history-heritage/official-military-history-

lineages/reports.html.

Simpkin, Richard E. and John Erickson. Deep Battle: The Brainchild of Marshal Tukhachevskii.

London: Brassey’s Defence, 1987, 150.

Slim, Field-Marshall Viscount William Joseph. Defeat into Victory: Battling Japan in Burma and

India, 1942–1945. London: Casell, 1956; reprint New York, NY: Cooper Square Press, 2000.

Slim, Field-Marshall Viscount William Joseph. Unofficial History. New York, NY: Orion Publishing

Group, 1962.

Truppen Fuhrung: German Field Regulations, Volume 1. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Command and

General Staff School Press. 1935.

http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p4013coll7/id/131.

Wavell Field-Marshal Earl, Soldiers and Soldiering or Epithets of War. Oxford, United Kingdom:

Alden Press, 1953.

PRESCRIBED FORMS This section contains no entries.

REFERENCED FORMS Unless otherwise indicated, DA forms are available on the Army Publishing Directorate Website:

https://armypubs.army.mil/.

DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.

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31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 Index-1

Index

Entries are by paragraph number.

A

accept subordinates’ risk taking and errors, 2-87–2-90

act, make timely decisions and, 2-117–2-121

adaptability, encourage, 3-63– 3-65

allocating resources, 4-82

allow subordinates maximum freedom of decision and action, 3-49–3-53

analytic decision making, 2-24– 2-25

applications, end-user, 4-42–4-43

Army team building, defined, 2-95

Army’s primary mission, 1-8

assess, 2-80–2-81 subordinates, 2-114–2-116

assessing operations, 4-60

assist subordinate commanders, staffs, and units, 4-21

authority, 2-6–2-7 delegate, 2-39–2-41 delegation of, 4-14

B

build mutual trust and shared understanding, 2-91 teams, 2-94–2-98

building and maintaining situational understanding, 4-56–4-58

C

capacity, 4-69

chain of command, defined, 4-79

channels, of communication, 3-39–3-40

characteristics of good staff members, 4-25

combat power, defined, 1-96

command, 1-80–1-84, 2-1–2-123 defined, 1-80 elements of, 2-5

guides to effective, 2-82–2-121 nature of, 2-1–2-4 presence, 2-57–2-58 seconds in, 4-7–4-15 succession of, 4-12–4-13

command and control, 1-74–1-94 defined, 1-74 domain considerations, 1-93–

1-94 in multinational environments,

1-91–1-92 organizing for, 4-75–4-92 relationship between, 1-77–

1-90 train subordinates in, 2-103–

2-116 warfighting function,

command and control system, 4-1–4-93 command posts, 1-106 defined, 1-100, 4-1–4-74 networks in, 1-105 people in, 1-101 processes in, 1-102–1-104

command and control warfighting function, defined, 1-98 tasks, 1-99

command and support relationships, 4-80–4-81

command climate, create a positive, 2-83–2-86

command post, defined, 4-50

command post administration, performing, 4-62

command posts, 4-50–4-62 in command and control

system, 1-106 organization and employment

considerations, 4-63–4-74

command sergeants major, 4-16

commander, location of the, 2-59– 2-66 support the, 4-18–4-20 temporary absence of, 4-11

commander’s critical information requirement, 3-20–3-25 defined, 3-20

commander’s intent, 1-45–1-51

defined, 1-45

commander’s visualization, defined, 2-75

commanders, 4-5–4-6 role in operations, 2-67–2-81

common operational picture, create, maintain and disseminate the, 3-54–3-60 defined, 3-54

common staff duties and responsibilities, 4-24

communicate with subordinates, 2-92–2-93

communication, 3-34–3-41 channels of, 3-39–3-40 structure of, 3-41

competence, 1-27–1-29

conducting, foreign disclosure, 4-53–4-55 information management,

4-53–4-55 knowledge management,

4-53–4-55

continuity, 4-67–4-68

control, 1-85–1-90 3-1–3-66 defined, 1-85 elements of, 3-7–3-41 guides to effective, 3-48–3-65 levels of, 1-24–1-25 nature of, 3-1–3-6 span of, 4-83–4-85

control measure, defined, 3-42

control measures, 3-42–3-47

controlling operations, 4-59

coordinating with internal and external organizations, 4-61

create a positive command climate, 2-83–2-86

create, maintain and disseminate the common operational picture, 3-54–3-60

critical and creative thinking, 2-21–2-23

cumulative risk, 2-35

Index

Entries are by paragraph number.

Index-2 ADP 6-0 31 July 2019

D

data, and information services , 4-44–4-45 defined, 2-15

decentralized execution, 1-21– 1-23

decision making, 2-10–2-49 analytic, 2-24–2-25 intuitive, 2-26–2-29 subordinate, 1-17–1-20

degraded environments, 4-89– 4-92

delegate authority, 2-39–2-41

delegation of authority, 4-14

deputies of joint and multinational forces, 4-15

describe, 2-77

design layout, 4-65

direct, 2-78 the staff, 2-48–2-49

direction, 3-9–3-10

disciplined initiative, 1-59–1-65

dispersion, 4-71

domain, command and control considerations, 1-93–1-94

dynamic, nature, 1-4–1-5

E

effectiveness, 4-64–4-69

elements of command, 2-5 of control, 3-7–3-41

encourage, adaptability, 3-63– 3-65 flexibility, 3-63–3-65

end state, 1-48

end-user applications, 4-42–4-43

ensure unity of effort, 2-99–2-102

environments, degraded, 4-89– 4-92

essential element of friendly information, 3-23

execution, decentralized, 1-21– 1-23

external organizations, coordinating with, 4-61

F

feedback, 3-11–3-13

flexibility, encourage, 3-63–3-65

foreign disclosure, conducting, 4-53–4-55

friendly force information requirement, defined, 3-22

G

good staff members, characteristics of, 4-25

graphic control measure, defined, 3-44

graphics, use correct, 3-61–3-62

guides, to effective command, 2-82–2-121 to effective control, 3-48–3-65

guides to organizing for command and control, 4-75–4-92

H

human endeavor, 1-3

I

identify, mitigate, and accept risk, 2-33–2-38

inform units and organizations outside the headquarters, 4-22– 4-23

information, 3-14–3-33 defined, 2-16

information management, conducting, 4-53–4-55 defined, 3-29

information services and data, 4-44–4-45

integrity, unit, 4-86–4-88

internal organizations, coordinating with, 4-61

introduction to mission command, 1-1–1-110

intuitive decision making, 2-26– 2-29

J

joint forces, deputies of, 4-15

judgment, 2-30–2-49

K

key tasks, defined, 1-47

knowledge, defined, 2-17

knowledge management, 3-26– 3-33 conducting, 4-53–4-55 defined, 3-26

L

layout, design, 4-65

lead, 2-79

leader qualities, promote, 2-110– 2-113

leadership, 2-50–2-66 defined, 2-50

levels of control, 1-24–1-25

liaison officers, 4-29–4-32

location of the commander, 2-59– 2-66

M

make timely decisions and act, 2-117–2-121

mission, Army’s primary, 1-8

mission command, 1-13–1-25 defined, 1-14 introduction to, 1-1–1-110 principles of, 1-26–1-69 subordinates in , 1-70–1-73 train subordinates in the

application of, 2-103–2-116

mission orders, 1-52–1-58 defined, 1-53

mission variables, 3-18–3-19

mobility, 4-74

multinational environments, command and control in, 1-91– 1-92

multinational forces, deputies of, 4-15

multinational operations, defined, 1-91

mutual trust, 1-30–1-35 build, 2-91

N

nature, dynamic, 1-4–1-5 of command, 2-1–2-4 of operations, 1-1–1-6 uncertain, 1-4–1-5 of control, 3-1–3-6

network transport, defined, 4-46 and management, 4-46–4-49

networks, 4-40–4-41 in command and control

system, 1-105

O

officers, liaison, 4-29–4-32

operational approach, defined, 2-76

operational environment, defined, 1-9

operational initiative, defined, 1-61

operational variables, 3-17

operations, assessing, 4-60 controlling, 4-59 nature of, 1-1–1-6 the role of commanders in, 2-

67–2-81 unified land, 1-7–1-12

Index

Entries are by paragraph number.

31 July 2019 ADP 6-0 Index-3

operations process, defined, 2-68

organization and employment considerations, command posts, 4-63–4-74

organizing for command and control, 4-75–4-92

P

people, in the command and control system, 1-101 4-4–4-49

performing command post administration, 4-62

political purpose, 1-6

presence, command, 2-57–2-58

principles of mission command, 1-26–1-69

prioritize resources, 2-42–2-47

priority intelligence requirement, defined, 3-21

processes, in the command and control system, 4-33–4-39 1-102–1-104

promote leader qualities, 2-110– 2-113

Q-R

redundancy, 4-73

relationship between command and control, 1-77–1-90

relationships, command and support, 4-80–4-81 staff, 4-26–4-28

relevant information, defined, 3-14

resources, allocating, 4-82 prioritize, 2-42–2-47

responsibility, 2-8–29