ClimatePrefaceandCh1.pdf

Preface

My purpose in this study is to clarify the function of climate as

a factor within the structure of human existence. So my problem

is not that of the ordering of man's life by his natural.environment.

Natural environment is usually understood as a n objective extension

of "human climate" regarded as a concrete basis. But when we come

to consider the relationship between this and human life, the latter

is already objectified, with the result that we find ourselves examin-

ing the relation between object and object, and there is no link with

subjective human existence. I t is the latter that is my concern here,

for it is essential to my position that the phenomena of climate are

treated as expressions of subjective human existence and not of natural

environment. I should like at the outset to register my protest against

this confusion.

I t was in the early summer of 1927 when I was reading Heideg-

ger's Zein u n d Seit i n Berlin that I first came to reflect o n the problem

of climate. I found myself intrigued by the attempt to treat the

structure of man's existence in terms of time but I found i t hard to

see why, when time had thus been made to play a part i n the struc-

ture of subjective existence, at the same juncture space also was not

postulated as part of the basic structure of existence. Indeed it would

be a mistake to allege that space is never taken into account in

Heidegger's thinking, for Lebendige Natur was given fresh life by

the German Romantics, yet even so it tended to be almost obscured

in the face of the strong glare to which time was exposed. I perceived

that herein lay the limitations of Heidegger's work, for time not linked

with space is not time in the true sense and Heidegger stopped short

at this point because his Dasein was the Dasein of the individual

or.:y. H e created human existence as bring the existence of a man.

Fr-?rn the standpoint of the dual structure--both individual and social-

of liuman existence, he did not advance beyond an abstraction of a

single aspect. But it is only when human existence is treated in

terms of its concrete duality that time and space are linked and that

history also (which never appears fully in Heidegger) is first revealed

in its true guise. And at the same time the connection between history

and climate becomes evident.

I t may well be that this problem presented itself to me because

it was precisely when my mind was full of a variety of impressions

about climate that I was confronted with a detailed examination of

the question of time. But again, it was precisely in that this problem

did present itself that I was made to ruminate over and to concentrate

my attention on my impressions about climate. I n this sense it would

be fair to argue that for my part it was the problems of time and

history that brought a realization of the question of climate. H a d

not these problems acted as intermediaries, my impressions of climate

woultl have stayed simply as such, mere impressions of climate. And,

in fact, the intermediary function that these considerations fulfilled

indicates the connection between climate and history.

I n the main, this work is based on notes for lectures given over

the period September 1928 to March 1929. T h i s series was given

very soon after my return from my travels outside Japan with the

result that, i n that I had no leisure to reflect in detail on the problems

of time and space in human existence, I took u p for discussion only

the consideration of climate. T h e greater part of the contents of

this book have been published piecemeal, with my original lecture

notes written u p and revised as the occasion arose, and only the last

chapter retains its basic format. From the outset, the several problems

were considered as intimately inter-related and though I am fully

conscious that there still remain considerable deficiencies, I have

vi

decided for the present to put my thoughts together and publish.

I should be gratefull for my colleagues' criticisms and suggestions.

August 1935

I have taken the opportunity of this re-edition to revise the

section o n China i n Chapter Three which was written i n 1928, when

leftist thinking was very prevalent. I have eliminated traces of leftist

theory a n d now present this chapter as a pure study of climate.

November 1943

vii

or.:y. H e created human existence as bring the existence of a man.

Fr-?rn the standpoint of the dual structure--both individual and social-

of liuman existence, he did not advance beyond an abstraction of a

single aspect. But it is only when human existence is treated in

terms of its concrete duality that time and space are linked and that

history also (which never appears fully in Heidegger) is first revealed

in its true guise. And at the same time the connection between history

and climate becomes evident.

I t may well be that this problem presented itself to me because

it was precisely when my mind was full of a variety of impressions

about climate that I was confronted with a detailed examination of

the question of time. But again, it was precisely in that this problem

did present itself that I was made to ruminate over and to concentrate

my attention on my impressions about climate. I n this sense it would

be fair to argue that for my part it was the problems of time and

history that brought a realization of the question of climate. H a d

not these problems acted as intermediaries, my impressions of climate

woultl have stayed simply as such, mere impressions of climate. And,

in fact, the intermediary function that these considerations fulfilled

indicates the connection between climate and history.

I n the main, this work is based on notes for lectures given over

the period September 1928 to March 1929. T h i s series was given

very soon after my return from my travels outside Japan with the

result that, i n that I had no leisure to reflect in detail on the problems

of time and space in human existence, I took u p for discussion only

the consideration of climate. T h e greater part of the contents of

this book have been published piecemeal, with my original lecture

notes written u p and revised as the occasion arose, and only the last

chapter retains its basic format. From the outset, the several problems

were considered as intimately inter-related and though I am fully

conscious that there still remain considerable deficiencies, I have

vi

decided for the present to put my thoughts together and publish.

I should be gratefull for my colleagues' criticisms and suggestions.

August 1935

I have taken the opportunity of this re-edition to revise the

section o n China i n Chapter Three which was written i n 1928, when

leftist thinking was very prevalent. I have eliminated traces of leftist

theory a n d now present this chapter as a pure study of climate.

November 1943

vii

CONTENTS

Translator's Preface ............................................................ i

....................................................................................... Preface v

CHAPTER 1 T H E BASIC PRINCIPLES OF CLIMATE ......... 1 (1) T h e Phenomena of Climate ........................... 1 (2) Climatic Limitation of Human Existence ...... 8

CHAPTER 2 T H R E E TYPES ............................................. 18 (1) bfonsoon .................................................... 18 (2) Desert ............................................................ 39 (3) Meadow ......................................................... 59

CHAPTER 3 T H E DISTINCTIVE NATURE OF MON-

SOON CLIMATE ....................................... 119 (1) China ............................................................ 119

(2) Japan ........................ ... .............................. 133 Japan's typhoon nature .............................. 133 T h e Uniqueness of Japan ........................ 156

CHAPTER 4 CLIMATE I N A R T ........................................ 171

Watsuji Tetsuro. the Man and his Work .................................... 209

CONTENTS

Translator's Preface ............................................................ i

....................................................................................... Preface v

CHAPTER 1 T H E BASIC PRINCIPLES OF CLIMATE ......... 1 (1) T h e Phenomena of Climate ........................... 1 (2) Climatic Limitation of Human Existence ...... 8

CHAPTER 2 T H R E E TYPES ............................................. 18 (1) bfonsoon .................................................... 18 (2) Desert ............................................................ 39 (3) Meadow ......................................................... 59

CHAPTER 3 T H E DISTINCTIVE NATURE OF MON-

SOON CLIMATE ....................................... 119 (1) China ............................................................ 119

(2) Japan ........................ ... .............................. 133 Japan's typhoon nature .............................. 133 T h e Uniqueness of Japan ........................ 156

CHAPTER 4 CLIMATE I N A R T ........................................ 171

Watsuji Tetsuro. the Man and his Work .................................... 209

Chapter 1 T h e Basic Principles of Climate

( 1 ) T h e P h e n o m e n a of Climate

I use our word Fu-do, which means literally, "Wind and E a r t h ,

as a general term for the natural environment of a given land, its

climate, its weather, the geological and productive nature of the soil,

its topographic and scenic features. T h e ancient term for this concept

was Sui-do, which might be literally translated as "Water and E a r t h .

Behind these terms lies the ancient view of Nature as man's environ-

ment compounded of earth, water, fire, and wind. It is not without

reason that I wish to treat this natural environment of man not as

"nature" but as "climate" in the above sense. But in order to clarify

my reason, I must, in the first place, deal with the phenomenon of

climate.

All of us live on a given land and the natural environment of

this land "environs" us whether we like it or not. People usually

discern this natural environment in the form of natural phenomena

of various kinds, and accordingly concern themselves with the influences

which such a natural environment exercises upon "us"-in some cases

upon "us" as biological and physiological objects and in other cases

upon "us" as being engaged in practical activities such as the forma- tion of a polity. Each of these influences is complicated enough to

demand specialized study. However, what I am here concerned with

is whether the climate we experience in daily life is to be regarded

as a natural phenomenon. I t is proper that natural science should

treat climate as a natural phenomenon, but it is another question

whether the phenomena of climate are in essence objects of natural

science.

By way of clarifying this question, let me quote as an example the

phenomenon of cold, which is merely one element within climate,

Chapter 1 T h e Basic Principles of Climate

( 1 ) T h e P h e n o m e n a of Climate

I use our word Fu-do, which means literally, "Wind and E a r t h ,

as a general term for the natural environment of a given land, its

climate, its weather, the geological and productive nature of the soil,

its topographic and scenic features. T h e ancient term for this concept

was Sui-do, which might be literally translated as "Water and E a r t h .

Behind these terms lies the ancient view of Nature as man's environ-

ment compounded of earth, water, fire, and wind. It is not without

reason that I wish to treat this natural environment of man not as

"nature" but as "climate" in the above sense. But in order to clarify

my reason, I must, in the first place, deal with the phenomenon of

climate.

All of us live on a given land and the natural environment of

this land "environs" us whether we like it or not. People usually

discern this natural environment in the form of natural phenomena

of various kinds, and accordingly concern themselves with the influences

which such a natural environment exercises upon "us"-in some cases

upon "us" as biological and physiological objects and in other cases

upon "us" as being engaged in practical activities such as the forma- tion of a polity. Each of these influences is complicated enough to

demand specialized study. However, what I am here concerned with

is whether the climate we experience in daily life is to be regarded

as a natural phenomenon. I t is proper that natural science should

treat climate as a natural phenomenon, but it is another question

whether the phenomena of climate are in essence objects of natural

science.

By way of clarifying this question, let me quote as an example the

phenomenon of cold, which is merely one element within climate,

2 C H A P T E R 1 T H E BASIC PRINCIPLES OF C L I M A T E CHAPTER 1 T H E BASIC PRINCIPLES OF CLIMATE 5

and is something distinct and evident as far as our common sense

is concerned. I t is an undeniable fact that we feel cold. But what

is this cold that we feel? Is it that air of a certain temperature, cold,

that is, as a physical object, stimulates the sensory organs in our body

so that we as psychological subjects experience it as a certain set mental

state? If so, it follows that the "cold" and "we" exist as separate

and independent entities in such a manner that only when the cold

presses upon us from outside is there created an "intentional" o r

directional relationship by which "we feel the cold". If this is the

case, i t is natural that this should be conceived in terms of the in-

fluence of the cold upon us.

But is this really so? How can we know the independent existence

of the cold before we feel cold? I t is impossible. I t is by feeling

cold, that we discover the cold. I t is simply by mistaking the inten-

tional relationship that we consider that the cold is pressing in o n

us from outside. I t is not true that the intentional relationship is

set u p only when an object presses from outside. As far as individual

consciousness is concerned, the subject possesses the intentional structure

within itself and itself "directs itself towards something". T h e "feel-

ing" of "feeling the cold" is not a "point" which establishes a relation-

ship directed at the cold, but it is in itself a relationship in virtue

of its "feeling" and it is in this relationship that we discover cold.

T h e intentionality of such a relational structure is thus a structure

of the subject in relation with the cold. T h e fact that "We feel t h e

cold" is, first and foremost, an "intentional experience" of this kind.

But, it may be argued, if this is the case, is not the cold merely

a moment of subjective experience? T h e cold thus discovered is cold

limited to the sphere of the "I". But what we call the cold is a

transcendental object outside the "I", and not a mere feeling of the

"I". Now how can a subjective experience establish a relation with

such a transcendental object? I n other words, how can the feeling

of cold relate itself to the coldness of the outside air? This question

involves a misunderstanding with regard to the object of the intention

in the intentional relationship. T h e object of intention is not a mental

entity. I t is not cold as an experience independent of objective cold

that is the intentional object. When we feel the cold, it is not the

"feeling" of cold that we feel, but the "coldness of the air" o r the

" c o l d . I n other words, the cold felt in intentional experience is

not subjective but objective. I t may be said, therefore, that an in-

tentional relation in which we feel the cold is itself related to the

coldness of the air. T h e cold as a transcendental existence only exists

in this intentionality. Therefore, there can be n o problem of the

relationship of the feeling of cold to the coldness of the air.

According to this view, the usual distinction between subject and

object, or more particularly the distinction between "the c o l d a n d

the "I" independently of each other, involves a certain misunderstand-

ing. When we feel cold, we ourselves are already in the coldness

of the outside air. T h a t we come into relation with the cold means

that we are outside in the cold. I n this sense, our state is characterized

by "ex-sistere" as Heidegger emphasizes, or, in our term, by "inten-

tionality".

T h i s leads me to the contention that we ourselves face ourselves in

the state of "ex-sistere". Even in cases where we do not face ourselves

by means of reflection or looking into ourselves, our selves are exposed

to ourselves. Reflection is merely a form of grasping ourselves. Fur-

thermore, it is not a primary mode of self-revelation. (But if the

word "reflect" is taken in its visual sense, i. e., if it is understood as

to dash against something and rebound from it and to reveal oneself i n

this rebound or reflection, it can be argued that the word may we11

indicate the way in which our selves are exposed to ourselves.) W e

fetl the cold, or we are out if! thd c6ld. Therefore, in feeling t h e

Cold, We discov&r b u ~ e l v & in the Cold itself. Tkds does not meah

2 C H A P T E R 1 T H E BASIC PRINCIPLES OF C L I M A T E CHAPTER 1 T H E BASIC PRINCIPLES OF CLIMATE 5

and is something distinct and evident as far as our common sense

is concerned. I t is an undeniable fact that we feel cold. But what

is this cold that we feel? Is it that air of a certain temperature, cold,

that is, as a physical object, stimulates the sensory organs in our body

so that we as psychological subjects experience it as a certain set mental

state? If so, it follows that the "cold" and "we" exist as separate

and independent entities in such a manner that only when the cold

presses upon us from outside is there created an "intentional" o r

directional relationship by which "we feel the cold". If this is the

case, i t is natural that this should be conceived in terms of the in-

fluence of the cold upon us.

But is this really so? How can we know the independent existence

of the cold before we feel cold? I t is impossible. I t is by feeling

cold, that we discover the cold. I t is simply by mistaking the inten-

tional relationship that we consider that the cold is pressing in o n

us from outside. I t is not true that the intentional relationship is

set u p only when an object presses from outside. As far as individual

consciousness is concerned, the subject possesses the intentional structure

within itself and itself "directs itself towards something". T h e "feel-

ing" of "feeling the cold" is not a "point" which establishes a relation-

ship directed at the cold, but it is in itself a relationship in virtue

of its "feeling" and it is in this relationship that we discover cold.

T h e intentionality of such a relational structure is thus a structure

of the subject in relation with the cold. T h e fact that "We feel t h e

cold" is, first and foremost, an "intentional experience" of this kind.

But, it may be argued, if this is the case, is not the cold merely

a moment of subjective experience? T h e cold thus discovered is cold

limited to the sphere of the "I". But what we call the cold is a

transcendental object outside the "I", and not a mere feeling of the

"I". Now how can a subjective experience establish a relation with

such a transcendental object? I n other words, how can the feeling

of cold relate itself to the coldness of the outside air? This question

involves a misunderstanding with regard to the object of the intention

in the intentional relationship. T h e object of intention is not a mental

entity. I t is not cold as an experience independent of objective cold

that is the intentional object. When we feel the cold, it is not the

"feeling" of cold that we feel, but the "coldness of the air" o r the

" c o l d . I n other words, the cold felt in intentional experience is

not subjective but objective. I t may be said, therefore, that an in-

tentional relation in which we feel the cold is itself related to the

coldness of the air. T h e cold as a transcendental existence only exists

in this intentionality. Therefore, there can be n o problem of the

relationship of the feeling of cold to the coldness of the air.

According to this view, the usual distinction between subject and

object, or more particularly the distinction between "the c o l d a n d

the "I" independently of each other, involves a certain misunderstand-

ing. When we feel cold, we ourselves are already in the coldness

of the outside air. T h a t we come into relation with the cold means

that we are outside in the cold. I n this sense, our state is characterized

by "ex-sistere" as Heidegger emphasizes, or, in our term, by "inten-

tionality".

T h i s leads me to the contention that we ourselves face ourselves in

the state of "ex-sistere". Even in cases where we do not face ourselves

by means of reflection or looking into ourselves, our selves are exposed

to ourselves. Reflection is merely a form of grasping ourselves. Fur-

thermore, it is not a primary mode of self-revelation. (But if the

word "reflect" is taken in its visual sense, i. e., if it is understood as

to dash against something and rebound from it and to reveal oneself i n

this rebound or reflection, it can be argued that the word may we11

indicate the way in which our selves are exposed to ourselves.) W e

fetl the cold, or we are out if! thd c6ld. Therefore, in feeling t h e

Cold, We discov&r b u ~ e l v & in the Cold itself. Tkds does not meah

4 CHAPTER I T H E BASIC PRINCIP1.ES OF CLIMATE CHAPTER 1 THE BASIC PRINCIPLES O F C L I M A T E 5

that we transfer our selves into the cold and there discover the selves

thus transferred. T h e instant that the cold is discovered, we are

already outside in the cold. Therefore, the basic essence of what is

"present outside" is not a thing or object such as the cold, but we

ourselves. "Ex-sistere" is the fundamental principle of the structure

of our selves, and i t is on this principle that intentionality depends.

T h a t we feel the cold is an intentional experience, in which we discover

our selves in the state of "ex-sistere", or our selves already outside in

the cold.

We have considered the problem in terms of individual conscious-

ness in the experience of cold. But, as we have been able to use the

expression "we feel cold", without any contradiction, it is "we", not

"I" alone that experience the cold. We feel the same cold in common.

It is precisely because of this that we can use terms describing the

cold in our exchange of daily greetings. T h e fact that the feeling

of cold differs between us is possible only o n the basis of our feeling

the cold in common. Without this basis it would be quite impossible

to recognise that any other "I" experiences the cold. Thus, it is not

"I" alone but "we", o r more strictly, "I" as "we" and "we" as "I" that are outside in the cold. T h e structure of which "ex-sistere"

is the fundamental principle is this "we", not the mere "I". Accord-

ingly, "ex-sistere" is "to be out among other '1's' " rather than "to

be out in a thing such as the cold". This is not a n intentional relation

b u t a "mutual relationship" of existence. T h u s it is primarily "we"

i n this "mutual relationship" that discover our selves in the cold.

I have attempted to define the phenomenon cold. However, we

d o not experience this kind of atmospheric phenomenon in isolation

from others of its kind. I t is experienced in relation to warmth, or

heat, or in connection with wind, rain, snow, sunshine, and so forth.

I n other words the cold is simply one of the whole series of similar

phenomena which we call weather. When we enter a warm room

after walking in the cold wind, when we stroll in the mild spring

breeze after a cold winter is over, or when we are caught in a

torrential shower on a boiling hot summer day, we first of all apprehend

ourselves within such meteorological phenomena, which are other

than our selves. Again, in changes in the weather, we first of all ap-

prehend changes i n ourselves. This weather, too, is not experienced

in isolation. I t is experienced only in relation to the soil, the topo-

graphic and scenic features and so on of a given land. A cold wind

may be experienced as a mountain blast or the cold, dry wind that

sweeps through Tokyo at the end of the winter. T h e spring breeze

may be one which blows off cherry blossoms or which caresses the

waves. So, too, the heat of summer may be of the kind to wither

rich verdure or to entice children to play merrily in the sea. As we

find o u r gladdened o r pained selves in a wind that scatters the cherry

blossoms, so d o we apprehend our wilting selves in the very heat of

summer that scorches down on plants and trees in a spell of dry weather.

I n other words, we find ourselves-ourselves as a n element in the

"mutual relationshipv-in "climate".

Such self-apprehension is not the recognition of the "I" as the

subject that feels the cold and the heat or as the subject that is glad-

dened by the cherry blossoms. I n these experiences we d o not look

towards the "subject". We stiffen, or we p u t o n warm clothes, o r

we draw near the brazier when we feel cold. Or, we may feel more

concern about putting clothes o n our children o r seeing that the old

are near the brazier. We work hard to have the money to buy more

clothes and charcoal. Charcoal burners make charcoal in the moun-

tains, and textile factories produce clothing materials. T h u s , in o u r

relationship with the cold, we come to engage ourselves, individually

and socially, in various measures for protecting ourselves from the

cold. I n the same way, when we rejoice in the cherry blossoms, we

d o not look to the subject; rather it is the blossoms that take o u r

4 CHAPTER I T H E BASIC PRINCIP1.ES OF CLIMATE CHAPTER 1 THE BASIC PRINCIPLES O F C L I M A T E 5

that we transfer our selves into the cold and there discover the selves

thus transferred. T h e instant that the cold is discovered, we are

already outside in the cold. Therefore, the basic essence of what is

"present outside" is not a thing or object such as the cold, but we

ourselves. "Ex-sistere" is the fundamental principle of the structure

of our selves, and i t is on this principle that intentionality depends.

T h a t we feel the cold is an intentional experience, in which we discover

our selves in the state of "ex-sistere", or our selves already outside in

the cold.

We have considered the problem in terms of individual conscious-

ness in the experience of cold. But, as we have been able to use the

expression "we feel cold", without any contradiction, it is "we", not

"I" alone that experience the cold. We feel the same cold in common.

It is precisely because of this that we can use terms describing the

cold in our exchange of daily greetings. T h e fact that the feeling

of cold differs between us is possible only o n the basis of our feeling

the cold in common. Without this basis it would be quite impossible

to recognise that any other "I" experiences the cold. Thus, it is not

"I" alone but "we", o r more strictly, "I" as "we" and "we" as "I" that are outside in the cold. T h e structure of which "ex-sistere"

is the fundamental principle is this "we", not the mere "I". Accord-

ingly, "ex-sistere" is "to be out among other '1's' " rather than "to

be out in a thing such as the cold". This is not a n intentional relation

b u t a "mutual relationship" of existence. T h u s it is primarily "we"

i n this "mutual relationship" that discover our selves in the cold.

I have attempted to define the phenomenon cold. However, we

d o not experience this kind of atmospheric phenomenon in isolation

from others of its kind. I t is experienced in relation to warmth, or

heat, or in connection with wind, rain, snow, sunshine, and so forth.

I n other words the cold is simply one of the whole series of similar

phenomena which we call weather. When we enter a warm room

after walking in the cold wind, when we stroll in the mild spring

breeze after a cold winter is over, or when we are caught in a

torrential shower on a boiling hot summer day, we first of all apprehend

ourselves within such meteorological phenomena, which are other

than our selves. Again, in changes in the weather, we first of all ap-

prehend changes i n ourselves. This weather, too, is not experienced

in isolation. I t is experienced only in relation to the soil, the topo-

graphic and scenic features and so on of a given land. A cold wind

may be experienced as a mountain blast or the cold, dry wind that

sweeps through Tokyo at the end of the winter. T h e spring breeze

may be one which blows off cherry blossoms or which caresses the

waves. So, too, the heat of summer may be of the kind to wither

rich verdure or to entice children to play merrily in the sea. As we

find o u r gladdened o r pained selves in a wind that scatters the cherry

blossoms, so d o we apprehend our wilting selves in the very heat of

summer that scorches down on plants and trees in a spell of dry weather.

I n other words, we find ourselves-ourselves as a n element in the

"mutual relationshipv-in "climate".

Such self-apprehension is not the recognition of the "I" as the

subject that feels the cold and the heat or as the subject that is glad-

dened by the cherry blossoms. I n these experiences we d o not look

towards the "subject". We stiffen, or we p u t o n warm clothes, o r

we draw near the brazier when we feel cold. Or, we may feel more

concern about putting clothes o n our children o r seeing that the old

are near the brazier. We work hard to have the money to buy more

clothes and charcoal. Charcoal burners make charcoal in the moun-

tains, and textile factories produce clothing materials. T h u s , in o u r

relationship with the cold, we come to engage ourselves, individually

and socially, in various measures for protecting ourselves from the

cold. I n the same way, when we rejoice in the cherry blossoms, we

d o not look to the subject; rather it is the blossoms that take o u r

6 C H A P T E R I THE BASIC PRINCIPLES O F CLIMATE CHAPTER 1 THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF CLIMATE 7

attention and we invite our friends to go blossoq-viewing, o r drink

a n d dance with them under the trees. T h u s in our relationship with

the spring scene, either individually or socially we adopt various

measures for securing enjoyment from it. T h e same may be said of

the summer heat or disasters such as storms and floods. I t is in our

relationship with the tyranny of nature that we first come to engage

ourselves in joint measures to secure early protection from such

tyranny. T h e apprehension of the self in climate is revealed as the

discovery of such measures; it is not the recognition of the subject.

T h e various measures which are thus discovered, such as clothes,

braziers, charcoal-burning, houses, blossom-viewing, dykes, drains,

anti-typhoon structures, and the like, are of course what we ourselves

have devised at our own discretion. I t is not, however, with no con-

nection with such climatic phenomena as the cold, the heat, and

the humidity that we have devised them. We have discovered ourselves

in climate, and in this self-apprehension we are directed to our free

creation. Further, it is not only we ourselves who today cooperate

to defend ourselves or work against the cold, the heat, the storm or

the flood. We possess an inheritance of self-apprehension accumulated

over the years since the time of our ancestors. A house style is a n

established mode of construction, and this cannot have come into be-

ing without some conneotion with climate. T h e house is a device for

protecting ourselves both from cold and from heat. T h e style of

architecture must be determined most of all by the degree of protection

required against cold or heat. T h e n a house must be so built as to

withstand storm, flood, earthquake, fire and the like. A heavy roof

is necessary against storm and flood, though it may be disadvantageous

i n the event of an earthquake. T h e house should be adapted to these

various conditions. Furthermore, humidity imposes severe limitations

o n residential style. Where the humidity is very high, thorough

ventilation is essential. 'Wood, paper and clay are the building ma.

terials that offer the best protection against humidity, but they give

n o protection at all against fire. These various restraints and con-

ditions are taken into account and accorded their degree of importance

before the pattern of the house of a given locality is finally established.

T h u s the determination of the architectural style of a house is a n ex-

pression of the self-apprehension of man within climate. T h e same

may be said about clothing styles. Here again, clothing styles have

been established socially over a long period, styles being determined

by climate. A style distinctive to a certain locality, perhaps because

of the latter's cultural supremacy, may be transplanted to another

locality with a different climate. (This can occur more readily with

dress than with architectural styles). But to whatever locality i t may

be transplanted, the fact that the style is conditioned by the climate

which produced it can never be effaced. European-style clothes remain European, even after more than half a century of wear i n Japan.

Such climatic conditioning is even more obvious in the case of food,

for i t is with climate that the production of food is most intimately

connected. I t is not that man made the choice between stock-raising

a n d fishing according to his preference for meat or fish. O n the contrary, he came to prefer either meat o r fish because climate deter-

mined whether he should engage i n stock-raising o r i n fishing. I n the same way, the predominant factor governing the choice between a

vegetable or a meat diet is climate, rather than the vegetarian's ideology.

So our appetite is not for food in general but for food prepared in

a certain way which has long been established. What we actually want when we are hungry is bread o r rice, a beef steak o r raw fish.

T h e way that food is prepared is a n expression of a people's climatic

self-apprehension and is something which has taken shape over many

generations. O u r ancestors ate shell-fish and seaweed long before

they mastered the skills of the farmer.

We can also discover climatic phenomena in all the expressions

of human activity, such as literature, art, religion, and manners and

6 C H A P T E R I THE BASIC PRINCIPLES O F CLIMATE CHAPTER 1 THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF CLIMATE 7

attention and we invite our friends to go blossoq-viewing, o r drink

a n d dance with them under the trees. T h u s in our relationship with

the spring scene, either individually or socially we adopt various

measures for securing enjoyment from it. T h e same may be said of

the summer heat or disasters such as storms and floods. I t is in our

relationship with the tyranny of nature that we first come to engage

ourselves in joint measures to secure early protection from such

tyranny. T h e apprehension of the self in climate is revealed as the

discovery of such measures; it is not the recognition of the subject.

T h e various measures which are thus discovered, such as clothes,

braziers, charcoal-burning, houses, blossom-viewing, dykes, drains,

anti-typhoon structures, and the like, are of course what we ourselves

have devised at our own discretion. I t is not, however, with no con-

nection with such climatic phenomena as the cold, the heat, and

the humidity that we have devised them. We have discovered ourselves

in climate, and in this self-apprehension we are directed to our free

creation. Further, it is not only we ourselves who today cooperate

to defend ourselves or work against the cold, the heat, the storm or

the flood. We possess an inheritance of self-apprehension accumulated

over the years since the time of our ancestors. A house style is a n

established mode of construction, and this cannot have come into be-

ing without some conneotion with climate. T h e house is a device for

protecting ourselves both from cold and from heat. T h e style of

architecture must be determined most of all by the degree of protection

required against cold or heat. T h e n a house must be so built as to

withstand storm, flood, earthquake, fire and the like. A heavy roof

is necessary against storm and flood, though it may be disadvantageous

i n the event of an earthquake. T h e house should be adapted to these

various conditions. Furthermore, humidity imposes severe limitations

o n residential style. Where the humidity is very high, thorough

ventilation is essential. 'Wood, paper and clay are the building ma.

terials that offer the best protection against humidity, but they give

n o protection at all against fire. These various restraints and con-

ditions are taken into account and accorded their degree of importance

before the pattern of the house of a given locality is finally established.

T h u s the determination of the architectural style of a house is a n ex-

pression of the self-apprehension of man within climate. T h e same

may be said about clothing styles. Here again, clothing styles have

been established socially over a long period, styles being determined

by climate. A style distinctive to a certain locality, perhaps because

of the latter's cultural supremacy, may be transplanted to another

locality with a different climate. (This can occur more readily with

dress than with architectural styles). But to whatever locality i t may

be transplanted, the fact that the style is conditioned by the climate

which produced it can never be effaced. European-style clothes remain European, even after more than half a century of wear i n Japan.

Such climatic conditioning is even more obvious in the case of food,

for i t is with climate that the production of food is most intimately

connected. I t is not that man made the choice between stock-raising

a n d fishing according to his preference for meat or fish. O n the contrary, he came to prefer either meat o r fish because climate deter-

mined whether he should engage i n stock-raising o r i n fishing. I n the same way, the predominant factor governing the choice between a

vegetable or a meat diet is climate, rather than the vegetarian's ideology.

So our appetite is not for food in general but for food prepared in

a certain way which has long been established. What we actually want when we are hungry is bread o r rice, a beef steak o r raw fish.

T h e way that food is prepared is a n expression of a people's climatic

self-apprehension and is something which has taken shape over many

generations. O u r ancestors ate shell-fish and seaweed long before

they mastered the skills of the farmer.

We can also discover climatic phenomena in all the expressions

of human activity, such as literature, art, religion, and manners and

8 CHAPTER I THE BASIC PRINCIP:.ES OF CLIMATE C H A P T F R 1 T H E BASIC PRINCIPLES O F C L I M A T E 9

customs. This is a natural consequence as long as man apprehends

himself in climate. I t is evident, therefore, that climatic phenomena

understood in this light differ from phenomena studied by natural

science. T o consider a sea-food diet as a climatic phenomenon is not

to regard climate merely as natural environment. T o interpret artistic

style in relation to climate is to indicate the inseparability of climate

from history. T h e most frequent misunderstanding about climate

occurs in the commonplace view that influences exist between man a n d

his natural environment.

Here, however, the factors of human existence and history have

been excluded from the concrete phenomena of climate, which are

regarded merely as natural environment. It is from such a standpoint

that it is often said that not only is man conditioned by climate, but

that he, in his turn, works o n and transforms climate. But this is t o

ignore the true nature of climate. We, on the other hand, have seen

that it is in climate that man apprehends himself. T h e activity of

man's self-apprehension, man, that is, in his dual character of individual

and social being, is at the same time of a historical nature. Therefore,

climate does not exist apart from history, nor history apart from climate.

This can only be understood from the fundamental structure of human

existence.

( 2 ) Climatic Limitation of Human Existence

I have defined climate as a means for man to discover himself.

Rut what is this "man"? If one is to interpret climate as one of the

forms of limitation on human existence, one should attempt to state,

in broad terms, the place this limitation has in the general structure

of human existence.

By "man" I mean ngt the individual (anthrhpos, homo, homme,

etc.) but man both in this individual sense and at the same time

man in society, the combination o r the association of man. T h i s

duality is the essential nature of man. Sd neither anthropology,

which treats man the individual, nor sociology, which takes u p the

other aspect, can grasp the real or full substance of man. For a true

and full understanding, one must treat man both as individual and

as whole; i t is only when the analysis of human existence is made from

this viewpoint that it becomes evident that this existence is completely

and absolutely negative activity. And human existence is precisely

the realisation of this negative activity.

Human existence, through fragmentation into countless individual

entities, is the activity which brings into being all forms of combina-

tion a n d community. Such fragmentation and union are essentially

of a self-active and practical nature and cannot come about in the

absence of self-active entities. Hence, space and time in this self-active

sense, form the fundamental structure of these activities. I t is a t this

point that space and time are grasped i n their essential form and their

inseparability becomes distinct. An attempt to treat the structure of

human existence as one of time only would fall into the error of trying

to discover human existence on the level only of individual con-

sciousness. But if the dual character of human existence is taken as the

essential nature of man, then it is immediately clear that space must

be regarded as linked with time.

W i t h the elucidation of the space-and time-nature of human ex-

istence, the structure of human association also appears in its true

light. T h e several unions and combinations that man fashions evolve

intrinsically according to a certain order. They are to be regarded

as not static social structures but as active and evolving systems. They

are the realisation of negative activity. T h i s is how history took shape.

Here the space-and time-structure of human existence is revealed

as climate and history: the inseparability of time a n d space is the

basis of the inseparability of history and climate. No social forma-

tion could exist if i t lacked all foundation in the space-structure of

man, nor does time become history unless it is founded in such social

8 CHAPTER I THE BASIC PRINCIP:.ES OF CLIMATE C H A P T F R 1 T H E BASIC PRINCIPLES O F C L I M A T E 9

customs. This is a natural consequence as long as man apprehends

himself in climate. I t is evident, therefore, that climatic phenomena

understood in this light differ from phenomena studied by natural

science. T o consider a sea-food diet as a climatic phenomenon is not

to regard climate merely as natural environment. T o interpret artistic

style in relation to climate is to indicate the inseparability of climate

from history. T h e most frequent misunderstanding about climate

occurs in the commonplace view that influences exist between man a n d

his natural environment.

Here, however, the factors of human existence and history have

been excluded from the concrete phenomena of climate, which are

regarded merely as natural environment. It is from such a standpoint

that it is often said that not only is man conditioned by climate, but

that he, in his turn, works o n and transforms climate. But this is t o

ignore the true nature of climate. We, on the other hand, have seen

that it is in climate that man apprehends himself. T h e activity of

man's self-apprehension, man, that is, in his dual character of individual

and social being, is at the same time of a historical nature. Therefore,

climate does not exist apart from history, nor history apart from climate.

This can only be understood from the fundamental structure of human

existence.

( 2 ) Climatic Limitation of Human Existence

I have defined climate as a means for man to discover himself.

Rut what is this "man"? If one is to interpret climate as one of the

forms of limitation on human existence, one should attempt to state,

in broad terms, the place this limitation has in the general structure

of human existence.

By "man" I mean ngt the individual (anthrhpos, homo, homme,

etc.) but man both in this individual sense and at the same time

man in society, the combination o r the association of man. T h i s

duality is the essential nature of man. Sd neither anthropology,

which treats man the individual, nor sociology, which takes u p the

other aspect, can grasp the real or full substance of man. For a true

and full understanding, one must treat man both as individual and

as whole; i t is only when the analysis of human existence is made from

this viewpoint that it becomes evident that this existence is completely

and absolutely negative activity. And human existence is precisely

the realisation of this negative activity.

Human existence, through fragmentation into countless individual

entities, is the activity which brings into being all forms of combina-

tion a n d community. Such fragmentation and union are essentially

of a self-active and practical nature and cannot come about in the

absence of self-active entities. Hence, space and time in this self-active

sense, form the fundamental structure of these activities. I t is a t this

point that space and time are grasped i n their essential form and their

inseparability becomes distinct. An attempt to treat the structure of

human existence as one of time only would fall into the error of trying

to discover human existence on the level only of individual con-

sciousness. But if the dual character of human existence is taken as the

essential nature of man, then it is immediately clear that space must

be regarded as linked with time.

W i t h the elucidation of the space-and time-nature of human ex-

istence, the structure of human association also appears in its true

light. T h e several unions and combinations that man fashions evolve

intrinsically according to a certain order. They are to be regarded

as not static social structures but as active and evolving systems. They

are the realisation of negative activity. T h i s is how history took shape.

Here the space-and time-structure of human existence is revealed

as climate and history: the inseparability of time a n d space is the

basis of the inseparability of history and climate. No social forma-

tion could exist if i t lacked all foundation in the space-structure of

man, nor does time become history unless it is founded in such social

10 CHAPTER 1 T H E BASIC PRINCIPLES O F CLIMATE CHAPTER 1 THE BASIC PRINCIPLES O F C L I M A T E 11

being, for history is the structure of exi:tence in society. Here also

we see clearly the duality of human existence-the finite and the

infinite. Men die; their world changes; but through this unending

death and change, man lives and his world continues. I t continues

incessantly through ending incessantly. I n the individual's eyes, it is

a case of an "existence for death", but from the standpoint of society

it is an "existence for life". T h u s human existence is both individual

and social. But it is not only history that is the structure of social

existence, for climate is also a part of this structure and, a t that, a

part quite inseparable from history. For it is from the union of

climate with history that the latter gets its flesh and bones. I n terms

of the contrast between spirit and matter, history can never be merely

spiritual self-development. For it is only when, as self-active being,

the spirit objectivises itself, in other words, only when it includes such

self-active physical principle that it becomes history, as self-develop-

ment. This "self-active physical principle", as we might term it, is

climate. T h e human duality, of the finite and the infinite, is most

plainly revealell as the historical and climatic structure.

It is here that climate is revealed; for mankind is saddled not

simply with a general past but with a specific climatic past; a general

formal historical structure is substantiated by a specific content. I t

is only in this way that the historical being of mankind can become

the being of man in a given country at a given age. Again, climate

as this specific content does not exist alone and in isolation from

history, entering and becoming a part of the content of history a t a

later juncture. From the very first, climate is historical climate. I n

the dual structure of map-the historical and the climatic-history is

climatic history and climate is historical climate. History and climate

in isolation from each other are mere abstractions; climate as I shall

consider it is the essential climate that has not undergone this abstrac-

tion.

Such, then, is the place of climatic limitation in the structure of

human life. I t will n o doubt be evident that there are certain points

of similarity between the problem of climate and that of "body" in

traditional anthropology, which took as its study the individual nature

abstracted from the duality of the individual and the social. It then

endeavoured to treat man, divorced from his relationships, as a duality

of body and spirit, but all efforts to clearly grasp this distinction be-

tween body and spirit led to a final disregard for the unity in this

distinction. This was essentially because the body was taken as equiva-

lent to a "material body" and divorced from concrete self-active

principle. I t was for this reason that anthropology was divided into

spiritualist and materialist camps, the one developing from psychology

towards epistemology, the other moving in the direction either of

anthropology as a branch of zoology, or of physiology and anatomy.

But the philosophical anthropology of today is attempting to heal

this division and again treat man as a duality of spirit and body.

So the crux of the problem becomes the realisation that the body is

not mere matter; in other words, it is the problem of the self-active

nature of the body. Yet anthropology will always be the study of

"individual man" rather than of "man in his social relationship".

We, in this enquiry, are pursuing a problem of a similar nature,

although ours, that of the duality of human nature, is the more funda-

mental. T h e self-active nature of the body has as its foundation the

spatial and temporal structure of human life; a self-active body cannot

remain in isolation for its structure is dynamic, uniting in isolation

and isolated within union. When various social combinations are

evolved within this dynamic structure it becomes something historical

or climatic. Climate, too, as part of man's body, was regarded like

the body as mere matter, and so came to be viewed objectively as

mere natural environment. So the self-active nature of climate must

be retrieved in the same sense that the self-active nature of the body

10 CHAPTER 1 T H E BASIC PRINCIPLES O F CLIMATE CHAPTER 1 THE BASIC PRINCIPLES O F C L I M A T E 11

being, for history is the structure of exi:tence in society. Here also

we see clearly the duality of human existence-the finite and the

infinite. Men die; their world changes; but through this unending

death and change, man lives and his world continues. I t continues

incessantly through ending incessantly. I n the individual's eyes, it is

a case of an "existence for death", but from the standpoint of society

it is an "existence for life". T h u s human existence is both individual

and social. But it is not only history that is the structure of social

existence, for climate is also a part of this structure and, a t that, a

part quite inseparable from history. For it is from the union of

climate with history that the latter gets its flesh and bones. I n terms

of the contrast between spirit and matter, history can never be merely

spiritual self-development. For it is only when, as self-active being,

the spirit objectivises itself, in other words, only when it includes such

self-active physical principle that it becomes history, as self-develop-

ment. This "self-active physical principle", as we might term it, is

climate. T h e human duality, of the finite and the infinite, is most

plainly revealell as the historical and climatic structure.

It is here that climate is revealed; for mankind is saddled not

simply with a general past but with a specific climatic past; a general

formal historical structure is substantiated by a specific content. I t

is only in this way that the historical being of mankind can become

the being of man in a given country at a given age. Again, climate

as this specific content does not exist alone and in isolation from

history, entering and becoming a part of the content of history a t a

later juncture. From the very first, climate is historical climate. I n

the dual structure of map-the historical and the climatic-history is

climatic history and climate is historical climate. History and climate

in isolation from each other are mere abstractions; climate as I shall

consider it is the essential climate that has not undergone this abstrac-

tion.

Such, then, is the place of climatic limitation in the structure of

human life. I t will n o doubt be evident that there are certain points

of similarity between the problem of climate and that of "body" in

traditional anthropology, which took as its study the individual nature

abstracted from the duality of the individual and the social. It then

endeavoured to treat man, divorced from his relationships, as a duality

of body and spirit, but all efforts to clearly grasp this distinction be-

tween body and spirit led to a final disregard for the unity in this

distinction. This was essentially because the body was taken as equiva-

lent to a "material body" and divorced from concrete self-active

principle. I t was for this reason that anthropology was divided into

spiritualist and materialist camps, the one developing from psychology

towards epistemology, the other moving in the direction either of

anthropology as a branch of zoology, or of physiology and anatomy.

But the philosophical anthropology of today is attempting to heal

this division and again treat man as a duality of spirit and body.

So the crux of the problem becomes the realisation that the body is

not mere matter; in other words, it is the problem of the self-active

nature of the body. Yet anthropology will always be the study of

"individual man" rather than of "man in his social relationship".

We, in this enquiry, are pursuing a problem of a similar nature,

although ours, that of the duality of human nature, is the more funda-

mental. T h e self-active nature of the body has as its foundation the

spatial and temporal structure of human life; a self-active body cannot

remain in isolation for its structure is dynamic, uniting in isolation

and isolated within union. When various social combinations are

evolved within this dynamic structure it becomes something historical

or climatic. Climate, too, as part of man's body, was regarded like

the body as mere matter, and so came to be viewed objectively as

mere natural environment. So the self-active nature of climate must

be retrieved in the same sense that the self-active nature of the body

12 C H A P T E R 1 T H E BASIC PRINCIPI.ES OF CLIMATE CHAPTER 1 THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF CLIMATE 13

has to be retrieved. I t would be fair to say, then, that, i n its most funda-

mental significance, the relation between body and spirit lics in the

relation between the body and the spirit of "man in his social relation-

ships", the individual and social body-spirit relation which includes

the relationship with history and climate.

T h e problem of climate affords a pointer for any attempt to analyse

the structure of human life. T h e ontological comprehension of human

life is not to be attained by a mere transcendence which regards the

structure as one of time, for this has to be transcendence in the sense

of the discovery of the self in the other and the subsequent reversal

to absolute negation in the union of self and other. Jn this case, the

relationships between man and man must be o n a transcendent plane

and the relationships themselves, the basis for the discovery of self and

other, must already be essentially on a plane which "stands outside"

(ex-sistere) . Transcendence itself must have assumed some historical significance, as being the temporal structure of such relationships. I t

is not something in the individual consciousness but the relationships

themselves that constantly reach into the future. Time in individual

consciousness is a mere abstraction on the basis of the history of the

relationships. Transcendence also "stands outside" (ex-sistere) cli-

matically. I n other words, man discovers himself in climate. From

the standpoint of the individual, this becomes consciousness of the

body, but in the context of the more concrete ground of human life,

it reveals itself in the ways of creating communities, presence conscious-

ness, in the ways of consciousness, and thus in the ways of constructing

speech, the methods of production, the styles of building, and so on.

Transcendence, as the structure of human life, must include all these

entities.

T h u s climate is seen to be the factor by which self-active human

being can be made objective: climatic phenomena show man how

to discover himself as "standing outside" (i.e., ex-sistere) . T h e self

discovered by the cold turns into tools devised against the cold, such

a> houses or clothes, which then confront the self. Again climate

itself, the climate in which we move, and in which we "stand outside",

becomes a tool to be used. T h e cold, for instance, is not only some-

thing that sends us off for warm clothes; it can also be utilised to freeze

the bean-curd. Heat is not only something that makes us use a fan;

it is also the heat that nourishes the rice-plants. M7ind has us scurry-

ing to the temple to pray for safety through the typhoon season; it

is also the wind that fills a sail. So even in such relationships we

"stand outside" in climate and understand our selves from it, our

selves, that is, as consumers or users. I n other words, this self-com-

prehension through climate at the same time leads us to discover

ourselves as confronted with such tools.

There is much to be learnt from the thought that such tools are

t o be found very near to hand i n human life. A tool is essentially

"for doing something". A hammer is for beating, a shoe for wearing.

But the object that is "for doing something else" has a n immanent

connection with the purpose for which it is employed. T h e hammer,

for example, is a tool for making shoes, and shoes, again, are tools for

walking. T h e essential character of the tool lies i n its being "for a

purpose", lies, that is, in this purpose-relation. Now this purpose-

relation derives from human life and at its basis we find the climatic

limitation of human life. Shoes may be tools for walking, but the

great majority of mankind could walk without them; it is rather cold

and heat that make shoes necessary. Clothes are to be worn, yet they

are worn above all as a protection against cold. T h u s this purpose-

relation finds its final origin in climatic self-comprehension. As well

as understanding ourselves in cold or heat, we take measures, as free

agents, for protection. We should not devise clothes completely

spontaneously i n the absence of the factors of cold o r heat. I t is when

we proceed from "for our protection" to "with what" that climatic

12 C H A P T E R 1 T H E BASIC PRINCIPI.ES OF CLIMATE CHAPTER 1 THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF CLIMATE 13

has to be retrieved. I t would be fair to say, then, that, i n its most funda-

mental significance, the relation between body and spirit lics in the

relation between the body and the spirit of "man in his social relation-

ships", the individual and social body-spirit relation which includes

the relationship with history and climate.

T h e problem of climate affords a pointer for any attempt to analyse

the structure of human life. T h e ontological comprehension of human

life is not to be attained by a mere transcendence which regards the

structure as one of time, for this has to be transcendence in the sense

of the discovery of the self in the other and the subsequent reversal

to absolute negation in the union of self and other. Jn this case, the

relationships between man and man must be o n a transcendent plane

and the relationships themselves, the basis for the discovery of self and

other, must already be essentially on a plane which "stands outside"

(ex-sistere) . Transcendence itself must have assumed some historical significance, as being the temporal structure of such relationships. I t

is not something in the individual consciousness but the relationships

themselves that constantly reach into the future. Time in individual

consciousness is a mere abstraction on the basis of the history of the

relationships. Transcendence also "stands outside" (ex-sistere) cli-

matically. I n other words, man discovers himself in climate. From

the standpoint of the individual, this becomes consciousness of the

body, but in the context of the more concrete ground of human life,

it reveals itself in the ways of creating communities, presence conscious-

ness, in the ways of consciousness, and thus in the ways of constructing

speech, the methods of production, the styles of building, and so on.

Transcendence, as the structure of human life, must include all these

entities.

T h u s climate is seen to be the factor by which self-active human

being can be made objective: climatic phenomena show man how

to discover himself as "standing outside" (i.e., ex-sistere) . T h e self

discovered by the cold turns into tools devised against the cold, such

a> houses or clothes, which then confront the self. Again climate

itself, the climate in which we move, and in which we "stand outside",

becomes a tool to be used. T h e cold, for instance, is not only some-

thing that sends us off for warm clothes; it can also be utilised to freeze

the bean-curd. Heat is not only something that makes us use a fan;

it is also the heat that nourishes the rice-plants. M7ind has us scurry-

ing to the temple to pray for safety through the typhoon season; it

is also the wind that fills a sail. So even in such relationships we

"stand outside" in climate and understand our selves from it, our

selves, that is, as consumers or users. I n other words, this self-com-

prehension through climate at the same time leads us to discover

ourselves as confronted with such tools.

There is much to be learnt from the thought that such tools are

t o be found very near to hand i n human life. A tool is essentially

"for doing something". A hammer is for beating, a shoe for wearing.

But the object that is "for doing something else" has a n immanent

connection with the purpose for which it is employed. T h e hammer,

for example, is a tool for making shoes, and shoes, again, are tools for

walking. T h e essential character of the tool lies i n its being "for a

purpose", lies, that is, in this purpose-relation. Now this purpose-

relation derives from human life and at its basis we find the climatic

limitation of human life. Shoes may be tools for walking, but the

great majority of mankind could walk without them; it is rather cold

and heat that make shoes necessary. Clothes are to be worn, yet they

are worn above all as a protection against cold. T h u s this purpose-

relation finds its final origin in climatic self-comprehension. As well

as understanding ourselves in cold or heat, we take measures, as free

agents, for protection. We should not devise clothes completely

spontaneously i n the absence of the factors of cold o r heat. I t is when

we proceed from "for our protection" to "with what" that climatic

14 CHAPTER 1 THE BASIC P R I N C I P L E S OF CLIMATE CHAPTER 1 THE BASIC PRINCIPLES O F CLIMATE 15

self-comprehension becomes express. Hence clothes are devised t o

keep us warm or cool; they are of every style and thickness. Such

stuffs as wool, cotton and silk come to be socially recognized as mate-

rials for clothes. I t is clear, then, that such tools have a very close

relationship with climatic limitation. T o say, then, that tools are to

be found nearest to hand is, in fact, to say that climatic limitation is

the foremost factor in objective existence.

Climate, then, is the agent by which human life is objectivised,

and it is here that man comprehends himself; there is self-discovery in

climate. We discover ourselves in all manner of significances every

clay; it may be in a pleasant or a sad mood, but such feelings or

tempers are to be regarded not merely as mental states but as our

way of life. These, moreover, are not feelings that we are free to

choose of ourselves, but are imposed on us as pre-determined states.

Nor is it climate only that prescribes such pre-determined feelings,

for our individual and social existence controls the way of life of the

individual, which is dependent o n it in the form of pre-existent rela-

tionships, and imparts to him determined moods; it may sometimes

impart to society a determined mood in the form of a n existent histori-

cal situation. But the imposition of climate, united and involved

with these, is the most conspicuous. One morning we may find our-

selves "in a revived mowed". This is interpreted in terms of specific temperature and humidity conditions influencing us externally and

inducing internally a revived mental condition. But the facts are quite

different, for what we have here is not a mental state but the freshness

of the external atmosphere. But the object that is understoocl in

terms (Pf the temperature and the humidity of the atmosphere has not

the slightest similarity with the freshness itself. This freshness is a

state; it appertains to the atmosphere but it is neither the atmosphere

itself nor a property of the atmosphere. It is not that we have certaifi

states imposed on us by the atmosphere; the fact that the atmosphere

possesses a state of freshness is that we ourselves feel revived. We

discover ourselves, that is, in the atmosphere. But the freshness of

the atmosphere is not that of a mental state, as is shown best by the

fact that the morning feeling of freshness is embodied and expressed

directly in our mutual greetings. We comprehend ourselves in this

freshness of the atmosphere, for what is fresh is not o u r own mental

state but the atmosphere itself. So we do not need to go through the

process of examining others' mental states to be able to greet each

other with "Isn't i t a lovely morning?".

Such climatic burdens or impositions occur very frequently i n

our life. T h e feeling of exhilaration on a clear, fine day, of gloom

o n a day in the rainy season, of vitality when the young green bursts,

of gentleness when the spring rain falls, of freshness o n a summer

morning, of savageness on a day of violent wind and rain-we could

r u n through all the words that haiku uses to denote the season a n d

still not exhaust such climatic burdens. Our life is thus restricted by

a climate Possessed of a limitless range of states. So not only the

past but also climate are imposed on us.

Our being has a free in addition to this imposed character. W h a t

has already occurred happens in advance; what suffers imposition is

at the same time free; in this we see the historical nature of o u r

being. But this historical nature is bound u p with climatic nature,

so that if the imposition contains climate in addition to the past,

climatic limitation lends a certain character even to man's free activities.

I t goes without saying that clothes, food and the like, as being tools,

assume a climatic character; but, even more essentially, if man is

already suffering climatic limitation when he attains self-comprehen-

sion, then the character of climate cannot but become the charactef

of this self-understanding. I t is existentially evident to us that accord-

ing to the changes in the climate in which man lives, h e reveals all

sorts of distinctive characteristics in the expressions of his existence.

14 CHAPTER 1 THE BASIC P R I N C I P L E S OF CLIMATE CHAPTER 1 THE BASIC PRINCIPLES O F CLIMATE 15

self-comprehension becomes express. Hence clothes are devised t o

keep us warm or cool; they are of every style and thickness. Such

stuffs as wool, cotton and silk come to be socially recognized as mate-

rials for clothes. I t is clear, then, that such tools have a very close

relationship with climatic limitation. T o say, then, that tools are to

be found nearest to hand is, in fact, to say that climatic limitation is

the foremost factor in objective existence.

Climate, then, is the agent by which human life is objectivised,

and it is here that man comprehends himself; there is self-discovery in

climate. We discover ourselves in all manner of significances every

clay; it may be in a pleasant or a sad mood, but such feelings or

tempers are to be regarded not merely as mental states but as our

way of life. These, moreover, are not feelings that we are free to

choose of ourselves, but are imposed on us as pre-determined states.

Nor is it climate only that prescribes such pre-determined feelings,

for our individual and social existence controls the way of life of the

individual, which is dependent o n it in the form of pre-existent rela-

tionships, and imparts to him determined moods; it may sometimes

impart to society a determined mood in the form of a n existent histori-

cal situation. But the imposition of climate, united and involved

with these, is the most conspicuous. One morning we may find our-

selves "in a revived mowed". This is interpreted in terms of specific temperature and humidity conditions influencing us externally and

inducing internally a revived mental condition. But the facts are quite

different, for what we have here is not a mental state but the freshness

of the external atmosphere. But the object that is understoocl in

terms (Pf the temperature and the humidity of the atmosphere has not

the slightest similarity with the freshness itself. This freshness is a

state; it appertains to the atmosphere but it is neither the atmosphere

itself nor a property of the atmosphere. It is not that we have certaifi

states imposed on us by the atmosphere; the fact that the atmosphere

possesses a state of freshness is that we ourselves feel revived. We

discover ourselves, that is, in the atmosphere. But the freshness of

the atmosphere is not that of a mental state, as is shown best by the

fact that the morning feeling of freshness is embodied and expressed

directly in our mutual greetings. We comprehend ourselves in this

freshness of the atmosphere, for what is fresh is not o u r own mental

state but the atmosphere itself. So we do not need to go through the

process of examining others' mental states to be able to greet each

other with "Isn't i t a lovely morning?".

Such climatic burdens or impositions occur very frequently i n

our life. T h e feeling of exhilaration on a clear, fine day, of gloom

o n a day in the rainy season, of vitality when the young green bursts,

of gentleness when the spring rain falls, of freshness o n a summer

morning, of savageness on a day of violent wind and rain-we could

r u n through all the words that haiku uses to denote the season a n d

still not exhaust such climatic burdens. Our life is thus restricted by

a climate Possessed of a limitless range of states. So not only the

past but also climate are imposed on us.

Our being has a free in addition to this imposed character. W h a t

has already occurred happens in advance; what suffers imposition is

at the same time free; in this we see the historical nature of o u r

being. But this historical nature is bound u p with climatic nature,

so that if the imposition contains climate in addition to the past,

climatic limitation lends a certain character even to man's free activities.

I t goes without saying that clothes, food and the like, as being tools,

assume a climatic character; but, even more essentially, if man is

already suffering climatic limitation when he attains self-comprehen-

sion, then the character of climate cannot but become the charactef

of this self-understanding. I t is existentially evident to us that accord-

ing to the changes in the climate in which man lives, h e reveals all

sorts of distinctive characteristics in the expressions of his existence.

16 C H A P T E R 1 T H E BASIC P R I N C I P L E S O F C L I M A T E CHAPTER 1 THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF C L I M A T E :17

So if climatic character becomes the character of man's self-understand-

ing, it is this climatic character that we need to study and discover.

What, then, should be our approach to such a thing as climatic

character?

T h e climatic limitation of human life is a problem of the whole

climatic and historical structure; i t is not a concrete or specific problem

of man's way of life. I n the latter case, the limitation only takes

a distinctive form in a given country at a given age and this is a

distinctiveness that we are not concerned to study. Man's way of

life understood ontologically does not lead directly to a comprehen-

sion of the distinctive character of being; all it can do is to act as

go-between for such comprehension.

This being so, for an understanding of life lived in this distinctive

moulcl, we must apply ourselves to a direct comprehension of historical

and climatic phenomena. But would the latter understood merely

as objective lead to a full comprehension of climate in the sense in

which I have used it above? We must accept that it is only through

the interpretation of historical and climatic phenomena that we can

show that these phenomena are the expression of man's conscious

being, that climate is the organ of such self-objectivisation and self-

discovery and that the climatic character is the character of subjective

human existence. T h u s as long as this enquiry is directed to the

distinctiveness of distinctive being, it is an existential comprehension;

but in so far as it treats this distinctive way of life as the condition

of man's conscious being, it is ontological comprehension. T h u s a

grasp of the distinctive historical and climatic make-up of human being

becomes an ontological existential comprehension.

I n so far as climatic character is the subject of enquiry, i t cannot

help being so.

Our enquiry will, therefore, proceed from observations of distinc-

tive climatic phenomena to the distinctive nature of human life. I n

that climate is essentially historical climate, climatic types are simul-

taneously historical types. I do not seek to avoid this aspect, for i t

is one that cannot and should not be avoided. But I shall attempt

to treat this enquiry specifically from the aspect of climate, i n part

because it has been conspicuously neglected, a neglect which no doubt

arises from the difficulty of handling the problem i n a scholarly man-

ner. Herder attempted a "Climatic Study of the Human Spirit" from

a n exegesis of "Living Nature" and the outcome was, i n Kant's

criticism, not so much the labour of the scholar as the product of the

poet's imagination. This is a hazard that confronts anyone who dares

t o delve into the depths of the climatic problem. But I feel that i t

must be faced, for the problem of climatic characteristics should be p u t

under the searchlight of radical research and be thoroughly clarified

i n all its aspects, if only that historical enquiry might acquire a proper

concreteness.

(Drafted 1929; redrafted 193 1 ; revised 1935.)

16 C H A P T E R 1 T H E BASIC P R I N C I P L E S O F C L I M A T E CHAPTER 1 THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF C L I M A T E :17

So if climatic character becomes the character of man's self-understand-

ing, it is this climatic character that we need to study and discover.

What, then, should be our approach to such a thing as climatic

character?

T h e climatic limitation of human life is a problem of the whole

climatic and historical structure; i t is not a concrete or specific problem

of man's way of life. I n the latter case, the limitation only takes

a distinctive form in a given country at a given age and this is a

distinctiveness that we are not concerned to study. Man's way of

life understood ontologically does not lead directly to a comprehen-

sion of the distinctive character of being; all it can do is to act as

go-between for such comprehension.

This being so, for an understanding of life lived in this distinctive

moulcl, we must apply ourselves to a direct comprehension of historical

and climatic phenomena. But would the latter understood merely

as objective lead to a full comprehension of climate in the sense in

which I have used it above? We must accept that it is only through

the interpretation of historical and climatic phenomena that we can

show that these phenomena are the expression of man's conscious

being, that climate is the organ of such self-objectivisation and self-

discovery and that the climatic character is the character of subjective

human existence. T h u s as long as this enquiry is directed to the

distinctiveness of distinctive being, it is an existential comprehension;

but in so far as it treats this distinctive way of life as the condition

of man's conscious being, it is ontological comprehension. T h u s a

grasp of the distinctive historical and climatic make-up of human being

becomes an ontological existential comprehension.

I n so far as climatic character is the subject of enquiry, i t cannot

help being so.

Our enquiry will, therefore, proceed from observations of distinc-

tive climatic phenomena to the distinctive nature of human life. I n

that climate is essentially historical climate, climatic types are simul-

taneously historical types. I do not seek to avoid this aspect, for i t

is one that cannot and should not be avoided. But I shall attempt

to treat this enquiry specifically from the aspect of climate, i n part

because it has been conspicuously neglected, a neglect which no doubt

arises from the difficulty of handling the problem i n a scholarly man-

ner. Herder attempted a "Climatic Study of the Human Spirit" from

a n exegesis of "Living Nature" and the outcome was, i n Kant's

criticism, not so much the labour of the scholar as the product of the

poet's imagination. This is a hazard that confronts anyone who dares

t o delve into the depths of the climatic problem. But I feel that i t

must be faced, for the problem of climatic characteristics should be p u t

under the searchlight of radical research and be thoroughly clarified

i n all its aspects, if only that historical enquiry might acquire a proper

concreteness.

(Drafted 1929; redrafted 193 1 ; revised 1935.)