Literature Review

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Chapter 2

Review of Literature

Morality is intrinsically connected to leadership behavior (Ciulla, 1995). Chapter

two describes leadership behavior within the context of a full range of leadership and

cognitive moral development in terms of Rest’s schema theory. The chapter also

examines research into the moral development of educators and educational leaders and

the studies that look into the relationship between leadership behavior and moral

reasoning. Finally, chapter two will conclude by looking into the connections that have

been made between leadership behaviors and cognitive moral development.

Styles of Leadership

Researchers have long sought the alchemy that results in effective leadership. In

their search, they initially found the Great Man or the traits and skills that result in a great

man. They have since rested on the notion that an effective leader embodies a full range

of leadership behaviors that are used as the situation dictates. Vann, Coleman, and

Simpson (2014) offer a compelling description of this full range of leadership behavior.

Borrowing from the Leadership Styles Scale, Vann and colleagues (2014) propose that

leadership behavior is not monolithic in character but is instead a hybrid of traits.

Democratic and autocratic leadership. Democratic and autocratic leadership

exist on opposite ends of a spectrum. Democratic leaders “seek advice and input from

their followers” and “motivate their followers by engaging their followers, listening to

their ideas and treating both the individual and their ideas as equals” (Vann, Coleman &

Simpson, 2014, p. 31). By contrast, autocratic leaders “concentrate all decision-making

with themselves” (Vann et al., 2014, p. 31). Under democratic leadership, organizational

hierarchy is irrelevant, whereas autocratic leaders promote a strong sense of hierarchy.

And while autocratic leadership embraces a more Machiavellian-style of leadership,

democratic leadership blurs, if not undermines entirely, the distinction between leader

and follower as leadership becomes a “process of influence in which determining who is

leading and who is following may be difficult to assess” (Bass, 2000, p. 29).

Transformational leadership. Transformational leadership’s goal is to promote

change and transformation (Vann et al., 2014). Northouse (2013) defines

transformational leadership as “the process whereby a person engages with others and

creates a connection that raises the level of motivation and morality in both the leader and

the follower” (p. 186). Transformational leaders are attentive to their followers needs

and to their motives (Northouse, 2013; Vann et al., 2014). Vann et al. (2014) observe

that “these leaders achieve their results through personal charisma, charm, clear vision,

and passion” resulting in followers that “believe themselves valued as an individual, and

often empowered to perform better” (p. 31).

Transformational leaders raise the awareness of their constituencies about

what is important, increase concerns for achievement, self-actualization and

ideals. They move followers to go beyond their own self-interests for the

good of their group, organization, or community, country or society as a

whole (Bass, 2000, p. 21).

There are four recognized dimensions of transformational leadership: idealized

influence, individualized consideration, intellectual stimulation, and inspirational

motivation (Ghasabeh, Soosay & Reaiche, 2015). While idealized influence attempts to

create a shared vision between leader and follower, individualized consideration focuses

on the needs of the followers (Ghasabeh et al., 2015). Intellectual stimulation induces

knowledge sharing to promote innovation within the organization, and inspirational

motivation inspires followers, motivating them to attain higher expectations (Ghasabeh et

al., 2015).

Transactional leadership. Transactional leadership is often contrasted with

transformational leadership and is a common form of leadership that focuses on an

exchange between leader and follower (Northouse, 2013), a “quid pro quo approach to

leading others” (Vann et al., 2014, p. 31). Whereas transformational leadership attempts

to move followers beyond self-interest, transactional leaders “cater to the self-interests of

their constituencies by means of contingent reinforcement” (Bass, 2000, p. 22). The

behaviors of the followers may be reinforced positively or negatively (Bass, 2000) to

achieve a task-oriented goal. Compared to the transformational leader’s motivation to

promote innovation and change in an organization, transactional leaders focus on the

management of personnel and achieving results (Vann et al., 2014).

Laissez-faire leadership. A laissez-faire style of leadership borrows from the

economic theory of the same name and implies a hands-off approach to leadership (Vann

et al., 2014). Laissez-faire leadership is an absence of leadership (Northouse, 2013), in

which a leader avoids the responsibilities of leadership, providing neither direction nor

support to subordinates. Bass (2000) refers to it as passive leadership and Northouse

(2013) calls it non-leadership.

Full range of leadership. Although transactional leadership and transformational

leadership are often described as a dichotomy, Bass (2000) states that they are “not two

ends of one dimension” (p. 22) as he once originally suggested. Rather, a laissez-

approach is placed at the opposite end of a spectrum that includes transformative

leadership on one end and transactional leadership in the middle (Bass, 2000). For Bass

(2000), this spectrum of leadership is the “full range of leadership.” The full range of

leadership includes inspirational leadership (a combination of inspirational motivation

and idealized influence), intellectual stimulation, individualized consideration, contingent

reward, active management-by-exception (in which leaders correct mistakes and

otherwise react to problems), and passive leadership. Each style of leadership

“contributes to the creation and maintenance” of an organization (Bass, 2000, p. 26),

suggesting that each has their place when called upon.

Situational leadership. While Bass’s full range of leadership (Bass, 2000) states

that each style of leadership should be utilized in an organization and implies that one

style of leadership may be better than another depending upon the situation, Hersey and

Blanchard’s situational approach to leadership clearly operates under the premise that

“different situations demand different kinds of leadership” and “an effective leader

requires that a person adapt his or her style to the demand of different situations”

(Northouse, 2016, p. 99). This approach requires the leader to evaluate the development

level of their subordinates—a combination of behavioral maturity and task-completion

ability—and apply a leadership style appropriate to the situation.

As Northouse (2014) describes it, a subordinate may be said to be highly capable

and highly committed to the completion of the task (a developmental level labeled D4);

highly capable but not committed to the task’s completion (D3); said to have some

capability but low commitment (D2); or have low capability but high commitment (D1).

Each of these developmental levels are then matched with a style of leadership. A D1

employee is matched with a directing style that is highly directive but low supporting

(S1). A coaching approach (S2)—which is highly directive and highly supportive—is

matched with D2. A supporting style (S3) of leadership provides high support but low

direction to a D3 subordinate. And an S4, or delegating approach, includes low support

and low direction and is matched with a D4 employee.

Vannsimpco model. If trait theory and skills theory are theories of leadership

limited to characteristics of a leader in the case of trait theory, and to the capabilities of a

leader in the case of skills theory, then it follows that their use is limited to descriptive

theories of leadership. However, since a styles theory of leadership “focuses exclusively

on what leaders do and how they act” (Northouse, 2016, p. 69), its value as a prescriptive

theory of leadership is considerable since it implies leaders have some agency in the

effectiveness of their leadership. Vann, Coleman, and Simpson (2014) acknowledge the

Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire’s (MLQ) recognized styles of leadership, which

includes transformational, transactional, and laissez-faire styles, but concede that “most

leaders cannot be described in monolithic terms” (p. 30). Rather than embodying a single

leadership style, most leaders “employ a hybrid of various styles based upon their

contextual situation” (p. 30). This hybrid of various styles is categorized per the

Leadership Style Scale (LSS) and its five dimensions, or styles, of leadership:

democratic, autocratic, transformational, transactional, and laissez-faire. This hybrid

form of leadership is situational in nature, “permit[ting] the leader to employ various

leadership methods to different situations and groups, allowing the context of events to

shape the leadership’s methods” (Vann et al., 2014, p. 32).

Ethics and Leadership Behavior

The link between leadership style and organization outcomes has been studied in

detail. The link between transformational leadership, “the darling of the leadership

studies discipline” (Vann et al., 2014, p. 30) and personal and organizational outcomes

has been noted elsewhere (Bass, 1997). Givens (2008), citing Tucker and Russell,

concludes with blanket affirmation: “transformational leadership is needed in all

organizations” (p. 5).

However, Sendjaya (2005) points out that leadership effectiveness—an evaluation

that is often conveyed in terms of profits (Sendjaya, 2005; Vann, Coleman & Simpson,

2014), perhaps to justify its relevance in research—and its relationship to leadership style

are studied to the exclusion of other leader traits, particularly morality. This is at odds

with ethics’ centrality elsewhere, with Ciulla (1995) arguing that “ethics is located in the

heart of leadership studies and not in an appendage” (p. 6). Thus, the moral judgment

and reasoning of leaders should be central to the study of effective leadership.

Within this paper no distinction is made between ethics and morals and the terms

are used interchangeably. The choice in doing so is both for the sake of simplicity and

because whatever distinction in terms there may otherwise be are insubstantial. This

choice is not without precedent. Ciulla (2004) explains:

Some people like to make a distinction between these two concepts, arguing

that ethics is about social values and morality is about personal values. Like

most philosophers, I use the terms interchangeably. As a practical matter,

courses on moral philosophy cover the same material as courses on ethics.

There is a long history of using these terms as synonyms of each other,

regardless of their roots in different languages (p. 303).

Moral Judgment Development

What is a moral judgment, and how far does its domain extend? Judgments are

moral insofar as they are

judgments of value, not of fact. This distinguishes them from cognitive

reasoning and judgment studied by Piaget. Second, they are social

judgments, judgments involving people. Third, they are prescriptive or

normative judgments, judgments of ought, of rights and responsibilities,

rather than value judgments of liking and preference (Colby, Kohlberg,

Speicher, Hewer, Candee, Gibbs & Power, 1987, p. 10).

Moral judgments are, by their nature, prescriptive since “it is only when social cognition

is extended into prescriptive judgments as to what is right or good that we can identify a

moral judgment” (Colby et al., 1987, p. 10).

In their overview of the schema theory of moral development, Rest, Narvaez,

Bebeau, and Thoma (1999) credit Lawrence Kohlberg with a legacy of major ideas for

psychological research in morality, observing that “it is no coincidence that the first and

last words of [Postconventional Moral Thinking] are ‘Lawrence Kohlberg.’ He died over

10 years ago, but his significance to the field of moral psychology endures” (p. ix).

Kohlberg credits Piaget with defining moral development (Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977), but

it is ultimately Kohlberg who illuminates the field of moral judgment development (Rest,

Narvaez, Thoma & Bebeau, 1999).

Kohlberg and Moral Development

Moral judgments, and in particular cognitive moral judgment development, are

understood in this paper in light of Rest’s neo-Kohlbergian schema theory. However,

Rest’s theory, as the name Rest adopted implies, owes much to Kohlberg’s stage theory

of moral development. Kohlberg’s stage theory of moral development mirrors Piaget’s

stages of cognitive development, with moral reasoning developing across a series of six

advancing stages and each stage representing a consistent level of moral judgment.

Development is a progression to the next stage, and individuals tend to operate at the

highest available stage (Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977). The development of moral judgment

is the result of social interaction, “from the dialogue between the person’s cognitive

structure and the complexity presented by environment” (Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977, p.

57). Moral judgment arises from the conflict that results from situations that cannot be

adequately resolved from a present level of moral reasoning: the individual can only

resolve the situation by developing more complex understandings or otherwise

inadequately resolving it by oversimplifying the situation.

Levels of reasoning. According to Kohlberg, the six stages occur on three

different levels of reasoning, each from its own sociomoral perspective and each

comprising two stages: preconventional, conventional, or postconventional (Colby,

Kohlberg, Speicher, Hewer, Candee, Gibbs & Power, 1987). At the preconventional

level the individual’s viewpoint is concrete and rules are external to the self (Colby et al.,

1987). Kohlberg and Hersh (1977) add:

the child is responsive to cultural rules and labels of good and bad, right or

wrong, but interprets these labels either in terms of the physical or the

hedonistic consequences of action (punishment, reward, exchange of

favors), or in terms of the physical power of those who enunciate the rules

and labels (p. 54).

At Stage 1, individuals, usually in their very early childhood, are motivated by and

ultimately value the avoidance of punishment and the power of authority itself, finding no

meaning in the underlying values that the punishment may represent. The rightness of an

action is determined by the level of punishment it brings (Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977;

Colby et al., 1987). At Stage 2, children are motivated by fulfilling their own needs but

recognize that others have needs as well (Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977; Colby et al., 1987).

Kohlberg and Hersh (1977) liken this stage to a marketplace of quid pro quo rather than

reciprocity based upon higher values such as gratitude or loyalty.

At the conventional level, the individual’s perspective is that of a member-of-

society (Colby et al., 1987) and “there is a clear effort to define moral values and

principles that have validity and application apart from the authority of the groups or

persons holding these principles and apart from the individual’s own identification with

these groups” (Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977, p. 55). At Stage 3, the rightness of behavior is

determined by its approval from others and motivated by conformity. Kohlberg and

Hersh (1977) note that at this stage “behavior is frequently judged by intention [and it is

when] ‘he means well’ becomes important for the first time” (p. 55). At Stage 4,

individuals fully internalize the social system as conscience, maintaining social order for

the sake of itself, and acting according to a sense of duty (Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977;

Colby et al., 1987).

At the postconventional level “there is a clear effort to define moral values and

principles that have validity and application apart from the authority of the groups or

persons holding these principles and apart from the individual’s own identification with

these groups” (Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977, p. 55). A Stage 5 level of moral development

understands the relativity of individual values and reasons according to generally

utilitarian principles. Rightness at Stage 5 is determined by rationally-based standards

generally agreed upon by the society as a whole with a utility calculated to do the greatest

good for the greatest number of people. At a Stage 6, the highest level of moral

development and most sophisticated level of moral reasoning, individuals act according

to universal ethical principles. According to Kohlberg and Hersh (1977),

right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen

ethical principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and

consistency… At heart, these are universal principles of justice, of the

reciprocity and equality of human rights, and of respect for the dignity of

human beings as individual persons (p. 55).

Moral judgment interview. Kohlberg and his associates developed the Standard

Issue Moral Judgment Interview and Scoring System (MJI) to measure individual moral

development (Colby et al., 1987). The basis of the system is the interview, which

Kohlberg claimed was “theoretically the most valid method of scoring, since it is

instrument free. . .” (Kohlberg, 1999). The interview uses three hypothetical situations

along with questions meant to probe for answers related to the two moral issues (e.g., life

and law) thought to be central to the situation’s moral conflict. The MJI requires

participants to reflect upon the decisions made and accurately convey their reasoning for

those decisions, and the interviews are transcribed and require a scoring guide of over

800 pages to score for stage. The resulting data presumably illuminates the justifications,

elaborations, and clarifications of the moral judgment of the individual.

A Neo-Kohlbergian Approach to Ethics

While Kohlberg sought to build a stage theory of moral development in the mold

of Piaget, others came to the conclusion that Kohlberg’s theories and methods were too

problematic to be resolved (Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau & Thoma, 1999). Kohlberg, rather

than dismiss the criticism outright, seemed also aware of the deficiencies in his research

and invited critics and followers alike to help develop his research into moral

development (Rest et al., 1999). Indeed, Kohlberg made many changes to his model of

moral development over the course of his life including reformulating both definitions of

his stages and his method of scoring, shifting his approach to moral education, and

narrowing the parameters of his stages (Rest et al., 1999). However, other limitations and

just criticisms remained.

James Rest and his colleagues, in developing their “neo-Kohlbergian” approach to

moral development, did not, as others did, dismiss Kohlberg’s theory outright. Rest found

Kohlberg’s theory “still fruitful—although some problems warrant modification” (Rest et

al., 1999, p. 1). Indeed, Rest et al. (1999) identified several “fruitful” ideas in Kohlberg’s

theory as guides for their own research, namely that a.) to understand moral behavior the

researcher must also understand how the person makes sense of the world, b.) the

individual actively constructs meaning and does not merely absorb cultural ideology, c.)

that not all differences in morality are equally defensible, and d.) concepts in moral

development can be understood in terms of advancement.

Rest was also careful to draw a distinction in morality itself, dividing it into

concepts much in the same way economics distinguishes micro- and macroeconomics.

Rest proposed that Kohlberg’s theory is more useful when distinguishing between micro-

and macromorality, the latter of which is more appropriate for both Kohlberg’s stage

theory and his own schema theory (Rest et al., 1999; Bebeau, Rest, Narvaez & Thoma,

1999). Macromorality “concerns the formal structures of society that are involved in

making cooperation possible at a society level” (Rest et al., 1999, p. 2). By contrast,

micromorality “concerns developing relationships with particular others, and with an

individual’s creating consistent virtues within him- or herself through everyday life”

(Rest et al., 1999, p. 2). For micromorality, traits of loyalty, dedication, and caring for

loved ones are held in esteem while equivalent macromoral traits include impartiality and

acting on principle (Rest et al., 1999). Though both areas of morality concern themselves

with society, and presumably a better society, they are not always compatible. This, Rest

acknowledges, is a limitation of both stage theory and schema theory.

Schema theory. Where Rest and colleagues diverged most notably is in

Kohlberg’s conception of stages. For Kohlberg, the stages of moral development are a

staircase in which the individual seeks solutions at the highest available level of moral

reasoning (Rest et al., 1999; Bebeau et al., 1999). For Rest, the stages are best

understood in terms of schema, a term adopted to differentiate their neo-Kohlbergian

“soft” stages from Kohlberg’s “hard stages” (Rest et al., 1999; Bebeau et al., 1999).

Rest’s schemas still represent a developmental sequence, but individuals do not, notably,

always reason from the highest level of reasoning available to them since they may be in

more than one stage at a given time (Rest et al., 1999; Bebeau et al., 1999).

Nevertheless, similarities remain, and Rest and colleagues further differentiate

their theory by providing different labels for their three schemas of development. First,

the preconventional level of reasoning is relabeled as the Personal Interests schema (Rest

et al., 1999; Bebeau et al., 1999). The Personal Interests schema includes Kohlbergian

Stages 2 and 3 and functions on a “presociocentric” level, without awareness or to the

exclusion of an organized society. The Personal Interests schema “justifies a decision by

appealing to the personal stake that an actor has in the consequences of an action,

including prudential affectional relationship” (Bebeau et al., 1999, p. 305). The research

resulting from Rest’s schemas are notably devoid of attention to the Personal Interests

schema since the reasoning involved typically predates adolescence, whereas Rest’s

research requires individuals of at least twelve years of age.

The Maintaining Norms schema shares traits with Kohlberg’s Stage 4, where

morality is defined by the established social order. For a Maintaining Norms disposition,

without law “there would be no order; people would act instead on their own special

interests, leading to anarchy, a situation that responsible people want to prevent” (Bebeau

et al., 1999, p. 307). This schema is characterized by a need for norms; a society-wide

scope; the uniform, categorical application of laws; the establishment of reciprocity

through law, though partial in nature and therefore not necessarily equitable in benefit for

everyone; and a duty orientation and deference to authorities (Rest et al., 1999; Bebeau et

al., 1999). Moral reasoning within this schema is limited to law and the established order

and therefore what is also ought to be (Rest et al., 1999; Bebeau et al., 1999).

The Postconventional schema—though similarly labeled—is broader in scope

than its Kohlbergian counterpart. Whereas the postconventional level of Kohlberg bore

strong resemblance to the deontological perspective of Kant, the Postconventional

schema is nonpartisan though less exacting (Rest et al., 1999). However, a less exacting

understanding of postconventional thinking may be called for: Kohlberg eventually

abandoned his Stage 6 from his scoring system while Stage 5 was also found lacking in

evidence, leaving postconventional thinking in question altogether (Rest et al., 1999).

Rest and colleagues, in developing a broader understanding of postconventional thinking,

began with its “defining characteristic… that rights and duties are based on sharable

ideals for organizing cooperation in society, and are open to debate and tests of logical

consistency, experience of the community, and coherence with accepted practice” (Rest

et al., 1999, p. 41). Thus, postconventional thinking, holds moral criteria above all other

criteria, particular norms and laws; it constructs an ideal society and is not merely a

rejection of the establishment for the sake of contrarianism; it includes sharable ideas

rather than idiosyncratic, personal intuition, or ethnocentric preference; and it offers full

reciprocity through recognition that laws may be biased and favor some over others (Rest

et al., 1999).

Defining issues test. Rest and colleagues also diverged from Kohlberg in another

key way. Whereas Kohlberg understood moral reasoning as a single facet of

understanding, moral judgment, Rest et al. (1999; Bebeau et al., 1999) propose a four-

component model of the psychology of morality. Rest’s model offers a multifaceted

understanding of moral reasoning that consists of moral sensitivity, or acknowledging a

moral problem and interpreting its significance and potential impact; moral judgment, or

deciding which action is morally justifiable; moral motivation, or the extent to which an

individual is willing to act morally; and moral character, which is akin to a kind of moral

grit.

For their schema theory of cognitive moral development, Rest and associates

developed a new test called the Defining Issues Test (DIT) in the 1970s (Rest et al.,

1999), now in its second iteration since its inception. The DIT eschews Kohlberg’s use

of interviews for a more simplistic multiple-choice rating and ranking system. Though

Kohlberg dismissed the DIT as “quick and dirty” (Thoma, Rest, Narvaez & Bebeau,

1999, p. 646) Kohlberg’s interview data from the MJI had been found problematic,

resulting in reports by researchers in which:

participant’s theories about their own inner processes are quoted to support

the psychologist’s theories of how the mind works… When Kohlberg

reported interviews, the participants sounded like the philosopher John

Rawls (e.g., Kohlberg et al., 1990; Rawls, 1971); when Gilligan reported

interviews, the participants sounded like gender feminists (e.g., Gilligan,

1982); when Youniss and Yates (e.g., this issue) report interviews, the

participants say that they do not engage in deliberative reasoning at all about

their moral actions (Bebeau et al., 1999, p. 295).

Indeed, interview data is a verbal production by nature and therefore assumes a high

degree of verbal articulation. It also assumes “participants can verbally explain the

workings of their minds” (Bebeau et al., 1999, p. 295) and it may not, as Kohlberg

maintained, be “theoretically the most valid method of scoring” (Kohlberg, 1979, p. 47).

The most current version of the DIT, the Defining Issues Test Version 2 (DIT-2),

consists of five, paragraph length stories, or dilemmas, followed by twelve short and

cryptically phrased issues or questions representing the different schemas. The

participant then rates and ranks according to their importance to the individual (Thoma et

al., 1999, Rest et al., 1999). Rest and associates derived the test items from Kohlberg’s

research, using items derived from responses given in the MJI (Rest et al., 1999). As for

how the DIT functions, according to Rest et al. (1999)

the DIT is a device for activating moral schemas. We presume that reading

moral dilemmas and the DIT issue statements activates moral schemas (to

the extent that a person has developed them). As the participant encounters

an item that both makes sense and also activates a preferred schema, that

item is given a high rating and ranked of high importance. Alternatively,

when the participant encounters an item that either does not make sense or

seems simplistic and unconvincing (is not activating a preferred schema),

the item receives a low rating (Bebeau et al., 1999, p. 301).

Because Rest’s schema theory suggests individuals do not always operate at a single

stage or schema, the results of the DIT do not provide a single consistent schema.

Instead, the results provide an aggregate of responses from which a “P,” or principled,

score is derived from weighting responses that are considered postconventional (Rest et

al., 1999; Bebeau et al., 1999). A more recent scoring innovation for the DIT, the N2

index, is a hybrid index incorporating the P score, or the degree to which the individual

chooses items reflecting postconventional reasoning, along with the degree to which the

individual rejects more simplistic reasoning, calculated by how often the individual

chooses items of representing lower schemas as least preferable (Rest et al., 1999; Rest,

Thoma, Narvaez & Bebeau, 1997). Though the P score has been in use longer, the N2

index generally outperforms the results of the P score alone in capturing information on

moral judgment development (Rest et al., 1999; Rest et al., 1997).

DIT research. As befits research ongoing for the better part of forty years, DIT

research is extensive and its results more or less consistent. P scores range from zero to

95, and Bebeau and Thoma (2003) found that, in general, middle school students score in

the 20s, high school seniors score on average in the 30s, the average adult at 40, college

students in the 40s, graduate students score in the 50s, and moral philosophy and political

science doctoral students are expected to score in the 60s. The relationship between P

score and education is not an accident: formal education and moral development are

highly correlated (Rest & Thoma, 1985; Rest et al., 1999; Rest et al., 1997). Rest and

Thoma (1985) interpret this correlation as reinforced sociomoral attitudes at the college

level, with “the progressive increase in moral judgment scores [reflecting] the cumulative

impact of particular external social pressure” and “an increasing capacity to comprehend

higher level thinking” (p. 712). Other interpretations for this link between P score and

formal education include relationships between moral reasoning and skill and knowledge,

moral reasoning and general intellectual stimulation, and the possibility that college

students, as a population, are simply predisposed to higher levels of moral reasoning

(Rest & Thoma, 1985).

While colleges in particular have a positive effect on P scores, age has also been

found to have a positive impact on P scores (Rest, 1979) and there appears to be a close

link to life experiences and moral development as well. Deemer (1986) found that when

life experiences are coded as continued intellectual stimulation, life richness, or richness

of social environment, there is a significant correlation with the P score, even when

formal education is corrected for (Rest & Deemer, 1986).

The DIT has also linked political ideology to moral development and has been

criticized as little more than a measurement of political attitude (Rest et al., 1999).

However, Narvaez, Getz, Rest and Thoma (1999) reject this claim, concluding that only

when political identity, religious fundamentalism (determined by the individual’s belief

in the literalness of the Bible), and moral judgment (as determined by an individual’s P

score) are combined can stances on public policy issues be explained. Further, each

individual element cannot be reduced to another or to a common liberal-conservative

factor. Rather, Narvaez et al. (1999) along with Rest et al. (1999) theorize that cultural

ideology—the “values, norms, and standards that exist independently of a single person

and that are shared by a group as part of its mutual culture” (Narvaez et al., 1999, p.

478)—is but one process that shapes moral thinking. Moral thinking, not to be confused

with moral judgment, is a broader concept than moral judgment encompassing “people’s

judgments about right and wrong and the rationale behind such thinking” (Narvaez et al.,

1999, p. 478).

This theory proposes that autonomy, “the self-initiated, agentic side of morality”

(Rest et al., 1999, p. 177), and heteronomy, “the external, conforming side of morality”

(Rest et al., 1999, p. 177), codetermine moral thinking and that both the “individual’s

construction of meaning” (p. 177) and cultural ideology “co-occur to produce moral

thinking” (p. 178). In this context, Orthodoxy, characterized by belief in a moral center

found in traditional religion (Narvaez et al., 1999), and religious fundamentalism,

characterized by authoritarianism and belief in the literalness of the Bible, are likely to

coincide with a maintaining norms schema. Further moral judgment development is then

stunted by beliefs that discourage the questioning of authority (Rest et al., 1999). Thus, it

is not surprising that religious fundamentalism is related to high scores in the maintaining

norms schema (Narvaez, 2005), nor that political views are also related to moral

judgment development (Vitton & Wasonga, 2009).

Educators and Moral Reasoning Development

Ethical conduct is central to education (Cummings, Harlow & Maddux, 2007),

with ethically complex problems arising daily that require decisions based on values and

moral judgment (Vitton & Wasonga, 2009). Indeed, as Cummings et al. (2007) observe,

“teachers should be able to make sound moral judgments, look beyond their own self-

interest and take a broad view of morality that considers the perspectives of all students

who represent diverse racial, ethnic and cultural backgrounds” (p. 67). Moreover, “the

teacher’s level of moral reasoning affects students’ perceptions of moral atmosphere of

the classroom and… teachers with higher moral reasoning are more likely to motivate

student learning and healthy social development than teachers with lower moral reason”

(Cummings, Dyas, Maddux & Kochman, 2001, p. 145). Further, “teachers who reason at

lower levels are not effective teacher mentors, they negatively and inaccurately evaluate

student teachers who function at higher levels, and they take a singular approach to

instruction” (Cummings et al., 2007, p. 69). It follows that teaching, and by extension

educational leadership, should require advanced moral reasoning ability; however,

research indicates that this is not the case.

Teachers and moral reasoning development. To wit, educators generally show

moral reasoning ability equal to or below that of the average adult (Cummings, Dyas,

Maddux & Kochman, 2001; King & Matthew, 2002; Derryberry, Snyder & Wilson,

2006; Livingstone, Derryberry, King & Vendetti, 2006). Preservice teachers, in

particular, have been the subject of several studies, which have found that their moral

reasoning ability is lower than that expected of college educated adults, who should

easily exceed a P score of 40 (Cummings et al., 2007). Of even more concern, education

majors may actually lose moral reasoning ability over the course of their undergraduate

education, with freshmen DIT P score averaging 33.52 and senior DIT P scores averaging

22.57 (Lampe, 1994; McNeel, 1994; Yeazell & Johnson, 1988). This contrasts

significantly with findings that consistently show education plays a positive role in the

development of moral reasoning

While other studies are not so dire in their impression of education majors

(Cummings et al., 2001), there is an indication that the curriculum for education majors

does play a role in their moral development, or lack thereof. The DIT scores of education

majors has been found, for example, to be lower than those of liberal arts majors

(McNeel, 1994), though they are consistent with the scores of business majors. And

although isolated findings show that education majors may be on par with other majors

(Cummings et al., 2001), the moral reasoning ability of education majors (P=24) still

remains lower than the adult average P score of 40 (Derryberry et al., 2006). Many

theories have been offered to explain this discrepancy, but one of the more convincing

theories for why education majors fail to advance and may, in some cases, regress in

moral reasoning development is that the education curriculum relies heavily on technical

ability as opposed to critical reasoning skills, upon which moral reasoning development

relies. There is also little reason to believe that moral reasoning ability improves over the

course of a teacher’s career. The moral reasoning level of inservice teachers reflect little

improvement: postconventional reasoning was found only 30 to 50 percent of the time

(P=30, P=50, respectively).

Educational leaders and moral reasoning development. As with teachers,

principals also appear to have a lower than expected level of moral judgment. Vitton and

Wasonga (2009), in their study of elementary school principals, concluded as much,

finding that their participants had an average P score of 38.7, below the average adult

(P=40) and above the average senior high school student (P=31.8). In their study of

educational leadership graduate students, Greer, Searby and Thoma (2015) found an

average P score of only 29.98, or a score equivalent to what one would expect of a senior

high school student. Although Slavinsky (2006) found higher P scores than Vitton and

Wasonga (2009) and Greer et al. (2015), with scores just above that of the average adult

(P=41.94 compared to P=40), his study is ungeneralizable with only nine percent of

mailed surveys returned.

These results, when taken together, indicate that school faculty and administration

operate at lower levels of moral reasoning. Jordan, Brown, Trevino, and Finkelstein

(2013) found a positive link between employee perception of ethical leadership and

leadership moral reasoning. Building on Kohlberg’s (1981) theory that a significant

relationship exists between cognitive moral development and normative behavior, their

findings suggest that employees are likely to emulate the level of moral reasoning

perceived in their leadership. The sampling of educational leaders—former teachers—

indicate little progress from their preservice moral reasoning level. This is also

unsurprising. Teachers impact the moral atmosphere of their classroom and therefore the

moral development of their students. Educational leaders likewise provide a similar

influence in their role as leader, with research indicating that ethical leadership begets

ethical employees (Jordan et al., 2013). Thus, teachers are likely to be no more advanced

than their leaders in moral reasoning, and it therefore comes as no surprise that—given

the relationship between teacher and student—students should not be expected to grow in

reasoning ability either.

Ethics and Leadership Theory

Bass and Steidlmeier (1999) propose three pillars upon which the ethics of leadership

rest:

1. The moral character of the leader

2. The ethical legitimacy of the values embedded in the leaders’ vision, articulation,

and program which followers either embrace or reject; and

3. The morality of the processes of social ethical choice and action that leaders and

followers engage in and collectively pursue (p. 182).

However, key amongst these pillars is the moral legitimacy of a leader’s decisions (Bass

& Steidlmeier, 1999). Both transformational and transactional leadership have the

potential for moral legitimacy and ethical leadership. In transactional leadership, ethical

leadership is associated with a “free contract,” in which the transactions between leader

and follower are freely made and “depends on granting the same liberty and opportunity

to others that one claims for oneself, on telling the truth, keeping promises, distributing to

each what is due, and employing valid incentives or sanctions” (p. 185). Furthermore,

moral transactional leadership recognizes a “pluralism of values and diversity of

motivations” (p. 185).

Transformational leadership, by definition, is a relationship entered upon by

choice, by which in choosing to follow a particular leader both follower and leader are

changed as a result. A moral component of transformational leadership has existed since

its inception (Ciulla, 1995; Burns, 1978). Indeed, transformational leaders “have very

strong values. They do not water down their values and moral ideals by consensus, but

rather they elevate people by using conflict to engage followers and help them reassess

their own values and needs” (p. 15). Transformational leadership is very much

concerned with values synonymous with ethical behavior—such as liberty, justice, and

equality (Ciulla, 1995)—which likely explains why transformational leadership is

associated with subordinate outcomes like improved trust and respect for the leader

(Engelbrecht, van Aswegan & Theron, 2005).

Transformational leadership is complicated by the limits of its definition. Burns

from the beginning held that transformational leaders must be morally uplifting (Bass &

Steidlmeier, 1999). In contrast, Bass operationalized the transformational-transactional

dyad and held that transformational leaders could be either virtuous or villain (Bass &

Steidlmeier, 1999). Thus, according to Bass, both Adolf Hitler and Martin Luther King,

Jr. could be compared as transformational leaders.

It was not until later that Bass came to see a distinction between an authentic and

inauthentic transformational leader, distinguishing them by labeling the latter pseudo-

transformational (Bass & Steidlmeier, 1999). In distinguishing between these types, Bass

(1998) explains:

Leaders are authentically transformational when they increase awareness of

what is right, good, important, and beautiful, when they help to elevate

followers’ needs for achievement and self-actualization, when they foster

in followers higher moral maturity, and when they move followers to go

beyond their self-interests for the good of their group, organization, or

society. Pseudo-transformational leaders may also motivate and transform

their followers, but, in doing so, they arouse support for special interests at

the expense of others rather than what’s good for the collectivity. They will

foster psychodynamic identification, projection, fantasy, and rationalization

as substitutes for achievement and actualization. They will encourage ‘we-

they’ competitiveness and the pursuit of the leaders’ own self-interests

instead of the common good. They are more likely to foment envy, greed,

hate, and conflict rather than altruism, harmony, and cooperation (p. 191).

Although Bass distinguishes between the two, he felt they were ultimately two idealized

types and that most leaders would have traits of both, though authentic transformational

leaders would have more traits considered authentic more often than not, and vice versa

for pseudo-transformational leaders (Bass & Steidlmeier, 1999).

DIT and Leadership

As for the relationship between cognitive moral development and leadership style,

less has been said, and even less studied. On a theoretical level, Kuhnert and Lewis

(1987) proposed a stage-theory for the development of leadership traits in individuals.

Like the model for moral development proposed by Rest and his colleagues (1999),

Kuhnert and Lewis’ model of leadership development also includes three stages which

may also provide insight into a link between moral reasoning and leadership style.

Building from the work of Kegan’s (1982) adult development model, Kuhnert and Lewis

(1987) associated their three leadership developmental stages with the second, third, and

fourth stages of Kegan’s model. The two lower stages included transactional

leadership—distinguished as lower order (second stage) and higher-order (third stage)—

and the highest stage (fourth stage) consists of transformational leadership (Kuhnert &

Lewis, 1987). For Kuhnert and Lewis (1987), higher-order transactional exchanges

include exchanges that augment an interpersonal bond, such as support; lower-order

transactional exchanges are characterized by exchanges of goods or rights, such as those

that are contractually agreed upon (Kuhnert & Lewis, 1987).

If transactional leadership does represent a lower stage of development than

transformational leader on a spectrum of leadership behavior, a la the full range of

leadership, then it might be theorized that a connection could be made between this

spectrum of leadership development and a spectrum of moral development. Indeed, there

is a relationship between the description of Kuhnert and Lewis’s (1987) frames of

references for each stage of development and Rest’s schema theory. This relationship is

an unsurprising development since Kegan’s and Kohlberg’s stages are both based upon a

Piagetian model of cognitive development (Kuhnert & Lewis, 1987; Rest et al., 1999).

Kuhnert and Lewis’s lower-order transactional stage is organized around personal goals

and agendas (Kuhnert & Lewis, 1987) and bears a resemblance to both the Personal

Interests and Maintaining Norms schema (Bebeau et al., 1999). The third stage, Kuhnert

and Lewis’s higher-order transactional stage, includes a more subjective understanding of

needs that allows a person to take into consideration the needs of themselves and others

in mutual support (Kuhnert and Lewis, 1987). Kuhnert and Lewis’s (1987) third stage

seems to bear both a resemblance to conventional and postconventional moral reasoning.

Turner, Barling, Epitropaki, Butcher, and Milner (2002) may have been the first

to look at the relationship between moral reasoning development, as measured by the

DIT, and leadership behaviors. In their study of 111 managers across three organizations,

Turner et al. (2002) did find a connection between level of moral development and

leadership behaviors. Their study found that higher levels of moral reasoning are

perceived as exhibiting more transformational leadership behaviors (Turner et al., 2002).

Moreover, they found that leaders of differing levels of moral development were not

perceived any differently when exhibiting transactional leadership behaviors (Turner et

al., 2002). Thus, they concluded that there is a connection between higher levels of

moral reasoning and transformational leadership. Transactional leadership, by contrast,

could be found at each level of moral reasoning for the simple reason that transactional

relationships between leader and follower existed in every leader-follower relationship.

In their study of Norwegian naval cadets, Olsen, Eid and Johnsen (2006) came to

similar conclusions. They found that, like Turner and his colleagues (2002), that

transformational leadership was positively correlated with postconventional reasoning

(Olsen et al., 2006). Olsen et al. (2002) also expected to find a relationship between

transactional leadership and conventional reasoning under the assumption that

transactional leadership represents less developed leadership behavior. However, they

found no association between transactional leadership behaviors and the Maintaining

Norms schema. Unsurprisingly, they did find that moral behavior was negatively

correlated with passive leadership styles and an absence of leadership, particularly

management-by-exception-passive and laissez-faire. (Olsen et al., 2002).

Summary

Joanne Ciulla (1995) argues that “ethics lies at the heart of leadership studies and

has veins in leadership research” (p. 18). This chapter has sought the heart and veins of

leadership studies and research by covering the relevant literature for understanding the

full range of leadership, moral cognitive development, research related to educator and

educational leader moral reasoning levels, and research that connects leadership behavior

with moral development. Leadership behaviors are neither static nor simple, embodying

a host of traits and characteristics that are at once transformational and transactional.

Beyond the characteristics of leadership styles, leadership behavior encompasses a moral

component linked to certain leader characteristics.

The most popular conceptions of moral cognitive development are based on

Piaget’s stage theory. Kohlberg developed a model of moral reasoning development

similar in style and concept to Piaget’s model. Rest and his colleagues, building upon the

work of Kohlberg, suggest that moral cognitive development is not static and individuals

do not always reason on a single level of development. Rather, by discovering the level

at which the individual most frequently reasons researchers can then determine the

approximate level at which the individual does reason, a level Rest characterized as

schemas. To test an individual’s level of moral reasoning, Rest and his colleagues

proposed a multiple-choice assessment, the Defining Issues Test, to replace the interview

format used for Kohlberg’s stage theory.

Research indicates a lack of high-level moral reasoning in education, with both

teachers and administrators scoring lower, on average, than the average adult, and

certainly lower than their levels of education would suggest. This is problematic for any

number of reasons, not least of all the moral nature of the school’s work. Moreover,

early studies indicate that higher-level moral reasoning is linked to transformational

leadership. With transformational leadership so closely associated with positive

employee and organizational outcomes, the lower cognitive moral development of

educational leaders is concerning in a culture that includes broader reform efforts. This

study seeks to discover whether a link between cognitive moral development and

leadership behavior also exists in education leaders. However, it goes a step further by

examining the link between moral cognitive development and a survey of leadership

behavior that attempts to embody a more accurate representation of leadership behavior.

This more accurate picture of leadership behavior is accomplished by including not only

the full range of leadership but characteristics of situational leadership as well, as

represented by the Vannsimpco model.