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An Existential-Humanistic-Positive Theory of Human Motivation

Christine N. Winston Women’s Christian College, Chennai

Abraham Maslow proposed a theory of human motivation, which, despite widespread criticism, bears much relevance to the study of human behavior. I examine the criticisms in the light of existing literature, and reconceptualize key concepts in order to make the validity of the theory more apparent. Further, I articulate an integrated theory of human motivation by drawing parallels between Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, Seligman’s approaches to happiness, and Kierkegaard’s types of despair. The theory posits that gratification of one’s needs influences whether an individual will conceptualize the ideal life as a pursuit for pleasure, a quest for engagement, or a search for meaning. Consequently, the theory has implications for formation of identity, basis of morality, and emergence of values.

Keywords: needs, ideal life, Maslow, Seligman, Kierkegaard

Abraham Maslow (1987), the pioneering humanistic psychologist, proposed a theory of human motivation that can be found in any given book on introductory psychology. Nevertheless, similar to Freudian theories, it is only given symbolic significance and is dismissed on the grounds that it is conceptually arbitrary and empirically untestable (Neher, 1991; Wahba & Bridwell, 1976). The purpose of the present article is to make apparent the validity and utility of the hierarchy of needs by addressing major criticisms presented against the theory in the light of existing literature and to articulate an integrated theory of human motivation by drawing parallels between Maslow’s (1987) hierarchy of five needs, Seligman’s (2002) three approaches to happiness, and Kierkegaard’s (1941) three types of despair. The theory also has implications for identity formation, moral development, and the emergence of values.

Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs

According to Maslow (1987), human needs can be presented as a hierarchy of five clusters of needs, namely, physiological needs, safety needs, love and belongingness needs, esteem needs, and the need for self-actualization. The first four needs are referred to as deficit or deficiency needs (D-needs) and the need for self-actualization is referred to as growth or being needs (B-needs). Deficit needs are qualitatively different from the

Christine N. Winston, Department of Psychology, Women’s Christian College, Chennai. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Christine N. Winston, 25 (Old

no. 47), Srinivasa Nagar Main Road, Koyambedu, Chennai– 600 107, India. E-mail: [email protected]

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The Humanistic Psychologist © 2016 American Psychological Association 2016, Vol. 44, No. 2, 142–163 0887-3267/16/$12.00 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/hum0000028

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higher-order needs, in that an individual is “driven” to satisfy the former but “drawn” to meet the latter (Griffin, 1991, p. 126). In other words, when a lower-order need is gratified to a certain extent, the adjacent need in the hierarchy emerges. Deficiency, therefore, motivates behavior. On the other hand, engagement with growth needs fuels one’s desire to become a more self-actualizing individual. Adequate gratification of a need results in the emergence of a higher-order need, culminating in the pursuit for self-actualization. Conversely, higher-order needs do not emerge when an individual’s basic needs have not been adequately gratified.

The hierarchy of needs has been heavily criticized on the grounds that it is unamenable to scientific validation (Neher, 1991). Ambivalent literature with mixed-research findings further questions the validity of the theory (Wahba & Bridwell, 1976). A number of attempts have therefore been made to “reconsider” (Wahba & Bridwell, 1976), “recon- figure” (Germana, 2007), “rebuild,” “renovate,” (Kenrick, Griskevicius, Neuberg, & Schaller, 2010), and “rewire” (Rutledge, 2011) Maslow’s theory. Alternatives include the spiral model (Agrawal & Sharma, 1977), which underscores the recurrence of needs; the Y-model (Yang, 2003), which offers a genetic and culture-sensitive reinterpretation of the hierarchy; the evolutionary model (Kenrick et al., 2010), which emphasizes the importance of mating and parenting in human motivation; the interactive-dynamic model (Rutledge, 2011), which identifies social relationships as necessary for the gratification of all other needs; and the holarchy model (Germana, 2007), which sheds lights on the transpersonal needs of individuals. The many limitations and criticisms raised against Maslow’s hierarchy of needs are presented in the following section and evaluated in the light of existing literature.

The Structure of Needs

Number of needs. Wahba and Bridwell (1976) have noted that there is no evidence to suggest that there are five discrete categories of needs. Accordingly, some have reduced the number of needs (Alderfer, 1969; Yang, 2003), while others have suggested additions (Koltko-Rivera, 2006). Indeed, Maslow (1987) himself revised the hierarchy by including other needs such as the need for self-transcendence (Koltko-Rivera, 2006). One of the primary reasons why the determination of a definitive number of human needs is an elusive goal is because of difficulties in differentiating between the “means” and the “ends” of need gratification (Maslow, 1987, p. 47). The needs presented in the hierarchy are the “ends” of need gratification (e.g., to feel safe, to feel loved) that can be achieved through various means. For instance, a child might seek affiliation with the mother (means) in order to fulfill his or her need for safety (need). Therefore, what might appear to be a child’s need for belongingness, may in fact serve a more ulterior need for safety. Maslow (1987) drew from research on feeding behaviors in monkeys, in order to demonstrate that a piece of food can be construed as both an “appeaser of hunger” as well as a “symbol of dominant status” (p. 118). Similarly, Maslow (1987) contended that sex can be the means by which an individual gratifies his need for sexual release, physical intimacy, love, dominance, or any number of ultimate needs. Such enmeshments com- plicate the segregation of needs into discrete clusters. Accordingly, in her article entitled, Social Networks: What Maslow Misses, Rutledge (2011) argued that none of the needs that Maslow has explicated can be met without social relationships. It is ironic, however, that it is the author who has “missed” Maslow’s (1987) explicit statement that “basic needs can be satisfied only interpersonally” (p. 139). The functions (the ends) that human relation- ships (means) serve, however, are diverse, namely “the giving of safety, love, belonging-

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143AN INTEGRATED THEORY OF HUMAN MOTIVATION

ness, feeling of worth, and self-esteem” (p. 139). It is these “ultimate goals or desires or needs” (p. 47) that Maslow considered to be essential to the study of human motivation. Despite the many difficulties in discretely delineating the different human needs, recent factor analytic studies (Taormina & Gao, 2013) have been successful in extracting clusters of needs that conform to Maslow’s hierarchy.

Order of need emergence. Critics have argued that needs do not emerge in a given order. Instead, needs recur over time (Agrawal & Sharma, 1977; Neher, 1991). Further, they have contended that the order of need emergence is not universal, but dependent on numerous personal and environmental variables. Indeed, studies have found that the emergence of needs is dependent on culture and sociopolitical climate (Tang, Ibrahim, & West, 2002). However, in a recent study conducted by Tay and Diener (2011) across 123 countries, it was found that needs do arise in the order specified by Maslow.

Maslow’s theory also has developmental validity. In other words, an individual’s needs across the life span emerge in accordance with the hierarchy (Goebel & Brown, 1981; Heckhausen, 1991). The basic physiological needs such as nourishment, rest, and elimination are dominant during the early years. The need for safety has been considered by many to be the basic need of childhood (Horney, 1937; Maslow, 1987). The pursuit of love and belongingness has been found to follow an inverted-U developmental trajectory, peaking in adolescence and early adulthood (Helgeson, 2005). The need for esteem, recognition, and appreciation for one’s contribution and generativity has become synon- ymous with adulthood (McAdams, & de St. Aubin, 1992). Finally, Maslow (1987) has suggested that the need for self-actualization is most dominant among older adults. Studies have accordingly found older subjects to be more self-actualizing than young adults (Ivtzan, Gardner, Bernard, Sekhon, & Hart, 2013). It should be noted however, that the developmental pattern is based on the “dominance” of a need rather than the “presence” of a need. For instance, although the need for love and belongingness may dominate during adolescence, they are nevertheless present and recurrent throughout the life span.

The Theory of Self-Actualization

Validity of the construct. Myers (2006) has questioned the validity of the profile of the self-actualizing individual because the criteria used by Maslow to select “healthy individuals” for the study were arbitrary and subjective. In other words, if a researcher were to select individuals that one subjectively considers to be self-actualized, he or she would probably end up with a personality profile that bears little resemblance to that drawn up by Maslow. Nevertheless, attempts have been made to operationalize the construct, resulting in the construction of self-report measures such as the Personal Orientation Inventory (Shostrom, 1964) and Personal Attitude Survey (Sumerlin, 1995). Further, in accordance with Maslow’s (1987) predictions, self-actualization scores have been found to be associated with psychological health (Fox, Knapp, & Michael, 1968), and negatively correlated with dysfunction (Dahl, Wakefield, Kimlicka, Wiederstein, & Cross, 1983).

One of the reasons why operationalizing self-actualization is a complex endeavor is because self-actualizing individuals are paradoxical persons. They are paradoxical be- cause they integrate values and traits that are considered to be polarities (Maslow, 1987). For instance, healthy individuals appreciate solitude, but they also share deeply enmeshed relationships; they tend to be resistant to enculturation, but they also identify deeply with humanity; they are autonomous but not egocentric. Accordingly, Maslow (1987) has observed:

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In healthy people, these dichotomies were resolved, the polarities disappeared, and many oppositions thought to be intrinsic merged and coalesced with each other to form unities. . . . [their] act is both selfish and unselfish . . . very spiritual and very pagan . . . duty cannot be contrasted with pleasure nor work with play when duty is pleasure. (p. 191)

Maslow’s self-actualizing individual is characterized by the best of human qualities rather than by normative values that characterize arbitrary dichotomies such as collectiv- istic–individualistic, masculine–feminine, agentic– communal, and autonomic– homonomic (Ivtzan & Conneely, 2009). Csikszentmihalyi (1996), despite his skepticism about the methods of inquiry in humanistic psychology, has reached startlingly similar conclusions in his work with eminent individuals. He has written, “they show tendencies of thought and action that in most people are segregated. They contain contradictory extremes; instead of being an ‘individual,’ each of them is a ‘multitude’” (p. 57). Accordingly, Schwartz and Sagie (2000) have found need gratification to be associated with the emergence of seemingly contradictory self-centered (e.g., self-directedness) and other-centric values (e.g., self-transcendence). The self-actualizing individual can there- fore be described, from a holarchic perspective, as an autonomous-authentic unit who is integrated into a larger whole (Germana, 2007).

Implicit ethnocentrism. Unlike most psychological theories that seek to describe “what is” (descriptive), Maslow’s theory of self-actualization is a study of “what ought to be” (prescriptive; Maslow, 1987, p. 191). Critics have argued that the values embedded in Maslowian (and humanistic) theory are biased toward Euro-American ideals of autonomy and personal growth and are therefore inconsistent with the collectivistic orientation toward conformity and communality (Gambrel & Cianci, 2003; Hofstede, 1984; Ivtzan, 2008; Yang, 2003). Indeed, Ivtzan (2008) reported that British participants scored higher than Indians on the Personal Orientation Inventory. He interpreted the findings to mean that self-actualization entails individualistic values, such as a tendency to be inner- oriented and present-oriented, that are not endorsed by most collectivists. He has noted:

The essence of self-actualization, becoming all that one can be while fulfilling our greatest potential, is a universal theme . . . beyond culture, gender, race and religion. . . . The separation begins as we try to classify the characteristics of this self-fulfillment; how we specifically define self-actualization. (Ivtzan, 2008, p. 118)

Such an explanation takes an essentialist orientation and posits that culture is something that is “within” the individual. An alternative explanation, however, is that the differences can be explained by examining other environmental variables that confound culture. For instance, Schwartz and Sagie (2000) have found that socioeconomic development is associated with the emergence of individualistic values such as spontaneity, self-directedness, and openness to experience. It is possible, therefore, that cultural differences in self-actualization scores reflect differences in socioeconomic development. In other words, as India is economically less developed than Britain, basic needs may be less gratified among Indians, thereby hindering the emergence of the need for self-actualization.

From a metacritical perspective, the “bias towards White males” critique of self- actualization stems from an incomplete portrayal of Maslow’s (1987) self-actualizing individual. Critics have chosen to highlight the centrality of individualistic values such as autonomy, spontaneity, and resistance to enculturation (Hofstede, 1984; Neher, 1991), while ignoring other “less-Western” characteristics such as identification with humanity, deep and profound relationships, relational enmeshment, and concern with problems outside oneself rather than within (Maslow, 1987).

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145AN INTEGRATED THEORY OF HUMAN MOTIVATION

The role of need gratification. Maslow (1987) proposed that gratification of lower-order needs results in the emergence of higher-order needs, culminating in the need for self-actualization. Critics have argued that gratification of lower-order needs does not always activate higher-order needs (Agrawal & Sharma, 1977; Neher, 1991; Wahba & Bridwell, 1976). Indeed, some have contended that self-actualizing individuals have often foregone their basic needs. For instance, one might refer to Michelangelo, the prolific artist who, while painting the Sistine chapel, paid little or no attention to his basic physiological needs.

An important distinction ought to be made between “deprivation” and “denial” of a need. Deprivation refers to a helpless state in which an individual is unable to gratify his or her needs. Examples include scarcity of food as a result of poverty, lack of friends as a result of poor social skills, and threats to safety as a result of living in a war-torn region. On the other hand, denial refers to an individual’s voluntary decision to not gratify a particular need. Examples include an anorexic person’s decision to ignore one’s basic need for food, a soldier risking his or her safety for the sake of one’s country, and a hermit renouncing the need for loving relationships in order to devote oneself completely to a deity. It is noteworthy that, even in the case of anorexic persons who voluntary decide to deprive themselves of food, compensatory behaviors such as hoarding recipe books, being preoccupied with food, and cooking elaborate meals are commonly reported (Comer, 2014). While deprivation is associated with helplessness, denial is accompanied by a sense of control. Indeed, Maslow (1987) has noted that it is not enough for needs to be gratified; they ought to be mastered. Mastery of needs entails the following components.

Quality of past gratification. Quality of gratification refers to the consistency and abundance with which an individual’s needs have been met in the past. In other words, an individual who has been consistently gratified in the past and has witnessed adequate gratification in those around him is likely to have a sense of mastery over his needs. Accordingly, Tay and Diener (2011) have observed that “need fulfilment needs to be achieved at a societal level, not simply at the individual level” (p. 363) in order to enhance one’s well-being. Consider the example of a child who has been raised under conditions of poverty. Even if this individual’s need for food were to be adequately gratified, hunger and starvation would be an ever-present threat, because of the deprivation that the person has witnessed among those in his environment (e.g., parents, community members). On the other hand, an individual who has mastered a particular need takes that need “for granted,” such that its absence would cause distress; however, its presence would not contribute much to one’s satisfaction with life (Oishi, Diener, Lucas, & Suh, 1999). It is unfortunate, however, that need satisfaction is often assessed as a current state in the “here and now.” Need deprivation, in Maslowian theory, has significance for motivation theory only when it is “chronic” and “extreme” (Maslow, 1987, p. 59). Maslow illustrated this distinction by differentiating between “appetite” (temporal deprivation) and “hunger” (chronic deprivation).

Content of present preoccupation. Prolonged deprivation of a particular need results in an individual becoming preoccupied with that need. “He or she dreams food, remembers food, thinks about food, emotes only about food, perceives only food, and wants only food” (Maslow, 1987, p. 59). In other words, the individual’s thoughts, fantasies, and conceptual- izations of the ideal life tend to be oriented toward the gratification of that particular need. The role of need deprivation–gratification in one’s conceptualization of the ideal life is the primary thesis of this article and is taken up for discussion elsewhere in the article.

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Competence for future deprivation. Maslow (1987) has noted that individuals whose needs have been adequately gratified in the past are better equipped to tolerate frustration. Heylighen (1992) has illustrated this principle by referring to findings that, despite similar caustic living conditions, the victims of the Nazi regime, in contrast to tribesmen (who have experienced chronic and caustic deprivation), were oriented toward higher needs because their needs were adequately gratified in the past (prior to captivity). It is noteworthy, however, that gratification does not always foster one’s perceived compe- tence to overcome potential deprivation. For instance, a child who has been raised in an affluent family would have been sufficiently gratified with food in the past; however, he or she might not possess the competence to address future deprivation. Mastery therefore entails the “overcoming” of deprivation, in such a manner that an individual becomes aware of the capacity or competence to regulate and satisfy one’s needs. Deprivation can therefore be beneficial because, in Nietzsche’s words, “What does not kill me makes me stronger” (Neher, 1991, p. 101).

Mastery over a particular need, therefore, entails past gratification, freedom from need preoccupation, and a sense of competence and control over potential deprivation. Ac- cordingly, Heylighen (1992) has noted:

What seems essential for SA [Self-Actualization], however, is not the (subjective or objective) actual gratification of needs, but the fact that the subject feels competent to find gratification. . . . need frustration will not change the personality structure, world view or self-image of the subject, as long as the subject knows that he is able to get gratification in due time. (p. 49)

The Ideal Life

According to Maslow (1987), need gratification is central to one’s conceptualization of the ideal life. An individual construes the ideal life as one in which there is no threat to the gratification of one’s most dominant need. For instance, a youth in love might consider the idea of spending the rest of his life with his or her beloved to be an ideal and happy life. Maslow (1987) offered a similar example:

Another peculiar characteristic of the human organism when it is dominated by a certain need is that the whole philosophy of the future tends also to change. For our chronically and extremely hungry person, Utopia can be defined simply as a place where there is plenty of food. He or she tends to think that, if only guaranteed food for the rest of life, he or she will be perfectly happy and will never want anything more. Life itself tends to be defined in terms of eating. Anything else will be defined as unimportant. (p. 59)

However, since man is a “perpetually wanting animal” (Maslow, 1943, p. 370), once a particular need has been adequately satisfied, higher-order needs will emerge and one’s conceptualization of the ideal life will accordingly change, thereby necessitating gratifi- cation of the newly emergent need. It is noteworthy, however, that expectancies of potential gratification (conceptualization) and actual gratification have different implica- tions for happiness. In other words, it is possible that an individual does not find the actualization of one’s conceptualization of an ideal life to be as satisfying as one imagined it to be. For instance, a person may derive much satisfaction from conceptualizing his or her ideal life as one in which he or she is married to a beloved one; however, once married, marriage may not be very gratifying. Another empirically grounded example is the “parenthood paradox,” (Baumeister, 1991), which refers to the phenomenon by which

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many individuals express a strong desire to become parents; parenthood, however, diminishes happiness.

Seligman’s Approaches to Happiness

Happiness is a subjective experience (Diener, 2000). Therefore, individuals differ in what they consider to be the constituents and contingencies of happiness. For instance, there has been a recent phenomenon on social-networking websites in which users complete the caption, “Happiness is . . .” with subjective descriptions of what happiness entails. The responses tend to be varied, including daydreams of pleasurable activities (e.g., walking barefoot on fresh grass, stomping on bubble wrap), absence of aversive situations (e.g., not having to set the alarm for the next day, the last day of exams), appreciation of relationships (e.g., real friends who care, seeing my mother smile), and opportunities to use one’s skills and abilities (e.g., writing poems, singing in a choir).

According to Seligman (2002), there are three primary routes to happiness: the pleasant life, the good life, and the meaningful life. An individual who conceptualizes the ideal life as a pleasant life seeks to maximize pleasure and minimize pain. The good life, on the other hand, entails using one’s skills and abilities to engage with various domains of life, such as relationships, work, parenting, and leisure. On the other hand, an individual who seeks to lead a meaningful life uses one’s personal skills to contribute to a cause that is greater than the self. It is noteworthy, however, that one does not have to lead a “meaningful life” (as per Seligman’s definition) in order to find life meaningful. In other words, an individual who leads a pleasant life or a good life may report leading a very “meaningful life.” For the individual who wishes to lead a pleasant life, the pleasures that life has to offer are essentially what make life worth living; conversely, the absence of pleasure or the presence of pain is what makes life not worthwhile. Similarly, with respect to the individual who leads a good life, it is an engagement with work and relationships that makes life worth living; the loss of a loved one or the loss of a meaningful job makes life meaningless.

One’s approach to happiness has implications for his or her attitudes toward various aspects of life. For instance, one’s belief in God, or lack of it, would depend on how the ideal life has been conceptualized. An individual who conceptualizes the ideal life as a pleasant one might explain, “How can I believe in God when He lets bad things happen to me?” whereas a person who endorses a meaningful life might say, “I believe in God because He gives me a sense of purpose in life.”

Seligman (2002) contended that an individual who integrates all the three paths to happiness lives a full life. Although he states that “there is no incompatibility among the three lives” and that the simultaneous pursuit of all three lives is essential to living a “full life” (Seligman, 2002, p. 303), individuals are often presented with life decisions in which the different paths to happiness are incompatible (e.g., Should I pursue the job with the better salary or the job that will help me maximize my potentials? Should I give up my meaningful career in order to be a responsible parent; or should I jeopardize the well-being of my children for the sake of my career?). The choices that one makes in such conflicting life situations are indicators of which of the three paths to happiness one values the most.

There are “within-group” differences among individuals who endorse a particular life orientation. An individual who seeks to pursue a pleasant life may be primarily oriented either toward the maximization of pleasure or the minimization of pain. Similarly, the good life can entail a drive either toward engagement or away from emptiness. The endorsement of a meaningful life as an ideal life can either reflect a pursuit for purpose

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148 WINSTON

or a reaction against life’s absurdity. An orientation toward pleasure, engagement, and meaning would be more adaptive than a movement away from pain, emptiness, and absurdity, because an individual with the former orientation would be preoccupied with the many reasons that make life living, while the one with the latter orientation would consider life to be, as Freud put it, “a roundabout way to death” (Gotz, 2010, p. 171).

The Danish existentialist, Soren Kierkegaard (1941) also expounded on the topics of the pleasant life, the good life, and the meaningful life in his seminal book, The Sickness Unto Death. However, unlike Seligman (2002), who emphasized the happiness that each of the life orientations can bring, Kierkegaard (1941) exposited the (type of) despair that accompanies each of the life orientations. Happiness and despair may then be conceptu- alized as two sides of the same life orientation. Presented in the following section is a brief discussion comparing Seligman’s and Kierkegaard’s conceptualizations of each of the three life orientations.

The pleasant life. The pleasant life involves the amplification of pleasure and elimination of pain in all domains of life (Seligman, 2002). Scollon and King (2011) have illustrated such an ideology; “the lay notion of a good marriage may equate to a lifelong honeymoon, the lay notion of the good life may equate to a very long vacation” (p. 7). Similarly, the moral reasoning of individuals oriented toward the pleasant life is hypoth- esized to be preconventional, such that whatever is pleasurable is considered “good” (reinforcement) and whatever is painful is considered “bad” (punishment; Kohlberg, 1958).

The despairing unconsciousness of having a self. Kierkegaard (1941) de- scribed the individual who lives only for pleasure as one who is unaware that he has a self. Such a person is comparable to Marcia’s (1966) diffused individual who has little or no insight into what it means to be a self. Kierkegaard (1941) demonstrated, in the following illustration, the unfortunate truth that those who constantly seek to “eat, drink, and make merry” fail to experience life in all its fullness.

Unfortunately, this is the sorry and ludicrous condition of the majority of men, that in their own house they prefer to live in the cellar . . . that is, in the determinants of sensuousness. And not only does he prefer to dwell in the cellar; no, he loves that to such a degree that he becomes furious if anyone would propose to him to occupy the bel étage which stands empty at his disposition—for in fact he is dwelling in his own house. (p. 46)

Living a pleasant life is, therefore, not an antidote to despair. Indeed, such an individual, according to Kierkegaard (1941), is simply unaware of his or her despair, and is therefore in more despair than he or she is aware of. Such individuals can be said to have diffused identities because their behaviors are dependent on external forces and conse- quences, rather than on internal values and standards (Sheldon & Kasser, 2001). They tend to “go wherever the wind blows” (Kroger, 2003, p. 213).

The good life. The good life involves using one’s skills and abilities to engage with the different domains of life such as love, work, and play (Seligman, 2002), irrespective of whether the act is inherently pleasurable. In fact, even though the “good life” is considered to be an approach to “happiness,” engagement with relationships, work, and parenting can often entail distress, unhappiness, challenges, or pain. Nevertheless, these activities contribute to one’s sense of meaning in life and are therefore pursued even at the cost of personal happiness (Baumeister, Vohs, Aaker, & Garbinsky, 2013). Therefore, in contrast to the pleasant life which involves having as many pleasures as possible, the good life involves doing various things that foster engagement and avoid emptiness. Accord-

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ingly, the moral reasoning of individuals oriented toward the good life is hypothesized to be conventional, such that socially accepted rules and norms dictate what is right and wrong (Kohlberg, 1958).

Despair at not willing to be oneself. While the person who endorses a pleasant life is in despair because he is unaware that he has a self (absence of self-awareness), the one who endorses a good life is in despair because, despite being aware that he or she has a self (presence of self-awareness), there is an unwillingness to be the self that one is (absence of self-acceptance). Such individuals tend to be inauthentic because they do not will to be themselves. Or worse, they may seek to appropriate others’ selves (Kierkegaard, 1941). This phenomenon by which an individual denies the self and conforms to a structure that has been dictated by another draws to mind the adolescent, who appropriates the identity that his or her peer culture endorses. Similarly, adults make great efforts to be the ideal parent, ideal employee, or ideal spouse and in doing so, often trade the “real” self for the “role” self, resulting in an “individual loss of personhood” (Rogers, 1961, p. 214). Kierkegaard (1941) referred to such an individual who has achieved the good life, “[one who has] been happily married for a number of years, is an active and enterprising man, a father and a citizen, perhaps even a great man,” as one who is in despair because of not willing to be oneself (p. 63).

A man finds his dwelling place distasteful, either because the chimney smokes, or for any reason whatsoever; so he leaves it, but he does not move out, he does not engage in a new dwelling . . . he reckons the offense will pass away . . . he comes to himself only once in a while, as it were on a visit . . . this only means that he begins again where he left off; he was to a certain degree a self of a sort, and he became nothing more. (p. 62)

In contrast to the pleasure-seeker who refuses to move out of the cellar, the above mentioned individual is discontent with his or her “dwelling place,” and therefore copes by suffering passively or by repressing “this thing in the background that might again emerge” (Kierkegaard, 1941, pp. 62–63).

Kierkegaard (1941, p. 62) observed that the utilization of one’s “abilities” and “talents” in order to engage with “life, the real, the active life” (“the outward direction”), may, in actuality, serve as a defensive barrier against self-reflection (“the inward direc- tion”).

[He] distances himself from the topic of the self, whereas outwardly he is completely ‘a real man’ . . . a university man, husband and father, an uncommonly competent civil functionary even, a respectable father, very gentle to his wife and carefulness itself with respect to his children. (p. 62)

The meaningful life. The meaningful life involves using one’s strengths to con- tribute to a meaningful cause (e.g., science, art) that is larger than oneself (Seligman, 2002). The existential inquiry of life’s meaning can either be cosmic (What is the meaning of life?) or terrestrial (What is my purpose in life?). Psychologists have primarily concerned themselves with the latter while philosophers and theologians have addressed the former (Nelson-Jones, 2006). When individuals report that their lives are meaningful (because of relationships, family, religion, or work), they are, in a sense, referring to suicide-deterrents (Why should I not terminate my existence?) rather than a grand plan for the universe or a cosmic meaning for existence. While the existentialists assert that an individual ought to construct one’s own meaning for existence (“existence precedes essence;” Sartre, 1945, p. 1), the humanists contend that the purpose of one’s life rests in

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becoming the self that one truly is (essence precedes existence; Maslow, 1987; Rogers, 1961). The two perspectives can be integrated to mean that a healthy individual will construct his or her meaning in life in a manner that is true to one’s self. In other words, authenticity is crucial to the construction of one’s meaning in life (Winston, 2015).

The meaningful life entails making an authentic or unique contribution to the world. Inauthentic contributions (e.g., doing volunteer work at a charity to earn course credits, making a donation to gain admiration) may serve a good cause, but they do not constitute a meaningful life because an individual’s unique potentials have not been actualized. Indeed, Maslow (1987) has observed, “Musicians must make music, artists must paint, poets must write if they are to be ultimately at peace with themselves. What humans can be, they must be” (p. 64). The meaningful life is, therefore, oriented toward authentic generativity and away from inauthenticity and stagnation (Maslow, 1987). Accordingly, the moral reasoning of such individuals is hypothesized to be postconventional, whereby they devise ideological structures that are personally meaningful and cosmically edifying (Kohlberg, 1958).

The will to despairingly be oneself. An authentic individual possesses an increasing sense of self (self-awareness), validation of one’s self (self-acceptance), as well as the determination to be the self that one truly is (self-assertion). Kierkegaard (1941) used the term defiance to capture the despair that characterizes the will to be oneself. Such a sense of authenticity is often socially punished and as a result, is “seldom seen in the world” (Kierkegaard, 1941, p. 83). It is because of such a lonely struggle for authenticity that self-actualizing individuals experience a sense of alienation in this world (Maslow, 1987) and become extremely self-reliant, to the extent that “even if . . . God . . . and his angels were to help him out of it . . . he doesn’t want it” (Kierkegaard, 1941, p. 82). Although for Kierkegaard (1941) such defiance is demonic because it is self-reliant (rejects God), the humanists assert that authenticity, which is “the will to be that self which one truly is, is indeed the opposite of despair” and the epitome of human functioning (Kierkegaard, 1941, p. 18). (In Kierkegaardian thought, both the demonic man and the godly man are defiant. However, while the demonic man is defiant of everyone including God, the godly man is defiant of everything but God).

Kierkegaard (1941) offered a cure for despair. He observed that despair can be overcome by grounding oneself in a system that is larger than oneself. He has written, “By relating itself to its own self and by willing to be itself, the self is grounded transparently in the Power which posited it” (Kierkegaard, 1941, p. 154). The “Power” that Soren Kierkegaard is referring to is God. As a theistic philosopher, he believed that a creation (person) requires one’s Creator in order to truly comprehend his or her identity and purpose, and to ultimately rid oneself of despair. Kierkegaard’s (1941) proposition can be interpreted from a nontheistic perspective to mean that an individual requires grounding in a personally meaningful system that is larger than oneself (Seligman, 2002), in order to truly eradicate despair. This resonates with the holarchic theory, which suggests that a healthy individual is one who is an autonomous unit but nevertheless integrated into a larger whole (Germana, 2007).

An Integrated Theory of Human Motivation

Need Gratification and Conceptualizations of the Ideal Life

An integrated theory of human motivation, according to which need gratification influences one’s conceptualization of the ideal life, is illustrated in Figure 1. The

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gratification of one’s basic physiological and safety needs is crucial to survival. Accord- ingly, Alderfer (1969) has grouped the two clusters of needs into one, Existence needs. The gratification of these basic needs results in the emergence of higher-order needs, namely love and belongingness needs, and esteem needs (Maslow, 1987) collectively referred to as Relatedness needs (Alderfer, 1969). Deprivation of basic survival needs on the other hand, results in preoccupation with these needs such that an individual’s conceptualization of the ideal life revolves around the gratification of survival needs (Maslow, 1987).

An individual who has experienced prolonged deprivation of basic needs, such as food, water, and safety, is likely to have witnessed caustic conditions such as poverty or natural calamities. Such adverse conditions can influence one’s fantasies and daydreams in such a way that the person conceptualizes the ideal life as that which is pleasurable and devoid of pain. Further, since money is essential for the gratification of survival needs (Diener, Ng, Harter, & Arora, 2010), an individual who has experienced deprivation of basic needs is likely to believe that, if only he or she had more money, his life would be

Figure 1. The role of need deprivation–gratification in conceptualizations of an ideal life.

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ideal (the pleasant life). In addition, the gratification of physiological (food, sex, sleep, excretion, etc.) and safety needs (absence of threat) is inherently pleasurable (intrinsic reinforcers) to most living beings because they are essential for survival.

As depicted in Figure 1, the gratification of survival needs results in the emergence of higher-order needs for love and esteem (Maslow, 1987). Prolonged deprivation of such needs results in an individual conceptualizing the ideal life as that which entails satisfying relationships and engaging work (the good life). The daydreams of many young adults centered around finding lasting love explain this pathway. Adequate gratification of one’s need for love and esteem results in the emergence of the ultimate need for self- actualization, which is the need to actualize one’s potentials (Maslow, 1987). The need for self-actualization, however, can never be truly satisfied as the self is a constantly evolving organism (Maslow, 1987). Therefore, an individual oriented toward a meaningful life understands that the “[ideal] life is a process, not a state of being . . . a direction, not a destination” (Rogers, 1961, p. 186). A meaningful life entails a lifelong journey of self-discovery and self-transcendence.

Implications for life satisfaction. Peterson, Park, and Seligman (2005) have found that an orientation toward the good life and the meaningful life is a stronger predictor of life satisfaction than an orientation toward the pleasant life. However, these findings may not be universally generalizable; cross-national findings suggest that in poor nations, life satisfaction is indeed related to income (Oishi et al., 1999) as it is necessary for the gratification of basic lower-order needs (Diener et al., 2010). On the other hand, in wealthy nations, life satisfaction is associated with gratification of higher-order needs (Oishi et al., 1999). The findings suggest that gratification of the most potent need is associated with life satisfaction. In other words, in poor countries, where hunger and starvation are ever-present threats, an individual might conceptualize the ideal life as that which involves no threat to survival (the pleasant life). Therefore, gratification of basic needs contributes to life satisfaction. On the other hand, in wealthy nations, the gratifi- cation of lower-order needs is “taken for granted,” such that deprivation of these needs causes distress; however, gratification does not significantly improve one’s satisfaction with life. Since basic physiological needs are relatively satisfied in most individuals in wealthy countries, their conceptualizations of the ideal life revolve around the need for engagement with love and work (the good life). Therefore, gratification of these higher- orders needs contribute to life satisfaction (Tay & Diener, 2011). It is apparent that need gratification has implications for one’s conceptualization of the ideal life and, by exten- sion, one’s contingencies of life satisfaction.

Implications for human development. Seligman (2002), in outlining the three approaches to happiness noted, “It would be disingenuous to deny that I personally value the meaningful life above the good life, which in turn I value above the pleasant life” (p. 303). One of the reasons why Seligman (and possibly, many others) hold such a sentiment is because such a value orientation is consistent with the process of healthy human development. Infancy and childhood are phases of one’s existence that are primarily devoted to pleasure and the avoidance of pain (the pleasant life). Adolescence and early adulthood signify the emergence of the self and the need to engage with love, work, and play (the good life), even at the cost of pleasure. Middle and late adulthood, during which the imminence of death is prominent, is a process of reorienting one’s life toward greater authenticity and generativity (the meaningful life). This developmental perspective is consistent with the developmental trend that one finds in Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. In other words, survival needs that dominate during the early years are consistent with

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children’s orientation toward a pleasant life; love and esteem needs that dominate during adulthood are consistent with an orientation toward a good life; the need for authenticity and transcendence that dominate in senior adults are oriented toward a meaningful life. Indeed, Maslow (1987) has contended that “as the years go by,” an individual masters his or her basic needs and becomes increasingly “impervious to threat,” either because of “a lack of threat through childhood” or because one’s “threats [have been] successfully overcome” (p. 121). Consequently, with age, one’s conceptualizations of the ideal life will also become more mature and transcendent.

Need Gratification and Emergence of Values

One’s conceptualization of the ideal life is embedded with values that reflect one’s attitude toward the self (self-oriented values) and others (other-oriented values). As mentioned earlier, the meaningful life involves an attitude of autonomy and authenticity with respect to the self, and an orientation toward generativity and transcendence with respect to others. These Being values can also be noted in self-actualizing individuals, whose lives reflect a “self for others” (transcendent) orientation. Diametrically opposed to such a lifestyle is the “others for self” (parasitic) orientation, notable in infants, as they are completely dependent on others for the gratification of their needs. This is in accordance with Tay and Diener’s (2011) observation that basic need gratification is dependent on factors that “lie beyond individual control” (p. 363), whereas the fulfilment of psychos- ocial needs is dependent on personal factors.

The gratification of physiological needs, be it in infants, adults, or even animals, benefits only the one who has been satiated (Maslow, 1987). In contrast, an individual who actualizes one’s potentials and consequently makes an authentic contribution to the world has benefitted others more than oneself. In between the basic “self-centered” needs and the ultimate “self-transcendent” needs, lies the need for love and belongingness, characterized by interdependence, reciprocity, and mutualism. Therefore, the values that emerge as a result of gratification of one’s needs range from “parasitic” dependence on externalities for need gratification (physiological needs, particularly in infancy) to a “transcendent” life of authentic contribution (self-actualization needs), with a “symbiotic” lifestyle situated midway (love and belongingness needs). Therefore, gratification of needs results not only in the emergence of higher-order needs but also in the emergence of higher-order values. Indeed, Maslow (1987) has noted,

The higher the need, the less selfish it must be. Hunger is highly egocentric . . . but the search for love and respect necessarily involves other people. . . . People living at the level of self-actualization . . . love mankind most and [are] most developed idiosyncratically. This supports Fromm’s contention that self-love . . . is synergic with rather than antagonistic to love for others. (p. 100)

In accordance with the humanistic orientation, it is evident that gratification of an individual’s needs results in the emergence of values that enhance growth in oneself as well as the world to which one belongs.

The role of culture. The proposition that need gratification results in the emer- gence of values oriented toward the actualization of one’s idiosyncratic potentials may be interpreted as being inconsistent with the collectivistic ideology that personal fulfilment ought to occur in the context of one’s social group (Ivtzan, 2008; Neher, 1991). For instance, cultural theorists have observed that in collectivistic cultures, individuals gratify their needs and actualize their potentials in a manner that benefits one’s group (Yang,

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2003). Accordingly, they have dispensed with individualistic characteristics such as autonomy and resistance to enculturation as necessary features of a self-actualizing individual. However, such a proposition, that collectivists can be transcendent without being autonomous, is inconsistent with the theory presented in the article as well as with past research findings (Schwartz & Sagie, 2000).

An orientation toward others’ well-being may be an end in itself (e.g., transcendence, benevolence, generativity) or a means to other ulterior needs and motives. Collectivism has been found to be a means to the gratification of one’s basic needs. In other words, as collectivistic nations tend to be poorer than individualistic nations, fidelity and conformity to one’s group are necessary conditions for need gratification and survival (Borrero, Escobar, Cortes, & Maya, 2013). Accordingly, empirical literature suggests that collec- tivists tend to be collectivistic only to the extent that it serves their needs (Voronov & Singer, 2002). Further, they tend to differentiate between “us” and “them” and are likely to be biased toward members of their in-group and biased against nonmembers. It becomes apparent therefore, that collectivistic values are oriented toward the well-being of a group because “it is advantageous to the self in the long run” (Voronov & Singer, 2002, p. 464). On the other hand, adequate gratification of one’s needs results in the emergence of autonomy as well as concern for the well-being of all people (not just one’s in-group) irrespective of whether one’s contribution reaps personal benefits. Schwartz and Sagie’s (2000) observations, based on a study carried out across 42 countries concur, “As national income rises and life conditions improve, most people may acquire sufficient resources to free them from total self-preoccupation and allow them to express their natural tendency to attribute high importance to self-transcendence values” (p. 488). Sheldon and Kasser (2001), based on their extensive review of literature on needs, goals, and well-being, also suggested that, across cultures, an intrinsic orientation is conducive to both personal growth and well-being (self-enhancement) as well as other-oriented values such as empathy and cooperativeness (self-transcendence).

In explaining collectivists’ orientation toward fidelity to one’s social group, authors inadvertently convey the idea that group values are democratically agreed upon by group members. This is rather inaccurate because group norms are enforced by those who have a higher status in society upon those of a lower status. For instance, in India, individuals belonging to a higher caste (Brahmins) dictated the lives and ways of those belonging to the lower castes (Kshatriyas, Vaishyas, Sudras, Panchamas) for centuries (Pruthi, 2004). The social system, therefore, is more hierarchical than collectivistic and one’s obligation to the group entails ownership rather than membership. It is with development and democratization that oppressive social structures have weakened, resulting in a movement away from a “hierarchical” regime and toward a “holarchic” attitude of self-directedness and self-transcendence (Schwartz & Sagie, 2000). There emerges a universal trend, therefore, in which, need gratification orients one toward the actualization of one’s idiosyncratic potentials for greater good.

Conceptualizations of the Good Life: Antecedents and Characteristics

The antecedents (needs) and characteristic features (identity, morality, values) of individuals who endorse the different conceptualizations of the ideal life are summarized in Table 1. Explication of the themes that run common to both theories suggests that Seligman’s theory of happiness is grounded in Maslow’s hierarchy of needs.

The pleasant life. The satisfaction of basic physiological needs results in the emergence of higher-order needs for love and esteem. On the other hand, deprivation of

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these needs results in an individual conceptualizing the ideal life as one that is abundant in pleasure and devoid of pain (Maslow, 1987). As presented in Table 1, the individual oriented toward having as many pleasures as one can have is guided by external consequences and forces rather than by internal standards and values. The pursuit of pleasure becomes a guiding principle in various domains of one’s life, such as morality, identity, and meaning (Seligman, 2002).

The good life. The individual who has adequately mastered the basic survival needs experiences the need for love and esteem (Maslow, 1987). Failure to adequately gratify these needs can result in an individual becoming preoccupied with fantasies related to relationships, work, mating, and, parenting. However, the need for love and esteem from others can cause a person to deny one’s self and appropriate the wishes, desires, and goals of others. Accordingly, one’s identity, morality, and meaning are derived largely from what is accepted and endorsed by others.

The meaningful life. The mastery of one’s need for love and esteem from others fosters a sense of autonomy, which in turn orients the individual to discover and actualize one’s unique potentials (Maslow, 1987). However, unlike deficit needs, engagement with growth needs reinforces an individual’s need to become more of one’s true self. In other words, self-actualization is a process (Maslow, 1987). The values of the self-actualizing individual are oriented toward authenticity and transcendence. Further, as presented in Table 1, such an individual crafts his or her identity, morality, and meaning in life in a manner that is true to oneself as well as beneficial to the world to which one belongs.

Beyond Deprivation and Gratification: A Phenomenological Interpretation

Maslow’s (1987) fundamental premise in articulating the theory of human motivation is that gratification is growth-producing and that deprivation is growth-inhibiting; how- ever, one can certainly argue the converse: “Can gratification be growth-inhibiting and deprivation be growth-producing?” The answer is a resounding “Yes!” Maslow’s differ- entiation between healthy and unhealthy deprivation and gratification explains this para- dox.

Unhealthy Deprivation

Deprivation, Maslow (1987) argued, is often defined as “not getting what one desires . . . or interference with a wish” (p. 117). Such definitions of deprivation have little implications for understanding health and pathology. Indeed, he contended, “deprivation

Table 1 Summary of the Existential-Humanistic-Positive Theory of Human Motivation

Need Ideal life

Values

Despair MoralitySelf Others

Physiological Security Pleasant life Dependence Stagnation To not have a self Preconventional

Love and belongingness

Esteem Good life Interdependence Mutualism To not be oneself Conventional

Self-Actualization Meaningful life Autonomy Transcendence To be oneself Postconventional

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is not psychopathogenic; threat is” (p. 119). Further, deprivation is unhealthy only to the extent that it “a threat to the personality . . . to the life goals of the individual . . . [and] to self-actualization” (p. 117). In other words, deprivation is unhealthy only when it is “growth-inhibiting.” Maslow (1987) further contended that individuals who have been adequately gratified are less likely to be threatened by deprivation.

Healthy Deprivation

Maslow (1987) has noted that deprivation “may be psychologically threatening but it does not have to be. It may indeed be educative and strengthening if well handled” (p. 120). The capacity of an individual to learn life lessons from difficult situations, which has been dubbed “nadir experiences” (Stagg, 2014), has been well-documented in psycho- logical literature. Maslow’s painfully deprived childhood is, in itself, a testament to the capacity of an individual to use painful experiences as opportunities for growth (Hoffman, 1988). The biographies of any number of existential thinkers (e.g., Rollo May, Albert Camus, Soren Kierkegaard) explicate an individual’s capacity to turn a potentially growth-inhibiting experience (e.g., loneliness, illness, childhood trauma) into a growth- promoting experience. The capacity to learn and to grow from difficult life situations such as illness or trauma has been termed “benefit-finding” in positive psychology (Tennen & Affleck, 2002, p. 584). The individual who perceives a deprived state to be an opportunity for growth is, therefore, less likely to be threatened by potential deprivation. Deprivation, Maslow (1987) observed, can promote frustration tolerance. “Those persons who have been accustomed to relative starvation for a long time, are partially enabled, therefore, to withstand food deprivation” (p. 69).

Unhealthy Gratification

Maslow (1987) contended that gratification can be unhealthy when individuals fail to “count one’s blessings” (p. 75). He observed, “the food, the security, the love, the admiration, the freedom that have always been there, that have never been lacking or yearned for, tend not only to be unnoticed but also even to be devalued or mocked or destroyed” (p. 75). Maslow was, in essence, describing a “spoilt brat,” the individual for whom gratification is unhealthy because he or she has lost the capacity to appreciate gratification. Maslow (1987) eloquently referred to this phenomenon of taking for granted one’s blessings as “post-gratification forgetting” (p. 75), which is the antithesis of gratitude. Maslow’s cure for such an individual is deprivation! Indeed, he has written, “It may be necessary to experience loss of their blessings in order to be able to appreciate them again.” (p. 82). Unhealthy gratification can be “cured very easily by experiencing the appropriate deprivation or lack” (p. 75).

Healthy Gratification

Gratification is healthy to the extent that it is growth-promoting. Individuals who have experienced healthy gratification do not take their blessings for granted. Gratitude and newness of appreciation are the hallmarks of healthy gratification (Maslow, 1987).

The relationship between threat and appreciation requires further elaboration. In some cases, threat and appreciation are inextricable. For instance, when a person says, “I could not have done this without you!” or “I could never take you for granted!” both threat and gratitude are implied. The individual values gratification (your presence is gratifying) but is also threatened by its absence (your absence is threatening); appreciation is contingent on threat. It is this mechanism that is at work when deprivation (illness, loneliness,

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trauma) results in a renewed appreciation of gratification. On the other hand, there are individuals for whom deprivation is very threatening; however, gratification is not very gratifying. Conversely, individuals who develop a tolerance for deprivation may also end up losing their capacity to appreciate gratification. For instance, those who have been repeatedly rejected or pervasively unloved may assert, “I do not need anyone!” or “The need for love is a sign of weakness!” Another classic example is the insecurely attached child who, as a result of early deprivation, develops a negative view of other people and relationships (Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991).

The healthiest individuals (self-actualizing individuals) are simultaneously unthreat- ened by deprivation (low levels of threat) and very grateful for each of life’s blessings (high levels of appreciation). Maslow (1987) described the self-actualizing individual as someone who can “appreciate again and again, freshly and naively, the basic goods of life, with awe, pleasure, wonder, and even ecstasy” (p. 178). The paradox, however, is that to the extent that gratification is appreciated, deprivation is unthreatening. As a result, healthy individuals can forgo gratification (e.g., need for love, approval, respect,) for a higher cause (the Being values of justice, truth, beauty). Maslow (1987) noted that self-actualizing individuals have “a relative stability in the face of hard knocks, blows, deprivations, frustrations, and the like . . . [and] a relative serenity in the midst of circumstances that would drive other people to suicide” (p. 178).

The true humanism of Maslow’s (1987) theory lies in his assertion that it is neither deprivation nor gratification (external events over which one has little control) that promotes or inhibits growth, but the capacity of an individual to learn and grow from life experiences, both favorable and unfavorable. Maslow’s humanism is exemplified in his implicit assertion that it is the person who ultimately determines the meaning of life experiences, not vice versa. It is because of such a profoundly phenomenological orien- tation that Maslow’s theory holds out the hope of a truly meaningful life to deprived, hurt, and traumatized individuals.

Evaluation

Limitations

The integration of different perspectives into a unifying theory tends to compromise on the integrity of each theoretical orientation. In other words, points of convergence are emphasized and differences are ignored. There are indeed implicit differences between existential, humanistic, and positive psychology on a number of issues such as ontological positions, existential orientations, and views of human nature that have not been addressed in the proposed theory (Waterman, 2013; Winston, 2015). For instance, Kierkegaard (1941) has grouped together the philosopher and the alcoholic, under the premise that both individuals compulsively engage in activities that will defend them from the awareness of despair. However, according to Seligman’s (2002) approaches to happiness, the wine- lover would be labeled as one who is oriented toward a pleasant life, whereas the philosopher would be considered to be oriented toward a meaningful life.

The present article makes broad comparisons between the different theories and as a result “reduces” the intricacies of each independent approach. For instance, Kierkegaard’s (1941) elaborate treatise on the many types of despair has been reduced to three broad categories. Similarly, Kohlberg’s (1958) theory of moral development has been presented as a three-stage theory, when in reality it consists of six substages grouped under three broad stages. The theory is also limited in that it does not address later additions to the

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hierarchy of needs such as cognitive needs, aesthetic needs, and self-transcendence needs. It is noteworthy, however, that these needs fit into the larger framework presented in the present article.

The implicit assumptions of some of theories presented in the framework are difficult to scientifically test and practically implement. For instance, according to Kierkegaard (1941), despair is universal; indeed, the man who claims to be without despair because he is unaware of his despair is considered to be in more despair than he is aware of. Such assumptions pertaining to the universality of despair and blindness to one’s own despair are difficult to operationalize and validate. Further, efforts directed at promoting authen- ticity by making an individual who is unconscious of despair aware of one’s despair would be both counterproductive and unethical. It is noteworthy, however, that Kierkegaard (1941) did not consider self-reports of despair to be reliable and valid means of assessing despair.

It is ordinarily assumed that a man is well when he does not himself say that he is sick, and still more confidently when he says that he is well. The physician on the other hand regards sickness differently. . . . The physician knows that just as there is sickness which is only imaginary, so also there is such a thing as fictitious health. . . . So it is also with the physician of souls when dealing with despair. He knows what despair is, he is acquainted with it, and hence he is not satisfied with man’s assertion that he is in despair or that he is not. (pp. 21–22)

The present theory deals with “healthy” motivation. It describes the mechanism by which needs have to be mastered in order for an individual to approximate self- actualization (Maslow, 1987). However, the theory is limited in that it does not explain motivation toward maladaptive and destructive behaviors. Further, the mechanism by which need frustration predisposes an individual to psychological dysfunction has not been addressed. This is particularly significant in understanding suicide, as individuals with suicidal tendencies do not conceptualize an ideal life; instead, they consider death to be an ideal “life” as it would be devoid of pain.

According to the present theory, a meaningful life involves actualizing one’s unique potentials for greater good. However, what constitutes a “good” cause is subjective and has ethical implications. Indeed, some of the most gruesome human atrocities have been carried out by individuals who believed that they were contributing to the betterment of humanity. Accordingly, Seligman (2002) posed the following question, “Imagine a sadomasochist who comes to savor serial killing . . . [or] a hit man who derives enormous gratification from stalking and slaying . . . [or] a terrorist . . . who flies a hijacked plane into the World Trade Center. Can these three people be said to have achieved the pleasant life, the good life, and the meaningful life, respectively? Although the textbook definitions offer a resounding “yes,” these actions are “morally despicable” . . . “on grounds independent of [his] theory” (p. 303). As Seligman (2002) rightly pointed out, it is not within the scope of psychological science to evaluate the benevolence or egocentrism of a particular cause.

Implications

Maslow’s (1943) theory of human motivation, published more than half a century ago, continues to bears relevance to the study of human behavior. In the present article, I have critically analyzed Maslow’s theory in the light of existing conceptual and empirical literature, and have reinterpreted key concepts in order to enhance the validity and utility of the hierarchy. More specifically, the importance of mastery of needs, rather than

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gratification, in the emergence of higher-order needs has been articulated. Further, self-actualization has been redefined from a holarchic perspective as the actualization of one’s unique potentials (authenticity) for a cause that is greater than the self (transcen- dence).

The role of need gratification in one’s conceptualizations of the ideal life has been discussed. More specifically, while gratification of a need results in the emergence of higher-order needs, prolonged deprivation has implications for one’s conceptualizations of the ideal life. Parallels have been drawn between a number of theories including Maslow’s (1987) hierarchy of needs, Seligman’s (2002) approaches to happiness, and Kierkegaard’s (1941) types of despair. A pathway has been suggested in which need deprivation has implications for one’s conceptualizations of the ideal life and associated orientations toward identity, morality, and meaning.

The integrated theory of human motivation implicitly asserts that, despite differences between the theoretical orientations, the three theories complement each other and paint a holistic picture of human motivation by providing different interpretations of the same phenomenon. For instance, the same lifestyles (pleasant life, good life, meaningful life) are interpreted differently by Seligman (an approach to happiness) and Kierkegaard (associated despair). While happiness and despair may be considered antonymous, and, consequently, the two theories antagonistic, the integrated theory suggests that the two theories complement each other.

The integrated framework underscores themes of convergence between three theoret- ical orientations, namely, existential, humanistic, and positive psychology. Perhaps the similarities reflect their common roots; humanistic psychology has its roots in existential philosophy and positive psychology has its origins in humanistic thought. The theory holds that adequate gratification of an individual’s needs promotes the pursuit of a meaningful life. It is hoped that this positive view of human nature will become “the basis for a more universal science of psychology” (Maslow, 1987, p. 191).

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Author Note

Christine N. Winston is a doctoral student at the Department of Psychology, Women’s Christian College. Her areas of interest include existential-humanistic psychology, eccen- tricity, misanthropy, authenticity, and personhood.

Received July 17, 2014 Accepted April 19, 2015 �

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163AN INTEGRATED THEORY OF HUMAN MOTIVATION

  • An Existential-Humanistic-Positive Theory of Human Motivation
    • Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs
      • The Structure of Needs
        • Number of needs
        • Order of need emergence
      • The Theory of Self-Actualization
        • Validity of the construct
        • Implicit ethnocentrism
        • The role of need gratification
          • Quality of past gratification
          • Content of present preoccupation
          • Competence for future deprivation
    • The Ideal Life
      • Seligman’s Approaches to Happiness
        • The pleasant life
        • The despairing unconsciousness of having a self
        • The good life
        • Despair at not willing to be oneself
        • The meaningful life
        • The will to despairingly be oneself
    • An Integrated Theory of Human Motivation
      • Need Gratification and Conceptualizations of the Ideal Life
        • Implications for life satisfaction
        • Implications for human development
      • Need Gratification and Emergence of Values
        • The role of culture
      • Conceptualizations of the Good Life: Antecedents and Characteristics
        • The pleasant life
        • The good life
        • The meaningful life
    • Beyond Deprivation and Gratification: A Phenomenological Interpretation
      • Unhealthy Deprivation
      • Healthy Deprivation
      • Unhealthy Gratification
      • Healthy Gratification
    • Evaluation
      • Limitations
      • Implications
    • References
    • Author Note