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PROFESSIONALISM VS. DEMOCRACY: FRIEDRICH VS. FINER REVISITED Author(s): DEBRA W. STEWART Source: Public Administration Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 1 (SPRING, 1985), pp. 13-25 Published by: SPAEF Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41575704 Accessed: 25-04-2018 17:42 UTC

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PROFESSIONALISM VS. DEMOCRACY

FRIEDRICH VS. FINER REVISITED

DEBRA W. STEWART North Carolina State University

INTRODUCTION

As a professional field, public administration has yet to come to terms with tension reflected in the classic debate between

Carl Friedrich and Herman Finer on the role of professionalism versus democratic accountability in guiding public adminis- trative decision-making. (Friedrich, 1940; Finer, 1941) As public service claims position in the ranks of the other developed professions (law, medicine, etc.), it continues to be visited by the partisans of accountability and responsiveness who demand adherence to the popular will over the fellowship of the profession.

This article addresses the implications of strict adherence either to the principle of democratic accountability or the principle of professionalism as the sole principle informing administrative decision-making. The thesis developed is that, while each emphasis plays a role in ensuring bureaucratic accountability neither is adequate to guide the manager through the ethical quandries he or she confronts. The debate between Friedrich and Finer assumed that the standards of

judgment are external to the personal morality of the decision- maker , While it is true that certain external criteria impinge, the ultimate expression of administrative judgment is individual and personal. Hence, this article suggests that accommodation of these two perspectives within the professional field of public administration can only be reached within the context of the

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current thinking about management ethics in the public sector. A review of Carl Friedriche and Herman Finer' s theses sets

the framework for this analysis. Then current implications of these two paths to securing bureaucratic accountability are explored. Finally, the place of individual moral analysis and judgment in contemporary administrative decision-making is considered.

THE FRIEDRICH-FINER DEBATE

The debate between Carl Friedrich and Herman Finer in the

1930s and 1940s constitute a classic public administration scholarly exchange. Confronting the reality of bureaucratic power and looking to the emerging technocratic culture foreshadowed in an America preparing for war, Carl Friedrich saw flaws in the strict interpretation of administrative responsi- bility. In Friedrich' s view, administrative responsibility was much more comprehensive in scope than simply executing policies already formulated. 4 'Public policy/ ' he suggested, "is a continuous process, the formulation of which is inseparable from its execution/ ' (Friedrich, 1940:225) Because the administrator in the complex organizational world emerging in the 1940s commanded a degree of technical knowledge not accessible to the general public, ' 'responsibility' ' came to take on a new and different meaning. While responsible adminis- trators must remain responsive to popular sentiment, it was the scrutiny of colleagues in the "fellowship of science" that gave force to the term "responsibility" as fellow professionals oversaw the implementation of technical knowledge.

Friedrich' s thought resonates today in our discussion of public administration professionalism. The nature of a profession is to apply a specialized knowledge in the service of a designated clientele. (Goldman, 1980:33) Here the normative foundation of work derives from the requirements and the mandates of the profession.

In response to Friedrich' s redefinition of administrative responsibility as responsibility to the "fellowship of science," Finer charged that such notions obscured the very meaning of responsibility in a political context. He argued, "... There is no

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responsibility unless there is an obligation to someone else; no one is interested in a question of responsibility as a relationship between man and a science, but as it involves a problem of duty- and the problem of duty is an interpersonal, not a personal, matter." (Finer, 1941:269) "Responsibility in the sense of an interpersonal, externally sanctioned duty is, then, the dominant consideration for public administration." (Ibid.) Finer argued that focus should be on ensuring that the mechanisms for securing continuing responsiveness of adminis- trative professionals are in place and functioning.

This classic exchange resurfaces regularly in our literature, suggesting that neither position was sufficiently persuasive to settle the difference of opinion on how to control bureaucratic behavior. On balance, it is probably fair to say that most political scientists have found Friedrich' s position more compatible with the reality they observe and with the requirements of the modern state. (Sigelman and Vanderbok, 1978:442) Broad theories about representative bureaucracy have been built on Friedrich's assumption. (Mosher, 1968; Long, 1952) Still, echoing the Finer tradition, emphatic demands to heightened accountability by curbing administrative discretion recur in the literature. (Lowi, 1969:7)

Some scholars claim the time has come to lay this debate to rest; that both professional (Friedrich) and institutional (Finer) controls must be present for administrative responsibility to be assured. (Meier, 1975:542) But this response, while reasonable and not untrue, is inadequate because it fails to indicate how each source of advice should be utilized. The argument to be presented here is that simplu striking the right balance between professionalism and accountability is not enough. In some situations, neither gives adequate direction for administrative action. In the following paragraphs, the author analyzes each principle in terms of its implications when given emphasis in the current environment of administrative decision-making.

ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS

Herman Finer saw two options available to the architects of

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administrative practice in the early 1940s: either public servants would decide their own course or their course of action would be

decided by a body outside themselves. (Finer, 1941:249) He stood for the proposition that public administrators should not decide their own course. Finer' s perspective did not imply a dim view of the character of public administrators. He acknowledged that government might well be staffed with good people. But he warned that 4 'we must beware of the too good men as the too bad, [for] each in his own way might give the public what it doesn't want. ' ' Finer advocated a world in which public officials would be responsible to the elected representatives of the public who would determine the course of action of the public servant to the most minute degree that is technically feasible. (Ibid.) Adherence to these details of the the prescribed course of action would be secured through courts and disciplinary controls within agencies and through the authority exercised over officials by politically accountable ministries. (Finer, 1941) According to Finer, the challenge was simply to ensure that these controls worked by implementation strategies which would leave little room for managerial missteps.

Judged from a contemporary standpoint, the problem with Finer' s blueprint for accountability is that it requires elaborate institutional controls to ensure that the various courses of action mandated by the public are uniformly implemented. However, in a pluralistic system the institutionalization of particular controls in the service of one set of goals often makes it impossible to achieve other equally important goals for which an agency is held accountable. Personnel practices in the public sector best illustrate this problem.

The merit system in public employment was developed as part of a reform movement which aimed to purify a government riddled by patronage and corruption by making merit selection the avenue for advancement. Current advocates for merit practices argue that 4 'the merit method has no substitute in providing the conditions of competence and continuity that are essential to the operation of complex administrative machines of modern government." (Stahl, 1971:41) Today, our civil service systems with their emphases on a battery of competitive examinations and established vertical advancement practices

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represent an effort to institutionalize ' 'merit" principles in selection for government employment and promotion. [1] Certainly these strategies further attainment of the original

objectives. As Mosher (1968:203-204) notes, merit systems achieve their purposes by eliminating many irrelevant con- siderations (family ties, party identification, etc.) in assessing an employee and by measuring the relative capability to perform a specific type of work. The whole Civil Service reform movement represents the development and implementation of strategies designed to ensure that elected officials can remain accountable for the programs and the policies they promise by employing a neutrally competent group of civil servants standing ready to carry out politicial mandates. The problem is that, in an effort to secure accountability on this front, we have developed a system for selection and promotion which sometimes inhibits achieving other goals for which the public sector CEO is also accountable.

Juxtaposing civil service systems with affirmative action pleins best, illustrates this point. In recent years public sector jurisdictions around the country have expressed a firm commit- ment to EEO as a basic tenet of government practice and increasingly are held accountable for making good on their commitment. Through the courts, through affirmative action committees and plans, and through the commitment of top administrators, the policy goal of gaining equal representation of women and minorities at all levels of government organization is advanced. Progress, however, is often inhibited by the institutional expression of the merit principle. The case of New York State best illustrates this point.

New York has made a strong commitment to achieving equal employment opportunity in public sector employment while at the same time preserving a highly institutionalized state civil service system. In New York State the typical promotion process involves four seperate stages:

1.The establishment of a set of criteria for eligibility to compete for a promotion;

2. The competitive examination process; 3. The canvassing of candidates to determine if they want to

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be considered to fill an existing vacancy; and 4. The selection of an individual from the pool of the top three

candidates who have expressed an interest in the job. (Steinberg, 1981:2-3)

This process is the institutional expression of merit selection. It is designed to curb managerial discretion to hire less competent persons and thus to ensure that top elected officials can be held accountable for enacting their programs through the competent efforts of neutral civil servants.

Adherence to this process, however, often prevents top elected officials from achieving their public commitment to equal employment opportunity. Ronnie Steinberg's (1981) careful study of the impact of the Civil Service system in New York found that both eligibility requirements and the rule of three constituted institutional barriers to the advancement of

women and minorities in state government. Eligibility to compete for managerial jobs requires incumbency in job titles held by low numbers of women and minorities and restricting the hiring officials to consider only the top three candidates limit opportunity even further. This dilemma described in New York is echoed in public jurisdictions around the country where political leaders attempt to achieve EEO objectives through civil service procedures.

Ensuring democratic accountability in administrative practice by spelling out to a minute degree the way a goal is to be achieved works in a system where goals are rank-ordered and non-competitive. But in complex organizations, guided by multiple and conflicting goals, the logic of Finer' s approach leads to developing parallel sets of institutional requirements to see that all goals are achieved. The purpose of one set of implementation strategies may be to combat the effects of another. Many affirmative action programs with reporting requirements for goals and time tables are designed with this logic in mind.

However, and this author (Stewart, 1984) has argued elsewhere, the effect of this approach, institutionalizing procedures to serve competing goals and exacting high account- ability from managers in attempting these goals, turns

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managers into referees of process and often results in signficiant goal displacement from the point of view of the public policies at stake. While accountability is central in any democratic system, Finer's strategies for achieving it ultimately hold administrators accountable for monitoring processes rather than achieving ends. Since processes, driven by significant value thrusts, inevitably conflict, Finer' s solution seems inadequate for a complex administrative system riddled with competing claims.

ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH PROFESSIONALISM

But, if Finer fails us, what of Friedrich' s notion of profession- alism as a check on the arbitrary and irresponsible behavior of administrative officials? Does the standard Friedrich offers, insisting that individual officials act in a way consistent with the highest requirements of scientific work (Friedrich, 1940:245), provide a satisfactory solution?

The first task in answering the above questions is to decide if public servants an* sufficiently ''professionalized" for Fried- rich's notion to be broadly applicable. Friedrich's (1940:233) rationale seemed to envisage a mature professionalism in which standards of conduct would be clearly articulated by the profession and deviation from these standards subjected to thorough scrutiny by fellow professionals. While many public service rolet ^eet this standard, some clearly do not. Using Mosher's (1968:106) categories, the "general professions" (law, medicine, engineering) represented in public service as well as the "public service professions" (corrections officials, social workers, teachers; fully merit the "profession" label. In each case the professional officials follows the objectives of a professionally formed conscience, a conscience which is given shape by professionally defined frameworks for viewing, stating, and resolving problems.

In contrast, public management professions (personnel managers, budget officers, purchasing officers, etc.), termed by Mosher as "emergent," fall shon of meeting all the require- ments for membership in the professional club. Certainly these occupational groups sire becoming established professions by

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systematizing the body of knowledge and theory in their field, by establishing professional journals, by requiring specialized higher education, by offering a lifetime career to its members, and by continuing efforts to establish rules of ethics. (Mosher, 1968:106; Kline, 1982:277) It seems just a matter of time until these groups reach a level of maturity that would confer the full rights to self-regulation enjoyed by the established professions. But in order to create the best case for analysis of Friedrich' s

contribution to solving our problem of accountability in democracy, we consider only the established professions. The argument is that public accountability is achieved through professional public servants who, under strict scrutiny of peers, apply a specialized body of knowledge in the interests of their clientele. Even in this narrow context, does adherence to professionally defined guidelines solve our problems? Does it provide the kind of framework for administrative decision- making that will satisfy the demands for accountability in our political system?

There are two difficulties with turning to professionalism as the solution to the problem of bureaucratic accountability. First, the professional response cannot be assumed to be coterminous with the right response in all situations and, second, in some situations behavior called for by professionals is not congruent with that mandated by personal moral judgment. Two brief examples will illustrate these problems.

Recently, in a middle-sized southern city, the press clashed with medical professionals when a severely mentally disturbed child hung himself in a local detention center. The child's mother had tried to commit him several days earlier to the community mental hospital and had been turned away by the resident medical professionals because they were not staffed to handle such severe cases. The doctors in charge were striving to cure the patients currently in the hospital and felt that to add a severely disturbed child to this environment would diminish their ability to cure the less disturbed patients they already had. Their professional mores directed them to cure the sick but to do so had to deny admission to this particular child who was very sick indeed.

While this response might be professionally appropriate, it

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was, from the point of view of the mother and the press, cruel and irresponsible. After the child committed suicide in the detention center where he was placed, the press charged that unbridled professionalism invites such violations of the public interest. Critics alleged that, because doctors need successes, they often create programs which serve narrow and more easily treatable populations. They acknowledged that medical profes- sionals need to succeed a reasonable percentage of the time both for their own self image and because, when competing for funds within a public bureaucracy, they need to demonstrate accomplishment. But they charged that professional judgment in this context violated the public interest. The second case describes a situation where a professional

norm dictates action in conflict with the personal moral judgment of the professional. A man with a distinguished record in the corrections field became warden of a large state prison in the midwest. Moving from a non-capital punishment state to one where capital punishment was the law, the new warden inherited supervision of two women on death row. About six months into the warden's tenure, one of the death row inmates entered into the last stage of her appeal process. The warden had always been very professional and objective about the disposition of particular cases. He had always firmly supported enforcement of the law as enacted by the legislature and applied by the courts. In the abstract he had no problem with the death penalty; however, in this situation he became increasingly uneasy about being part of a system that would end the life of the woman he had come to know.

The woman was generally recognized as a mainstay of the social support system in the prison. She served as a counselor, even a mother figure for many young offenders. Though she seemed personally reconciled to her fate, she was making a significant contribution to enhancing the quality of prison life. She had become a new person in prison; execution of this person seemed unnecessary and wrong. Yet, the professional code of corrections administration offered the warden no help in sorting through the dilemma he faced. On the contrary, it denied the legitimacy of the moral qualms he was experiencing.

These two cases point out the two principal problems with

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relying on ' 'professionalism' ' to secure bureaucratic account- ability. First, the rules and standards which determine the validity of professional judgment are themselves subject to a kind of political determination and contro . (Harmon, 1974:13) In the case of the director of medical services who turned away the mortally ill child, the line between professional judgment and personal and organizational requirements appears to have been blurred in this decision. Such blurring challenges Friedrich' s belief that the professional bridle achieves bureau- cratic accountability.

The second problem with finding solace in the concept of professionalism is philosophical in nature. Professional ethics, the appeal to special norms and principles to override normal moral judgment, is only acceptable if the effect on the character of the professional is not too detrimental. (Goldman, 1980) The effect would be too detrimental if a professional norm caused serious conscious problems for the morally sensitive professional or if it promoted a justified insensitivity to moral rights. Our case of the warden about to supervise the execution of an inmate convicted of a capital crime illustrates the first point. His own moral judgment surfaced to demand attention along with the dictates of his professional code. While adherence to the code seemed professionally right, he continued to be plagued by moral qualms. In contrast, the medical director example demonstrates how a professional norm might generalize to a global insensitivity to moral considerations. (Goldman, 1980:32) Taken together, it appears that the power of professionalism as the solution to the problem of bureaucratic accountability is eroded by the reality of organizational intrusion on professional norms and by the ethical quandaries entailed in displacing personal moral judgment of the professional.

MORAL ANALYSIS AND

BUREAUCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY

Carl Friedrich and Herman Finer joined issue over a problem with no simple solution. Resolution lies in abandoning the hope to find a conclusion in one position or the other, or even both. Frederick Mosher (1968), writing in the Friedrich tradition, is

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right in describing professionalism as the most significant characteristic of the public service today. This inevitably means professionally defined ways of viewing and solving problems. But to acknowledge this is not to minimize the chilling effect of bureaucratic autonomy on democracy. Theodore Lowi (1979: 304), voicing the Finer perspective, may also be right in his critique that broad administrative discretion in pluralist political systems impairs the rational ordering of public policy and the routinization of practice. Pluralist politics might do a disservice to society by the extent to which it makes a politician out of a bureaucrat. Perhaps it would be better if we could force resolution of competing claims upward where dispute would be most susceptible to public scrutiny. (Ibid.) But from the point of view of the administrator on the front line, effort to curb administrative discretion often result in institutionalizing procedures to serve the goals of competing interests. In this context the manager becomes merely a manager of process whose success is measured by his/her alacrity in monitoring processes rather than achieving ends. (Stewart, 1984:17) It is not only foolish to build a system which is increasingly staffed by professionals so that it rewards incapacity for judgment, it can also lead to significant goal displacement from the vantage point of the organized interest at stake. (Ibid.)

It seems that both autonomous public servants, constrained principally by their professional norms, and loyal bureaucrats, rigidly monitoring rules, fail to provide the answer to questions of accountability. But a promising answer is found in the recent work on management ethics. The present article proposes that the public interest is best served by a system of administration in which those with operational responsibility for making hard choices among competing claims are also charged with the value analysis that supports those choices. (Stewart, 1984:18) Casting the public administrator as a moral analyst may bring resolution to the Friedrich-Finer debate.

Douglas Yates (1982:17) suggests the context in which values analysis might be set. According to Yates, proper bureaucratic control can be achieved by requiring bureaucrats to provide an open, public accounting of the valuative basis of their decisions on significant policy issues. Yates cites the example of the

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Secretary of Transportation, William Coleman, who, at the time of the controversy over whether the Concorde could land at Kennedy Airport, provided the public with a careful analysis of the legal, environmental, and political values involved. By providing full accounting of this weighing of relevant values, Coleman provided the basis for a broader public debate about the competing claims inherent in the policy dispute. He also gave the citizens an opportunity to see what kinds of values were driving decisions of the policy-maker. (Yates, 1982) Explicit analysis of values behind bureaucratic decisions is

the bridge which would link Finer' s requirement for bureau- cratic accountability with Friedrich' s claim for professional autonomy. Formal controls and sanctions as well as professional norms and codes are essential to ensure effective control of

administrative decision-making. (Meier, 1975:542) But to gain full benefit as well as protect against limitations of each, a finely honed capacity for moral analysis and judgment must occupy the interstitial zone between Finer and Friedrich.

CONCLUSION

Public servants need an ethical framework for representing the values and norms of their professions as well as for responding to legitimate demands for democratic accountability. Elsewhere (Stewart, 1984) the author has proposed one ethical framework which calls for systematic analysis of stakeholder interests and sensitive reflection on injury done to some interests by active service to others. While detailed discussion of this framework is not fitting here, the author would argue that this or some other conceptual apparatus is essential to bridge the gap between the equally legitimate values of professionalism and democracy expressed in the Finer-Friedrich debate.

NOTES

l.The decentralization of the merit system triggered by the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 in the federal sector has addressed only the level at which the merit system should be implemented, not the substance of the system itself.

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REFERENCES

Finer, Herman (1941). "Administrative Responsibility in Democratic Government." Public Administration Review 1, 4:335-350; reprinted in Peter Woll (ed.). Public Administration and Public Policy. New York: Harper Torch Books, 1966.

Friedrich, Carl J. (1940). "The Nature of Administrative Responsibility. Public Policy 1:3-24; reprinted in Peter Woll (ed.). Public Administration and Public Policy. New York: Harper Torch Books, 1966.

Goldman, Alan H. The Moral Foundations of Professional Ethics. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Little field.

Harman, Michael (1974). "Motivation and Organizational Democracy." Public Administration Review 34 (January): 11-18.

Kline, Elliot H. (1981). "To Be A Professional." Southern Review of Public Admin- istration 5, 3:258-281.

Long, Morton (1952). "Bureaucracy and Constitutionalism." American Political Science Review 46 (September) :808-818.

Lowi, Theodore J. (1969). The End of Liberalism. New York: W.W. Norton. Meier, Kenneth John (1975). "Representative Democracy." American Political

Science Review 69 (June):526-542. Mosher, Frederick C. (1968). Democracy and the Public Service. New York: Oxford

University Press. Sigelman, Lee and William Vanderbok (1978). "The Saving Grace? Bureaucratic

Power and American Democracy." Polity 10:440-445. Stahl, O. Glenn (1971). Public Personnel Administration, 6th ed. New York: Harper

and Row.

Steinberg, Ronnie (1981). "Barriers to Advancement." Paper presented for a conference on "Overcoming Barriers to Advancement for Women" at the University of Pittsburgh, September 19.

Stewart, Debra (1984). "Managing Competing Claims: An Ethical Framework for Human Resource Decision Making." Public Administration Review 44, 1:14-22.

Yates, Douglas (1982). Bureaucratic Democracy . Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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  • Contents
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  • Issue Table of Contents
    • Public Administration Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 1 (SPRING, 1985) pp. 1-121
      • Front Matter
      • CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE [pp. 2-3]
      • SYMPOSIUM: Public Administration Professionalism: Has it A Future? Part II
        • WHO JOINS PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS: A PREDICTIVE MODEL [pp. 4-12]
        • PROFESSIONALISM VS. DEMOCRACY: FRIEDRICH VS. FINER REVISITED [pp. 13-25]
        • THE LIMITS OF PROFESSIONALISM [pp. 26-46]
        • CPM--PROFESSIONALIZING PROFESSIONALISM [pp. 47-54]
        • CREDENTIALING PUBLIC MANAGERS: COST OF AMATEURS TOO HIGH [pp. 55-83]
      • BUDGETARY THEORY AND LOCAL AIR POLLUTION CONTROL PROGRAMS [pp. 84-104]
      • RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT NOTES
        • EPA FUNDING REDUCTIONS: CALCULATING THE IMPACT [pp. 105-115]
      • BOOK REVIEWS
        • Review: untitled [pp. 116-118]
        • Review: untitled [pp. 119-121]
      • Back Matter