Fan
lance5600
Preface
My purpose in this study is to clarify the function of climate as
a factor within the structure of human existence. So my problem
is not that of the ordering of man's life by his natural.environment.
Natural environment is usually understood as a n objective extension
of "human climate" regarded as a concrete basis. But when we come
to consider the relationship between this and human life, the latter
is already objectified, with the result that we find ourselves examin-
ing the relation between object and object, and there is no link with
subjective human existence. I t is the latter that is my concern here,
for it is essential to my position that the phenomena of climate are
treated as expressions of subjective human existence and not of natural
environment. I should like at the outset to register my protest against
this confusion.
I t was in the early summer of 1927 when I was reading Heideg-
ger's Zein u n d Seit i n Berlin that I first came to reflect o n the problem
of climate. I found myself intrigued by the attempt to treat the
structure of man's existence in terms of time but I found i t hard to
see why, when time had thus been made to play a part i n the struc-
ture of subjective existence, at the same juncture space also was not
postulated as part of the basic structure of existence. Indeed it would
be a mistake to allege that space is never taken into account in
Heidegger's thinking, for Lebendige Natur was given fresh life by
the German Romantics, yet even so it tended to be almost obscured
in the face of the strong glare to which time was exposed. I perceived
that herein lay the limitations of Heidegger's work, for time not linked
with space is not time in the true sense and Heidegger stopped short
at this point because his Dasein was the Dasein of the individual
or.:y. H e created human existence as bring the existence of a man.
Fr-?rn the standpoint of the dual structure--both individual and social-
of liuman existence, he did not advance beyond an abstraction of a
single aspect. But it is only when human existence is treated in
terms of its concrete duality that time and space are linked and that
history also (which never appears fully in Heidegger) is first revealed
in its true guise. And at the same time the connection between history
and climate becomes evident.
I t may well be that this problem presented itself to me because
it was precisely when my mind was full of a variety of impressions
about climate that I was confronted with a detailed examination of
the question of time. But again, it was precisely in that this problem
did present itself that I was made to ruminate over and to concentrate
my attention on my impressions about climate. I n this sense it would
be fair to argue that for my part it was the problems of time and
history that brought a realization of the question of climate. H a d
not these problems acted as intermediaries, my impressions of climate
woultl have stayed simply as such, mere impressions of climate. And,
in fact, the intermediary function that these considerations fulfilled
indicates the connection between climate and history.
I n the main, this work is based on notes for lectures given over
the period September 1928 to March 1929. T h i s series was given
very soon after my return from my travels outside Japan with the
result that, i n that I had no leisure to reflect in detail on the problems
of time and space in human existence, I took u p for discussion only
the consideration of climate. T h e greater part of the contents of
this book have been published piecemeal, with my original lecture
notes written u p and revised as the occasion arose, and only the last
chapter retains its basic format. From the outset, the several problems
were considered as intimately inter-related and though I am fully
conscious that there still remain considerable deficiencies, I have
vi
decided for the present to put my thoughts together and publish.
I should be gratefull for my colleagues' criticisms and suggestions.
August 1935
I have taken the opportunity of this re-edition to revise the
section o n China i n Chapter Three which was written i n 1928, when
leftist thinking was very prevalent. I have eliminated traces of leftist
theory a n d now present this chapter as a pure study of climate.
November 1943
vii
or.:y. H e created human existence as bring the existence of a man.
Fr-?rn the standpoint of the dual structure--both individual and social-
of liuman existence, he did not advance beyond an abstraction of a
single aspect. But it is only when human existence is treated in
terms of its concrete duality that time and space are linked and that
history also (which never appears fully in Heidegger) is first revealed
in its true guise. And at the same time the connection between history
and climate becomes evident.
I t may well be that this problem presented itself to me because
it was precisely when my mind was full of a variety of impressions
about climate that I was confronted with a detailed examination of
the question of time. But again, it was precisely in that this problem
did present itself that I was made to ruminate over and to concentrate
my attention on my impressions about climate. I n this sense it would
be fair to argue that for my part it was the problems of time and
history that brought a realization of the question of climate. H a d
not these problems acted as intermediaries, my impressions of climate
woultl have stayed simply as such, mere impressions of climate. And,
in fact, the intermediary function that these considerations fulfilled
indicates the connection between climate and history.
I n the main, this work is based on notes for lectures given over
the period September 1928 to March 1929. T h i s series was given
very soon after my return from my travels outside Japan with the
result that, i n that I had no leisure to reflect in detail on the problems
of time and space in human existence, I took u p for discussion only
the consideration of climate. T h e greater part of the contents of
this book have been published piecemeal, with my original lecture
notes written u p and revised as the occasion arose, and only the last
chapter retains its basic format. From the outset, the several problems
were considered as intimately inter-related and though I am fully
conscious that there still remain considerable deficiencies, I have
vi
decided for the present to put my thoughts together and publish.
I should be gratefull for my colleagues' criticisms and suggestions.
August 1935
I have taken the opportunity of this re-edition to revise the
section o n China i n Chapter Three which was written i n 1928, when
leftist thinking was very prevalent. I have eliminated traces of leftist
theory a n d now present this chapter as a pure study of climate.
November 1943
vii
CONTENTS
Translator's Preface ............................................................ i
....................................................................................... Preface v
CHAPTER 1 T H E BASIC PRINCIPLES OF CLIMATE ......... 1 (1) T h e Phenomena of Climate ........................... 1 (2) Climatic Limitation of Human Existence ...... 8
CHAPTER 2 T H R E E TYPES ............................................. 18 (1) bfonsoon .................................................... 18 (2) Desert ............................................................ 39 (3) Meadow ......................................................... 59
CHAPTER 3 T H E DISTINCTIVE NATURE OF MON-
SOON CLIMATE ....................................... 119 (1) China ............................................................ 119
(2) Japan ........................ ... .............................. 133 Japan's typhoon nature .............................. 133 T h e Uniqueness of Japan ........................ 156
CHAPTER 4 CLIMATE I N A R T ........................................ 171
Watsuji Tetsuro. the Man and his Work .................................... 209
CONTENTS
Translator's Preface ............................................................ i
....................................................................................... Preface v
CHAPTER 1 T H E BASIC PRINCIPLES OF CLIMATE ......... 1 (1) T h e Phenomena of Climate ........................... 1 (2) Climatic Limitation of Human Existence ...... 8
CHAPTER 2 T H R E E TYPES ............................................. 18 (1) bfonsoon .................................................... 18 (2) Desert ............................................................ 39 (3) Meadow ......................................................... 59
CHAPTER 3 T H E DISTINCTIVE NATURE OF MON-
SOON CLIMATE ....................................... 119 (1) China ............................................................ 119
(2) Japan ........................ ... .............................. 133 Japan's typhoon nature .............................. 133 T h e Uniqueness of Japan ........................ 156
CHAPTER 4 CLIMATE I N A R T ........................................ 171
Watsuji Tetsuro. the Man and his Work .................................... 209
Chapter 1 T h e Basic Principles of Climate
( 1 ) T h e P h e n o m e n a of Climate
I use our word Fu-do, which means literally, "Wind and E a r t h ,
as a general term for the natural environment of a given land, its
climate, its weather, the geological and productive nature of the soil,
its topographic and scenic features. T h e ancient term for this concept
was Sui-do, which might be literally translated as "Water and E a r t h .
Behind these terms lies the ancient view of Nature as man's environ-
ment compounded of earth, water, fire, and wind. It is not without
reason that I wish to treat this natural environment of man not as
"nature" but as "climate" in the above sense. But in order to clarify
my reason, I must, in the first place, deal with the phenomenon of
climate.
All of us live on a given land and the natural environment of
this land "environs" us whether we like it or not. People usually
discern this natural environment in the form of natural phenomena
of various kinds, and accordingly concern themselves with the influences
which such a natural environment exercises upon "us"-in some cases
upon "us" as biological and physiological objects and in other cases
upon "us" as being engaged in practical activities such as the forma- tion of a polity. Each of these influences is complicated enough to
demand specialized study. However, what I am here concerned with
is whether the climate we experience in daily life is to be regarded
as a natural phenomenon. I t is proper that natural science should
treat climate as a natural phenomenon, but it is another question
whether the phenomena of climate are in essence objects of natural
science.
By way of clarifying this question, let me quote as an example the
phenomenon of cold, which is merely one element within climate,
Chapter 1 T h e Basic Principles of Climate
( 1 ) T h e P h e n o m e n a of Climate
I use our word Fu-do, which means literally, "Wind and E a r t h ,
as a general term for the natural environment of a given land, its
climate, its weather, the geological and productive nature of the soil,
its topographic and scenic features. T h e ancient term for this concept
was Sui-do, which might be literally translated as "Water and E a r t h .
Behind these terms lies the ancient view of Nature as man's environ-
ment compounded of earth, water, fire, and wind. It is not without
reason that I wish to treat this natural environment of man not as
"nature" but as "climate" in the above sense. But in order to clarify
my reason, I must, in the first place, deal with the phenomenon of
climate.
All of us live on a given land and the natural environment of
this land "environs" us whether we like it or not. People usually
discern this natural environment in the form of natural phenomena
of various kinds, and accordingly concern themselves with the influences
which such a natural environment exercises upon "us"-in some cases
upon "us" as biological and physiological objects and in other cases
upon "us" as being engaged in practical activities such as the forma- tion of a polity. Each of these influences is complicated enough to
demand specialized study. However, what I am here concerned with
is whether the climate we experience in daily life is to be regarded
as a natural phenomenon. I t is proper that natural science should
treat climate as a natural phenomenon, but it is another question
whether the phenomena of climate are in essence objects of natural
science.
By way of clarifying this question, let me quote as an example the
phenomenon of cold, which is merely one element within climate,
2 C H A P T E R 1 T H E BASIC PRINCIPLES OF C L I M A T E CHAPTER 1 T H E BASIC PRINCIPLES OF CLIMATE 5
and is something distinct and evident as far as our common sense
is concerned. I t is an undeniable fact that we feel cold. But what
is this cold that we feel? Is it that air of a certain temperature, cold,
that is, as a physical object, stimulates the sensory organs in our body
so that we as psychological subjects experience it as a certain set mental
state? If so, it follows that the "cold" and "we" exist as separate
and independent entities in such a manner that only when the cold
presses upon us from outside is there created an "intentional" o r
directional relationship by which "we feel the cold". If this is the
case, i t is natural that this should be conceived in terms of the in-
fluence of the cold upon us.
But is this really so? How can we know the independent existence
of the cold before we feel cold? I t is impossible. I t is by feeling
cold, that we discover the cold. I t is simply by mistaking the inten-
tional relationship that we consider that the cold is pressing in o n
us from outside. I t is not true that the intentional relationship is
set u p only when an object presses from outside. As far as individual
consciousness is concerned, the subject possesses the intentional structure
within itself and itself "directs itself towards something". T h e "feel-
ing" of "feeling the cold" is not a "point" which establishes a relation-
ship directed at the cold, but it is in itself a relationship in virtue
of its "feeling" and it is in this relationship that we discover cold.
T h e intentionality of such a relational structure is thus a structure
of the subject in relation with the cold. T h e fact that "We feel t h e
cold" is, first and foremost, an "intentional experience" of this kind.
But, it may be argued, if this is the case, is not the cold merely
a moment of subjective experience? T h e cold thus discovered is cold
limited to the sphere of the "I". But what we call the cold is a
transcendental object outside the "I", and not a mere feeling of the
"I". Now how can a subjective experience establish a relation with
such a transcendental object? I n other words, how can the feeling
of cold relate itself to the coldness of the outside air? This question
involves a misunderstanding with regard to the object of the intention
in the intentional relationship. T h e object of intention is not a mental
entity. I t is not cold as an experience independent of objective cold
that is the intentional object. When we feel the cold, it is not the
"feeling" of cold that we feel, but the "coldness of the air" o r the
" c o l d . I n other words, the cold felt in intentional experience is
not subjective but objective. I t may be said, therefore, that an in-
tentional relation in which we feel the cold is itself related to the
coldness of the air. T h e cold as a transcendental existence only exists
in this intentionality. Therefore, there can be n o problem of the
relationship of the feeling of cold to the coldness of the air.
According to this view, the usual distinction between subject and
object, or more particularly the distinction between "the c o l d a n d
the "I" independently of each other, involves a certain misunderstand-
ing. When we feel cold, we ourselves are already in the coldness
of the outside air. T h a t we come into relation with the cold means
that we are outside in the cold. I n this sense, our state is characterized
by "ex-sistere" as Heidegger emphasizes, or, in our term, by "inten-
tionality".
T h i s leads me to the contention that we ourselves face ourselves in
the state of "ex-sistere". Even in cases where we do not face ourselves
by means of reflection or looking into ourselves, our selves are exposed
to ourselves. Reflection is merely a form of grasping ourselves. Fur-
thermore, it is not a primary mode of self-revelation. (But if the
word "reflect" is taken in its visual sense, i. e., if it is understood as
to dash against something and rebound from it and to reveal oneself i n
this rebound or reflection, it can be argued that the word may we11
indicate the way in which our selves are exposed to ourselves.) W e
fetl the cold, or we are out if! thd c6ld. Therefore, in feeling t h e
Cold, We discov&r b u ~ e l v & in the Cold itself. Tkds does not meah
2 C H A P T E R 1 T H E BASIC PRINCIPLES OF C L I M A T E CHAPTER 1 T H E BASIC PRINCIPLES OF CLIMATE 5
and is something distinct and evident as far as our common sense
is concerned. I t is an undeniable fact that we feel cold. But what
is this cold that we feel? Is it that air of a certain temperature, cold,
that is, as a physical object, stimulates the sensory organs in our body
so that we as psychological subjects experience it as a certain set mental
state? If so, it follows that the "cold" and "we" exist as separate
and independent entities in such a manner that only when the cold
presses upon us from outside is there created an "intentional" o r
directional relationship by which "we feel the cold". If this is the
case, i t is natural that this should be conceived in terms of the in-
fluence of the cold upon us.
But is this really so? How can we know the independent existence
of the cold before we feel cold? I t is impossible. I t is by feeling
cold, that we discover the cold. I t is simply by mistaking the inten-
tional relationship that we consider that the cold is pressing in o n
us from outside. I t is not true that the intentional relationship is
set u p only when an object presses from outside. As far as individual
consciousness is concerned, the subject possesses the intentional structure
within itself and itself "directs itself towards something". T h e "feel-
ing" of "feeling the cold" is not a "point" which establishes a relation-
ship directed at the cold, but it is in itself a relationship in virtue
of its "feeling" and it is in this relationship that we discover cold.
T h e intentionality of such a relational structure is thus a structure
of the subject in relation with the cold. T h e fact that "We feel t h e
cold" is, first and foremost, an "intentional experience" of this kind.
But, it may be argued, if this is the case, is not the cold merely
a moment of subjective experience? T h e cold thus discovered is cold
limited to the sphere of the "I". But what we call the cold is a
transcendental object outside the "I", and not a mere feeling of the
"I". Now how can a subjective experience establish a relation with
such a transcendental object? I n other words, how can the feeling
of cold relate itself to the coldness of the outside air? This question
involves a misunderstanding with regard to the object of the intention
in the intentional relationship. T h e object of intention is not a mental
entity. I t is not cold as an experience independent of objective cold
that is the intentional object. When we feel the cold, it is not the
"feeling" of cold that we feel, but the "coldness of the air" o r the
" c o l d . I n other words, the cold felt in intentional experience is
not subjective but objective. I t may be said, therefore, that an in-
tentional relation in which we feel the cold is itself related to the
coldness of the air. T h e cold as a transcendental existence only exists
in this intentionality. Therefore, there can be n o problem of the
relationship of the feeling of cold to the coldness of the air.
According to this view, the usual distinction between subject and
object, or more particularly the distinction between "the c o l d a n d
the "I" independently of each other, involves a certain misunderstand-
ing. When we feel cold, we ourselves are already in the coldness
of the outside air. T h a t we come into relation with the cold means
that we are outside in the cold. I n this sense, our state is characterized
by "ex-sistere" as Heidegger emphasizes, or, in our term, by "inten-
tionality".
T h i s leads me to the contention that we ourselves face ourselves in
the state of "ex-sistere". Even in cases where we do not face ourselves
by means of reflection or looking into ourselves, our selves are exposed
to ourselves. Reflection is merely a form of grasping ourselves. Fur-
thermore, it is not a primary mode of self-revelation. (But if the
word "reflect" is taken in its visual sense, i. e., if it is understood as
to dash against something and rebound from it and to reveal oneself i n
this rebound or reflection, it can be argued that the word may we11
indicate the way in which our selves are exposed to ourselves.) W e
fetl the cold, or we are out if! thd c6ld. Therefore, in feeling t h e
Cold, We discov&r b u ~ e l v & in the Cold itself. Tkds does not meah
4 CHAPTER I T H E BASIC PRINCIP1.ES OF CLIMATE CHAPTER 1 THE BASIC PRINCIPLES O F C L I M A T E 5
that we transfer our selves into the cold and there discover the selves
thus transferred. T h e instant that the cold is discovered, we are
already outside in the cold. Therefore, the basic essence of what is
"present outside" is not a thing or object such as the cold, but we
ourselves. "Ex-sistere" is the fundamental principle of the structure
of our selves, and i t is on this principle that intentionality depends.
T h a t we feel the cold is an intentional experience, in which we discover
our selves in the state of "ex-sistere", or our selves already outside in
the cold.
We have considered the problem in terms of individual conscious-
ness in the experience of cold. But, as we have been able to use the
expression "we feel cold", without any contradiction, it is "we", not
"I" alone that experience the cold. We feel the same cold in common.
It is precisely because of this that we can use terms describing the
cold in our exchange of daily greetings. T h e fact that the feeling
of cold differs between us is possible only o n the basis of our feeling
the cold in common. Without this basis it would be quite impossible
to recognise that any other "I" experiences the cold. Thus, it is not
"I" alone but "we", o r more strictly, "I" as "we" and "we" as "I" that are outside in the cold. T h e structure of which "ex-sistere"
is the fundamental principle is this "we", not the mere "I". Accord-
ingly, "ex-sistere" is "to be out among other '1's' " rather than "to
be out in a thing such as the cold". This is not a n intentional relation
b u t a "mutual relationship" of existence. T h u s it is primarily "we"
i n this "mutual relationship" that discover our selves in the cold.
I have attempted to define the phenomenon cold. However, we
d o not experience this kind of atmospheric phenomenon in isolation
from others of its kind. I t is experienced in relation to warmth, or
heat, or in connection with wind, rain, snow, sunshine, and so forth.
I n other words the cold is simply one of the whole series of similar
phenomena which we call weather. When we enter a warm room
after walking in the cold wind, when we stroll in the mild spring
breeze after a cold winter is over, or when we are caught in a
torrential shower on a boiling hot summer day, we first of all apprehend
ourselves within such meteorological phenomena, which are other
than our selves. Again, in changes in the weather, we first of all ap-
prehend changes i n ourselves. This weather, too, is not experienced
in isolation. I t is experienced only in relation to the soil, the topo-
graphic and scenic features and so on of a given land. A cold wind
may be experienced as a mountain blast or the cold, dry wind that
sweeps through Tokyo at the end of the winter. T h e spring breeze
may be one which blows off cherry blossoms or which caresses the
waves. So, too, the heat of summer may be of the kind to wither
rich verdure or to entice children to play merrily in the sea. As we
find o u r gladdened o r pained selves in a wind that scatters the cherry
blossoms, so d o we apprehend our wilting selves in the very heat of
summer that scorches down on plants and trees in a spell of dry weather.
I n other words, we find ourselves-ourselves as a n element in the
"mutual relationshipv-in "climate".
Such self-apprehension is not the recognition of the "I" as the
subject that feels the cold and the heat or as the subject that is glad-
dened by the cherry blossoms. I n these experiences we d o not look
towards the "subject". We stiffen, or we p u t o n warm clothes, o r
we draw near the brazier when we feel cold. Or, we may feel more
concern about putting clothes o n our children o r seeing that the old
are near the brazier. We work hard to have the money to buy more
clothes and charcoal. Charcoal burners make charcoal in the moun-
tains, and textile factories produce clothing materials. T h u s , in o u r
relationship with the cold, we come to engage ourselves, individually
and socially, in various measures for protecting ourselves from the
cold. I n the same way, when we rejoice in the cherry blossoms, we
d o not look to the subject; rather it is the blossoms that take o u r
4 CHAPTER I T H E BASIC PRINCIP1.ES OF CLIMATE CHAPTER 1 THE BASIC PRINCIPLES O F C L I M A T E 5
that we transfer our selves into the cold and there discover the selves
thus transferred. T h e instant that the cold is discovered, we are
already outside in the cold. Therefore, the basic essence of what is
"present outside" is not a thing or object such as the cold, but we
ourselves. "Ex-sistere" is the fundamental principle of the structure
of our selves, and i t is on this principle that intentionality depends.
T h a t we feel the cold is an intentional experience, in which we discover
our selves in the state of "ex-sistere", or our selves already outside in
the cold.
We have considered the problem in terms of individual conscious-
ness in the experience of cold. But, as we have been able to use the
expression "we feel cold", without any contradiction, it is "we", not
"I" alone that experience the cold. We feel the same cold in common.
It is precisely because of this that we can use terms describing the
cold in our exchange of daily greetings. T h e fact that the feeling
of cold differs between us is possible only o n the basis of our feeling
the cold in common. Without this basis it would be quite impossible
to recognise that any other "I" experiences the cold. Thus, it is not
"I" alone but "we", o r more strictly, "I" as "we" and "we" as "I" that are outside in the cold. T h e structure of which "ex-sistere"
is the fundamental principle is this "we", not the mere "I". Accord-
ingly, "ex-sistere" is "to be out among other '1's' " rather than "to
be out in a thing such as the cold". This is not a n intentional relation
b u t a "mutual relationship" of existence. T h u s it is primarily "we"
i n this "mutual relationship" that discover our selves in the cold.
I have attempted to define the phenomenon cold. However, we
d o not experience this kind of atmospheric phenomenon in isolation
from others of its kind. I t is experienced in relation to warmth, or
heat, or in connection with wind, rain, snow, sunshine, and so forth.
I n other words the cold is simply one of the whole series of similar
phenomena which we call weather. When we enter a warm room
after walking in the cold wind, when we stroll in the mild spring
breeze after a cold winter is over, or when we are caught in a
torrential shower on a boiling hot summer day, we first of all apprehend
ourselves within such meteorological phenomena, which are other
than our selves. Again, in changes in the weather, we first of all ap-
prehend changes i n ourselves. This weather, too, is not experienced
in isolation. I t is experienced only in relation to the soil, the topo-
graphic and scenic features and so on of a given land. A cold wind
may be experienced as a mountain blast or the cold, dry wind that
sweeps through Tokyo at the end of the winter. T h e spring breeze
may be one which blows off cherry blossoms or which caresses the
waves. So, too, the heat of summer may be of the kind to wither
rich verdure or to entice children to play merrily in the sea. As we
find o u r gladdened o r pained selves in a wind that scatters the cherry
blossoms, so d o we apprehend our wilting selves in the very heat of
summer that scorches down on plants and trees in a spell of dry weather.
I n other words, we find ourselves-ourselves as a n element in the
"mutual relationshipv-in "climate".
Such self-apprehension is not the recognition of the "I" as the
subject that feels the cold and the heat or as the subject that is glad-
dened by the cherry blossoms. I n these experiences we d o not look
towards the "subject". We stiffen, or we p u t o n warm clothes, o r
we draw near the brazier when we feel cold. Or, we may feel more
concern about putting clothes o n our children o r seeing that the old
are near the brazier. We work hard to have the money to buy more
clothes and charcoal. Charcoal burners make charcoal in the moun-
tains, and textile factories produce clothing materials. T h u s , in o u r
relationship with the cold, we come to engage ourselves, individually
and socially, in various measures for protecting ourselves from the
cold. I n the same way, when we rejoice in the cherry blossoms, we
d o not look to the subject; rather it is the blossoms that take o u r
6 C H A P T E R I THE BASIC PRINCIPLES O F CLIMATE CHAPTER 1 THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF CLIMATE 7
attention and we invite our friends to go blossoq-viewing, o r drink
a n d dance with them under the trees. T h u s in our relationship with
the spring scene, either individually or socially we adopt various
measures for securing enjoyment from it. T h e same may be said of
the summer heat or disasters such as storms and floods. I t is in our
relationship with the tyranny of nature that we first come to engage
ourselves in joint measures to secure early protection from such
tyranny. T h e apprehension of the self in climate is revealed as the
discovery of such measures; it is not the recognition of the subject.
T h e various measures which are thus discovered, such as clothes,
braziers, charcoal-burning, houses, blossom-viewing, dykes, drains,
anti-typhoon structures, and the like, are of course what we ourselves
have devised at our own discretion. I t is not, however, with no con-
nection with such climatic phenomena as the cold, the heat, and
the humidity that we have devised them. We have discovered ourselves
in climate, and in this self-apprehension we are directed to our free
creation. Further, it is not only we ourselves who today cooperate
to defend ourselves or work against the cold, the heat, the storm or
the flood. We possess an inheritance of self-apprehension accumulated
over the years since the time of our ancestors. A house style is a n
established mode of construction, and this cannot have come into be-
ing without some conneotion with climate. T h e house is a device for
protecting ourselves both from cold and from heat. T h e style of
architecture must be determined most of all by the degree of protection
required against cold or heat. T h e n a house must be so built as to
withstand storm, flood, earthquake, fire and the like. A heavy roof
is necessary against storm and flood, though it may be disadvantageous
i n the event of an earthquake. T h e house should be adapted to these
various conditions. Furthermore, humidity imposes severe limitations
o n residential style. Where the humidity is very high, thorough
ventilation is essential. 'Wood, paper and clay are the building ma.
terials that offer the best protection against humidity, but they give
n o protection at all against fire. These various restraints and con-
ditions are taken into account and accorded their degree of importance
before the pattern of the house of a given locality is finally established.
T h u s the determination of the architectural style of a house is a n ex-
pression of the self-apprehension of man within climate. T h e same
may be said about clothing styles. Here again, clothing styles have
been established socially over a long period, styles being determined
by climate. A style distinctive to a certain locality, perhaps because
of the latter's cultural supremacy, may be transplanted to another
locality with a different climate. (This can occur more readily with
dress than with architectural styles). But to whatever locality i t may
be transplanted, the fact that the style is conditioned by the climate
which produced it can never be effaced. European-style clothes remain European, even after more than half a century of wear i n Japan.
Such climatic conditioning is even more obvious in the case of food,
for i t is with climate that the production of food is most intimately
connected. I t is not that man made the choice between stock-raising
a n d fishing according to his preference for meat or fish. O n the contrary, he came to prefer either meat o r fish because climate deter-
mined whether he should engage i n stock-raising o r i n fishing. I n the same way, the predominant factor governing the choice between a
vegetable or a meat diet is climate, rather than the vegetarian's ideology.
So our appetite is not for food in general but for food prepared in
a certain way which has long been established. What we actually want when we are hungry is bread o r rice, a beef steak o r raw fish.
T h e way that food is prepared is a n expression of a people's climatic
self-apprehension and is something which has taken shape over many
generations. O u r ancestors ate shell-fish and seaweed long before
they mastered the skills of the farmer.
We can also discover climatic phenomena in all the expressions
of human activity, such as literature, art, religion, and manners and
6 C H A P T E R I THE BASIC PRINCIPLES O F CLIMATE CHAPTER 1 THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF CLIMATE 7
attention and we invite our friends to go blossoq-viewing, o r drink
a n d dance with them under the trees. T h u s in our relationship with
the spring scene, either individually or socially we adopt various
measures for securing enjoyment from it. T h e same may be said of
the summer heat or disasters such as storms and floods. I t is in our
relationship with the tyranny of nature that we first come to engage
ourselves in joint measures to secure early protection from such
tyranny. T h e apprehension of the self in climate is revealed as the
discovery of such measures; it is not the recognition of the subject.
T h e various measures which are thus discovered, such as clothes,
braziers, charcoal-burning, houses, blossom-viewing, dykes, drains,
anti-typhoon structures, and the like, are of course what we ourselves
have devised at our own discretion. I t is not, however, with no con-
nection with such climatic phenomena as the cold, the heat, and
the humidity that we have devised them. We have discovered ourselves
in climate, and in this self-apprehension we are directed to our free
creation. Further, it is not only we ourselves who today cooperate
to defend ourselves or work against the cold, the heat, the storm or
the flood. We possess an inheritance of self-apprehension accumulated
over the years since the time of our ancestors. A house style is a n
established mode of construction, and this cannot have come into be-
ing without some conneotion with climate. T h e house is a device for
protecting ourselves both from cold and from heat. T h e style of
architecture must be determined most of all by the degree of protection
required against cold or heat. T h e n a house must be so built as to
withstand storm, flood, earthquake, fire and the like. A heavy roof
is necessary against storm and flood, though it may be disadvantageous
i n the event of an earthquake. T h e house should be adapted to these
various conditions. Furthermore, humidity imposes severe limitations
o n residential style. Where the humidity is very high, thorough
ventilation is essential. 'Wood, paper and clay are the building ma.
terials that offer the best protection against humidity, but they give
n o protection at all against fire. These various restraints and con-
ditions are taken into account and accorded their degree of importance
before the pattern of the house of a given locality is finally established.
T h u s the determination of the architectural style of a house is a n ex-
pression of the self-apprehension of man within climate. T h e same
may be said about clothing styles. Here again, clothing styles have
been established socially over a long period, styles being determined
by climate. A style distinctive to a certain locality, perhaps because
of the latter's cultural supremacy, may be transplanted to another
locality with a different climate. (This can occur more readily with
dress than with architectural styles). But to whatever locality i t may
be transplanted, the fact that the style is conditioned by the climate
which produced it can never be effaced. European-style clothes remain European, even after more than half a century of wear i n Japan.
Such climatic conditioning is even more obvious in the case of food,
for i t is with climate that the production of food is most intimately
connected. I t is not that man made the choice between stock-raising
a n d fishing according to his preference for meat or fish. O n the contrary, he came to prefer either meat o r fish because climate deter-
mined whether he should engage i n stock-raising o r i n fishing. I n the same way, the predominant factor governing the choice between a
vegetable or a meat diet is climate, rather than the vegetarian's ideology.
So our appetite is not for food in general but for food prepared in
a certain way which has long been established. What we actually want when we are hungry is bread o r rice, a beef steak o r raw fish.
T h e way that food is prepared is a n expression of a people's climatic
self-apprehension and is something which has taken shape over many
generations. O u r ancestors ate shell-fish and seaweed long before
they mastered the skills of the farmer.
We can also discover climatic phenomena in all the expressions
of human activity, such as literature, art, religion, and manners and
8 CHAPTER I THE BASIC PRINCIP:.ES OF CLIMATE C H A P T F R 1 T H E BASIC PRINCIPLES O F C L I M A T E 9
customs. This is a natural consequence as long as man apprehends
himself in climate. I t is evident, therefore, that climatic phenomena
understood in this light differ from phenomena studied by natural
science. T o consider a sea-food diet as a climatic phenomenon is not
to regard climate merely as natural environment. T o interpret artistic
style in relation to climate is to indicate the inseparability of climate
from history. T h e most frequent misunderstanding about climate
occurs in the commonplace view that influences exist between man a n d
his natural environment.
Here, however, the factors of human existence and history have
been excluded from the concrete phenomena of climate, which are
regarded merely as natural environment. It is from such a standpoint
that it is often said that not only is man conditioned by climate, but
that he, in his turn, works o n and transforms climate. But this is t o
ignore the true nature of climate. We, on the other hand, have seen
that it is in climate that man apprehends himself. T h e activity of
man's self-apprehension, man, that is, in his dual character of individual
and social being, is at the same time of a historical nature. Therefore,
climate does not exist apart from history, nor history apart from climate.
This can only be understood from the fundamental structure of human
existence.
( 2 ) Climatic Limitation of Human Existence
I have defined climate as a means for man to discover himself.
Rut what is this "man"? If one is to interpret climate as one of the
forms of limitation on human existence, one should attempt to state,
in broad terms, the place this limitation has in the general structure
of human existence.
By "man" I mean ngt the individual (anthrhpos, homo, homme,
etc.) but man both in this individual sense and at the same time
man in society, the combination o r the association of man. T h i s
duality is the essential nature of man. Sd neither anthropology,
which treats man the individual, nor sociology, which takes u p the
other aspect, can grasp the real or full substance of man. For a true
and full understanding, one must treat man both as individual and
as whole; i t is only when the analysis of human existence is made from
this viewpoint that it becomes evident that this existence is completely
and absolutely negative activity. And human existence is precisely
the realisation of this negative activity.
Human existence, through fragmentation into countless individual
entities, is the activity which brings into being all forms of combina-
tion a n d community. Such fragmentation and union are essentially
of a self-active and practical nature and cannot come about in the
absence of self-active entities. Hence, space and time in this self-active
sense, form the fundamental structure of these activities. I t is a t this
point that space and time are grasped i n their essential form and their
inseparability becomes distinct. An attempt to treat the structure of
human existence as one of time only would fall into the error of trying
to discover human existence on the level only of individual con-
sciousness. But if the dual character of human existence is taken as the
essential nature of man, then it is immediately clear that space must
be regarded as linked with time.
W i t h the elucidation of the space-and time-nature of human ex-
istence, the structure of human association also appears in its true
light. T h e several unions and combinations that man fashions evolve
intrinsically according to a certain order. They are to be regarded
as not static social structures but as active and evolving systems. They
are the realisation of negative activity. T h i s is how history took shape.
Here the space-and time-structure of human existence is revealed
as climate and history: the inseparability of time a n d space is the
basis of the inseparability of history and climate. No social forma-
tion could exist if i t lacked all foundation in the space-structure of
man, nor does time become history unless it is founded in such social
8 CHAPTER I THE BASIC PRINCIP:.ES OF CLIMATE C H A P T F R 1 T H E BASIC PRINCIPLES O F C L I M A T E 9
customs. This is a natural consequence as long as man apprehends
himself in climate. I t is evident, therefore, that climatic phenomena
understood in this light differ from phenomena studied by natural
science. T o consider a sea-food diet as a climatic phenomenon is not
to regard climate merely as natural environment. T o interpret artistic
style in relation to climate is to indicate the inseparability of climate
from history. T h e most frequent misunderstanding about climate
occurs in the commonplace view that influences exist between man a n d
his natural environment.
Here, however, the factors of human existence and history have
been excluded from the concrete phenomena of climate, which are
regarded merely as natural environment. It is from such a standpoint
that it is often said that not only is man conditioned by climate, but
that he, in his turn, works o n and transforms climate. But this is t o
ignore the true nature of climate. We, on the other hand, have seen
that it is in climate that man apprehends himself. T h e activity of
man's self-apprehension, man, that is, in his dual character of individual
and social being, is at the same time of a historical nature. Therefore,
climate does not exist apart from history, nor history apart from climate.
This can only be understood from the fundamental structure of human
existence.
( 2 ) Climatic Limitation of Human Existence
I have defined climate as a means for man to discover himself.
Rut what is this "man"? If one is to interpret climate as one of the
forms of limitation on human existence, one should attempt to state,
in broad terms, the place this limitation has in the general structure
of human existence.
By "man" I mean ngt the individual (anthrhpos, homo, homme,
etc.) but man both in this individual sense and at the same time
man in society, the combination o r the association of man. T h i s
duality is the essential nature of man. Sd neither anthropology,
which treats man the individual, nor sociology, which takes u p the
other aspect, can grasp the real or full substance of man. For a true
and full understanding, one must treat man both as individual and
as whole; i t is only when the analysis of human existence is made from
this viewpoint that it becomes evident that this existence is completely
and absolutely negative activity. And human existence is precisely
the realisation of this negative activity.
Human existence, through fragmentation into countless individual
entities, is the activity which brings into being all forms of combina-
tion a n d community. Such fragmentation and union are essentially
of a self-active and practical nature and cannot come about in the
absence of self-active entities. Hence, space and time in this self-active
sense, form the fundamental structure of these activities. I t is a t this
point that space and time are grasped i n their essential form and their
inseparability becomes distinct. An attempt to treat the structure of
human existence as one of time only would fall into the error of trying
to discover human existence on the level only of individual con-
sciousness. But if the dual character of human existence is taken as the
essential nature of man, then it is immediately clear that space must
be regarded as linked with time.
W i t h the elucidation of the space-and time-nature of human ex-
istence, the structure of human association also appears in its true
light. T h e several unions and combinations that man fashions evolve
intrinsically according to a certain order. They are to be regarded
as not static social structures but as active and evolving systems. They
are the realisation of negative activity. T h i s is how history took shape.
Here the space-and time-structure of human existence is revealed
as climate and history: the inseparability of time a n d space is the
basis of the inseparability of history and climate. No social forma-
tion could exist if i t lacked all foundation in the space-structure of
man, nor does time become history unless it is founded in such social
10 CHAPTER 1 T H E BASIC PRINCIPLES O F CLIMATE CHAPTER 1 THE BASIC PRINCIPLES O F C L I M A T E 11
being, for history is the structure of exi:tence in society. Here also
we see clearly the duality of human existence-the finite and the
infinite. Men die; their world changes; but through this unending
death and change, man lives and his world continues. I t continues
incessantly through ending incessantly. I n the individual's eyes, it is
a case of an "existence for death", but from the standpoint of society
it is an "existence for life". T h u s human existence is both individual
and social. But it is not only history that is the structure of social
existence, for climate is also a part of this structure and, a t that, a
part quite inseparable from history. For it is from the union of
climate with history that the latter gets its flesh and bones. I n terms
of the contrast between spirit and matter, history can never be merely
spiritual self-development. For it is only when, as self-active being,
the spirit objectivises itself, in other words, only when it includes such
self-active physical principle that it becomes history, as self-develop-
ment. This "self-active physical principle", as we might term it, is
climate. T h e human duality, of the finite and the infinite, is most
plainly revealell as the historical and climatic structure.
It is here that climate is revealed; for mankind is saddled not
simply with a general past but with a specific climatic past; a general
formal historical structure is substantiated by a specific content. I t
is only in this way that the historical being of mankind can become
the being of man in a given country at a given age. Again, climate
as this specific content does not exist alone and in isolation from
history, entering and becoming a part of the content of history a t a
later juncture. From the very first, climate is historical climate. I n
the dual structure of map-the historical and the climatic-history is
climatic history and climate is historical climate. History and climate
in isolation from each other are mere abstractions; climate as I shall
consider it is the essential climate that has not undergone this abstrac-
tion.
Such, then, is the place of climatic limitation in the structure of
human life. I t will n o doubt be evident that there are certain points
of similarity between the problem of climate and that of "body" in
traditional anthropology, which took as its study the individual nature
abstracted from the duality of the individual and the social. It then
endeavoured to treat man, divorced from his relationships, as a duality
of body and spirit, but all efforts to clearly grasp this distinction be-
tween body and spirit led to a final disregard for the unity in this
distinction. This was essentially because the body was taken as equiva-
lent to a "material body" and divorced from concrete self-active
principle. I t was for this reason that anthropology was divided into
spiritualist and materialist camps, the one developing from psychology
towards epistemology, the other moving in the direction either of
anthropology as a branch of zoology, or of physiology and anatomy.
But the philosophical anthropology of today is attempting to heal
this division and again treat man as a duality of spirit and body.
So the crux of the problem becomes the realisation that the body is
not mere matter; in other words, it is the problem of the self-active
nature of the body. Yet anthropology will always be the study of
"individual man" rather than of "man in his social relationship".
We, in this enquiry, are pursuing a problem of a similar nature,
although ours, that of the duality of human nature, is the more funda-
mental. T h e self-active nature of the body has as its foundation the
spatial and temporal structure of human life; a self-active body cannot
remain in isolation for its structure is dynamic, uniting in isolation
and isolated within union. When various social combinations are
evolved within this dynamic structure it becomes something historical
or climatic. Climate, too, as part of man's body, was regarded like
the body as mere matter, and so came to be viewed objectively as
mere natural environment. So the self-active nature of climate must
be retrieved in the same sense that the self-active nature of the body
10 CHAPTER 1 T H E BASIC PRINCIPLES O F CLIMATE CHAPTER 1 THE BASIC PRINCIPLES O F C L I M A T E 11
being, for history is the structure of exi:tence in society. Here also
we see clearly the duality of human existence-the finite and the
infinite. Men die; their world changes; but through this unending
death and change, man lives and his world continues. I t continues
incessantly through ending incessantly. I n the individual's eyes, it is
a case of an "existence for death", but from the standpoint of society
it is an "existence for life". T h u s human existence is both individual
and social. But it is not only history that is the structure of social
existence, for climate is also a part of this structure and, a t that, a
part quite inseparable from history. For it is from the union of
climate with history that the latter gets its flesh and bones. I n terms
of the contrast between spirit and matter, history can never be merely
spiritual self-development. For it is only when, as self-active being,
the spirit objectivises itself, in other words, only when it includes such
self-active physical principle that it becomes history, as self-develop-
ment. This "self-active physical principle", as we might term it, is
climate. T h e human duality, of the finite and the infinite, is most
plainly revealell as the historical and climatic structure.
It is here that climate is revealed; for mankind is saddled not
simply with a general past but with a specific climatic past; a general
formal historical structure is substantiated by a specific content. I t
is only in this way that the historical being of mankind can become
the being of man in a given country at a given age. Again, climate
as this specific content does not exist alone and in isolation from
history, entering and becoming a part of the content of history a t a
later juncture. From the very first, climate is historical climate. I n
the dual structure of map-the historical and the climatic-history is
climatic history and climate is historical climate. History and climate
in isolation from each other are mere abstractions; climate as I shall
consider it is the essential climate that has not undergone this abstrac-
tion.
Such, then, is the place of climatic limitation in the structure of
human life. I t will n o doubt be evident that there are certain points
of similarity between the problem of climate and that of "body" in
traditional anthropology, which took as its study the individual nature
abstracted from the duality of the individual and the social. It then
endeavoured to treat man, divorced from his relationships, as a duality
of body and spirit, but all efforts to clearly grasp this distinction be-
tween body and spirit led to a final disregard for the unity in this
distinction. This was essentially because the body was taken as equiva-
lent to a "material body" and divorced from concrete self-active
principle. I t was for this reason that anthropology was divided into
spiritualist and materialist camps, the one developing from psychology
towards epistemology, the other moving in the direction either of
anthropology as a branch of zoology, or of physiology and anatomy.
But the philosophical anthropology of today is attempting to heal
this division and again treat man as a duality of spirit and body.
So the crux of the problem becomes the realisation that the body is
not mere matter; in other words, it is the problem of the self-active
nature of the body. Yet anthropology will always be the study of
"individual man" rather than of "man in his social relationship".
We, in this enquiry, are pursuing a problem of a similar nature,
although ours, that of the duality of human nature, is the more funda-
mental. T h e self-active nature of the body has as its foundation the
spatial and temporal structure of human life; a self-active body cannot
remain in isolation for its structure is dynamic, uniting in isolation
and isolated within union. When various social combinations are
evolved within this dynamic structure it becomes something historical
or climatic. Climate, too, as part of man's body, was regarded like
the body as mere matter, and so came to be viewed objectively as
mere natural environment. So the self-active nature of climate must
be retrieved in the same sense that the self-active nature of the body
12 C H A P T E R 1 T H E BASIC PRINCIPI.ES OF CLIMATE CHAPTER 1 THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF CLIMATE 13
has to be retrieved. I t would be fair to say, then, that, i n its most funda-
mental significance, the relation between body and spirit lics in the
relation between the body and the spirit of "man in his social relation-
ships", the individual and social body-spirit relation which includes
the relationship with history and climate.
T h e problem of climate affords a pointer for any attempt to analyse
the structure of human life. T h e ontological comprehension of human
life is not to be attained by a mere transcendence which regards the
structure as one of time, for this has to be transcendence in the sense
of the discovery of the self in the other and the subsequent reversal
to absolute negation in the union of self and other. Jn this case, the
relationships between man and man must be o n a transcendent plane
and the relationships themselves, the basis for the discovery of self and
other, must already be essentially on a plane which "stands outside"
(ex-sistere) . Transcendence itself must have assumed some historical significance, as being the temporal structure of such relationships. I t
is not something in the individual consciousness but the relationships
themselves that constantly reach into the future. Time in individual
consciousness is a mere abstraction on the basis of the history of the
relationships. Transcendence also "stands outside" (ex-sistere) cli-
matically. I n other words, man discovers himself in climate. From
the standpoint of the individual, this becomes consciousness of the
body, but in the context of the more concrete ground of human life,
it reveals itself in the ways of creating communities, presence conscious-
ness, in the ways of consciousness, and thus in the ways of constructing
speech, the methods of production, the styles of building, and so on.
Transcendence, as the structure of human life, must include all these
entities.
T h u s climate is seen to be the factor by which self-active human
being can be made objective: climatic phenomena show man how
to discover himself as "standing outside" (i.e., ex-sistere) . T h e self
discovered by the cold turns into tools devised against the cold, such
a> houses or clothes, which then confront the self. Again climate
itself, the climate in which we move, and in which we "stand outside",
becomes a tool to be used. T h e cold, for instance, is not only some-
thing that sends us off for warm clothes; it can also be utilised to freeze
the bean-curd. Heat is not only something that makes us use a fan;
it is also the heat that nourishes the rice-plants. M7ind has us scurry-
ing to the temple to pray for safety through the typhoon season; it
is also the wind that fills a sail. So even in such relationships we
"stand outside" in climate and understand our selves from it, our
selves, that is, as consumers or users. I n other words, this self-com-
prehension through climate at the same time leads us to discover
ourselves as confronted with such tools.
There is much to be learnt from the thought that such tools are
t o be found very near to hand i n human life. A tool is essentially
"for doing something". A hammer is for beating, a shoe for wearing.
But the object that is "for doing something else" has a n immanent
connection with the purpose for which it is employed. T h e hammer,
for example, is a tool for making shoes, and shoes, again, are tools for
walking. T h e essential character of the tool lies i n its being "for a
purpose", lies, that is, in this purpose-relation. Now this purpose-
relation derives from human life and at its basis we find the climatic
limitation of human life. Shoes may be tools for walking, but the
great majority of mankind could walk without them; it is rather cold
and heat that make shoes necessary. Clothes are to be worn, yet they
are worn above all as a protection against cold. T h u s this purpose-
relation finds its final origin in climatic self-comprehension. As well
as understanding ourselves in cold or heat, we take measures, as free
agents, for protection. We should not devise clothes completely
spontaneously i n the absence of the factors of cold o r heat. I t is when
we proceed from "for our protection" to "with what" that climatic
12 C H A P T E R 1 T H E BASIC PRINCIPI.ES OF CLIMATE CHAPTER 1 THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF CLIMATE 13
has to be retrieved. I t would be fair to say, then, that, i n its most funda-
mental significance, the relation between body and spirit lics in the
relation between the body and the spirit of "man in his social relation-
ships", the individual and social body-spirit relation which includes
the relationship with history and climate.
T h e problem of climate affords a pointer for any attempt to analyse
the structure of human life. T h e ontological comprehension of human
life is not to be attained by a mere transcendence which regards the
structure as one of time, for this has to be transcendence in the sense
of the discovery of the self in the other and the subsequent reversal
to absolute negation in the union of self and other. Jn this case, the
relationships between man and man must be o n a transcendent plane
and the relationships themselves, the basis for the discovery of self and
other, must already be essentially on a plane which "stands outside"
(ex-sistere) . Transcendence itself must have assumed some historical significance, as being the temporal structure of such relationships. I t
is not something in the individual consciousness but the relationships
themselves that constantly reach into the future. Time in individual
consciousness is a mere abstraction on the basis of the history of the
relationships. Transcendence also "stands outside" (ex-sistere) cli-
matically. I n other words, man discovers himself in climate. From
the standpoint of the individual, this becomes consciousness of the
body, but in the context of the more concrete ground of human life,
it reveals itself in the ways of creating communities, presence conscious-
ness, in the ways of consciousness, and thus in the ways of constructing
speech, the methods of production, the styles of building, and so on.
Transcendence, as the structure of human life, must include all these
entities.
T h u s climate is seen to be the factor by which self-active human
being can be made objective: climatic phenomena show man how
to discover himself as "standing outside" (i.e., ex-sistere) . T h e self
discovered by the cold turns into tools devised against the cold, such
a> houses or clothes, which then confront the self. Again climate
itself, the climate in which we move, and in which we "stand outside",
becomes a tool to be used. T h e cold, for instance, is not only some-
thing that sends us off for warm clothes; it can also be utilised to freeze
the bean-curd. Heat is not only something that makes us use a fan;
it is also the heat that nourishes the rice-plants. M7ind has us scurry-
ing to the temple to pray for safety through the typhoon season; it
is also the wind that fills a sail. So even in such relationships we
"stand outside" in climate and understand our selves from it, our
selves, that is, as consumers or users. I n other words, this self-com-
prehension through climate at the same time leads us to discover
ourselves as confronted with such tools.
There is much to be learnt from the thought that such tools are
t o be found very near to hand i n human life. A tool is essentially
"for doing something". A hammer is for beating, a shoe for wearing.
But the object that is "for doing something else" has a n immanent
connection with the purpose for which it is employed. T h e hammer,
for example, is a tool for making shoes, and shoes, again, are tools for
walking. T h e essential character of the tool lies i n its being "for a
purpose", lies, that is, in this purpose-relation. Now this purpose-
relation derives from human life and at its basis we find the climatic
limitation of human life. Shoes may be tools for walking, but the
great majority of mankind could walk without them; it is rather cold
and heat that make shoes necessary. Clothes are to be worn, yet they
are worn above all as a protection against cold. T h u s this purpose-
relation finds its final origin in climatic self-comprehension. As well
as understanding ourselves in cold or heat, we take measures, as free
agents, for protection. We should not devise clothes completely
spontaneously i n the absence of the factors of cold o r heat. I t is when
we proceed from "for our protection" to "with what" that climatic
14 CHAPTER 1 THE BASIC P R I N C I P L E S OF CLIMATE CHAPTER 1 THE BASIC PRINCIPLES O F CLIMATE 15
self-comprehension becomes express. Hence clothes are devised t o
keep us warm or cool; they are of every style and thickness. Such
stuffs as wool, cotton and silk come to be socially recognized as mate-
rials for clothes. I t is clear, then, that such tools have a very close
relationship with climatic limitation. T o say, then, that tools are to
be found nearest to hand is, in fact, to say that climatic limitation is
the foremost factor in objective existence.
Climate, then, is the agent by which human life is objectivised,
and it is here that man comprehends himself; there is self-discovery in
climate. We discover ourselves in all manner of significances every
clay; it may be in a pleasant or a sad mood, but such feelings or
tempers are to be regarded not merely as mental states but as our
way of life. These, moreover, are not feelings that we are free to
choose of ourselves, but are imposed on us as pre-determined states.
Nor is it climate only that prescribes such pre-determined feelings,
for our individual and social existence controls the way of life of the
individual, which is dependent o n it in the form of pre-existent rela-
tionships, and imparts to him determined moods; it may sometimes
impart to society a determined mood in the form of a n existent histori-
cal situation. But the imposition of climate, united and involved
with these, is the most conspicuous. One morning we may find our-
selves "in a revived mowed". This is interpreted in terms of specific temperature and humidity conditions influencing us externally and
inducing internally a revived mental condition. But the facts are quite
different, for what we have here is not a mental state but the freshness
of the external atmosphere. But the object that is understoocl in
terms (Pf the temperature and the humidity of the atmosphere has not
the slightest similarity with the freshness itself. This freshness is a
state; it appertains to the atmosphere but it is neither the atmosphere
itself nor a property of the atmosphere. It is not that we have certaifi
states imposed on us by the atmosphere; the fact that the atmosphere
possesses a state of freshness is that we ourselves feel revived. We
discover ourselves, that is, in the atmosphere. But the freshness of
the atmosphere is not that of a mental state, as is shown best by the
fact that the morning feeling of freshness is embodied and expressed
directly in our mutual greetings. We comprehend ourselves in this
freshness of the atmosphere, for what is fresh is not o u r own mental
state but the atmosphere itself. So we do not need to go through the
process of examining others' mental states to be able to greet each
other with "Isn't i t a lovely morning?".
Such climatic burdens or impositions occur very frequently i n
our life. T h e feeling of exhilaration on a clear, fine day, of gloom
o n a day in the rainy season, of vitality when the young green bursts,
of gentleness when the spring rain falls, of freshness o n a summer
morning, of savageness on a day of violent wind and rain-we could
r u n through all the words that haiku uses to denote the season a n d
still not exhaust such climatic burdens. Our life is thus restricted by
a climate Possessed of a limitless range of states. So not only the
past but also climate are imposed on us.
Our being has a free in addition to this imposed character. W h a t
has already occurred happens in advance; what suffers imposition is
at the same time free; in this we see the historical nature of o u r
being. But this historical nature is bound u p with climatic nature,
so that if the imposition contains climate in addition to the past,
climatic limitation lends a certain character even to man's free activities.
I t goes without saying that clothes, food and the like, as being tools,
assume a climatic character; but, even more essentially, if man is
already suffering climatic limitation when he attains self-comprehen-
sion, then the character of climate cannot but become the charactef
of this self-understanding. I t is existentially evident to us that accord-
ing to the changes in the climate in which man lives, h e reveals all
sorts of distinctive characteristics in the expressions of his existence.
14 CHAPTER 1 THE BASIC P R I N C I P L E S OF CLIMATE CHAPTER 1 THE BASIC PRINCIPLES O F CLIMATE 15
self-comprehension becomes express. Hence clothes are devised t o
keep us warm or cool; they are of every style and thickness. Such
stuffs as wool, cotton and silk come to be socially recognized as mate-
rials for clothes. I t is clear, then, that such tools have a very close
relationship with climatic limitation. T o say, then, that tools are to
be found nearest to hand is, in fact, to say that climatic limitation is
the foremost factor in objective existence.
Climate, then, is the agent by which human life is objectivised,
and it is here that man comprehends himself; there is self-discovery in
climate. We discover ourselves in all manner of significances every
clay; it may be in a pleasant or a sad mood, but such feelings or
tempers are to be regarded not merely as mental states but as our
way of life. These, moreover, are not feelings that we are free to
choose of ourselves, but are imposed on us as pre-determined states.
Nor is it climate only that prescribes such pre-determined feelings,
for our individual and social existence controls the way of life of the
individual, which is dependent o n it in the form of pre-existent rela-
tionships, and imparts to him determined moods; it may sometimes
impart to society a determined mood in the form of a n existent histori-
cal situation. But the imposition of climate, united and involved
with these, is the most conspicuous. One morning we may find our-
selves "in a revived mowed". This is interpreted in terms of specific temperature and humidity conditions influencing us externally and
inducing internally a revived mental condition. But the facts are quite
different, for what we have here is not a mental state but the freshness
of the external atmosphere. But the object that is understoocl in
terms (Pf the temperature and the humidity of the atmosphere has not
the slightest similarity with the freshness itself. This freshness is a
state; it appertains to the atmosphere but it is neither the atmosphere
itself nor a property of the atmosphere. It is not that we have certaifi
states imposed on us by the atmosphere; the fact that the atmosphere
possesses a state of freshness is that we ourselves feel revived. We
discover ourselves, that is, in the atmosphere. But the freshness of
the atmosphere is not that of a mental state, as is shown best by the
fact that the morning feeling of freshness is embodied and expressed
directly in our mutual greetings. We comprehend ourselves in this
freshness of the atmosphere, for what is fresh is not o u r own mental
state but the atmosphere itself. So we do not need to go through the
process of examining others' mental states to be able to greet each
other with "Isn't i t a lovely morning?".
Such climatic burdens or impositions occur very frequently i n
our life. T h e feeling of exhilaration on a clear, fine day, of gloom
o n a day in the rainy season, of vitality when the young green bursts,
of gentleness when the spring rain falls, of freshness o n a summer
morning, of savageness on a day of violent wind and rain-we could
r u n through all the words that haiku uses to denote the season a n d
still not exhaust such climatic burdens. Our life is thus restricted by
a climate Possessed of a limitless range of states. So not only the
past but also climate are imposed on us.
Our being has a free in addition to this imposed character. W h a t
has already occurred happens in advance; what suffers imposition is
at the same time free; in this we see the historical nature of o u r
being. But this historical nature is bound u p with climatic nature,
so that if the imposition contains climate in addition to the past,
climatic limitation lends a certain character even to man's free activities.
I t goes without saying that clothes, food and the like, as being tools,
assume a climatic character; but, even more essentially, if man is
already suffering climatic limitation when he attains self-comprehen-
sion, then the character of climate cannot but become the charactef
of this self-understanding. I t is existentially evident to us that accord-
ing to the changes in the climate in which man lives, h e reveals all
sorts of distinctive characteristics in the expressions of his existence.
16 C H A P T E R 1 T H E BASIC P R I N C I P L E S O F C L I M A T E CHAPTER 1 THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF C L I M A T E :17
So if climatic character becomes the character of man's self-understand-
ing, it is this climatic character that we need to study and discover.
What, then, should be our approach to such a thing as climatic
character?
T h e climatic limitation of human life is a problem of the whole
climatic and historical structure; i t is not a concrete or specific problem
of man's way of life. I n the latter case, the limitation only takes
a distinctive form in a given country at a given age and this is a
distinctiveness that we are not concerned to study. Man's way of
life understood ontologically does not lead directly to a comprehen-
sion of the distinctive character of being; all it can do is to act as
go-between for such comprehension.
This being so, for an understanding of life lived in this distinctive
moulcl, we must apply ourselves to a direct comprehension of historical
and climatic phenomena. But would the latter understood merely
as objective lead to a full comprehension of climate in the sense in
which I have used it above? We must accept that it is only through
the interpretation of historical and climatic phenomena that we can
show that these phenomena are the expression of man's conscious
being, that climate is the organ of such self-objectivisation and self-
discovery and that the climatic character is the character of subjective
human existence. T h u s as long as this enquiry is directed to the
distinctiveness of distinctive being, it is an existential comprehension;
but in so far as it treats this distinctive way of life as the condition
of man's conscious being, it is ontological comprehension. T h u s a
grasp of the distinctive historical and climatic make-up of human being
becomes an ontological existential comprehension.
I n so far as climatic character is the subject of enquiry, i t cannot
help being so.
Our enquiry will, therefore, proceed from observations of distinc-
tive climatic phenomena to the distinctive nature of human life. I n
that climate is essentially historical climate, climatic types are simul-
taneously historical types. I do not seek to avoid this aspect, for i t
is one that cannot and should not be avoided. But I shall attempt
to treat this enquiry specifically from the aspect of climate, i n part
because it has been conspicuously neglected, a neglect which no doubt
arises from the difficulty of handling the problem i n a scholarly man-
ner. Herder attempted a "Climatic Study of the Human Spirit" from
a n exegesis of "Living Nature" and the outcome was, i n Kant's
criticism, not so much the labour of the scholar as the product of the
poet's imagination. This is a hazard that confronts anyone who dares
t o delve into the depths of the climatic problem. But I feel that i t
must be faced, for the problem of climatic characteristics should be p u t
under the searchlight of radical research and be thoroughly clarified
i n all its aspects, if only that historical enquiry might acquire a proper
concreteness.
(Drafted 1929; redrafted 193 1 ; revised 1935.)
16 C H A P T E R 1 T H E BASIC P R I N C I P L E S O F C L I M A T E CHAPTER 1 THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF C L I M A T E :17
So if climatic character becomes the character of man's self-understand-
ing, it is this climatic character that we need to study and discover.
What, then, should be our approach to such a thing as climatic
character?
T h e climatic limitation of human life is a problem of the whole
climatic and historical structure; i t is not a concrete or specific problem
of man's way of life. I n the latter case, the limitation only takes
a distinctive form in a given country at a given age and this is a
distinctiveness that we are not concerned to study. Man's way of
life understood ontologically does not lead directly to a comprehen-
sion of the distinctive character of being; all it can do is to act as
go-between for such comprehension.
This being so, for an understanding of life lived in this distinctive
moulcl, we must apply ourselves to a direct comprehension of historical
and climatic phenomena. But would the latter understood merely
as objective lead to a full comprehension of climate in the sense in
which I have used it above? We must accept that it is only through
the interpretation of historical and climatic phenomena that we can
show that these phenomena are the expression of man's conscious
being, that climate is the organ of such self-objectivisation and self-
discovery and that the climatic character is the character of subjective
human existence. T h u s as long as this enquiry is directed to the
distinctiveness of distinctive being, it is an existential comprehension;
but in so far as it treats this distinctive way of life as the condition
of man's conscious being, it is ontological comprehension. T h u s a
grasp of the distinctive historical and climatic make-up of human being
becomes an ontological existential comprehension.
I n so far as climatic character is the subject of enquiry, i t cannot
help being so.
Our enquiry will, therefore, proceed from observations of distinc-
tive climatic phenomena to the distinctive nature of human life. I n
that climate is essentially historical climate, climatic types are simul-
taneously historical types. I do not seek to avoid this aspect, for i t
is one that cannot and should not be avoided. But I shall attempt
to treat this enquiry specifically from the aspect of climate, i n part
because it has been conspicuously neglected, a neglect which no doubt
arises from the difficulty of handling the problem i n a scholarly man-
ner. Herder attempted a "Climatic Study of the Human Spirit" from
a n exegesis of "Living Nature" and the outcome was, i n Kant's
criticism, not so much the labour of the scholar as the product of the
poet's imagination. This is a hazard that confronts anyone who dares
t o delve into the depths of the climatic problem. But I feel that i t
must be faced, for the problem of climatic characteristics should be p u t
under the searchlight of radical research and be thoroughly clarified
i n all its aspects, if only that historical enquiry might acquire a proper
concreteness.
(Drafted 1929; redrafted 193 1 ; revised 1935.)