Government

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One could assume that failure of German offensives in 1914 occurred because of lack of

mobility on the battlefield against improved defensive weaponry. But the doctrine of the

offensive would gain more credence because improved tanks and the concerted use of airpower

tilted the scales one again by 1940 in favor of the aggressor —with devastating results for Poland

and France. Heinz Guderian thought the armored tank was the difference maker. German

Panzers would allow rapid breakthroughs against infantry and crush reserves—with speed being

of the essence before the enemy could effectively counterattack. The new strategic realities that

planes and tanks brought to the fore essentially created a resurrection of the Schlieffen Plan by

1940 (but in France with armor through the Ardennes rather than Belgium). The German goal

was an attack that scored a decisive victory—but with armor used at the decisive point (Keegan,

1989).

No matter which weapon is to be employed, uncertainty and the law of unintended

consequences will continue to permeate the battlefield, attenuating the applicability of military

strategy to real war. In turn, a wise commander could learn much by studying Clausewitz and the

concept of friction on the battlefield. It is unjust to blame Schlieffen for the failure of the 1914

plan that became associated with him. Being in the grave before the event, there is no way to tell

for sure how he would have accounted for friction. His plan did lack strategic options and it is

fair to be critical on that point. But the German High Command went forward with it in modified

form and should take much of the blame for its failure. As Obama ordered the operation against

Bin Laden’s in Pakistan to go forward and had to take credit or blame for the results, Moltke Jr.

faced responsibility for the Schlieffen Plan’s eventual failure or success. Ultimately as

Rothenberg shows, the High Command went forward with the August offensive as they felt no

better option was available. This limiting of options and lack of consideration for battlefield

friction would have made Clausewitz uncomfortable.

Clausewitz’s wrote on the importance of subordinating military objectives to civilian

authority. He felt that armed forces should be a tool of policy for the political leadership and be

accepting of their decisions. Schlieffen did follow Clausewitz on these points and stayed

generally out of politics. These suggestions remain instructive for us today. Ignoring Clausewitz

and having no real political check on their power, both Napoleon and then Hitler both pursued

the goals of absolute war, requiring total mobilization of their societies. The composite of their

decisions led to disastrous results. The subordination of politics to unchecked military control

has also provided fertile ground for bad strategic decisions. This is clearly seen in those men

ordering their armies to move deep into the Russian heartland in 1812 and 1941 respectively……

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