Literature Review
Rosi_1
Chapter 2
Review of Literature
Morality is intrinsically connected to leadership behavior (Ciulla, 1995). Chapter
two describes leadership behavior within the context of a full range of leadership and
cognitive moral development in terms of Rest’s schema theory. The chapter also
examines research into the moral development of educators and educational leaders and
the studies that look into the relationship between leadership behavior and moral
reasoning. Finally, chapter two will conclude by looking into the connections that have
been made between leadership behaviors and cognitive moral development.
Styles of Leadership
Researchers have long sought the alchemy that results in effective leadership. In
their search, they initially found the Great Man or the traits and skills that result in a great
man. They have since rested on the notion that an effective leader embodies a full range
of leadership behaviors that are used as the situation dictates. Vann, Coleman, and
Simpson (2014) offer a compelling description of this full range of leadership behavior.
Borrowing from the Leadership Styles Scale, Vann and colleagues (2014) propose that
leadership behavior is not monolithic in character but is instead a hybrid of traits.
Democratic and autocratic leadership. Democratic and autocratic leadership
exist on opposite ends of a spectrum. Democratic leaders “seek advice and input from
their followers” and “motivate their followers by engaging their followers, listening to
their ideas and treating both the individual and their ideas as equals” (Vann, Coleman &
Simpson, 2014, p. 31). By contrast, autocratic leaders “concentrate all decision-making
with themselves” (Vann et al., 2014, p. 31). Under democratic leadership, organizational
hierarchy is irrelevant, whereas autocratic leaders promote a strong sense of hierarchy.
And while autocratic leadership embraces a more Machiavellian-style of leadership,
democratic leadership blurs, if not undermines entirely, the distinction between leader
and follower as leadership becomes a “process of influence in which determining who is
leading and who is following may be difficult to assess” (Bass, 2000, p. 29).
Transformational leadership. Transformational leadership’s goal is to promote
change and transformation (Vann et al., 2014). Northouse (2013) defines
transformational leadership as “the process whereby a person engages with others and
creates a connection that raises the level of motivation and morality in both the leader and
the follower” (p. 186). Transformational leaders are attentive to their followers needs
and to their motives (Northouse, 2013; Vann et al., 2014). Vann et al. (2014) observe
that “these leaders achieve their results through personal charisma, charm, clear vision,
and passion” resulting in followers that “believe themselves valued as an individual, and
often empowered to perform better” (p. 31).
Transformational leaders raise the awareness of their constituencies about
what is important, increase concerns for achievement, self-actualization and
ideals. They move followers to go beyond their own self-interests for the
good of their group, organization, or community, country or society as a
whole (Bass, 2000, p. 21).
There are four recognized dimensions of transformational leadership: idealized
influence, individualized consideration, intellectual stimulation, and inspirational
motivation (Ghasabeh, Soosay & Reaiche, 2015). While idealized influence attempts to
create a shared vision between leader and follower, individualized consideration focuses
on the needs of the followers (Ghasabeh et al., 2015). Intellectual stimulation induces
knowledge sharing to promote innovation within the organization, and inspirational
motivation inspires followers, motivating them to attain higher expectations (Ghasabeh et
al., 2015).
Transactional leadership. Transactional leadership is often contrasted with
transformational leadership and is a common form of leadership that focuses on an
exchange between leader and follower (Northouse, 2013), a “quid pro quo approach to
leading others” (Vann et al., 2014, p. 31). Whereas transformational leadership attempts
to move followers beyond self-interest, transactional leaders “cater to the self-interests of
their constituencies by means of contingent reinforcement” (Bass, 2000, p. 22). The
behaviors of the followers may be reinforced positively or negatively (Bass, 2000) to
achieve a task-oriented goal. Compared to the transformational leader’s motivation to
promote innovation and change in an organization, transactional leaders focus on the
management of personnel and achieving results (Vann et al., 2014).
Laissez-faire leadership. A laissez-faire style of leadership borrows from the
economic theory of the same name and implies a hands-off approach to leadership (Vann
et al., 2014). Laissez-faire leadership is an absence of leadership (Northouse, 2013), in
which a leader avoids the responsibilities of leadership, providing neither direction nor
support to subordinates. Bass (2000) refers to it as passive leadership and Northouse
(2013) calls it non-leadership.
Full range of leadership. Although transactional leadership and transformational
leadership are often described as a dichotomy, Bass (2000) states that they are “not two
ends of one dimension” (p. 22) as he once originally suggested. Rather, a laissez-
approach is placed at the opposite end of a spectrum that includes transformative
leadership on one end and transactional leadership in the middle (Bass, 2000). For Bass
(2000), this spectrum of leadership is the “full range of leadership.” The full range of
leadership includes inspirational leadership (a combination of inspirational motivation
and idealized influence), intellectual stimulation, individualized consideration, contingent
reward, active management-by-exception (in which leaders correct mistakes and
otherwise react to problems), and passive leadership. Each style of leadership
“contributes to the creation and maintenance” of an organization (Bass, 2000, p. 26),
suggesting that each has their place when called upon.
Situational leadership. While Bass’s full range of leadership (Bass, 2000) states
that each style of leadership should be utilized in an organization and implies that one
style of leadership may be better than another depending upon the situation, Hersey and
Blanchard’s situational approach to leadership clearly operates under the premise that
“different situations demand different kinds of leadership” and “an effective leader
requires that a person adapt his or her style to the demand of different situations”
(Northouse, 2016, p. 99). This approach requires the leader to evaluate the development
level of their subordinates—a combination of behavioral maturity and task-completion
ability—and apply a leadership style appropriate to the situation.
As Northouse (2014) describes it, a subordinate may be said to be highly capable
and highly committed to the completion of the task (a developmental level labeled D4);
highly capable but not committed to the task’s completion (D3); said to have some
capability but low commitment (D2); or have low capability but high commitment (D1).
Each of these developmental levels are then matched with a style of leadership. A D1
employee is matched with a directing style that is highly directive but low supporting
(S1). A coaching approach (S2)—which is highly directive and highly supportive—is
matched with D2. A supporting style (S3) of leadership provides high support but low
direction to a D3 subordinate. And an S4, or delegating approach, includes low support
and low direction and is matched with a D4 employee.
Vannsimpco model. If trait theory and skills theory are theories of leadership
limited to characteristics of a leader in the case of trait theory, and to the capabilities of a
leader in the case of skills theory, then it follows that their use is limited to descriptive
theories of leadership. However, since a styles theory of leadership “focuses exclusively
on what leaders do and how they act” (Northouse, 2016, p. 69), its value as a prescriptive
theory of leadership is considerable since it implies leaders have some agency in the
effectiveness of their leadership. Vann, Coleman, and Simpson (2014) acknowledge the
Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire’s (MLQ) recognized styles of leadership, which
includes transformational, transactional, and laissez-faire styles, but concede that “most
leaders cannot be described in monolithic terms” (p. 30). Rather than embodying a single
leadership style, most leaders “employ a hybrid of various styles based upon their
contextual situation” (p. 30). This hybrid of various styles is categorized per the
Leadership Style Scale (LSS) and its five dimensions, or styles, of leadership:
democratic, autocratic, transformational, transactional, and laissez-faire. This hybrid
form of leadership is situational in nature, “permit[ting] the leader to employ various
leadership methods to different situations and groups, allowing the context of events to
shape the leadership’s methods” (Vann et al., 2014, p. 32).
Ethics and Leadership Behavior
The link between leadership style and organization outcomes has been studied in
detail. The link between transformational leadership, “the darling of the leadership
studies discipline” (Vann et al., 2014, p. 30) and personal and organizational outcomes
has been noted elsewhere (Bass, 1997). Givens (2008), citing Tucker and Russell,
concludes with blanket affirmation: “transformational leadership is needed in all
organizations” (p. 5).
However, Sendjaya (2005) points out that leadership effectiveness—an evaluation
that is often conveyed in terms of profits (Sendjaya, 2005; Vann, Coleman & Simpson,
2014), perhaps to justify its relevance in research—and its relationship to leadership style
are studied to the exclusion of other leader traits, particularly morality. This is at odds
with ethics’ centrality elsewhere, with Ciulla (1995) arguing that “ethics is located in the
heart of leadership studies and not in an appendage” (p. 6). Thus, the moral judgment
and reasoning of leaders should be central to the study of effective leadership.
Within this paper no distinction is made between ethics and morals and the terms
are used interchangeably. The choice in doing so is both for the sake of simplicity and
because whatever distinction in terms there may otherwise be are insubstantial. This
choice is not without precedent. Ciulla (2004) explains:
Some people like to make a distinction between these two concepts, arguing
that ethics is about social values and morality is about personal values. Like
most philosophers, I use the terms interchangeably. As a practical matter,
courses on moral philosophy cover the same material as courses on ethics.
There is a long history of using these terms as synonyms of each other,
regardless of their roots in different languages (p. 303).
Moral Judgment Development
What is a moral judgment, and how far does its domain extend? Judgments are
moral insofar as they are
judgments of value, not of fact. This distinguishes them from cognitive
reasoning and judgment studied by Piaget. Second, they are social
judgments, judgments involving people. Third, they are prescriptive or
normative judgments, judgments of ought, of rights and responsibilities,
rather than value judgments of liking and preference (Colby, Kohlberg,
Speicher, Hewer, Candee, Gibbs & Power, 1987, p. 10).
Moral judgments are, by their nature, prescriptive since “it is only when social cognition
is extended into prescriptive judgments as to what is right or good that we can identify a
moral judgment” (Colby et al., 1987, p. 10).
In their overview of the schema theory of moral development, Rest, Narvaez,
Bebeau, and Thoma (1999) credit Lawrence Kohlberg with a legacy of major ideas for
psychological research in morality, observing that “it is no coincidence that the first and
last words of [Postconventional Moral Thinking] are ‘Lawrence Kohlberg.’ He died over
10 years ago, but his significance to the field of moral psychology endures” (p. ix).
Kohlberg credits Piaget with defining moral development (Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977), but
it is ultimately Kohlberg who illuminates the field of moral judgment development (Rest,
Narvaez, Thoma & Bebeau, 1999).
Kohlberg and Moral Development
Moral judgments, and in particular cognitive moral judgment development, are
understood in this paper in light of Rest’s neo-Kohlbergian schema theory. However,
Rest’s theory, as the name Rest adopted implies, owes much to Kohlberg’s stage theory
of moral development. Kohlberg’s stage theory of moral development mirrors Piaget’s
stages of cognitive development, with moral reasoning developing across a series of six
advancing stages and each stage representing a consistent level of moral judgment.
Development is a progression to the next stage, and individuals tend to operate at the
highest available stage (Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977). The development of moral judgment
is the result of social interaction, “from the dialogue between the person’s cognitive
structure and the complexity presented by environment” (Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977, p.
57). Moral judgment arises from the conflict that results from situations that cannot be
adequately resolved from a present level of moral reasoning: the individual can only
resolve the situation by developing more complex understandings or otherwise
inadequately resolving it by oversimplifying the situation.
Levels of reasoning. According to Kohlberg, the six stages occur on three
different levels of reasoning, each from its own sociomoral perspective and each
comprising two stages: preconventional, conventional, or postconventional (Colby,
Kohlberg, Speicher, Hewer, Candee, Gibbs & Power, 1987). At the preconventional
level the individual’s viewpoint is concrete and rules are external to the self (Colby et al.,
1987). Kohlberg and Hersh (1977) add:
the child is responsive to cultural rules and labels of good and bad, right or
wrong, but interprets these labels either in terms of the physical or the
hedonistic consequences of action (punishment, reward, exchange of
favors), or in terms of the physical power of those who enunciate the rules
and labels (p. 54).
At Stage 1, individuals, usually in their very early childhood, are motivated by and
ultimately value the avoidance of punishment and the power of authority itself, finding no
meaning in the underlying values that the punishment may represent. The rightness of an
action is determined by the level of punishment it brings (Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977;
Colby et al., 1987). At Stage 2, children are motivated by fulfilling their own needs but
recognize that others have needs as well (Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977; Colby et al., 1987).
Kohlberg and Hersh (1977) liken this stage to a marketplace of quid pro quo rather than
reciprocity based upon higher values such as gratitude or loyalty.
At the conventional level, the individual’s perspective is that of a member-of-
society (Colby et al., 1987) and “there is a clear effort to define moral values and
principles that have validity and application apart from the authority of the groups or
persons holding these principles and apart from the individual’s own identification with
these groups” (Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977, p. 55). At Stage 3, the rightness of behavior is
determined by its approval from others and motivated by conformity. Kohlberg and
Hersh (1977) note that at this stage “behavior is frequently judged by intention [and it is
when] ‘he means well’ becomes important for the first time” (p. 55). At Stage 4,
individuals fully internalize the social system as conscience, maintaining social order for
the sake of itself, and acting according to a sense of duty (Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977;
Colby et al., 1987).
At the postconventional level “there is a clear effort to define moral values and
principles that have validity and application apart from the authority of the groups or
persons holding these principles and apart from the individual’s own identification with
these groups” (Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977, p. 55). A Stage 5 level of moral development
understands the relativity of individual values and reasons according to generally
utilitarian principles. Rightness at Stage 5 is determined by rationally-based standards
generally agreed upon by the society as a whole with a utility calculated to do the greatest
good for the greatest number of people. At a Stage 6, the highest level of moral
development and most sophisticated level of moral reasoning, individuals act according
to universal ethical principles. According to Kohlberg and Hersh (1977),
right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen
ethical principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and
consistency… At heart, these are universal principles of justice, of the
reciprocity and equality of human rights, and of respect for the dignity of
human beings as individual persons (p. 55).
Moral judgment interview. Kohlberg and his associates developed the Standard
Issue Moral Judgment Interview and Scoring System (MJI) to measure individual moral
development (Colby et al., 1987). The basis of the system is the interview, which
Kohlberg claimed was “theoretically the most valid method of scoring, since it is
instrument free. . .” (Kohlberg, 1999). The interview uses three hypothetical situations
along with questions meant to probe for answers related to the two moral issues (e.g., life
and law) thought to be central to the situation’s moral conflict. The MJI requires
participants to reflect upon the decisions made and accurately convey their reasoning for
those decisions, and the interviews are transcribed and require a scoring guide of over
800 pages to score for stage. The resulting data presumably illuminates the justifications,
elaborations, and clarifications of the moral judgment of the individual.
A Neo-Kohlbergian Approach to Ethics
While Kohlberg sought to build a stage theory of moral development in the mold
of Piaget, others came to the conclusion that Kohlberg’s theories and methods were too
problematic to be resolved (Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau & Thoma, 1999). Kohlberg, rather
than dismiss the criticism outright, seemed also aware of the deficiencies in his research
and invited critics and followers alike to help develop his research into moral
development (Rest et al., 1999). Indeed, Kohlberg made many changes to his model of
moral development over the course of his life including reformulating both definitions of
his stages and his method of scoring, shifting his approach to moral education, and
narrowing the parameters of his stages (Rest et al., 1999). However, other limitations and
just criticisms remained.
James Rest and his colleagues, in developing their “neo-Kohlbergian” approach to
moral development, did not, as others did, dismiss Kohlberg’s theory outright. Rest found
Kohlberg’s theory “still fruitful—although some problems warrant modification” (Rest et
al., 1999, p. 1). Indeed, Rest et al. (1999) identified several “fruitful” ideas in Kohlberg’s
theory as guides for their own research, namely that a.) to understand moral behavior the
researcher must also understand how the person makes sense of the world, b.) the
individual actively constructs meaning and does not merely absorb cultural ideology, c.)
that not all differences in morality are equally defensible, and d.) concepts in moral
development can be understood in terms of advancement.
Rest was also careful to draw a distinction in morality itself, dividing it into
concepts much in the same way economics distinguishes micro- and macroeconomics.
Rest proposed that Kohlberg’s theory is more useful when distinguishing between micro-
and macromorality, the latter of which is more appropriate for both Kohlberg’s stage
theory and his own schema theory (Rest et al., 1999; Bebeau, Rest, Narvaez & Thoma,
1999). Macromorality “concerns the formal structures of society that are involved in
making cooperation possible at a society level” (Rest et al., 1999, p. 2). By contrast,
micromorality “concerns developing relationships with particular others, and with an
individual’s creating consistent virtues within him- or herself through everyday life”
(Rest et al., 1999, p. 2). For micromorality, traits of loyalty, dedication, and caring for
loved ones are held in esteem while equivalent macromoral traits include impartiality and
acting on principle (Rest et al., 1999). Though both areas of morality concern themselves
with society, and presumably a better society, they are not always compatible. This, Rest
acknowledges, is a limitation of both stage theory and schema theory.
Schema theory. Where Rest and colleagues diverged most notably is in
Kohlberg’s conception of stages. For Kohlberg, the stages of moral development are a
staircase in which the individual seeks solutions at the highest available level of moral
reasoning (Rest et al., 1999; Bebeau et al., 1999). For Rest, the stages are best
understood in terms of schema, a term adopted to differentiate their neo-Kohlbergian
“soft” stages from Kohlberg’s “hard stages” (Rest et al., 1999; Bebeau et al., 1999).
Rest’s schemas still represent a developmental sequence, but individuals do not, notably,
always reason from the highest level of reasoning available to them since they may be in
more than one stage at a given time (Rest et al., 1999; Bebeau et al., 1999).
Nevertheless, similarities remain, and Rest and colleagues further differentiate
their theory by providing different labels for their three schemas of development. First,
the preconventional level of reasoning is relabeled as the Personal Interests schema (Rest
et al., 1999; Bebeau et al., 1999). The Personal Interests schema includes Kohlbergian
Stages 2 and 3 and functions on a “presociocentric” level, without awareness or to the
exclusion of an organized society. The Personal Interests schema “justifies a decision by
appealing to the personal stake that an actor has in the consequences of an action,
including prudential affectional relationship” (Bebeau et al., 1999, p. 305). The research
resulting from Rest’s schemas are notably devoid of attention to the Personal Interests
schema since the reasoning involved typically predates adolescence, whereas Rest’s
research requires individuals of at least twelve years of age.
The Maintaining Norms schema shares traits with Kohlberg’s Stage 4, where
morality is defined by the established social order. For a Maintaining Norms disposition,
without law “there would be no order; people would act instead on their own special
interests, leading to anarchy, a situation that responsible people want to prevent” (Bebeau
et al., 1999, p. 307). This schema is characterized by a need for norms; a society-wide
scope; the uniform, categorical application of laws; the establishment of reciprocity
through law, though partial in nature and therefore not necessarily equitable in benefit for
everyone; and a duty orientation and deference to authorities (Rest et al., 1999; Bebeau et
al., 1999). Moral reasoning within this schema is limited to law and the established order
and therefore what is also ought to be (Rest et al., 1999; Bebeau et al., 1999).
The Postconventional schema—though similarly labeled—is broader in scope
than its Kohlbergian counterpart. Whereas the postconventional level of Kohlberg bore
strong resemblance to the deontological perspective of Kant, the Postconventional
schema is nonpartisan though less exacting (Rest et al., 1999). However, a less exacting
understanding of postconventional thinking may be called for: Kohlberg eventually
abandoned his Stage 6 from his scoring system while Stage 5 was also found lacking in
evidence, leaving postconventional thinking in question altogether (Rest et al., 1999).
Rest and colleagues, in developing a broader understanding of postconventional thinking,
began with its “defining characteristic… that rights and duties are based on sharable
ideals for organizing cooperation in society, and are open to debate and tests of logical
consistency, experience of the community, and coherence with accepted practice” (Rest
et al., 1999, p. 41). Thus, postconventional thinking, holds moral criteria above all other
criteria, particular norms and laws; it constructs an ideal society and is not merely a
rejection of the establishment for the sake of contrarianism; it includes sharable ideas
rather than idiosyncratic, personal intuition, or ethnocentric preference; and it offers full
reciprocity through recognition that laws may be biased and favor some over others (Rest
et al., 1999).
Defining issues test. Rest and colleagues also diverged from Kohlberg in another
key way. Whereas Kohlberg understood moral reasoning as a single facet of
understanding, moral judgment, Rest et al. (1999; Bebeau et al., 1999) propose a four-
component model of the psychology of morality. Rest’s model offers a multifaceted
understanding of moral reasoning that consists of moral sensitivity, or acknowledging a
moral problem and interpreting its significance and potential impact; moral judgment, or
deciding which action is morally justifiable; moral motivation, or the extent to which an
individual is willing to act morally; and moral character, which is akin to a kind of moral
grit.
For their schema theory of cognitive moral development, Rest and associates
developed a new test called the Defining Issues Test (DIT) in the 1970s (Rest et al.,
1999), now in its second iteration since its inception. The DIT eschews Kohlberg’s use
of interviews for a more simplistic multiple-choice rating and ranking system. Though
Kohlberg dismissed the DIT as “quick and dirty” (Thoma, Rest, Narvaez & Bebeau,
1999, p. 646) Kohlberg’s interview data from the MJI had been found problematic,
resulting in reports by researchers in which:
participant’s theories about their own inner processes are quoted to support
the psychologist’s theories of how the mind works… When Kohlberg
reported interviews, the participants sounded like the philosopher John
Rawls (e.g., Kohlberg et al., 1990; Rawls, 1971); when Gilligan reported
interviews, the participants sounded like gender feminists (e.g., Gilligan,
1982); when Youniss and Yates (e.g., this issue) report interviews, the
participants say that they do not engage in deliberative reasoning at all about
their moral actions (Bebeau et al., 1999, p. 295).
Indeed, interview data is a verbal production by nature and therefore assumes a high
degree of verbal articulation. It also assumes “participants can verbally explain the
workings of their minds” (Bebeau et al., 1999, p. 295) and it may not, as Kohlberg
maintained, be “theoretically the most valid method of scoring” (Kohlberg, 1979, p. 47).
The most current version of the DIT, the Defining Issues Test Version 2 (DIT-2),
consists of five, paragraph length stories, or dilemmas, followed by twelve short and
cryptically phrased issues or questions representing the different schemas. The
participant then rates and ranks according to their importance to the individual (Thoma et
al., 1999, Rest et al., 1999). Rest and associates derived the test items from Kohlberg’s
research, using items derived from responses given in the MJI (Rest et al., 1999). As for
how the DIT functions, according to Rest et al. (1999)
the DIT is a device for activating moral schemas. We presume that reading
moral dilemmas and the DIT issue statements activates moral schemas (to
the extent that a person has developed them). As the participant encounters
an item that both makes sense and also activates a preferred schema, that
item is given a high rating and ranked of high importance. Alternatively,
when the participant encounters an item that either does not make sense or
seems simplistic and unconvincing (is not activating a preferred schema),
the item receives a low rating (Bebeau et al., 1999, p. 301).
Because Rest’s schema theory suggests individuals do not always operate at a single
stage or schema, the results of the DIT do not provide a single consistent schema.
Instead, the results provide an aggregate of responses from which a “P,” or principled,
score is derived from weighting responses that are considered postconventional (Rest et
al., 1999; Bebeau et al., 1999). A more recent scoring innovation for the DIT, the N2
index, is a hybrid index incorporating the P score, or the degree to which the individual
chooses items reflecting postconventional reasoning, along with the degree to which the
individual rejects more simplistic reasoning, calculated by how often the individual
chooses items of representing lower schemas as least preferable (Rest et al., 1999; Rest,
Thoma, Narvaez & Bebeau, 1997). Though the P score has been in use longer, the N2
index generally outperforms the results of the P score alone in capturing information on
moral judgment development (Rest et al., 1999; Rest et al., 1997).
DIT research. As befits research ongoing for the better part of forty years, DIT
research is extensive and its results more or less consistent. P scores range from zero to
95, and Bebeau and Thoma (2003) found that, in general, middle school students score in
the 20s, high school seniors score on average in the 30s, the average adult at 40, college
students in the 40s, graduate students score in the 50s, and moral philosophy and political
science doctoral students are expected to score in the 60s. The relationship between P
score and education is not an accident: formal education and moral development are
highly correlated (Rest & Thoma, 1985; Rest et al., 1999; Rest et al., 1997). Rest and
Thoma (1985) interpret this correlation as reinforced sociomoral attitudes at the college
level, with “the progressive increase in moral judgment scores [reflecting] the cumulative
impact of particular external social pressure” and “an increasing capacity to comprehend
higher level thinking” (p. 712). Other interpretations for this link between P score and
formal education include relationships between moral reasoning and skill and knowledge,
moral reasoning and general intellectual stimulation, and the possibility that college
students, as a population, are simply predisposed to higher levels of moral reasoning
(Rest & Thoma, 1985).
While colleges in particular have a positive effect on P scores, age has also been
found to have a positive impact on P scores (Rest, 1979) and there appears to be a close
link to life experiences and moral development as well. Deemer (1986) found that when
life experiences are coded as continued intellectual stimulation, life richness, or richness
of social environment, there is a significant correlation with the P score, even when
formal education is corrected for (Rest & Deemer, 1986).
The DIT has also linked political ideology to moral development and has been
criticized as little more than a measurement of political attitude (Rest et al., 1999).
However, Narvaez, Getz, Rest and Thoma (1999) reject this claim, concluding that only
when political identity, religious fundamentalism (determined by the individual’s belief
in the literalness of the Bible), and moral judgment (as determined by an individual’s P
score) are combined can stances on public policy issues be explained. Further, each
individual element cannot be reduced to another or to a common liberal-conservative
factor. Rather, Narvaez et al. (1999) along with Rest et al. (1999) theorize that cultural
ideology—the “values, norms, and standards that exist independently of a single person
and that are shared by a group as part of its mutual culture” (Narvaez et al., 1999, p.
478)—is but one process that shapes moral thinking. Moral thinking, not to be confused
with moral judgment, is a broader concept than moral judgment encompassing “people’s
judgments about right and wrong and the rationale behind such thinking” (Narvaez et al.,
1999, p. 478).
This theory proposes that autonomy, “the self-initiated, agentic side of morality”
(Rest et al., 1999, p. 177), and heteronomy, “the external, conforming side of morality”
(Rest et al., 1999, p. 177), codetermine moral thinking and that both the “individual’s
construction of meaning” (p. 177) and cultural ideology “co-occur to produce moral
thinking” (p. 178). In this context, Orthodoxy, characterized by belief in a moral center
found in traditional religion (Narvaez et al., 1999), and religious fundamentalism,
characterized by authoritarianism and belief in the literalness of the Bible, are likely to
coincide with a maintaining norms schema. Further moral judgment development is then
stunted by beliefs that discourage the questioning of authority (Rest et al., 1999). Thus, it
is not surprising that religious fundamentalism is related to high scores in the maintaining
norms schema (Narvaez, 2005), nor that political views are also related to moral
judgment development (Vitton & Wasonga, 2009).
Educators and Moral Reasoning Development
Ethical conduct is central to education (Cummings, Harlow & Maddux, 2007),
with ethically complex problems arising daily that require decisions based on values and
moral judgment (Vitton & Wasonga, 2009). Indeed, as Cummings et al. (2007) observe,
“teachers should be able to make sound moral judgments, look beyond their own self-
interest and take a broad view of morality that considers the perspectives of all students
who represent diverse racial, ethnic and cultural backgrounds” (p. 67). Moreover, “the
teacher’s level of moral reasoning affects students’ perceptions of moral atmosphere of
the classroom and… teachers with higher moral reasoning are more likely to motivate
student learning and healthy social development than teachers with lower moral reason”
(Cummings, Dyas, Maddux & Kochman, 2001, p. 145). Further, “teachers who reason at
lower levels are not effective teacher mentors, they negatively and inaccurately evaluate
student teachers who function at higher levels, and they take a singular approach to
instruction” (Cummings et al., 2007, p. 69). It follows that teaching, and by extension
educational leadership, should require advanced moral reasoning ability; however,
research indicates that this is not the case.
Teachers and moral reasoning development. To wit, educators generally show
moral reasoning ability equal to or below that of the average adult (Cummings, Dyas,
Maddux & Kochman, 2001; King & Matthew, 2002; Derryberry, Snyder & Wilson,
2006; Livingstone, Derryberry, King & Vendetti, 2006). Preservice teachers, in
particular, have been the subject of several studies, which have found that their moral
reasoning ability is lower than that expected of college educated adults, who should
easily exceed a P score of 40 (Cummings et al., 2007). Of even more concern, education
majors may actually lose moral reasoning ability over the course of their undergraduate
education, with freshmen DIT P score averaging 33.52 and senior DIT P scores averaging
22.57 (Lampe, 1994; McNeel, 1994; Yeazell & Johnson, 1988). This contrasts
significantly with findings that consistently show education plays a positive role in the
development of moral reasoning
While other studies are not so dire in their impression of education majors
(Cummings et al., 2001), there is an indication that the curriculum for education majors
does play a role in their moral development, or lack thereof. The DIT scores of education
majors has been found, for example, to be lower than those of liberal arts majors
(McNeel, 1994), though they are consistent with the scores of business majors. And
although isolated findings show that education majors may be on par with other majors
(Cummings et al., 2001), the moral reasoning ability of education majors (P=24) still
remains lower than the adult average P score of 40 (Derryberry et al., 2006). Many
theories have been offered to explain this discrepancy, but one of the more convincing
theories for why education majors fail to advance and may, in some cases, regress in
moral reasoning development is that the education curriculum relies heavily on technical
ability as opposed to critical reasoning skills, upon which moral reasoning development
relies. There is also little reason to believe that moral reasoning ability improves over the
course of a teacher’s career. The moral reasoning level of inservice teachers reflect little
improvement: postconventional reasoning was found only 30 to 50 percent of the time
(P=30, P=50, respectively).
Educational leaders and moral reasoning development. As with teachers,
principals also appear to have a lower than expected level of moral judgment. Vitton and
Wasonga (2009), in their study of elementary school principals, concluded as much,
finding that their participants had an average P score of 38.7, below the average adult
(P=40) and above the average senior high school student (P=31.8). In their study of
educational leadership graduate students, Greer, Searby and Thoma (2015) found an
average P score of only 29.98, or a score equivalent to what one would expect of a senior
high school student. Although Slavinsky (2006) found higher P scores than Vitton and
Wasonga (2009) and Greer et al. (2015), with scores just above that of the average adult
(P=41.94 compared to P=40), his study is ungeneralizable with only nine percent of
mailed surveys returned.
These results, when taken together, indicate that school faculty and administration
operate at lower levels of moral reasoning. Jordan, Brown, Trevino, and Finkelstein
(2013) found a positive link between employee perception of ethical leadership and
leadership moral reasoning. Building on Kohlberg’s (1981) theory that a significant
relationship exists between cognitive moral development and normative behavior, their
findings suggest that employees are likely to emulate the level of moral reasoning
perceived in their leadership. The sampling of educational leaders—former teachers—
indicate little progress from their preservice moral reasoning level. This is also
unsurprising. Teachers impact the moral atmosphere of their classroom and therefore the
moral development of their students. Educational leaders likewise provide a similar
influence in their role as leader, with research indicating that ethical leadership begets
ethical employees (Jordan et al., 2013). Thus, teachers are likely to be no more advanced
than their leaders in moral reasoning, and it therefore comes as no surprise that—given
the relationship between teacher and student—students should not be expected to grow in
reasoning ability either.
Ethics and Leadership Theory
Bass and Steidlmeier (1999) propose three pillars upon which the ethics of leadership
rest:
1. The moral character of the leader
2. The ethical legitimacy of the values embedded in the leaders’ vision, articulation,
and program which followers either embrace or reject; and
3. The morality of the processes of social ethical choice and action that leaders and
followers engage in and collectively pursue (p. 182).
However, key amongst these pillars is the moral legitimacy of a leader’s decisions (Bass
& Steidlmeier, 1999). Both transformational and transactional leadership have the
potential for moral legitimacy and ethical leadership. In transactional leadership, ethical
leadership is associated with a “free contract,” in which the transactions between leader
and follower are freely made and “depends on granting the same liberty and opportunity
to others that one claims for oneself, on telling the truth, keeping promises, distributing to
each what is due, and employing valid incentives or sanctions” (p. 185). Furthermore,
moral transactional leadership recognizes a “pluralism of values and diversity of
motivations” (p. 185).
Transformational leadership, by definition, is a relationship entered upon by
choice, by which in choosing to follow a particular leader both follower and leader are
changed as a result. A moral component of transformational leadership has existed since
its inception (Ciulla, 1995; Burns, 1978). Indeed, transformational leaders “have very
strong values. They do not water down their values and moral ideals by consensus, but
rather they elevate people by using conflict to engage followers and help them reassess
their own values and needs” (p. 15). Transformational leadership is very much
concerned with values synonymous with ethical behavior—such as liberty, justice, and
equality (Ciulla, 1995)—which likely explains why transformational leadership is
associated with subordinate outcomes like improved trust and respect for the leader
(Engelbrecht, van Aswegan & Theron, 2005).
Transformational leadership is complicated by the limits of its definition. Burns
from the beginning held that transformational leaders must be morally uplifting (Bass &
Steidlmeier, 1999). In contrast, Bass operationalized the transformational-transactional
dyad and held that transformational leaders could be either virtuous or villain (Bass &
Steidlmeier, 1999). Thus, according to Bass, both Adolf Hitler and Martin Luther King,
Jr. could be compared as transformational leaders.
It was not until later that Bass came to see a distinction between an authentic and
inauthentic transformational leader, distinguishing them by labeling the latter pseudo-
transformational (Bass & Steidlmeier, 1999). In distinguishing between these types, Bass
(1998) explains:
Leaders are authentically transformational when they increase awareness of
what is right, good, important, and beautiful, when they help to elevate
followers’ needs for achievement and self-actualization, when they foster
in followers higher moral maturity, and when they move followers to go
beyond their self-interests for the good of their group, organization, or
society. Pseudo-transformational leaders may also motivate and transform
their followers, but, in doing so, they arouse support for special interests at
the expense of others rather than what’s good for the collectivity. They will
foster psychodynamic identification, projection, fantasy, and rationalization
as substitutes for achievement and actualization. They will encourage ‘we-
they’ competitiveness and the pursuit of the leaders’ own self-interests
instead of the common good. They are more likely to foment envy, greed,
hate, and conflict rather than altruism, harmony, and cooperation (p. 191).
Although Bass distinguishes between the two, he felt they were ultimately two idealized
types and that most leaders would have traits of both, though authentic transformational
leaders would have more traits considered authentic more often than not, and vice versa
for pseudo-transformational leaders (Bass & Steidlmeier, 1999).
DIT and Leadership
As for the relationship between cognitive moral development and leadership style,
less has been said, and even less studied. On a theoretical level, Kuhnert and Lewis
(1987) proposed a stage-theory for the development of leadership traits in individuals.
Like the model for moral development proposed by Rest and his colleagues (1999),
Kuhnert and Lewis’ model of leadership development also includes three stages which
may also provide insight into a link between moral reasoning and leadership style.
Building from the work of Kegan’s (1982) adult development model, Kuhnert and Lewis
(1987) associated their three leadership developmental stages with the second, third, and
fourth stages of Kegan’s model. The two lower stages included transactional
leadership—distinguished as lower order (second stage) and higher-order (third stage)—
and the highest stage (fourth stage) consists of transformational leadership (Kuhnert &
Lewis, 1987). For Kuhnert and Lewis (1987), higher-order transactional exchanges
include exchanges that augment an interpersonal bond, such as support; lower-order
transactional exchanges are characterized by exchanges of goods or rights, such as those
that are contractually agreed upon (Kuhnert & Lewis, 1987).
If transactional leadership does represent a lower stage of development than
transformational leader on a spectrum of leadership behavior, a la the full range of
leadership, then it might be theorized that a connection could be made between this
spectrum of leadership development and a spectrum of moral development. Indeed, there
is a relationship between the description of Kuhnert and Lewis’s (1987) frames of
references for each stage of development and Rest’s schema theory. This relationship is
an unsurprising development since Kegan’s and Kohlberg’s stages are both based upon a
Piagetian model of cognitive development (Kuhnert & Lewis, 1987; Rest et al., 1999).
Kuhnert and Lewis’s lower-order transactional stage is organized around personal goals
and agendas (Kuhnert & Lewis, 1987) and bears a resemblance to both the Personal
Interests and Maintaining Norms schema (Bebeau et al., 1999). The third stage, Kuhnert
and Lewis’s higher-order transactional stage, includes a more subjective understanding of
needs that allows a person to take into consideration the needs of themselves and others
in mutual support (Kuhnert and Lewis, 1987). Kuhnert and Lewis’s (1987) third stage
seems to bear both a resemblance to conventional and postconventional moral reasoning.
Turner, Barling, Epitropaki, Butcher, and Milner (2002) may have been the first
to look at the relationship between moral reasoning development, as measured by the
DIT, and leadership behaviors. In their study of 111 managers across three organizations,
Turner et al. (2002) did find a connection between level of moral development and
leadership behaviors. Their study found that higher levels of moral reasoning are
perceived as exhibiting more transformational leadership behaviors (Turner et al., 2002).
Moreover, they found that leaders of differing levels of moral development were not
perceived any differently when exhibiting transactional leadership behaviors (Turner et
al., 2002). Thus, they concluded that there is a connection between higher levels of
moral reasoning and transformational leadership. Transactional leadership, by contrast,
could be found at each level of moral reasoning for the simple reason that transactional
relationships between leader and follower existed in every leader-follower relationship.
In their study of Norwegian naval cadets, Olsen, Eid and Johnsen (2006) came to
similar conclusions. They found that, like Turner and his colleagues (2002), that
transformational leadership was positively correlated with postconventional reasoning
(Olsen et al., 2006). Olsen et al. (2002) also expected to find a relationship between
transactional leadership and conventional reasoning under the assumption that
transactional leadership represents less developed leadership behavior. However, they
found no association between transactional leadership behaviors and the Maintaining
Norms schema. Unsurprisingly, they did find that moral behavior was negatively
correlated with passive leadership styles and an absence of leadership, particularly
management-by-exception-passive and laissez-faire. (Olsen et al., 2002).
Summary
Joanne Ciulla (1995) argues that “ethics lies at the heart of leadership studies and
has veins in leadership research” (p. 18). This chapter has sought the heart and veins of
leadership studies and research by covering the relevant literature for understanding the
full range of leadership, moral cognitive development, research related to educator and
educational leader moral reasoning levels, and research that connects leadership behavior
with moral development. Leadership behaviors are neither static nor simple, embodying
a host of traits and characteristics that are at once transformational and transactional.
Beyond the characteristics of leadership styles, leadership behavior encompasses a moral
component linked to certain leader characteristics.
The most popular conceptions of moral cognitive development are based on
Piaget’s stage theory. Kohlberg developed a model of moral reasoning development
similar in style and concept to Piaget’s model. Rest and his colleagues, building upon the
work of Kohlberg, suggest that moral cognitive development is not static and individuals
do not always reason on a single level of development. Rather, by discovering the level
at which the individual most frequently reasons researchers can then determine the
approximate level at which the individual does reason, a level Rest characterized as
schemas. To test an individual’s level of moral reasoning, Rest and his colleagues
proposed a multiple-choice assessment, the Defining Issues Test, to replace the interview
format used for Kohlberg’s stage theory.
Research indicates a lack of high-level moral reasoning in education, with both
teachers and administrators scoring lower, on average, than the average adult, and
certainly lower than their levels of education would suggest. This is problematic for any
number of reasons, not least of all the moral nature of the school’s work. Moreover,
early studies indicate that higher-level moral reasoning is linked to transformational
leadership. With transformational leadership so closely associated with positive
employee and organizational outcomes, the lower cognitive moral development of
educational leaders is concerning in a culture that includes broader reform efforts. This
study seeks to discover whether a link between cognitive moral development and
leadership behavior also exists in education leaders. However, it goes a step further by
examining the link between moral cognitive development and a survey of leadership
behavior that attempts to embody a more accurate representation of leadership behavior.
This more accurate picture of leadership behavior is accomplished by including not only
the full range of leadership but characteristics of situational leadership as well, as
represented by the Vannsimpco model.